START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001121

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 24, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-051.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 24, 2009
Time: 3:30 A.M - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The seventh Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group
(TTDWG) meeting of the session was held at the U.S. Mission
on November 24, 2009. The Russian delegation provided a
working paper addressing counting rules for deployed and
non-deployed items. Specifically, an ICBM or SLBM within its
launcher would be considered a deployed missile in a deployed
launcher, otherwise the two components would be considered
non-deployed. There was general agreement with the concept
with the exception of heavy bombers because the proposal
stated that the status of a non-deployed heavy bomber would
be also dependent upon its location.


4. (S) The Russian delegation also provided a proposal
addressing location restrictions for non-deployed items. The
delegations agreed that consideration should be given to
adding production facilities and they also discussed whether
an ICBM or SLBM prototype should be addressed in the new
treaty.


5. (S) The U.S. delegation presented revised language
addressing the issue of releasability of Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) data both following the initial
compilation data and after 6-month MOU updates. The Russian
view was that current language in the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) simply stating that such data would
be released as agreed to by the Parties was adequate. The
U.S. proposal provided for the non-release of specific
information which would be articulated in the associated
treaty article. End Summary.


6. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Russian Proposal for Deployed and
Non-Deployed Items; Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Russian
Proposal for Locations of Non-Deployed Items; Production
Facilities; Is A Prototype Missile Non-Deployed?; and
Releasability of MOU Data.

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RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED ITEMS
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Mr. Taylor opened the meeting and invited Adm
Kuznetsov to suggest topics for discussion. Kuznetsov
proposed that the delegations concentrate on the subject of
non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA). He stated that
the Russian delegation had reviewed the handling of
non-deployed SOA in Article IV of START, the U.S. proposals
for the START Follow-On (SFO) treaty as well as the initial
Russian proposals. The result was encapsulated in two
documents that the Russian side provided to the U.S. side.



8. (S) The first document addressed counting rules for
non-deployed SOA. Kuznetsov noted that the Russian proposal
assumed that there were to be no numerical limitations on
non-deployed SOA even though they were to be accountable
items under the treaty. He recognized that the U.S. Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, had introduced
a proposal for limits on non-deployed SOA, but that no
decision had been made and so this Russian proposal did not
include it. Kuznetsov cautioned this proposal was just a
concept or vision and that if the U.S. delegation accepted
it, the specific wording and location within the SFO treaty
could be determined later. The official English version of
the document stated:

Begin Text:

Proposal on Counting Non-Deployed Items

-An ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be non-deployed after
this ICBM or SLBM has been removed from a deployed ICBM or
SLBM launcher;

-An ICBM or SLBM launcher shall be considered to be
non-deployed after an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from this
deployed ICBM or SLBM launcher;

-A heavy bomber shall be considered to be non-deployed after
the conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments as well as after a deployed heavy bomber has been
moved from an air base to facilities specified in paragraph 2
(c) of this Article.

End text.


9. (S) Kuznetsov explained that the draft SFO treaty
accounted for deployed and non-deployed SOA. So the Russian
approach was to provide a concept of the meaning of
"non-deployed" that was simple and understandable. The
objective was to articulate when a deployed item became a
non-deployed item. Once that was achieved, the rules
regarding the location of non-deployed SOA would follow,
which was the concept behind the second Russian proposal.
Kuznetsov noted that the concept applied to ICBMs including
mobile ICBMs, as well as to submarines and SLBMs. Regarding
non-deployed heavy bombers, all such bombers would be located
only at certain specified facilities. Kuznetsov declared
precise definitions for deployed and non-deployed SOA were
necessary in order to make the SFO treaty work.


10. (S) Taylor referred Kuznetsov to the first paragraph
stating that ICBMs and SLBMs shall be non-deployed after the
ICBM or SLBM was removed from its launcher and asked whether
this meant that the ICBM or SLBM was physically removed from
its launcher or, that it was not installed in or on the
launcher. Kuznetsov replied it was the former; the missile
was physically removed. He added that once the missile was
removed from its launcher, regardless of whether it was sent
to a storage facility or remained on the base, it was a
non-deployed missile. Taylor followed up by asking whether,
if the ICBM or SLBM was physically installed in its launcher,
do they become a deployed missile and a deployed launcher.
Kuznetsov answered yes and stated that the purpose of the


Russian text was to precisely state when a deployed item
became a non-deployed item and vice versa.


11. (S) Taylor then asked about the status of an ICBM or
SLBM when it came out of the production facility. Kuznetsov
replied that such a missile, whether an ICBM or SLBM, would
be non-deployed. He continued that facilities where
non-deployed SOA could be located should be stated in the
treaty and that was the purpose of the proposal in the second
document. Kuznetsov noted that when such a missile left the
production facility, notification would be provided to the
other Party. Further, the missile would stay non-deployed
even after its arrival at its designated base and would
remain so until it was loaded into its launcher. Kuznetsov
pointed out that if the missile was loaded into a test
launcher, it would also remain non-deployed because test
launchers were never considered deployed and the Russian side
believed this practice should be continued.


12. (S) Mr. Dean stated there was merit to a single "one
stop" definition of deployed and non-deployed items. However
he noted that the Russian proposal addressed only the time
after the missile was removed from its launcher but not
before. Therefore, the concept could be revised to state a
missile would be considered non-deployed when it is not
contained within a launcher. Kuznetsov agreed and emphasized
that the purpose of the document was to explore the concept
and, if agreed, the precise wording would be determined later.


13. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the sides should next
determine where the text for non-deployed SOA should be
placed. He proposed that if there was a limit for
non-deployed SOA, such as the 150 limit proposed by Mullen,
the concept should be placed in one of the treaty articles.
Otherwise, if there were no numerical limits, it should go
into the Terms and Definitions Section of the treaty. Dean
summarized that the task was two-fold: (1) to discuss if the
concept should go into the treaty and if so, then (2) where
within the treaty it should be placed. Dean advocated that
since a very clear description of this concept would be
needed, it should be located in only one place within the
treaty.


14. (S) Taylor stated his opinion that the Russian proposal
presented a clear concept for deployed and non-deployed SOA
and that it presented no major difficulties. However it
would have to be studied and there would have to be
additional work regarding the structure of the concept.
Kuznetsov stated that his lawyers had advocated against a
definition for deployed and non-deployed SOA and had instead
promoted defining when a deployed item became a non-deployed
item. Dean replied that if the concept of deployed and
non-deployed was clearly understood then the problem of when
it changed from one to the other was automatically solved.
Kuznetsov agreed. Taylor stated one issue that required
resolution was the U.S. concept that deployed ICBMs and
deployed SLBMs were "considered to be contained" in their
respective deployed launchers. Taylor noted that in studying
the Russian proposal, the U.S. delegation would take this
into account and return to the next meeting with the results.

--------------
NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS


--------------


15. (S) Kuznetsov asked the U.S. side for its view of the
concept with respect to heavy bombers. He stated that a
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments was a deployed
heavy bomber. However, if such a heavy bomber was
transferred to a conversion or elimination facility, it
became a non-deployed heavy bomber. Therefore, the
definition of a non-deployed heavy bomber was directly
related to its location. Kuznetsov pointed out that this was
a different construct than that used for ICBMs and SLBMs.
For example, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments
located at a conversion or elimination facility was by
definition, non-deployed. Taylor replied that the U.S. side
needed to understand the difference between "basing" and
"location" of heavy bombers as it was being used in the
proposed text. The U.S. delegation had some questions such
as the status of a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments which flew to an air base that had heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments. Taylor noted that the
Russian concept stated that the location determined whether a
heavy bomber was deployed or non-deployed but he asserted
that other factors should be included.


16. (S) Kuznetsov referred Taylor to Article V, paragraph 6
of the Russian-proposed SFO text which stated "Heavy bombers
equipped or converted for non-nuclear armaments shall be
based separately from heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments." Referencing Taylor's earlier question, Kuznetsov
explained that such heavy bombers could fly there but not be
based there. He also noted that the nomenclature and numbers
of heavy bombers would be provided by both sides to the other
Party and that any discrepancies would raise questions.
Taylor stated that regarding the overall Russian concept for
deployed and non-deployed issues, the two sides were in
general agreement.

-------------- --------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR LOCATIONS OF NON-DEPLOYED ITEMS
-------------- --------------


17. (S) Kuznetsov handed over the second document. The
official English translation of the document stated:

Begin Text:

Proposal on Locating Non-deployed Items


1. Each Party shall have the right to locate:

a) Non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs: at ICBM bases,
submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, repair
facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs
or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or
SLBMs, training facilities, test ranges.

b) Non-deployed ICBM or SLBM launchers: at ICBM bases,
submarine bases, production facilities for mobile launchers
of ICBMs or ballistic missile submarines, repair facilities
for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile
launchers of ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for
mobile launchers of ICBMs, training facilities, test ranges.


c) Non-deployed heavy bombers: at air bases for heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, heavy bomber
flight test centers, production facilities for heavy bombers,
training facilities for heavy bombers, repair facilities for
heavy bombers, and conversion or elimination facilities for
heavy bombers.


2. Non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs as well as non-deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party
shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities
to no more than 30 days.


3. Each Party shall provide notification to the other Party
regarding the transfer of deployed strategic offensive arms
to non-deployed strategic offensive arms and vice versa in
accordance with Section IV of the Protocol.

End text.


18. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the Russian side had reviewed
the language in START, the U.S proposals for the SFO treaty,
and their previous proposal for non-deployed SOA. The result
was the three paragraphs of their paper which addressed: (1)
facilities where non-deployed SOA may be located; (2)
non-deployed transit time; and (3) notifications. Kuznetsov
declared that this covered all the non-deployed issues for
the treaty. He explained that the MOU would be updated every
6 months and the notifications rules would remain unchanged
from START. Kuznetsov concluded that the Russian proposal
was a carefully thought-out and crafted product. As an
example, he noted that the START text addressed prototype
ICBMs but in this construct it is much simpler; there were
existing types of SOA and that was all. Kuznetsov offered
that if the U.S. side desired other locations for locating
non-deployed SOA, the Russian side would agree. He brought
up space launch facilities as a possibility but stated that
the current Russian position was that they should not be
included. Taylor replied that he understood.

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PRODUCTION FACILITIES
--------------


19. (S) Taylor asked why production facilities were not
listed as a location for non-deployed SOA. Kuznetsov replied
that the inspection regime did not include production
facilities and that missiles were not counted within them.
Taylor pointed out that the Russian SS-25 was occasionally
returned to its production facility. If a non-deployed ICBM
departed from its base and was returned to its production
facility, then it was logical that the Russian side would
advocate that it be included as an allowed location.
Kuznetsov conceded Taylor's point.


20. (S) Taylor noted that production facilities were listed
in START and in the U.S. proposal. He elaborated that his
question was in reference to mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk. When
a mobile ICBM was returned to Votkinsk, the United States
would get a notification, and likewise when the ICBM
departed. The United States was able to determine whether
the missile emerging from the production facility was a new
missile or a repaired one by its unique identifier (UID).
Kuznetsov made a reference that if UIDs were to be put on


mobile ICBMs they would have to be put on all SOA. But he
understood Taylor's point and agreed to consider it. Ms.
Zdravecky observed that it appeared, under the Russian
proposal, when a mobile ICBM returned to Votkinsk it would
relinquish its non-deployed status and, from the perspective
of the MOU, would cease to exist. Then, when it exited
Votkinsk again it might be notified as if it were a new
missile exiting even though it was still the same one.
Zdravecky concluded that, per the Russian-proposed treatment
of non-deployed SOA, "new" did not really matter--it was
either on the books or not on the books. Kuznetsov stated
that this was correct because non-deployed items were not
numerically accounted for in the way deployed items were.
However, if the U.S. proposals for counting mobile ICBMs were
accepted, then the Russian proposal for the treatment of
non-deployed SOA would be revised accordingly.

--------------
IS A PROTOTYPE MISSILE NON-DEPLOYED ?
--------------


21. (S) Taylor stated that regarding prototypes it was true
that in the START Treaty, Article IV stated that "Prototype
ICBMs and prototype SLBMs shall not be located at maintenance
facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases." He remarked
that it was his opinion that a prototype is a non-deployed
missile. The START re striction on prototypes was intended
to remove the potential that the missile would be considered
as deployed. Therefore some consideration of prototypes
needed to be included in the SFO treaty. Kuznetsov responded
that the SFO treaty was designed to only count deployed SOA
of new or existing types. Therefore, addressing prototypes
served no purpose.


22. (S) Taylor reminded Kuznetsov that the United States had
proposed the concept for prototypes in START. At that time,
the United States had the "small ICBM" prototype but later
Russia had also made use of the prototype provisions.
Therefore it should be reconsidered for the new treaty.
Kuznetsov said that the Russian side would do so, but pointed
out that in recent SLBM test launches, the missile was either
an existing or a declared new type. So, again, there was no
reason for including prototypes in the treaty. Taylor
reiterated that both sides had used this provision to develop
future systems and therefore it was something worth
considering. Kuznetsov relented that if the U.S. side deemed
it necessary the Russian side would agree.


23. (S) As a last point, Taylor noted that though paragraph
1(c) discussed "locating" heavy bombers, it seemed more
accurate to use the term "basing." Kuznetsov agreed and
committed to providing a revised version of the paper.

--------------
RELEASABILITY OF MOU DATA
--------------


24. (S) Taylor turned the discussion to Article VIII of the
U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT); specifically on the
issue of the releasability of MOU data. Kuznetsov agreed
that this issue required resolution but remarked that it
would be better to do it within the framework of the
Bilateral Consultative Commission. He stated that his


personal view was that the language in START was adequate.
However, Kuznetsov did point out that unlike START, there was
the additional element of data on nuclear and non-nuclear
warheads. Taylor noted that as of the last working group
meeting, he believed that both sides were close to agreement
on the releasability of initial MOU data. The new treaty and
the initial MOU which would be signed by both Presidents
would be releasable to the public. Taylor stated that the
challenge was how to write this into the treaty. Kuznetsov
replied that there were easier ways to accomplish this such
as a Joint Statement. The Joint Statement could be written
to provide the mechanism for releasing the data.


25. (S) The U.S. delegation handed to the Russian delegation
a revision of paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article VIII of the
U.S.-proposed JDT. Taylor explained that the proposal
specifically addressed what MOU data should and should not be
released. Additionally, it stated that the Parties would
hold consultations regarding the releasability of any
follow-up data. Taylor and Kuznetsov agreed that this
mechanism and the Russian solution of a Joint Statement were
viable approaches to this issue.


26. (U) Documents provided.

- U.S.:

-- Proposed JDT of Article VIII, paragraphs 6 and 7,
dated November, 24, 2009 (English and unofficial Russian)

-- Working Paper: Proposal on Counting Non-deployed
Items, dated November, 24, 2009 (Russian and English)

-- Working Paper: Proposal on Locating Non-Deployed
Items, dated November, 24, 2009 (Russian and English)


27. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
Col LaGraffe
Mr. Sims
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Lobach
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


28. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS