START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-042.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 20, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The sixth Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working
Group (WG) meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov,
continued a review of joint draft text (JDT) of the CorE
provisions. The sides agreed to send Section V (CorE of
Heavy Bombers) to conforming, albeit with brackets. Section
VII (Elimination of Fixed Structures) was discussed; the
United States accepted the Russian proposal not to eliminate
the reinforced concrete pad of the fixed structure, while
proposing new language prohibiting building anything on or
over the remaining pad.


4. (S) Section III (ICBM Launcher Elimination) text was
discussed briefly, followed by a lengthy dialogue on the
views of both sides with respect to mobile launcher CorE.
The Russian side offered that it regularly recycles scrap and
other materials from eliminated mobile launchers. Section II
(ICBM and SLBM Elimination) was discussed briefly followed by
a statement from Russia that it wished to sell eliminated
launch canisters to road construction firms to use as road
reinforcement culverts. End Summary.


5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section V to Conforming; Section
VII-Some Agreement and Some Brackets; Section III: Tip-toe
Through the Mobile Mle; A Long Discussion on Mobile
Launchers; A Greener Russia: We Recycle Our Mobile
Launchers; Section III Redux; Road-Building With Our Missile
Canisters.

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SECTION V TO CONFORMING
--------------


6. (S) The sides discussed paragraph 5 of Section V of the
CorE Protocol on Heavy Bomber Conversion. Elliott proposed
that the time period a heavy bomber be made available for
inspection should be 30 days and that the converted heavy
bomber could be removed from its viewing area after the
completion of an inspection: "If an inspection of the
converted heavy bomber took place on day 2, it makes no sense
for the heavy bomber to sit for another 28 days." Ryzhkov
agreed and asked Elliott whether text covering the time
period of inspections could be moved to Section I: General
Provisions (GP). Elliot objected and reminded Ryzhkov that
each time period was process-specific, so having one overall
statement on an inspection time period was not appropriate.
After some consideration, the Russian side agreed, and upon
Elliot's review of the final language of paragraph 5,
suggested the text be moved to the Conforming Group. Elliott
approved.



7. (S) Before concluding Section V, Elliott made a case for
a 60-day window to allow national technical means (NTM) of
verification to operate. Ryzhkov demurred and asked that
this paragraph (paragraph 2) remain bracketed. Both sides
agreed that subparagraph 4c was agreed and that the entire
text was ready to conform, even though some brackets
remained. Ryzhkov commented that Russia might be able to
agree to a 60-day window for heavy bombers, since they could
be removed at any time for scrapping. Russia would continue
to insist on a 45-day window for silos, however, because a
silo could only be graded in situ. Moreover, a silo was
always visible to NTM.

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SECTION VII-SOME AGREEMENT AND SOME BRACKETS
--------------


8. (S) Both sides agreed to delete paragraph 1 of Section
VII as it repeated text found in Section I: General
Provisions. Ryzhkov made a case that eliminated facilities
be subject to confirmatory inspections; he cited text in
paragraph 6 of the General Provisions Section and Treaty
Article VII that he believed made the case for these
inspections. Elliott agreed to check with U.S. members of
the Inspection Protocol WG (IPWG) on the issue. Ryzhkov
continued, stating that these confirmatory inspections would
build confidence, though he doubted either side would use
such inspections under the low quotas that Russia had
proposed. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that the U.S. side
included no quotas for these confirmatory inspections in its
proposal and that the IPWG chairs would need to make the
final decision.


9. (S) A discussion of ICBM emplacement equipment ensued,
with the Russian side making the case that references to this
equipment be removed from Section VII. Ryzhkov informed the
U.S. side that Russia did not station ICBM emplacement
equipment near its silos but would bring the vehicle from
another area to load a missile when required. The vehicle
would then return to its base. He made the case to Elliott
that if the silo was destroyed it made no difference whether
the emplacement equipment remained by the silo or not.
Elliott agreed to revisit this issue at the next WG meeting,
and Ryzhkov stated that Russia would accept the paragraph
with or without that language.


10. (S) Elliott proposed new language for Section VII,
paragraph 2; it specified that the reinforced concrete pad
could remain after a fixed structure for mobile launchers was
eliminated, but that no new structures, either temporary or
permanent, be built over the reinforced concrete pad.
Ryzhkov acknowledged the U.S. compromise on the concrete pad
issue, but asked that the paragraph be bracketed due to the
new U.S. proposal requiring no new structures over the
concrete pads. Elliott agreed to provide the Russian side
with an updated version of Section VII based on this
discussion.

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SECTION III: TIP-TOE
THROUGH THE MOBILE MELEE
--------------




11. (S) The sides reiterated that paragraphs 1-3 of Section
III had been agreed upon previously. Ryzhkov asked that
paragraph 4 be bracketed and argued much of paragraph 4 was a
repeat of the General Provisions Section. Elliott sought
comment from Ryzhkov on paragraphs 5, 6, and 7. (Begin
comment: All three are U.S.-proposed paragraphs on mobile
launcher elimination. End comment.) Ryzhkov requested that
paragraph 5 on inspections be bracketed. A discussion ensued
between Ryzhkov and Elliott on the procedures each side had
proposed for mobile launcher elimination. Ryzhkov confirmed
that Russia now proposed to remove both the erector-launcher
mechanism and the stabilizing jacks (leveling supports),but
did not want to cut off the aft 0.78 meters of the vehicle
chassis. Russia had decided it would be necessary to replace
the stabilizing jacks in any case to convert eliminated
launchers into cranes.

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A LONG DISCUSSION ON MOBILE LAUNCHERS
--------------


12. (S) Elliott provided the U.S. viewpoint on mobile
launcher elimination, stating that while the new treaty would
not have the strict verification provisions that START did,
certain minimal verification provisions were necessary.
Specifically, on-site verification of final mobile launcher
elimination procedures was necessary. He added that the U.S.
side had moved substantially from its original positions on
mobile launcher elimination and repeated that minimum
verification provisions were essential for the United States
to move forward: "NTM simply cannot substitute for
inspection of mobile launcher elimination."


13. (S) Ryzhkov countered Elliott's remarks with his bottom
line: "Do you think the Russian side will cheat? The two
sides have different approaches and requirements for
verification. The two Parties will have an opportunity to
verify anything at any moment. How could we cheat under this
regime?" Elliott countered by asking whether, in theory,
mobile launchers could be re-configured after a conversion
much in the same way that a heavy bomber could, in theory, be
re-configured to deliver nuclear weapons after a conversion.
Both Ryzhkov and Mr. Smirnov provided a detailed explanation
of why re-configuring a mobile launcher was difficult if not
impossible. Moreover, launchers being eliminated had already
exceeded their guaranteed service life. Elliott retorted
with his bottom line: "As we strive to make the procedures
less intrusive so the launcher can be used again, it becomes
more plausible that the launcher could be re-configured.
This is why if the inspectors see the cuts to the launcher
being made there is no question that the launcher has been
eliminated."


14. (S) Ryzhkov countered that for both sides, there was
always the opportunity to re-configure a converted SSBN or
heavy bomber. He pointed out that non-mobile missile
elimination had no verification provisions but neither side
had issues with this; each Party had to live up to its treaty
obligations and the option to verify one another's activities
provided the necessary confidence and deterrence to cheating.
Smirnov added that the Russian side would maintain current
START elimination procedures for future eliminations.
Elliott proffered that the Russian side could undertake many


of the preliminary elimination procedures ahead of the
inspection, leaving the final mounting bracket cut for the
inspectors to observe, thereby reducing the time inspectors
would be in country. Smirnov agreed that the time needed to
make the final mounting bracket cut on each mobile launcher
was in the range of 1 to 2 hours. He acknowledged that, in
theory, 4 to 5 launchers could be eliminated in 1 day.

-------------- --------------
A GREENER RUSSIA: WE RECYCLE OUR MOBILE LAUNCHERS
-------------- --------------


15. (S) Smirnov related that the Russian side regularly
recycled many items from eliminated mobile launchers--some
items went to scrap purchasers, some items were removed and
retained. He indicated that the scrap business was lucrative
and many people were likely to seek to purchase eliminated
launchers.


16. (S) Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether Russia would consider
using unique identifiers (UIDs) on its mobile launchers.
Ryzhkov demurred and repeated that the sides had different
approaches and the U.S. "extra provisions to confirm
eliminated items" were unnecessary. Smirnov provided an
oft-repeated phase: "What was important was seeing the
result of the elimination, not the process of elimination."

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SECTION III REDUX
--------------


17. (S) The sides returned to Section III, paragraph 8. The
Russian side did not object to the U.S.-proposed language
that eliminated vehicles may be used only for purposes not
inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty, but said it
required further study. Ryzhkov asked whether paragraph 8 of
the U.S. version could be combined with paragraph 5 of the
Russian version of the General Provisions Section. Elliott
agreed to consider it.

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ROAD-BUILDING WITH OUR MISSILE CANISTERS
--------------


18. (S) The sides discussed their work for the next WG
meeting and agreed to discuss Section II: Procedures for
Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs. Elliott provided the U.S.
position with respect to ICBM and SLBMs: Only the first
stage must be eliminated but inspectors should be given the
right to observe the final cut. The elimination of the
second and third stages could take place without inspectors
present. Lastly, launch canisters were to be destroyed or
cut. This precipitated a lengthy response by Ryzhkov and
Smirnov on how launch canisters, like mobile launchers, could
be re-used for other purposes. Ryzhkov admitted that his
previous argument that launch canisters could be reutilized
as grain silos was not feasible, but proposed that, in the
canisters' case, they could be used for road building.
Because of the canisters' strength and durability, road
builders wanted to purchase launch canisters in their
entirety and place them under road surfaces to be used as
culverts. Smirnov offered that if the canisters were cut or
damaged, they could not be re-used for road construction


projects. Elliott made a point that the U.S. side would not
accept this and that an uncut or undamaged launch canister
had the ability to house a missile. Ryzhkov also raised a
concern about the U.S. proposal. He stated that Russia often
will burn the propellant, and by doing so, the need to
perform a cut on the casing was negated. Elliott stated he
understood their technical point and would ask additional
questions at the next meeting.


19. (S) Ryzhkov countered that Russian launch canisters were
equal to U.S. loading tubes, which also should be eliminated.
Elliott replied that was not the case, as a U.S. loading
tube could not launch a missile whereas a launch canister
could, moreover, the United States did not maintain a
one-to-one ratio between missiles and loading tubes. Ryzhkov
replied that the issue would have to be discussed in detail
at a future meeting.


20. (S) Documents exchanged: None


21. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
LCDR Brons
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Russia

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Voloskov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS