START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001113

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-056.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 25, 2009
Time: 3:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The sixth meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working
Group (IPWG) was held at the U.S. Mission on November 25,

2009. The working group discussed Article XI of the treaty
which describes the types of inspections to be conducted.
Working from the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT),
general agreement was achieved on the first six paragraphs.
The discussion focused on inspections of non-deployed
strategic offensive arms (SOA) and the Russin delegation
agreed that formerly declared facilities (FDFs) should be
included in such inspections. The U.S. side proposed to
address in an Agreed Statement verifying that SSGNs and
converted B-1B bombers had not been reconverted back to SOA.
Exhibitions of new types of ICBM and SLBMs,
distinguishability of heavy bomber categories, and the
various exhibitions and demonstrations associated with the
conversion and elimination of SOA were discussed but without
reaching full agreement. End Summary.


4. SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article XI: First Six Paragraphs;
Russian-Proposed Article XI; Inspections of Non-Deployed SOA;
Exhibitions of SSGNs; Back to Non-Deployed SOA; Exhibitions;
and, Heavy Bomber Distinguishability.

--------------
ARTICLE XI: FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS
--------------


5. (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting by proposing to discuss
the first six paragraphs of Article XI of the U.S.-proposed
JDT which addressed inspections. Both sides agreed that
paragraph 1 would remain as written and that the language in
paragraph 3 would be moved into it as the last sentence. In
paragraph 2, Warner agreed with the Russian proposal that
inspection activities would begin 60 days after treaty
entry-into-force (EIF) and both sides agreed that the
paragraph should be moved to the Protocol. Likewise, it was
agreed that paragraph 4 addressing the number of inspection
activities (not yet agreed) would also be moved to the
Protocol. Regarding Russia's proposed paragraph 5, which
repeated the general right to conduct inspections, Warner
stated that it would also go in the Protocol, should the U.S.
side agree to keep it. Lastly, in the Russian-proposed
paragraph regarding the non-disclosure of information gained
at inspections, Warner stated that this meant non-disclosure
outside of the inspecting Party's Government which, for the
United States, included the United States Congress. Ilin
replied that the intent of the paragraph was to prohibit
disclosure to other countries such as China or Iran and asked
the U.S. side to find appropriate wording. Warner agreed and
stated that this paragraph would also go into the Protocol.



--------------
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED ARTICLE XI
--------------


6. (S) Ilin handed over to the U.S. delegation a revised
Russian-proposed JDT of Article XI. It contained a new
paragraph 7 which stated that the Parties had the right to
conduct the three types of inspection activities and provided
a list of inspectable facilities. Warner stated that this
paragraph repeated material discussed in subsequent
paragraphs and that it did not state the purpose of
inspection activities. Ilin proposed rewriting it to affirm
that the Parties shall have the right to conduct the three
types of inspection activities, specifying what they were,
and then putting the rest of the passage into the Protocol.
Ilin emphasized that this paragraph was important because it
listed the first two types of inspections and also
exhibitions. Warner pointed out that the next three
paragraphs covered each inspection activity, its purpose, and
the affected facilities. Ilin offered to delete the second
sentence addressing the facilities. Warner replied that both
sentences should be deleted and stated that this text would
remain bracketed.


7. (S) In paragraph ((5))1((8))2 of the Russian-proposed
JDT, Warner observed that it addressed Type 1 inspections for
deployed SOA at operational bases. He proposed that it be
revised to read "Inspections of deployed nuclear warheads and
their delivery vehicles at ICBM bases, submarine bases and
air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the
number and types of strategic offensive arms located at such
facilities." The word "nuclear" in front of "warheads" would
be bracketed pending a final decision on permit-and-count.
Regarding the annual inspection quota, Warner and Ilin agreed
providing that information in the Protocol. Warner also
noted that the locations of such inspections would be as
written as in the U.S-proposed JDT; specifically, ICBM bases,
submarine bases, and air bases for heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments. Ilin agreed.

--------------
INSPECTIONS OF NON-DEPLOYED SOA
--------------


8. (S) Paragraph ((6))1((9))2 of the Russian-proposed JDT
addressing Type 2 inspections of non-deployed SOA, stated
that storage facilities, repair facilities, conversion or
elimination facilities, loading facilities, test ranges,
training facilities and FDFs would be subject to this
inspection. Ilin questioned the need to include loading
facilities saying they were not associated with storage
facilities. Warner stated for now, loading facilities would
be bracketed. Ilin noted that FDFs were included and Warner
pointed out that FDFs were originally proposed as a separate
type of inspection with its own quota. However, in this
proposal, the U.S. side had included it as a Type 2
inspection and so it was subject to the Type 2 inspection
quota. Ilin agreed with this solution.


9. (S) Continuing on with Type 2 inspections, Warner noted
that the purpose was not to "confirm" technical


characteristics of SOA as that was one of the purposes of
exhibitions. He stated the inspectors confirm numbers of
items vice their technical characteristics. Technical
characteristics declared in the database were used to ensure
that the correct item was being counted. Warner further
noted that the U.S. side did not agree that Type 2
inspections included the confirmation of the elimination of
SOA. He emphasized that confirmation of conversions and
eliminations were done via exhibitions and observed that
paragraph (8))1((10))2 of the Russian-proposed JDT, which
described the purpose of exhibitions, included eliminations.
Therefore it seemed that both sides were in agreement on this
issue. Ilin stated that during an exhibition, the Party
demonstrated how an item would be converted or eliminated.
Warner agreed but added that subsequent exhibitions would be
conducted to confirm the elimination of the first and
subsequent items being eliminated.

--------------
EXHIBITIONS OF SSGNS
--------------


10. (S) Ilin declared that exhibitions would also be used to
confirm that a converted item had not been reconverted back
into SOA. That concept should be included in the treaty.
Warner disagreed and proposed that such periodic exhibitions
would be addressed in an Agreed Statement. An Agreed
Statement would cover SSGNs that had been converted from
SSBNs and it would contain the right of the other Party to
periodically re-inspect such submarines to verify that they
had not been reconverted to launch SLBMs. Such an exhibition
may occur during the conduct of a Type 1 inspection but it
would not be associated with or, in any way part of, that
inspection. That is, if circumstances allowed, it was
possible that this exhibition could be conducted concurrently
with a Type 1 inspection being conducted at a submarine base.
Warner assured Ilin that both the treaty and the Agreed
Statement would be part of an integral package which would be
signed and ratified together.


11. (S) Ilin opined that the SSGN viewing could be conducted
during either a Type 1 or Type 2 inspection because he
surmised that the most important time to view an SSGN would
be when it came out of extended overhaul. Warner stated that
all SSGN conversions had been completed and that the
submarines were fully operational. Currently, the SSGNs were
home-ported at operational submarine bases would be subject
to Type 1 inspections. If the SSGN happened to be in port
during the time the submarine base was undergoing a Type 1
inspection, then there may be an opportunity to conduct the
exhibition of the SSGN concurrently. Ilin expressed concern
about what the Agreed Statement would say. Warner stated
that it was in draft and that the U.S. side would forward it
to the Russian delegation as soon as possible. Ilin said he
would respond to the U.S. proposal after receiving a draft of
the Agreed Statement.

--------------
BACK TO NON-DEPLOYED SOA
--------------


12. (S) Continuing with paragraph ((6))1((9))2 of the
Russian-proposed JDT, Warner stated it should read, "The


Parties shall have the right to conduct inspections of
non-deployed items of SOA and formerly declared facilities
at" the facilities listed. He noted that heavy bomber repair
facilities were not included but this was consistent with the
practice of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Warner continued that it should read, "The purpose of such
inspections is to confirm the data on non-deployed SOA
located at facilities (listed) and to confirm that formerly
declared facilities are not being used for purposes
inconsistent with the Treaty." Warner noted the text
regarding confirming technical characteristics of SOA would
remain bracketed. Ilin stated that part of the purpose of
Type 1 and 2 inspections was to confirm the dimensions of the
distinguishable features of items. Warner replied that such
inspections simply counted the items and that the inspectors
only used measurements to confirm that they were counting the
correct items. Warner suggested revising the text to read
that "(the purpose) is to confirm the data on the number and
types (of SOA)." Ilin agreed to consider this.

--------------
EXHIBITIONS
--------------


13. (S) In paragraph ((7))1((9))2 of the U.S-proposed JDT on
exhibitions, Warner stated that the U.S. proposal was crafted
to shorten the text and to better highlight agreement and
disagreement. He noted that in subparagraph (a) addressing
technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs, the sides were
virtually in agreement. Ilin stated that he agreed with the
process of subparagraph (a) regarding exhibitions of
technical characteristics of new types of missiles but
objected to mobile ICBMs being separately listed. Warner
agreed to leave that in brackets but pointed out that
technical characteristics of mobile ICBMs would be listed in
the Memorandum of Understanding.

--------------
HEAVY BOMBER DISTINGUISHABILTY
--------------


14. (S) Ilin disagreed with the concept of "distinguishable
features" applying only to heavy bombers. Warner offered to
substitute "key features" in its place. Ilin had more
questions about why "distinguishable" applied only to heavy
bombers and about the differences between exhibitions and
demonstrations. Mr. Rust explained that distinguishability
features were important to differentiate the different
categories such as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments of the same type.


15. (S) Warner explained the general concept of exhibitions.
An exhibition was a "demonstration" from the point of view
of the presenting Party. However, from the point of view of
the participating Party, it was an exhibition. But the term
"demonstration" could be used in either case. For heavy
bombers, distinguishing features made it possible to identify
the different types and variants. The key categories were
those equipped for nuclear armaments and those equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. The B-1B was a primary example of a
type in which there was aircraft in both categories. The
United States will have completed the B-1B conversion such


that all of them will be heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. It was for this type of aircraft and
possibly some others in the future, that the U.S.-proposed
subparagraph (b),which read: "(the purpose of such
exhibitions shall be) to demonstrate that each exhibited
variant and category of heavy bomber of a type is
distinguishable from other variants and categories of heavy
bombers of the same type."


16. (S) Ilin stated that he understood the U.S. approach and
was familiar with the B-1B conversion exhibition. He
recognized that distinguishability was important for heavy
bombers, but he stated that he could not accept the U.S.
proposal because the Russian side must be able to confirm
that such heavy bombers were incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments. Warner remarked that Ilin was referring to
conversion and elimination; specifically, the exhibition
following the completion of a conversion process. He stated
that he could address Ilin's concerns by combining
subparagraphs (b) and (f). (Begin comment: Subparagraph (f)
read, "(the purpose of such exhibitions shall be) to
demonstrate the initial results of new procedures for
converting or eliminating SOA." End comment.) In this way,
the distinguishability and conversion exhibitions would be
combined. Ilin agreed and commented that confirming
distinguishability features was a different activity from a
demonstration.


17. (S) Regarding exhibitions of new types of nuclear
armaments and air launched cruise missiles, Ilin agreed that
subparagraphs (c) and (d) were acceptable. Continuing on,
Warner explained that subparagraph (e),was a new proposal
that Mr. Elliot and Mr. Ryzhkov had agreed upon. It stated
that an exhibition could be conducted to describe a new
conversion procedure developed by the Party conducting it.
Warner declared that this description would take place within
the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
However, there were some questions as to whether there would
be an on-site demonstration at the site of the launcher or
heavy bomber being converted. Warner and Ilin agreed to
further consult with the Conversion and Elimination Working
Group and to leave the text bracketed. Finally, regarding
subparagraph (g) addressing exhibitions for confirming the
completion of a conversion or elimination, Ilin stated that
he was concerned with the word "conversion" in the statement.
Warner commented that he was concerned with the Russian
approach of including exhibitions that confirm elimination of
SOA as Type 2 inspections. The session concluded with the
text remaining bracketed.


18. (S) Documents exchanged:

- U.S:

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of Article XI, dated November, 25,
2009 (English and unofficial Russian).

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed JDT of Article XI, dated November,
25, 2009 (Russian and unofficial English).


19. (S) Participants:



U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Celusnak
Maj Johnson
Mr. Leyde
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Col Izrazov
Ms. Vodopolova
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS