START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001125

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP

NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01110 (SFO-GVA-VII-050)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-059.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 27, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the November 27 meeting of the Conversion or
Elimination (CorE) Working Group, the two sides agreed on
wording to resolve differences in Sections VI and VII of the
CorE Part of the Protocol. They also resolved one bracketed
issue in Section I and some bracketed wording in treaty
Article VII. A difficult discussion on mobile launcher
elimination and missile elimination ensued. Col Ryzhkov
proposed tagging mobile launchers upon elimination and
allowing inspectors to check the tags following completion of
elimination. However, Ryzhkov did not agree to Mr. Elliott's
requirement that such tags must either be impossible to
remove or else be placed on all mobile launchers from the
beginning until the elimination inspection. Ryzhkov instead
withdrew the proposal.


4. (S) The Russian side offered no substantive change to its
previous proposals for liquid-fueled and solid-propellant
ICBM and SLBM elimination, as well as requiring elimination
of both launch canisters and loading tubes. Elliott made
clear that merely burning a solid rocket motor was not
sufficient to consider an SS-25 ICBM eliminated, but
suggested the possibility of putting two holes through the
side of the motor case, which inspectors would later confirm.
Ryzhkov did not reject the idea out-right, but railed
against persistent U.S. efforts to retain excessive START
verification measures that were inappropriate for the two
countries' current relationship. End Summary.


5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Back To Conforming; Touching Up
General Provisions; Playing Tag With Mobile Launchers;
Missile Elimination Technology Lesson; The Daily Sermon on
Verification.

--------------
BACK TO CONFORMING
--------------


6. (S) The seventh meeting of the CorE Working Group during
Session VII was held at the Russian Mission on Friday,
November 27, 2009. The two sides first discussed Section V
on Procedures for CorE of Heavy Bombers, which the U.S. side
had returned from conforming. Mr. Elliott informed Col
Ryzhkov, who did not have a copy of the latest U.S. draft,
that the U.S. side considered it necessary to add a statement
to the last paragraph clarifying that "The Party receiving
such notification shall have the right to inspect the
converted heavy bomber within a 30-day period beginning on
the date of notification." Elliott then provided a copy of


the latest U.S. draft, dated November 24, 2009. Ryzhkov
noted that the Russian delegation had worked off of an
earlier, shorter version of the paragraph. They would
consider the new U.S. wording, and if they found it
acceptable, they would send Section V back to the Conforming
Group.


7. (S) Similarly, the U.S. side had determined that Section
VII on Procedures for Elimination of Facilities was not yet
ready to be conformed. The U.S. version included ICBM
emplacement equipment in the list of items to be removed from
a facility, but the Russian version still did not include it,
even though Ryzhkov had agreed at the last meeting to accept
inclusion if the United States wanted (Reftel). Ryzhkov
tried to persuade the U.S. side that there was no need to
include ICBM emplacement equipment on the list. Russia saw
no reason for concern about ICBM emplacement equipment
located at a facility where all silos had been eliminated.
There would be no launchers for such equipment to load
missiles into any more. Russia preferred not to undertake an
obligation to spend the money to remove unusable ICBM
emplacement equipment from eliminated silo ICBM bases.
Elliott offered to consult with the U.S. delegation further
about it.


8. (S) Regarding another item on the list, Ryzhkov said
Russia had changed its terminology from "launch-associated
support vehicle" to "launch-associated vehicle," because
Russia's approach did not include the concept of support
equipment. Ryzhkov confirmed that the term still would refer
to vehicles that supported launches of ICBMs from mobile
launchers. Elliott acknowledged it was not a major
difference. For the word preceding the list, Elliott
recommended changing "including" to "and," so that it would
not appear as if the items of support equipment listed
thereafter were strategic offensive arms (SOA). Ryzhkov had
no objection.


9. (S) Ryzhkov raised a difference between the Russian and
U.S. wording in paragraph 2 of Section VII, on Elimination of
Fixed Structures. Russia omitted the word "other," saying
simply that "No structure or covering, permanent or
temporary, shall be reinstalled or built over the remaining
foundation." Elliott agreed there was no need to state "no
other structure."


10. (S) Elliott next raised some tracking fixes that needed
to be made in Section VI, which had been conformed earlier.
The Conforming Group had decided that the phrase "limitations
provided for in the Treaty" should be changed to "provisions
of the Treaty." Ryzhkov then noted that the Conforming Group
also disapproved of the section title "Other Procedures for
Removal from Accountability" because things like accidental
loss were not procedures. Russia proposed changing the title
to "Other Means for Removal from Accountability." Elliott
agreed, and Ryzhkov promised to return Section VI to the
Conforming Group.

--------------
TOUCHING UP GENERAL PROVISIONS
--------------


11. (S) Ryzhkov then turned to Section I, General


Provisions, providing a new Russian-proposed joint draft text
dated November 27. The sides recognized that references in
the text to sections and parts of the Protocol needed to be
updated in accordance with the new agreed structure of the
Protocol. Ryzhkov noted that Russia had shortened its
paragraph 6 of Section I, to simply refer to Article IX of
the treaty instead of spelling out observation by national
technical means (NTM).


12. (S) Elliott related that he had discussed paragraph 4
with Dr. Warner, and decided that the U.S. side was ready to
accept Russia's wording for what would take place within the
framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) - "a
demonstration of the procedures that it developed." The
chairs of the Inspection Protocol Working Group did not
consider it necessary to develop any treaty provisions for
such activities; the two Parties would instead work them out
in the BCC. Ryzhkov agreed and noted Mr. Smirnov had been
trying to convince Warner and Col Ilin of the same thing.


13. (S) Elliott predicted that the brackets in paragraph 3
on the status of items following conversion would be resolved
by the Agreed Statements on B-1B Heavy Bombers and U.S. SSGNs
that the U.S. side was drafting. Ryzhkov therefore decided
not to discuss Section I further.


14. (S) Ryzhkov raised the fact that, in paragraph 1 of
Article VII of the treaty, Russia used the term "removal from
accountability by other means" while the U.S. text had "other
removal from accountability." Elliott said he agreed with
Russia's wording, but would need to consult with the Treaty
Text and Definitions Working Group. Ryzhkov went on to
explain that the word "procedures" later in the paragraph was
inconsistent with what he and Elliott had just agreed
regarding other means for removal from accountability, so
Russia proposed deleting the word "procedures." The sentence
would simply say "in accordance with Part Three of the
Protocol." Mr. Ivanov suggested that Article VII could now
be sent to the Conforming Group.

--------------
PLAYING TAG WITH MOBILE LAUNCHERS
--------------


15. (S) Ryzhkov next raised mobile launcher elimination. He
proposed that, upon completion of elimination procedures, a
tag with a unique identification number would be attached to
the mobile launcher. Russia could use tags similar to those
used currently under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program for components undergoing elimination. In this case,
the tags could be metal instead of plastic, to make them more
difficult to remove. Ryzhkov suggested that the United
States could produce the special tags and the special device
to attach them, and Russia would attach the tags after
completing elimination of a launcher. Russia would provide
the unique identification number when notifying the
completion of elimination, and inspectors could confirm the
number on the tag during an inspection. Russia believed this
would ensure confidence that the launcher was really
eliminated.


16. (S) Elliott asked how such tags were currently used, and
Mr. Smirnov suggested Elliott ask Raytheon's Moscow office to


send photographs and documentation by FAX or e-mail. Smirnov
explained that the tags were affixed to items before moving
them from one facility to another. Upon their arrival at the
CorE facility, the tags were checked to ensure the item was
the same. The tag could not be removed except by cutting it
off. Elliott noted the idea had merit, but for it to be a
reliable verification tool, all mobile launchers would have
to be tagged from the beginning. After confirmation of the
completion of elimination, the tag could be removed.


17. (S) Both Smirnov and Ryzhkov objected strenuously. They
said Russia could not accept attaching unique identifiers
(UID) to all mobile launchers. Elliott noted that the United
States was offering to put UID on all U.S. missiles as well
as Russian missiles. Ryzhkov insisted it was necessary to
think of some other option besides UID. Elliott offered that
any marking put on a launcher that was impossible to remove
would work.


18. (S) Ryzhkov launched into a diatribe on the absurdity of
the apparent U.S. suspicion that Russia would restore its
obsolete mobile launchers to build up a covert force. If
Russia wanted to construct mobile launchers covertly, it
could do so at the Volgograd Barrikady plant, which was not
monitored. Moreover, many types of missiles had been
eliminated without any verification, and neither Party raised
questions about cheating. Smirnov argued that Russia's
proposed set of verification measures should be sufficient; a
mobile launcher would be displayed to NTM at a viewing site
for 60 days following elimination, and a tag would be
applied, and the launcher could be subject to an inspection.
Smirnov also argued that the B-1B problem was very similar,
until Russia could confirm that the bombers did not have
nuclear capability, Russia would consider them accountable as
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers.


19. (S) Elliott pointed out that, in the ratification
process, the treaty provisions would be examined to determine
whether elimination of each mobile launcher could be reliably
verified. If the tag could be removed, verification experts
would say it could not be proven that a specific launcher was
eliminated, since they all looked the same. This problem did
not exist for silo elimination or submarine elimination. If
Russia could offer an approach that would confirm each
specific launcher was eliminated, such as a serial number or
non-removable tag, then it might be possible to confirm
elimination with an inspection after the fact and Russia
might not have to remove the aft 0.78 meters of the chassis.
Then it would be easier for Russia to use the chassis for
other purposes.


20. (S) Ryzhkov claimed not to understand what difference it
made which specific launcher was eliminated. He found many
U.S. concerns far-fetched. Russia believed that providing
for NTM observation and for the possibility of an inspection
after the fact ensured verifiability. Elliott said he was
not accusing Russia of wanting to hide launchers, but people
reviewing the treaty would say it was not possible to be
certain that an eliminated launcher being shown was not the
same launcher that was eliminated a year ago. Such analyses
were particularly likely when the Senate would review the
treaty for advice and consent to ratification.



21. (S) At that point, Ryzhkov declared there was nothing
more to say. He withdrew the proposal to tag eliminated
mobile launchers since it had raised more questions than it
had answered.


22. (S) Nevertheless, during a break, Ryzhkov approached
Elliott to inform him that Russian serial numbers were on
metal plates that could be removed from the chassis and
replaced, so serial numbers were not a solution. However,
Russia believed notifications would be sufficient, along with
random inspections as a confidence-building measure. He
continued to argue that it was wrong to assume cheating.
Russia would reciprocate such suspicion and would say that
any U.S. tags or UID could be moved from one missile to
another.

--------------
MISSILE ELIMINATION TECHNOLOGY LESSON
--------------


23. (S) Ryzhkov provided a new Russia-proposed text for
Section II on procedures for elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs,
dated November 25, 2009. He outlined that paragraph 1
covered procedures for elimination of liquid-fueled ICBMs and
SLBMs, paragraphs 2 and 3 covered procedures for elimination
of solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, and paragraph 4 covered
elimination of launch canisters and SLBM loading tubes.


24. (S) Ryzhkov explained that Russia maintained its
previous position on liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. They
must be rendered inoperable by procedures determined by the
possessing Party, because the oxidizer of these missiles was
highly toxic, while the fuel was ten times more toxic. The
elimination procedures involved cutting off all the fuel
lines and neutralizing both the fuel and oxidizer. In
addition, at Surovatikha the engine was destroyed by
completely cutting up the fuel and oxidizer tanks. Other
valves and joints were also removed so that a special flange
could be inserted for fuel neutralization. The workers wore
special chemical suits, because it was very dangerous if any
fuel or oxidizer remnants were present. The process was very
different from that for solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, and
there was no need for verification.


25. (S) Regarding solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, Russia
provided for three elimination procedures:

- removing propellant from all stages by burning. This
in itself would complete the elimination of the missile;

- removing propellant from all stages by another means
followed by cutting the motor case of the first stage into
two pieces; and

- other procedures developed by the Party carrying out
the elimination. This could include elimination by
explosion, which Ryzhkov understood the United States planned
to do.


26. (S) Following elimination of solid-propellant ICBMs and
SLBMs, they would be displayed for NTM for 30 days, which
Russia understood the United States wanted to be 60 days.
Launch canisters and loading tubes would be separated into


two pieces and displayed for NTM for 60 days. However,
Russia would be willing to delete entirely the provisions on
launch canister and loading tube elimination. Elliott made
clear the United States would not accept that loading tubes
were equivalent to launch canisters.


27. (S) Elliott indicated his understanding, which Ryzhkov
and Smirnov confirmed, that Russia currently burned
solid-propellant ICBM motors at Perm' and then moved them
back to Votkinsk for cutting. He was trying to think of ways
for Russia to avoid having to move the empty motor cases.
Russian motor cases were very strong and did not always burn
through or even deform. They were stronger than U.S. ICBM
motor cases. Ryzhkov seemed surprised and said he thought
U.S. motor cases were stronger. Zaitsev asserted that U.S.
and Russian motor cases were made of the same material, but
might have different coefficients of strength and different
thicknesses. The important point in Zaitsev's view was that,
once a motor was burned it could not be used again.


28. (S) Elliott asked whether it would be possible to use a
torch to cut holes in the side of the motor case if it was
not already burned through when the fuel was removed by
burning. Inspectors could then confirm on-site that the
motor cases had been destroyed. If the fuel went bad and a
missile needed to be blown up, would that also be done at
Perm'? Ryzhkov responded that explosions could not be done
at Perm' because it was a large city. Russia would conduct
explosions, if needed, at the Telemba Test Range, which did
not exist yet but would be declared as a new facility. (Begin
comment: According to the Russian press, Telemba is a firing
range in the Chita Oblast. End comment.)


29. (S) Ryzhkov asked sardonically what kinds and sizes of
holes would have to be specified in the treaty text. Elliott
estimated that each hole should be 10cm in diameter. Ryzhkov
said a torch could not be used to cut holes in motor cases.
Smirnov drew a schematic of a solid rocket motor to indicate
that during a burn without nozzle attached, the plume was
uncontrolled and the aft edge of the casing was burned 90
percent of the time, reducing the case length slightly.
There was no possibility of reusing a burned motor case.
Smirnov began to object to the prospect of having to bring
U.S. inspectors to the burn site to inspect holes in motor
cases, but Ryzhkov quieted him, saying he would have to
consult with his delegation regarding the proposal to put
holes in the motor cases. Elliott suggested that inspections
of burned motor cases with holes drilled into them could be
done on a batch basis, such as three or four times a year.
It might be possible to limit the number of elimination
inspections conducted.

--------------
THE DAILY SERMON ON VERIFICATION
--------------


30. (S) Ryzhkov stonily insisted that the only on-site
verification of eliminations should be Type 2 inspections
within the annual quota for that type of inspection. That
was the guidance from Russia's leadership--the Russian
President had directed that there be only 16 inspections per
year, including elimination inspections. In general, Russia
believed there was no need to monitor the elimination of SOA,


but each Party should have the right to confirm that the
other was not cheating. The quota was small, but each Party
could use it as desired. It would provide confidence that
the treaty was being implemented fully. Russia was trying to
do away with burdensome verification measures, but the United
States kept pulling Russia back toward the START regime.
This was fundamentally objectionable to Russia. No other
treaty was as burdensome as START. It was wrong to retain
such a regime, especially given the current state of
U.S.-Russian relations.


31. (S) Returning to the topic, Ryzhkov acknowledged that
NTM could not verify the status of a solid rocket motor, but
he found the idea of holes far-fetched. Ukraine had agreed
to drill holes in its SS-24 rocket motor cases, but those
cases were washed out, not burned. Elliott indicated his
understanding of Russia's position, but pointed out that many
in the United States, including some in the Senate, believed
that an appropriate verification regime was a prerequisite
for having a treaty. The verification regime did not need to
be as intrusive as START, but if it was inadequate, it would
not be possible to convince the Senate to provide advice and
consent to ratification.


32. (S) Ryzhkov then provided a new Russian-proposed JDT for
Section IV on Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of
SLBM Launchers, dated November 25, 2009. As he did so, he
stated his view that fewer implementation obligations were
better for both countries. Russia strongly opposed
intrusiveness, not because it planned to cheat, but because
it was not necessary given the current level of relations.
The United States and Russia instead needed to conduct joint
programs and joint training. The treaty was needed more as
an example for other countries than for the United States and
Russia themselves. The United States and Russia needed more
flexibility, fewer expenses and fewer limitations. The new
treaty should be not just 30 percent easier but 90 percent
easier.


33. (S) When Elliott proposed meeting on Sunday (November
29),Ryzhkov put his foot down, saying he saw no possibility
to move forward at this time. It would be like trying to
grind water--a pointless exercise. It would make sense to
meet again only after new decisions were made. Ryzhkov
thought that would happen on Monday (November 30).


34. (S) Smirnov asked whether the procedures the United
States proposed for solid-propellant ICBMs would apply as
well to Peacekeeper and MM-II ICBMs. Elliott confirmed they
would apply in the same way, but acknowledged the United
States would utilize most of its ICBMs for space launch.
Ryzhkov sniffed that the United States was then drafting
proposals solely for Russia. Elliott countered that the
United States would in fact eliminate some missiles,
including many SLBMs, which were eliminated by explosion.
The United States would be required to use the same
elimination procedures as Russia. In addition, Russia was
also free to use its missiles for space launch.


35. (U) Documents provided:

- U.S.:


-- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Section V of Part III of Protocol:
Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers,
dated November 24, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Russian-Proposed JDT, Chapeau and Section C.I of
Protocol: General Provisions, dated November 25, 2009;

-- Russian-Proposed Text, Section C.II of Protocol:
Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, dated November
25, 2009; and

-- Russian-Proposed JDT, Section C.IV of Protocol:
Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers,
dated November 25, 2009.


36. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Broshar
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Voloskov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


37. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS