Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1123
2009-12-10 14:47:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1123/01 3441447
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101447Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0535
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5674
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2853
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1863
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7070
S E C R E T GENEVA 001123 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER
25, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001123

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER
25, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-054.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 25, 2009
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 1:10 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of
Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of
Defense Representative Col Ilin, Warner discussed in greater
detail the U.S. proposals made by the U.S. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen to the Chief of the Russian
Federation General Staff, General Makarov during their
meetings on November 22 and 23, 2009. Warner explained that
by broadening the application of a range of provisions, the
modified U.S. proposals responded to Russian concerns that
mobile ICBMs not be subject to separate or unique
verification measures.


4. (S) The Russians expressed interest in expanding the
application of unique identifiers (UIDs) to all missiles.
Gen Orlov suggested the possibility that Russia could provide
notification of missile exits from the production plant
within 48 hours of the exit. The Russian delegation also
appeared interested in the U.S. proposal to observe the final
elimination steps for all ICBMs, SLBMs, their launchers, and
for heavy bombers.


5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Non-deployed Launchers; Votkinsk
and Advance Notification; Issues with Advance Notification
But Interest in UIDs; How Many Spares Do You Need To Fight a
Nuclear War?; Cooperative Measures at Forty Below Zero?;
Final Elimination of SOA; We're Still Not Sure About Mobile
Concentration; and, The Purpose of Your Proposal is
Ineluctable, Only the Format is Different.


--------------
NON-DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS
--------------


6. (S) Warner opened the meeting with a reminder to both
sides of the tremendous amount of work still ahead to
complete the treaty befor December 5th. Noting that only
Ilin was presentduring all of the meetings between Mullen
and Maarov, held on November 23, 2009, Warner recommende
that the Ad Hoc Group discuss in greater detailthe proposals
made by Mullen during his small grup session on the
afternoon of November 23.


7. (S) Warner advised the Russian delegation that th United
States was prepared to accept the Russia-proposed approach
to distinguish between deployd and non-deploye ICBMs and
their launchers, SLMs and their launchers, and heavy
bombers, provided that the Russian side ccepted a separate
limit on the total number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM
launchers, on the order of 150, with the exact number to be
negotiated.




8. (S) Ilin asked of the number of 150 non-deployed
launchers (NDL) was it inside or outside the U.S.-proposed
limit on deployed launchers, and if this was a proposal for
800 launchers plus another 150. Warner confirmed that the
proposal was a separate limit on NDL and explained that it
could apply to situations common to both sides which resulted
in large numbers of launchers in long-term non-deployed
status, such as SSBNs in overhaul or mobile ICBMs in storage
awaiting elimination.


9. (S) Ilin then asked whether the United States would
include its MX (Peacekeeper) and Minuteman III (MM-III)
launchers in this 150 number and whether those launchers
would be eliminated during the START Follow-on (SFO)
reduction period. Warner stated that the United States had
every intention of eliminating its MM-III launchers, and
explained that the United States would need to meet its 800
deployed launcher limit as well as the separate limit of 150
NDL by the end of the SFO 7-year reduction period. Mr.
Elliott highlighted the fact that the United States could
have as many as 200-300 launchers considered to be
non-deployed under SFO rules in 2010, and Warner noted that
the United States would be obligated to eliminate a
considerable number of these NDLs in order to meet the
separate non-deployed limit.


10. (S) Warner commented that if the Russians believed a
limit of 150 NDLs was too high, then the sides could discuss
other numbers. The challenge was to find a number high
enough to allow for routine maintenance without resulting in
a treaty violation after the reduction period. Warner
offered that the sides may also want to consider provisions
for situations such as the discovery of a serious or systemic
maintenance problem that could unexpectedly force one side to
go above the limit on NDL. Elliott explained how Russian
practices for SLBM launcher eliminations and concurrent
deployment of new SSBNs could quickly bring Russia up to 100
NDLs and still have additional NDLs in routine maintenance.


11. (S) Mr. Kuznetsov dismissed the concept of a separate
limit on NDLs entirely, and stated that only numbers of
deployed launchers and deployed warheads mattered. He argued
that the only reason for iQoducing this separate limit was
to capture Russian mobile launchers, and wondered why Russia
would agree to this. Gen Poznihir claimed that because
Russia needed to eliminate many more strategic offensive arms
(SOA) than the United States, creating a separate NDL limit
that required elimination of old SSBNs that were no threat to
anyone would cost Russia additional money.


12. (S) When Elliott pointed out that it was the Russian
Federation that had initially proposed a separate limit on
NDLs, Ilin claimed that the Russian concept was different,
and Russia had subsequently "departed" from this concept.
Referring to a previous U.S. proposal for a limit of 80/80 on
non-deployed missiles and launchers, Ilin complained that
once again, the United States wanted to impose another limit
on Russia.


13. (S) Warner noted the 80/80 separate limit was derived
from START verification provisions for mobile missiles and
had been a U.S. proposal from the beginning of SFO



negotiations. This latest proposal for a limit on NDLs was a
serious move by the United States intended to address the
oft-stated Russian complaint about unfair provisions on their
mobile systems by broadening the application to all
non-deployed launchers.

--------------
VOTKINSK AND ADVANCE NOTIFICATION
--------------


14. (S) Warner then explained the U.S. proposal for both
sides to provide advance notification of the exits of new
ICBMs and SLBMs from their respective production facilities,
with the time period for advance notice of the exit to be
negotiated, and the U.S. proposal to apply a UID on each ICBM
and SLBM and its launch canister, if applicable.


15. (S) Orlov questioned why the United States needed
advance notification of exits of missiles from production
facilities and claimed the idea made no sense from an
operational perspective as notifications would be sent after
missiles arrived at bases. Orlov also questioned how advance
notification of exits would be implemented and verified.
Ultimately, Orlov suggested that Russia might consider
notifying the United States of a missile exiting a production
plant within 48 hours of its actual exit.


16. (S) Orlov then stated his opinion that the United States
had gotten so used to Votkinsk that it just couldn't drop it.
Warner pointed out that for the United States it was the
monitoring of mobile ICBMs that remained a concern, not
Votkinsk itself. Warner explained that the U.S. proposals on
UIDs and advance notification were being applied more
generally in response to Russian concerns about separate
restrictions on mobile systems.

-------------- --------------
ISSUES WITH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, BUT INTEREST IN UIDS
-------------- --------------


17. (S) In response to Orlov's recommendation for
notifications of new production items after their arrival at
operational bases, Warner pointed out that under the Russian
concept, such items become subject to the provisions of the
treaty upon exit from the production facility, not after
arrival at a base.


18. (S) Col Ryzhkov and Ilin both raised questions on the
practical implementation of advance notifications. Citing
the possibility that delays at the production facility could
result in an exit not occurring at the time specified,
Ryzhkov complained that this would increase the burden on the
Russian notification system. (Begin comment: During the
November 10, 2009, Ad Hoc Group, Ryzhkov claimed that
multiple notifications associated with changes in status of
missiles at bases would not be an issue for Russia. End
comment.)


19. (S) Warner explained that factory delays or missed exits
could be handled simply by cancellation of the notification
and re-notification when the missile was ready to exit.
Warner also confirmed that the United States was prepared to
provide advance notification for all new production missiles


exiting U.S. production facilities.


20. (S) Ilin asked whether the U.S. proposal to apply UIDs
similar to those used on Russian mobile ICBMs would be
applicable to all U.S. SLBMs, what UIDs for SLBMs would look
like, and how a side would confirm a UID on an SLBM when
conducting an inspection at a base. Warner explained that
the U.S. concept for UIDs would apply to all existing ICBMs
and SLBMs plus all newly produced ballistic missiles, and
that the United States would probably base its UIDs on serial
numbers for first stages. Warner acknowledged that
confirming UIDs for SLBMs during inspections of operational
bases would not be possible, but UIDs would be visible for
SLBMs removed from launchers and placed in storage. These
UIDs could be verified during a Type II inspection of such
locations.


21. (S) Ilin asked whether the same confirmation procedures
for UIDs on mobile ICBMs would apply for inspections of
missiles in storage and during eliminations, and whether the
UID was for the missile or the launcher. Warner stated the
UID would be placed on the canister for those missiles with
canisters, as the missile's first stage would not normally be
visible. Elliott explained that differences for U.S. systems
might require affixing UIDs to locations that would be
visible when the missiles were in storage. Warner also
explained that missiles could be moved from one launcher to
another launcher, and that notifications with the missile's
UID would provide the tracking mechanism. After confirming
that the U.S. proposal would add UIDs to notifications and
would be included on notifications throughout a missile's
entire lifecycle, Ilin and Poznihir agreed to study the
proposal.


22. (S) According to Ryzhkov, UIDs for Russian mobile ICBMs
were not related to the missile's serial number. Serial
numbers for missiles produced at the Votkinsk plant began
every year with the number "1" and so the same serial number
could be repeated. Therefore, Russia used a different
procedure for developing UIDs. Warner noted that this was
acceptable, provided there was a different number for each
missile produced and that the number stayed the same
throughout the missile's lifecycle. Ryzhkov then asked
whether the United States intended to provide UIDs for all
missile stages, or just for the first stage. Elliott
indicated that the U.S. proposal was only for first stages of
missiles.

--------------
HOW MANY SPARES DO YOU NEED
TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR?
--------------


23. (S) Warner then discussed the U.S. proposal to establish
a limit of five on the number of non-deployed ICBMs at ICBM
bases. He pointed out that the U.S. intention was to treat
all ICBMs the same now that the United States had accepted
the Russian definition of deployed and non-deployed. The
issue would be to determine how many non-deployed missiles
were actually needed at each base.


24. (S) Ilin said that this proposal was a return to a
sub-limit that was not in accordance with the subject matter


of the treaty--deployed launchers and delivery vehicles, and
deployed warheads. Ilin suggested that confidence building
measures could be applied to non-deployed items so that
whatever numbers a side determined it needed, the
non-deployed missiles could be placed in a declared facility.
Ilin suggested that confidence building measures could be
applied to non-deployed items so that whatever numbers a side
determined it needed, the non-deployed missiles could be
placed in a declared facility. In order to better understand
the U.S. proposal, Ilin asked whether the number applied only
to spare missiles or to those in maintenance.


25. (S) Warner said the limit on non-deployed missiles at
ICBM bases applied to both spares and those in maintenance,
but acknowledged that the number of five may be too small for
Russian practices. In response to Poznihir's question
whether this limit applied to SLBM bases, Warner replied that
the limit was only for ICBMs.


26. (S) Kuznetsov asked why this limit was needed. After
Warner replied that it was intended to avoid a large number
of spare missiles at ICBM bases, Kuznetsov wondered if the
United States was worried about a second strike capability or
rapid reload. He went on to describe an experience from his
days as a submariner in the Soviet Navy when military plans
required each submarine base to have two complete sets of
missiles (boevoy komplekt or "BK" in Russian) for each
submarine, with the "crazy" idea that a submarine could
return to base to reload during a nuclear war. Warner
acknowledged that reloading missiles during a nuclear war was
a strange concept, but Kuznetsov's story confirmed that this
possibility had been anticipated, at least by some.

--------------
COOPERATIVE MEASURES AT FORTY BELOW ZERO?
--------------


27. (S) Warner explained the U.S. proposal to extend
cooperative measures to all mobile SDVs, including SLBMs,
mobile ICBMs and heavy bombers. After Ilin asked about
timelines and whether this entailed opening the hatches on
submarines in port, Kuznetsov interrupted to question what
one could see with the submarine hatches open in port. He
then stated that no submarine commander in his right mind
would ever open his hatches at an SSBN base in the winter at
minus 40 degrees. Kuznetsov was adamant that cooperative
measures for submarines could not be implemented.

--------------
FINAL ELIMINATION OF SOA
--------------


28. (S) The Russian delegation appeared very interested in
the U.S. proposal which included the right to observe the
final elimination procedure for the first stage of any ICBM
or SLBM and its associated launch canister and the right to
observe the final elimination procedure for mobile systems,
to include SLBMs and their launchers, mobile ICBMs and their
launchers, and heavy bombers. (Begin comment: All Russian
delegates were intent on writing this proposal down and did
not interrupt during Warner's initial presentation. End
comment.)




29. (S) Ryzhkov claimed that the U.S. proposal still
amounted to confirming the process of elimination, not the
results, and went into great detail on the burden for Russia
to have inspectors observe the elimination process for 200
plus mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers. Ryzhkov said it
would take an inspection team 10 days to observe the final
cuts on 10 missiles and challenged the United States to have
its missile experts tell legislators that a burned out
solid-rocket motor case could be reused. He acknowledged
that if propellant were to be washed out, it would need to be
cut to eliminate it.


30. (S) Warner pointed out that the U.S. proposal didn't
specify which final elimination procedure had to be used,
only that each side had a right to observe it. Elliott
explained that while this proposal might make it more
difficult, the United States was prepared to treat all ICBMs
and SLBMs equally for eliminations.


31. (S) In response to Ryzhkov's continued questioning of
the U.S. logic and claims of unfairness, Warner said that the
United States was looking for mutually acceptable and
efficient ways to confirm the elimination of SOA, especially
mobile ICBMs and launchers. Warner questioned the length of
time Ryzhkov claimed was required to eliminate missiles,
noting that it should be possible for a team to complete the
inspection of a large number of missiles with only a few days
on site. Warner offered that Russia might consider
scheduling large-scale eliminations twice a year to minimize
the burden or determine more efficient processes for
elimination of first stages, whether that be a final cut of
the motor case or explosion.

--------------
WE'RE STILL NOT SURE ABOUT
MOBILE CONCENTRATION
--------------


32. (S) Warner moved on to highlight a few provisions in the
modified U.S. proposal that applied specifically to
land-based mobile systems; a provision requiring that any
mobile ICBMs that departed base 16 hours or less prior to the
designation of that base for inspection return to the base
for inspection; and a limit, yet to be negotiated, on the
total number of non-deployed mobile ICBMs.


33. (S) Warner explained that the concentration rule was
developed for START as a result of situations that occurred
during implementation of the INF Treaty. Warner pointed out
that under START all mobile launchers that had departed base
24 hours prior to designation had to return. This U.S.
proposal was intended to accomplish similar objectives, but
did not require all launchers to return. Those that had
deployed more than 16 hours prior to designation could stay
in the field, and the United States did not require that
their positions be reported.


34. (S) Ryzhkov noted that while Russia understood the logic
behind the concentration rule they did not understand the
16-hour requirement, or the proposal for a limit on the total
number of non-deployed mobile ICBMs. The U.S. side agreed to
discuss these points in greater detail during working group
meetings.



--------------
THE PURPOSE OF YOUR PROPOSAL IS INELUCTABLE,
ONLY THE FORMAT IS DIFFERENT
--------------


35. (S) In the interest of time, Warner asked that the
Russian side hold questions to allow Mr. Siemon to present
the final U.S. proposals on telemetry. Siemon noted that the
United States proposed to delete the exchange of tapes and
interpretive data; retain the prohibition on encryption of
telemetry data broadcasts; ban data denial techniques;
provide advance notifications of ballistic missile launches
with inclusion of frequencies and modulation of telemetry to
be used; and to limit the number of exemptions for the use of
encryption. He noted the United States allowed for up to
seven test flights using encryption, but was open to
discussion on that number. Ilin understood the U.S. proposal
on telemetry, but had no other comments.


36. (S) Warner summarized the modified U.S. proposals made
by Mullen, noting that the United States had tried to develop
provisions that applied equally to SOA across the board.
While these proposals might result in increased work, as in
the case of UIDs across the whole range of missiles, the
proposals affected both sides. Ilin thanked the United
States for its attempt to meet Russian concerns over unequal
treatment of its mobile missiles, and said the Russian
delegation would study the proposals. Ilin noted that the
key point of the U.S. proposal as he understood it, was
intent to retain some special measures for mobiles--the
substance was the same, only the format was different.


37. (U) Documents exchanged: None.


38. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Elliott
Mr. McConnell
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Kuznetsov
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


39. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS