START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001106

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER
25, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01098 (SFO-GVA-VII-024)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-057.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 25, 2009
Time: 11:00 P.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador
Antonov conducted a Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting on
November 25. Gottemoeller discussed details of the meeting to
occur that day in Washington between APNSA Jones with Russian
NSA Prikhodko, and they compared notes on the results of the
recent meeting between CJCS Mullen and Russian CSA Makarov.
The HOD also conducted a frank exchange on missile defense
and the offense-defense relationship, which Antonov deemed to
be the key issue to be resolved before the treaty could be
concluded. Gottemoeller reviewed the U.S. proposal for a
legally binding arrangement to allay Russian concerns. The
HOD also reviewed progress made on the treaty preamble,
Article V (Prohibitions),and the treaty structure. End
summary.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Mullen-Makarov and Jones-Prikhodko
Meetings; Missile Defense and Offense-Defense; Preamble,
Article V, and the Treaty Structure.

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MULLEN-MAKAROV AND JONES-PRIKHODKO MEETINGS
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5. (S) Antonov opened by commenting that Moscow strongly
believes the treaty can be done on time by December 5, and
that the treaty will be in the interest of both countries.
Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for that comment, and in answer
to his question, outlined her understanding of the proposed
meeting schedule for the Prikhodko visit. She noted
Ambassador Ries and Mr. Koshelev would participate in the
meetings, except for the one-on-one discussion between
Prikhodko and APNSA Jones, which Antonov thought Ambassador
Kislyak also would want to attend. Antonov asked if there
would be new proposals on the table for the meetings, to
which Gottemoeller replied there were already a number of
proposals on the table related to various issues, including
mobile missiles and telemetry. She stressed the need for the
Russian side to be flexible in its approach to these
proposals. She noted that Admiral Mullen had also expressed
flexibility on the part of the Untied States when he
discussed numerical limits on strategic delivery vehicles, if
the Russian side would move on mobile ICBM verification and
telemetry.


6. (S) Looking to what would follow after the meeting,
Antonov stated both sides will be calling for an update on
the Prikhodko visit. His personal take was that, after the
visit of Mullen and Makarov, both sides were now proceeding


on the basis that they now know what both sides really want.
While both sides may have engaged in tactical sparring,
Antonov assured Gottemoeller that for his own part he was
being open and sincere and not playing at politics. He was
happy for the Thanksgiving Day to give him time to think
about the issues and come up with some new ideas for fixing
them, and he hoped both sides were doing the same.


7. (S) Turning to ABM, Antonov stated missile defense was
the key issue in the negotiations. He thought the documents
he passed to Gottemoeller would play a key role in the
upcoming discussions in Washington (Begin comment: Antonov
was referring to Russian-proposed treaty text on the
interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic
defensive arms, a joint statement, and Russian and U.S.
unilateral statements on missile defense. See Reftel for
reporting and text of the documents passed. End comment.)
He wanted to ensure Gottemoeller had had the opportunity to
convey these proposals to Washington to ensure they would not
be unexpected when raised in discussions.


8. (S) Antonov reported he had requested Moscow not to spring
any last minute surprises such as coming up with more new
ideas to allow for focusing on the existing issues. He also
thanked Gottemoeller for her support of the recent visit of
Russian Federation Council representatives. He considered
the visit to be an unqualified success, and wished such an
event had taken place at the beginning of the negotiations
process rather than at the end. Looking back on the recent
visits of Senators Feinstein and Kyl, Antonov felt he now
better understood both and appreciated the role they would
play in upcoming treaty ratification, as well as in ties
between the U.S. and Russia.


9. (S) Gottemoeller noted there were about 14 days left
until the deadline for completing the writing of the treaty,
and she pushed for the best effort possible to complete the
work on time. Antonov joked there were really 28 days, as
both sides could work day and night. He went on to assess
the Mullen-Makarov and Jones-Prihodko meetings to be key
events in the negotiations process, though he worried that
they came very late in the game.


10. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether there had been any
initial comments from Moscow concerning the proposal on
mobile missiles advanced by Mullen during his visit.
Gottemoeller reminded Antonov of the key items in the U.S.
proposal: an offer to notify of exits of missiles from U.S.
production facilities, a requirement for 60 hours advance
notification of the exit of a missile, and willingness to add
unique identifiers (UIDs) to all strategic delivery vehicles
(SDV). For his part, Antonov saw the issue of mobile
missiles linked to analogous treatment of submarines.
Telemetry was also linked, as all of this went to a much
broader question of "equivalence." Answering the question,
he indicated Moscow will positively examine all U.S.
proposals, but he surmised there would probably be no
definitive word back from Moscow on either the Mullen-Makarov
or Jones-Prikhodko visits until Tuesday at the earliest.
Gottemoeller commented sharply that Tuesday would be too
late, but Antonov said he would not move without written
instructions from Moscow, and as they involved the highest
level of the Russian Government, he judged that it would take


that long to get them.


11. (S) Continuing on the subject of the recent
Mullen-Makarov meeting, Antonov thought the visit was helpful
for both sides, but he cautioned Gottemoeller that Makarov
possessed little authority to make key decisions. He said if
Mullen and Makarov had reached an agreement, it would have
had to go back to President Medvedev for final decision. He
wryly observed that Medevev would probably not be working on
such issues this weekend. Antonov also noted the negotiation
issues stemming from that visit or the ongoing Prikhodko
visit were highly sensitive and could not be discussed over
the phone. He said the representatives (i.e., Makarov and
Prikhodko) would have to return to Moscow and file a written
report, which meant Monday at the earliest.


12. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether Chairman of the Duma
International Affairs Committee Kozachev would be coming to
Geneva on Sunday, November 29, as Antonov had previously
mentioned. Antonov said he was quite reluctant to encourage
visitors to come and "help." He said Russian Military
Representative to NATO Army General Aleksey Maslov had also
offered to come to Geneva to help where he could. However,
such visits took Antonov away from his duties for an entire
day, which he assessed to be counterproductive to the overall
effort.


13. (S) Returning later in the conversation to discuss the
Mullen-Makarov visit, Antonov was glad that Makarov was able
to come here and see his generals and colonels in action. He
left Geneva satisfied with the progress being made, but most
important to Antonov was that Makarov left having been
afforded an opportunity to think things through.
Gottemoeller said she had spoken with Mullen prior to his
departure, and Mullen expressed his willingness to return to
Geneva or fly to Moscow if it would help to move the
negotiations forward. Mullen had also reported to
Gottemoeller how Makarov had touched on a proposal for
resolving the telemetry issue involving selecting certain
launches on which to exchange telemetry, and a provision for
encryption with a data key to be provided. Makarov also
mentioned, she reported, possible flexibility with regard to
the Russian proposal on SDV limits, which had been raised to
650 at the Monday meeting in Geneva. Gottemoeller assessed
Makarov's comments as useful developments.

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MISSILE DEFENSE AND OFFENSE-DEFENSE
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14. (S) Gottemoeller returned to the subject of missile
defense and its impact on the relationship between offense
and defense. She related how she had conferred with State
Department legal advisors and confirmed the proposed joint
statement or an exchange of letters would be legally binding
and part of the ratification package. Their status as
legally binding documents was not only confirmed in U.S. law
but by international law. She thought joint statements or an
exchange of letters were the most appropriate way to address
the offense-defense relationship, as the concept was related
to the treaty but not the subject matter of the treaty
itself. She emphasized that the document could not be an
integral part of the treaty from the U.S. perspective.




15. (S) Antonov retorted the offense-defense relationship
and telemetry issues were not technical or legal issues but
political decisions. He wanted to ensure that the treaty
would clearly indicate an ICBM or SLBM launcher could not be
reconfigured into an ABM launcher or vice versa. Russia's
position on the matter was unchanged, and at least one
sentence on the offense-defense relationship must be in the
treaty. Antonov articulated the Russian concern about the
3rd missile defense site. (Begin comment: Antonov was
referring to the missile defense sites proposed for
emplacement in Poland and the Czech Republic. End comment.)
He was concerned that a site originally intended for missile
defense could be reconfigured to be a forward-deployed ICBM
site. He saw this having a direct impact on the correlation
of forces. As a result, he pushed hard for language to be
inserted into the treaty that banned any reconfiguration
between ICBMs and missile defense launchers.


16. (S) Gottemoeller underscored that the U.S. proposal for
addressing the offense-defense relationship was not to be
simply a politically binding statement. She carefully
reiterated how the U.S. proposal would be legally binding in
the view of both the U.S. and international law. She
reported how she had confirmed with Washington to be clear on
how the U.S. proposal would be considered. In regards to
Antonov's comment about missile defense being a political
issue for the Russian Federation, Gottemoeller reminded
Antonov that this was also the case for the United States.
She pointed out to Antonov that the ultimate goal was not the
signature of the document but its entry into force, with the
middle step being the ratification process.


17. (S) Gottemoeller appreciated how Antonov had come a long
way in helping to find a workable solution. She reminded him
that the United States for its part had made considerable
efforts to find a middle ground. The United States was
willing to accept language on missile defense in the
preamble. She noted the United States had developed a
creative solution to allay Russian concerns, and that
abundant precedents exist for the approach being proposed.
She reminded him (again) that the proposal to use joint
statements or an exchange of letters would be legally
binding. She also pointed out the successful use of such a
solution in resolving difficult issues related to the
conclusion of the START Treaty, among which were treatment of
ALCMs and the Backfire bomber. Antonov then concluded the
discussion on missile defense by saying that the
offense-defense issue would obviously be a top political
issue during the endgame, and Russia would not sign the
treaty unless it was resolved in its favor. He worried aloud
about the potential fallout from the treaty not being signed
because missile defense was the single sticking point. He
wondered what would need to be done in the way of damage
control if such occurred. Gottemoeller said that in that
case, she would be reporting back to Washington to ensure her
White House colleagues were aware of the issue for the
Jones-Prikhodko meetings. Oddly, given his earlier comments,
Antonov stated that he would have to try to get his deputy
Sergei Koshelev on the phone in Washington, because Sergei
Prikhodko would not have been prepared to discuss the issue.

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PREAMBLE, ARTICLE V, AND THE TREATY STRUCTURE
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18. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov then reviewed the progress
made on the preamble. Antonov said one of his assistants was
responsible for finding language that would be better phrased
in Russian. Antonov also agreed to review the language
noting the implementation of the SORT Treaty and the
appropriateness of the adjective "successful" in defining the
implementation thereof.


19. (S) Gottemoeller then told Antonov that she would be
preparing some new proposals on Article V in anticipation of
the next meeting. Antonov complained that until Gottemoeller
was ready to work his offense-defense language, he would not
want to work Article V. She reminded him again that time was
growing short. Gottemoeller also reported to him that the
U.S. delegation leads were unanimous that it would not be
possible to combine test ranges and space launch facilities
into one all-encompassing term. She also asked for his
assistance in getting both sides working off of a treaty
structure that contained a single, agreed nomenclature for
its subgroups. Antonov agreed to take both issues for action.


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS