START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001105

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01083 (SFO-GVA-VII-030)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-055.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 25, 2009
Time: 3:40 P.M. - 6:15 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On November 25, 2009, the U.S. and Russian Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) Working Group chairs met at the
Russian Mission. The sides discussed potential dates of the
data exchange for the treaty and took the opportunity to
address outstanding bracketed issues. Some changes were made
to documents that had already been sent for pre-conforming.
The Russian side also asked questions regarding the U.S. list
of intended declared facilities. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Database Data Exchange; Discussions
of Bracketed Text Part I; Sections to Conforming; Discussions
of Bracketed Text Part II; Discussion of U.S. Facilities
List; and Closing Comments.

--------------
DATABASE DATA EXCHANGE
--------------


5. (S) Mr. Trout began the discussions by asking Gen Orlov
for clarification on when the actual numerical data would be
exchanged. Col Petrov replied that data exchange would occur
45 days after the treaty was signed. Trout then hypothesized
that if the treaty was signed on December 10, 2009, the data
exchange would occur on or about January 25, 2010, and that
the sides would probably have to meet in Geneva around
January 11, 2010. Additionally, if 45 days is agreed, the
opening chapeau should be changed to reflect this. Orlov
agreed, and Trout confirmed that he would deliver revised
text incorporating these details as soon as possible.

--------------
DISCUSSIONS OF BRACKETED TEXT PART I
--------------


6. (S) Trout began the discussion of bracketed text by
providing the U.S. position on inclusion of data on warheads
on individual missiles, explaining that the data helps the
inspection team prepare for the inspection. Orlov repeated
the Russian position that only aggregate warhead data by base
would be included in the MOU and that the inspection team
would be provided detailed warhead data during pre-inspection
briefings. He asked whether specific warhead data was
provided under START. Trout replied that START used warhead
attribution rules and did not require specific warhead data
for each missile, as it was implied by the attribution rule.
Orlov assured Trout that the history and lessons of START
showed that both sides could be trusted, and that this extra
information did not serve a purpose. Trout recapitulated the


U.S. approach, clarifying that the United States was trying
to increase the amount of data exchanged in order to increase
confidence and transparency and would provide information on
those bases that were not inspected. He explained that
exchanging this data should improve Russian insight into U.S.
forces and assuage over U.S. upload capacity. Orlov repeated
that missile warhead loadout data would be provided during
inspection briefings and that there was no need to list it in
the MOU. No changes were made to the bracketed text.


7. (S) Trout asked for an explanation of the Russian concept
of "Basing Areas" for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Orlov
stated that in this new treaty, Russia drops the idea of
"Deployment Areas" and "Restricted Areas" and has replaced it
with the concept of an ICBM Base for Mobile Launchers of
ICBMs which will include several "Basing Areas." He
explained that the geographic coordinates for the area will
not change, but noted that inspection procedures will
probably change due to new site diagrams. The requirements
for those site diagrams will not be the same as in START.
Trout asked for clarification--specifically whether the new
Russian site diagrams would only include fixed structures.
Petrov replied that only the fixed structures would be
annotated--all other structures would not be subject to the
limitations of the treaty. Trout stated that the U.S. side
will accept the Russian language for Basing Areas, but added
that he remained concerned about site diagrams and would
review this matter with the U.S. delegation.


8. (S) Trout returned to previous discussions on how the
fixed structures would be handled in the MOU. Referencing
the U.S. proposal tabled during the last meeting, Trout again
asked whether the Russian side had accepted the proposal that
no measurement data for fixed structures would be listed in
the MOU annexes in exchange for two photographs of fixed
structures, one of the front and one of the side. Orlov
stated that the Russian delegation had not yet decided and
asked why the photos were necessary. Trout replied that
since that is where the mobile launchers would be located and
the fixed structures will be eliminated according to
procedures agreed upon in the Conversion or Elimination
Protocol, the photos would help inspectors identify them.
Petrov asked whether the United States wanted photographs for
every single fixed structure, to which Trout replied that
since fixed structures are the same at all bases, one set of
photographs of the standard fixed structure would be
acceptable. Petrov reminded Trout that under START there
were two instances where mobile launchers were not housed in
fixed structures; however, the Russians would guarantee the
launchers will be in the fixed structures during inspection.
Trout stated that Petrov's use of Drovyanaya as an example of
a place where mobile launchers of ICBMs were not kept in the
fixed structures indicated that in the future Russia may
again use other buildings to house mobile launchers. Petrov
tried to make the argument that the fixed structures are
support equipment, but Trout reminded him that they are
surveyed launch positions and not support equipment. Orlov
stated that the Russian delegation would think about it, but
for himself, he would provide the photographs. Pischulov
added, in connection to fixed structures, that Russia had
accepted the U.S. position to list the number of fixed
structures at Basing Areas.



9. (S) Trout returned to a discussion continued from the
last MOU Working Group meeting regarding the use of the term
"returned" with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs at production
facilities to differentiate between new and reworked/repaired
missiles. He again stated that the term was acceptable if
Russia intended to continue the practice of identifying
missiles as "returned." Petrov said Russia would continue
the practice. Trout stated he would let the Notification
Working Group know and that we would drop the brackets at the
next meeting.


10. (S) Petrov asked to discuss Annex J, starting with
identifying which working group should have negotiation
responsibility. LT Lobner demurred stating that the U.S.
side had not had time to review the recent Russian-proposed
text. He stated that Petrov was correct in that there was
discussion to move it to the Inspection Protocol Working
Group, but that at this time there was no final decision on
this matter. Petrov reiterated that it did not matter who
deals with Annex J, and stated that the Russian-proposed text
modified and simplified the approach from START but not the
intent. Lobner replied that the United States was interested
in studying the text to see their approach.


11. (S) Trout turned to the topic of training models of
missiles (TMOMs) and argued that declaring the number of
TMOMs at facilities in the MOU would mitigate possible
questions that could arise in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC) about the number of non-deployed missiles at
a facility. For example, if the United States observed seven
non-deployed missiles via national technical means (NTM) at a
facility that only had five declared missiles in the MOU, the
additional MOU data regarding those TMOMs would quickly
answer the question why two additional missiles were
observed. Petrov stated that the United States would never
see a TMOM via NTM and that the numbers of TMOMs at a
facility would be provided during inspection pre-briefings.
Pischulov added that Russia had dropped its brackets
regarding distinguishing features for TMOMs in Annex A, but
again reiterated the Russian position regarding the utility
of declaring the numbers at facilities.


12. (S) A discussion of the U.S. intended declared
facilities for space launch facilities (SLF) ensued with
Trout reiterating that the United States will not combine
test ranges with SLFs. Lobner reiterated the current U.S.
position that only Minuteman (MM) III and Trident II will be
declared as existing types and consequently, only SLF that
launched space launch vehicles utilizing a first stage of one
of these existing types would be declared. Trout added that
Peacekeeper (PK) missiles would be addressed in an associated
letter or similar document which would state the U.S.
commitment to eliminate all such launchers. Orlov replied
that he was of the opinion that it was decided not to have
those types of documents, but after some consultation with
his colleagues, agreed that these types of documents probably
should exist. He then turned back to the PK issue, stating
that there was no misunderstanding regarding the condition of
these launchers, but rather that it was interesting that we
will not include these systems even though they still exist.
Petrov said that besides the 50 Peacekeeper launchers at
Warren, there were 65 Peacekeeper missiles at Hill Air Force
Base. Petrov then asked, given existence of the


Peacekeepers, how could the Peacekeeper not be declared as
existing type? Petrov then asked about the U.S. intentions
for the Trident I missiles and the MM-II launchers and
missiles, specifically two MM-II test launchers at Vandenberg
Test Range. Trout reminded the Russians that as they are
fond of saying, this is a new Treaty and PK, MM-II, and
Trident I are not existing types. Regarding the Russian
proposal to merge SLF with test ranges, Trout bluntly stated
that the U.S. position to not merge these facilities would
not change.

--------------
SECTIONS TO CONFORMING
--------------


13. (S) After a short break, Mr. Pischulov brought up the
status of Annexes A and C, which were in the process of
pre-conforming, stating that Russia was suggesting adding a
paragraph to Annex C. He then handed a document to Lobner
adding that the language for the proposed texts are now
similar and ready for conforming. Lobner stated that he
would have the text added to the document, but inquired about
the title of the section. He argued that the
Russian-proposed title did not adequately reflect the data
that would be contained in the Annex. After some discussion,
Pischulov agreed, and Orlov proposed the title be changed to
"Heavy Bomber Armaments Technical Data." Lobner agreed, with
the caveat that "nuclear" be added as U.S. bracketed text
prior to the word "armaments."

--------------
DISCUSSIONS OF BRACKETED TEXT PART II
--------------


14. (S) Moving to Annex D, Pischulov stated that the Russian
side had identified two categories of facilities that were
missing from the paragraph concerning facilities subject to
inspection: ICBM repair facilities and repair facilities for
mobile launchers of ICBMs. Lobner accepted the proposed text
and stated that the U.S. side had also noted the inadvertent
omission and had already added them to the U.S.-proposed
text.


15. (S) Trout said that the Russian delegation had proposed
definitions for deployed heavy bomber, non-deployed heavy
bomber, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, and
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments at a
Definitions Subgroup Meeting on November 17 (Refel). Trout
asked why we could not use the same structure for the heavy
bomber section of the MOU. Pischulov said they were provided
as a way to capture counting rules, specifically the one
warhead attribution counting rules that had recently been
proposed.


16. (S) Lobner countered that the nomenclature of the
bombers, specifically the Russian use of the START
categories, was no longer applicable in the new treaty. More
importantly, he argued, agreement on the U.S. proposal, which
was very similar to the new definitions recently provided by
the Russian Federation, could be made independently of the
final decisions on counting rules, with some small
exceptions, specifically deployed and non-deployed heavy
bomber status. Lobner stated that this issue was one that


this working group could settle separately from the counting
rules. Orlov engaged his colleagues for a few minutes, but
stated that the Russian proposal at this time was still
connected to resolution of the counting rules. He added,
however, that he would study the concept some more.


17. (S) Trout moved on to Annex A, pointing out that without
measurements for the length of first stages, there was
nothing with which to compare a new type. Petrov said that
when a new type was developed, the developing party would
provide the new data and identify which system to compare it
to. Trout asked for clarification: would the other party
then measure the existing type and the new type or would the
party just rely on data in the MOU. Petrov replied that they
proposed taking the MOU data as the basis and then measure
the new type. A short discussion followed with Petrov
finishing the conversation by stating we will have all the
technical data for each ICBM and SLBM in the MOU to declare a
new type based on a change in length. The new type will be
declared against one of the existing types and distinguishing
features will be provided. Trout then quickly addressed the
listing of the weight of the fully loaded first stage.
Petrov stated that the Russian text had deleted that
provision.


18. (S) Trout then provided a new Joint Draft Text for Annex
D: Other Data Required by the Treaty, which highlighted some
of the many changes proposed during the past 6 days. He then
offered to quickly go through the changes, but Petrov stated
that the Russian side needed time to study it. Trout
reminded Petrov that many of the changes were
Russian-proposed changes, but agreed to move on to a
discussion of the U.S. facilities list, which the Russian
side was eager to discuss.

--------------
DISCUSSION OF U.S. FACILITIES LIST
--------------


19. (S) Pischulov pointed out a couple of translation errors
in the U.S. facilities list and then questioned why a number
of facilities listed in START were not on the new list (see
paragraph 21). Lobner explained that most deletions could be
explained by the U.S. position on what constitutes existing
types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Some specific facilities were
mentioned that followed this logic. Petrov asked about the
Trident training facilities, noting that they were not
listed. Lobner replied that a training facility was a
"specified" facility, and as such there were no items of
inspection located at the two Trident training facilities.
The United States had decided that it was not necessary to
declare these facilities any longer. Moving back to the
issue of types of missiles the United States did not intend
to declare as existing types, Pischulov asked how the United
States would react if Russia decided not to declare the
SS-N-20/Typhoon since it had not been used in a long time.
Trout replied that it was an interesting question and that he
would think about it. Pischulov suggested that facilities
containing deployed and non-deployed SOA should be included.
After some more discussion regarding SLBM related facilities,
Lobner stated that two types of facilities specifically
related to SLBM launchers would require further study.
Additionally, after questions regarding the U.S. position on



training models of silos at Hill AFB, Lobner replied that the
United States would look at the issue.

--------------
CLOSING COMMENTS
--------------


20. (S) Orlov and Trout agreed to forward Annexes A and C to
conforming with the agreed changes but that Annex A would
continue to have fixed structures dimensional data bracketed
until resolution of the photograph issue. Trout promised to
provide the text for the new chapeau including the proposed
45-day reporting window. Trout also stated that he was not
sure the working group would have much to discuss on Friday
and would call Orlov to discuss whether or not a meeting
would be productive.


21. (S) Begin text:


I. ICBM Related Facilities

ICBM Base For Silo Launchers Of ICBMs:

Name/Location: F.E. Warren Missile Complex,
Wyoming
41-08n, 104-50w

Maintenance Facility:

Name/Location: F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming
41-08n, 104-50w

Name/Location: Malmstrom Missile Complex, Montana
47-30n, 111-10w

Maintenance Facility:

Name/Location: Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana
47-30n, 111-10w

Name/Location: Minot Missile Complex, North Dakota
48-25n, 101-20w

Maintenance Facility:

Name/Location: Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota
48-25n, 101-20w


ICBM Base For Mobile Launchers Of ICBMs:

None

ICBM Loading Facilities:

None

Production Facilities For ICBMs:

Name/Location: ATK Launch Systems, Inc
Promontory, Utah
41-40n, 112-26w


Production Facilities For Mobile Launchers Of ICBMs:

None

Storage Facilities For ICBMs:

Name/Location: Camp Navajo, Arizona
35-13n, 111-51w

Storage Facilities For Mobile Launchers Of ICBMs:

None

Repair Facilities For ICBMs:

Name/Location: Hill Air Force Base, Utah
41-08n, 112-00w

Test Ranges:

Name/Location: Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California
34-48n, 120-34w
Training Facilities:

None

Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For ICBMs:

Name/Location: Oasis Complex, Utah
41-04n, 112-57w

Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For Mobile
Launchers Of ICBMs:

None

II. SLBM Related Facilities

Submarine Base:

Name/Location: Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic
Kings Bay, Georgia
30-48n, 081-32w

Name/Location: Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific
Silverdale, Washington
47-43n, 122-43w

SLBM Loading Facilities:

None

Production Facilities For SLBMs:

Name/Location: Alliant Techsystems Inc.
Magna-Promontory, Utah
40-40n, 112-06w

Production Facilities For Ballistic Missile Submarines:

Name/Location: General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division


Groton, Connecticut
41-21n, 072-06w

Storage Facilities For SLBMs:

Name/Location: Naval Air Warfare Center
China Lake, California
35-40n, 117-34w

Repair Facilities For SLBMs:

None

Test Ranges:

None

Training Facilities:

None

Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For SLBMs:

Name/Location: Oasis Complex, Utah
41-04n, 112-57w

Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For SLBM Launchers:

None

III. Heavy Bomber Related Facilities

Air Base For Deployed Heavy Bombers:

Name/Location: Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana
32-30n, 093-40w

Name/Location: Dyess Air Force Base, Texas
32-26n, 099-51w

Name/Location: Ellsworth Air Force Base, South
Dakota
44-09n, 103-06w

Name/Location: Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota
48-25n, 101-21w

Name/Location: Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri
38-43n, 093-32w

Air Base For Heavy Bombers Equipped For Non-Nuclear
Armaments:

None

Production Facilities For Heavy Bombers:

Name/Location: Northrop Plant
Palmdale, California
34-39n, 118-05w

Storage Facilities For Heavy Bombers:


None

Repair Facilities For Heavy Bombers:

Name/Location: Boeing Plant
Wichita, Kansas
37-37n, 097-16w

Name/Location: Rockwell Plant
Palmdale, California
34-37n, 118-04w

Name/Location: Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
35-25n, 097-23w

Heavy Bomber Flight Test Centers:

Name/Location: Edwards Air Force Base, California
34-55n, 117-53w

Training Facilities:

None

Conversion Or Elimination Facilities For Heavy Bombers:

Name/Location: Davis-Monthan Air Force Base,
Arizona
32-09n, 110-49w

IV. Space Launch Facilities

None


22. (U) Documents Exchanged:

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed text for Annex D

- R.F.

-- Russian-proposed text for new paragraph for Annex C


23. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
Mr. Broshar
LT Lobner
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Col Petrov
Col Pischulov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS