START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING
GROUP, NOVEMBER 24, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01102 (SFO-GVA-VII-044)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-050.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 24, 2009
Time: 15:30 - 18:00.
Place: Russian Federation Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The seventh Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working
Group (WG) meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov,
began with a discussion of Section VII of the Protocol
(Elimination of Facilities) during which the Russian
delegation provided a joint draft text (JDT) accepting the
U.S. proposal for this section. The chairmen further decided
to send this section to the conforming group. The Russian
side then provided a revised Russian-proposed JDT for Section
III (ICBM Launcher Elimination). After a short discussion,
it was clear that neither side would move from its current
position with respect to mobile launcher CorE. The Russian
delegation provided an updated JDT of Section V (CorE of
Heavy Bombers) correcting administrative errors detected in
both sides' previous proposals. The U.S. delegation agreed
to study the Russian text and send to conforming if no issues
arose after review.


4. (S) Elliot explained the U.S. requirement for two time
limits for verification in the CorE sections (based on a
30-day window for inspections and a 60-day window for
national technical means (NTM)). The sides then discussed
Section I (General Provisions) in an effort to resolve the
issues in the section. Elliott explained that many of these
brackets were tied to treaty Articles VII, XI and IX and
would fall out once the articles were agreed. Finally,
Section IV (Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers) was
discussed. The Russian side presented alternate elimination
procedures for elimination of SLBM launchers. The U.S. Qe
asked the Russian side to produce a revised JDT containing
those procedures to allow the U.S. side to study and better
understand the Russian proposal. End Summary.


5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VII to Conforming; Section
III: No Movement; Section V to Conforming; Time for
Verification; Section I: Removing Brackets; and Section IV:
Who needs CTR.

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SECTION VII TO CONFORMING
--------------


6. (S) The meeting began with a discussion of Section VII
(Elimination of Facilities) of the Protocol. The Russian
delegation provided a revised joint draft text (JDT) that
fully accepted the U.S. proposal for this section and removed
all brackets. Specifically, the Russian delegation agreed to
paragraph 2 in the U.S.-proposed text which requires the
dismantlement and removal of the superstructures for fixed


structures for mobile ICBMs, as part of elimination. Also in
that paragraph is a ban on placing any structure or covering,
permanent or temporary, over the remaining foundation of the
fixed structure. Both chairmen agreed to send Section VII to
conforming. Later in the meeting, when discussing
elimination of SLBM launchers, Ryzhkov stated that there was
a large fight within the Russian delegation on accepting the
U.S. proposal on elimination of fixed structures. Intense
discussion developed within the Russian delegation to the ban
on not placing a cover over the remaining foundation of the
fixed structure for mobile launchers. The other intense
discussion within the Russian delegation centered on the U.S.
list of support equipment and that if they accepted or
acknowledged this listing then the U.S. side would later
force Russia into listing all the equipment in the Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU). Elliott assured Ryzhkov it was not
the intention of the U.S. delegation to list support
equipment in the MOU. Both chairmen agreed to send Section
VII to conforming.

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SECTION III: NO MOVEMENT
--------------


7. (S) The discussion next turned to Section III
(Elimination of Launchers of ICBMs). Despite the agreement
of both sides on paragraph 3 (Reftel),Ryzhkov presented a
revised paragraph 3 which broadened the right of inspection
to include all three options for elimination of silo
launchers. (Begin comment: The initial agreement only
provided for inspection if the Party used the "other
procedures" option in subparagraph c. The specified
procedures in subparagraphs a and b would be verified by NTM
only. End comment.) Ryzhkov surmised that this was a
broader interpretation and was also consistent throughout the
document. (Begin comment: The originally agreed paragraph
was bracketed in the Russian side's document. End comment.)
Elliott sought comment from Ryzhkov on mobile launcher
elimination. Ryzhkov reiterated that the requirement for
U.S. inspections of the final cut was not acceptable.
Elliott responded that this is a very firm U.S. position. A
discussion ensued between Ryzhkov and Elliott on the
procedures each side had proposed for mobile launcher
elimination. Ryzhkov confirmed that Russia now proposed to
remove both the erector-launcher mechanism and the
stabilizing jacks (leveling supports),but did not want to
cut off the aft 0.78 meters of the vehicle chassis. Elliott
questioned Ryzhkov on why the Russian delegation had included
a new subparagraph on "other procedures." Ryzhkov responded
that it was consistent with the rest of the document which
had similar paragraphs. Elliott informed Ryzhkov that if
there was any hope of the United States accepting "other
elimination procedures" for mobile launchers, the Russian
delegation should consider carefully the elimination
requirements and ensure they are verifiable. Ryzhkov stated
that if he accepted the U.S. proposal in this area he would
greatly exceed his authority.


8. (S) Elliott concluded the discussions on this section by
asking Ryzhkov whether, in accordance with paragraph 7 on
conversion of ICBM launchers, the Russian delegation intended
this to apply to silo launchers as well as mobile launchers.
Ryzhkov responded that it applied to both silo and mobile


launchers. Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether the Russian
Federation ever conducted such a conversion of a mobile
launcher to launch another type of missile. Ryzhkov
responded they had for the RS-24. Elliott asked whether the
Russian Federation conducted an exhibition of the converted
launcher. Ryzhkov responded they did not because the
converted launcher was only for testing.

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SECTION V TO CONFORMING
--------------


9. (S) The Russian side provided an updated JDT of Section V
(CorE of Heavy Bombers) to correct some administrative errors
detected in both sides' proposals. Ryzhkov explained that in
the new JDT, paragraph 5 was rewritten to incorporate the
U.S.-proposed text and to remove provisions now covered in
the General Provisions section. Ryzhkov further recommended
sending this section to conforming. The U.S. side agreed to
study the Russian document and, if after review, there were
no substantive differences, to send this section to the
Conforming Group.

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TIME FOR VERIFICATION
--------------


10. (S) Ryzhkov began the discussion on the two time limit
requirements for verification in the CorE sections (based a
30-day window for inspections and a 60-day window for NTM).
He stated that the Russian delegation's position was that
only one standardized timeline should be used for
verification. Elliott responded by saying that the United
States could not accept a single time due to the vast
differences in the two types of verification. Elliott then
provided hard data on the amount of cloud cover over
representative areas of the Russian Federation's silo fields
showing that for over 70 percent of the time there was 100
percent cloud cover. This showed that any time short of 60
days for verification by NTM was too short. Elliott also
stated the U.S. side had already moved from the 90-day
timeline in START to the proposed 60 days. Conversely, using
a 60-day window for verification by inspection would cause
undue restrictions on both sides by requiring the converted
item to remain at the conversion facility for up to 60 days
while awaiting inspection. Elliott concluded, saying given
these facts, two time frames were required for verification;
one for inspection (30 days) and the other for NTM (60 days).
Ryzhkov said he understood the data and needed to study the
U.S. proposal.

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SECTION I: REMOVING BRACKETS
--------------


11. (S) Elliott began the discussion on Section I (General
Provisions) by stating that paragraph 6 should be deleted for
two reasons. One, that the right to verification was already
covered in Treaty Article VII and two, that the timeframe for
verification was already covered in each section of the CorE
part of the Protocol. Ryzhkov said he understood the logic
and agreed; however, he wished to keep the first portion of
paragraph 6 bracketed just to be 100 percent sure that the


right to verification was included for CorE. Elliott agreed,
with the stipulation that if such language existed in treaty
Article VII, duplicate language would be deleted in the
General Provision Section. Elliott then moved to the
brackets in paragraph 4 dealing with exhibitions. He asked
Ryzhkov to explain why the Russian side used the term
"demonstration." Ryzhkov responded that demonstration, in
the Russian language, was a broader term than exhibition and
it includes all possibilities. For example, the presentation
of photographs or slides in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC),a combination of photographs, slides or
demonstrations at a operational site, or the presentation of
photographs, slides or demonstrations to explain the results
of CorE. Elliott explained that in the English language the
word exhibition meant the same and that in principle we
agreed. Elliott concluded by saying that the U.S. delegation
would consult with our lawyers and linguists to help with the
wording and that the brackets can be cleared in this
paragraph.

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SECTION IV: WHO NEEDS CTR
--------------


12. (S) Finally Ryzhkov began a discussion of Section IV
(Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers) by explaining a
new proposal for the elimination of SLBM launchers. He
explained that the Russian delegation had accepted the U.S.
proposal on removing the launcher hatches and superstructure
fairings but added the requirement to remove the gas
generator, if equipped. The Russian delegation, however, did
not accept the U.S. second procedure to remove the entire
missile section. Ryzhkov also stated that, for consistency,
the Russian delegation had added a subparagraph "other
procedures developed by the party conducting the
elimination." During subsequent discussions, Ryzhkov stated
he liked the U.S. proposal for when the SLBM launcher was
removed from accountability; however, the requirement to
remove the entire missile section was excessive. Elliott
asked whether the Russian Federation was intending to remove
the missile section during final disposition of the
submarine. Ryzhkov responded that they did intend to remove
the missile section. Elliott then stated his delegation did
not understand why the Russian delegation was objecting to
procedures they were going to accomplish anyway. Elliott
further stated that the United States had made it clear that
CTR program funds would be available for these eliminations.
Both Ryzhkov and Smirnov reacted negatively to the mention of
CTR funds.


13. (S) Elliott then asked whether the main issue of
contention was the U.S.-proposed time frame for completing
the elimination (365 days). Ryzhkov responded that it was
not a timing issue (although 5 years was a good time) but
rather a technical issue. He stated that SLBM launchers
could no longer be used when the hatches and superstructure
fairing were removed and that any Navy expert would confirm
this fact. With the superstructure fairings removed, any
attempt to install an SLBM would result in the missile
protruding from the launcher and this could easily be
verified by NTM. He further offered that the eliminated
launchers would remain visible to NTM and that an inspection
team could verify the elimination directly at the ship yard


(within the inspection quota.) Elliott stated he well
understood the technical aspects of the system and further
stressed that some on the U.S. delegation required the
complete elimination of the submarine by removal of the
missile section. He requested Ryzhkov provide the Russian
delegation proposal in a JDT so the United States could study
the proposal. Ryzhkov agreed.


14. (S) Documents provided:

- U.S:

-- Joint Draft Text for Section VII of Part III in the
Protocol dated November 24, 2009, in the original English
with unofficial Russian translation

Russian Federation:

-- Joint Draft Text for Section III and VII of Part III in
the Protocol dated November 24, 2009, in the original Russian
with unofficial English translation.

-- Joint Draft Text for Section V of Part III in the
Protocol dated November 24, 2009, in the original Russian.


15. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Russia

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS