START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001098

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING,
NOVEMBER 16, 2009

REF: A. STATE 115348

B. GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

C. GENEVA 0856 (SFO-GVA-V-044)

D. GENEVA 1012 (SFO-GVA-VI-052)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-024.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 16, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov
Ms. Purcell

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On November 16, 2009, U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD),
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, held a one-on-one meeting
with Russian HOD, Ambassador Antonov, at the U.S. Mission.
Antonov provided a heads-up about a directive of the Russian
President to reach agreement on a number between 600-700
delivery vehicles and a possible visit by Duma members to
Geneva. He insisted that the U.S.-proposed bridging
agreement (REF A) was a non-starter; provisional application
was the only realistic alternative. Antonov provided new
proposals for associated documents on missile defense, while
seeking to retain one paragraph in the treaty text on
non-conversion between offensive and defensive systems. The
HODs narrowed differences in the treaty preamble, and
reviewed in detail a new U.S.-proposed text for the treaty
Article on Prohibitions. End summary.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Assessing the Presidential Meeting;
Assessing Status of Treaty Negotiations; Associated Documents
on Missile Defense; Removing Brackets in Preamble; Revised
Article on Prohibitions; and, Not To Forget Ukraine.

--------------
ASSESSING THE
PRESIDENTIAL MEETING
--------------


5. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov resumed an exchange they had
begun the previous evening by telephone, conversing about the
results of the November 15 meeting between Presidents Obama
and Medvedev in Singapore. Antonov shared that Russian
President Medvedev had provided him direction to work out
agreement on a number of strategic delivery vehicles on the
order of 600-700. Further, Medvedev had said that Russia did
not need strict verification measures, but was ready to
review U.S. proposals. The number of inspections needed to
be reasonable and equal for both Parties.


6. (S) Antonov said he had heard that President Obama had
discussed verification measures related to road-mobile


systems and telemetry with Medvedev. Medvedev had responded
that such measures were unequal and had raised Russian
concerns about U.S. SSBNs. Antonov insisted that a treaty
could only be concluded on the basis of equality. On a
lighter note, Antonov said Medvedev had proposed that some
Russian Duma members travel to Geneva to meet with the
delegations. It might be a nightmare, but legislators such
as Margelov and Kosachev were well-informed, and a visit from
them could actually be useful.


7. (S) Recalling what Gottemoeller had told him the
preceding evening, Antonov admitted that the plan to send
Russian foreign policy adviser Prikhodko and Chief of the
General Staff Makarov to Washington was a blow to him. He
worried it would waste the delegations' time and complicate
their work in Geneva. Gottemoeller informed him that she had
recommended that the senior policy-makers meet in Geneva
instead, where they could keep in contact with the HODs and
leading experts on both sides. This would facilitate
reaching agreement. Antonov held the same view, saying all
of Russia's treaty experts were in Geneva. In addition,
Gottemoeller noted that Geneva was an option for treaty
signature. The U.S. Government was considering three
locations for treaty signature: Reykjavik, Helsinki and
Geneva. Antonov also preferred Geneva, seeing no reason for
the Presidents to go to Reykjavik or Helsinki to sign the
treaty. He was aware of some excellent facilities for
high-level visitors in the vicinity of Geneva.

--------------
ASSESSING STATUS OF
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


8. (S) Antonov said he was told that the U.S.-proposed
Memorandum of Agreement on Interim Measures (the bridging
agreement) was not discussed by the Presidents in Singapore,
but noted the confusion that had emerged in the Russian press
nevertheless. Russian press were reporting that the treaty
would not be finished before the end of the year and,
therefore, a separate bridging agreement was necessary.
Gottemoeller assured Antonov that the U.S. position on the
need to complete the treaty by early December had not
changed. Antonov said he had also assured his own delegation
that there was no change in the target date for treaty
completion. The delegations would have to wait for the
results of Prikhodko's and Makarov's visit but, in the
meantime, must continue working and do everything necessary
to ensure that the treaty was ready to sign on December 5.
Gottemoeller concurred, and recommended sending text to the
Conforming Group as soon as it was agreed.


9. (S) Antonov reminded Gottemoeller that the bridging
agreement, as proposed by the U.S., was not possible for
Russia because of the requirement for ratification by the
Russian Duma. The only option was provisional application.
The treaty could refer to provisional application either once
or in various places. Provisional application could be for
the entire treaty or just certain articles. Antonov believed
this could be decided quickly at the end.


10. (S) Antonov requested Gottemoeller's view as to what
percentage of the treaty was agreed so far, and commented


that his delegation's views on that matter were interesting.
Antonov believed it was 50 percent, while Colonel Ryzhkov had
said the conversion or elimination text was 80 percent
agreed. Gottemoeller said she could not yet make an
estimate, but the U.S. delegation was compiling a new
proposed joint draft text of the treaty articles, so the
Russian delegation would be able to see how much was agreed.
The agreement reached on the structure of the treaty
documents had resolved a significant number of brackets.

--------------
ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
ON MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


11. (S) Antonov noted that Russia had agreed to record
missile defense commitments in additional documents, which
must be considered second tier and not fourth tier documents.
He provided new versions of a joint statement and two
unilateral statements regarding missile defense issues, as
well as one paragraph that Russia still believed must be
contained in the treaty text. Antonov said Moscow had gone
as far as it could to compromise with the United States on
this issue. They were not even recording all of their
concerns about missile defense in these documents. They had
agreed to move some commitments to the joint statement that
properly should be in the treaty, recognizing what was
politically unacceptable to the United States. Antonov
requested that the documents be reported quickly to
Washington, as Moscow was awaiting the U.S. response and much
depended on it. He requested a careful and balanced
response, saying that emotional reactions had a
counterproductive effect in Moscow and slowed progress.
Gottemoeller promised that the U.S. side would study the
documents.


12. (S) Begin text (Russia-proposed treaty text):

Document of the Russian
Side
November 16, 2009

Proposal of the Russian Federation on the Formulation
of Treaty Provisions on the Interrelationship between
Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms

The Parties shall not convert and shall not use ICBM or
SLBM launchers for installation of interceptor missiles, and
also shall not convert and shall not use interceptor missile
launchers for installation of ICBMs or SLBMs. In addition,
interceptor missiles shall not be given the capabilities of
ICBMs or SLBMs.

End text.


13. (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed joint statement):

Document of the Russian
Side
November 16, 2009

Joint Statement of the United States of America
and the Russian Federation regarding Missile Defense





In connection with the Treaty between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
the United States of America and the Russian Federation
declare the following:

- The United States of America and the Russian
Federation assume the obligations under this Treaty in the
context of the strategic missile defense systems which the
Parties have at the time of Treaty signature;

- The United States of America and the Russian
Federation express the intent to discuss the unique features
that would make newly developed types of interceptor missiles
distinguishable from existing ICBMs and SLBMs;

- Procedures confirming the presence of the
aforementioned differences shall be subject to agreement by
the Parties to the Treaty in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.

End text.


14. (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed unilateral statements):

Document of the Russian
Side
November 16, 2009

Statement of the Russian Federation on Missile Defense

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
the Russian Federation declares the following:

The Treaty can function and be viable only under the
condition that no quantitative and qualitative increases in
the capabilities of missile defense systems take place.

Accordingly, the extraordinary events mentioned in
Article ((XV))1 ((XIV))2 of the Treaty also include
quantitative and qualitative increases in the capabilities of
missile defense systems beyond the level extant at Treaty
signature.

Statement of the United States on Missile Defense

The United States of America takes note of the statement
of the Russian Federation concerning the conditions under
which the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can function and be
viable, as well as the extraordinary events for the
termination of the Treaty.

End text.

--------------
REMOVING BRACKETS
IN PREAMBLE
--------------




15. (S) Antonov provided a Russian-proposed text of the
treaty preamble dated November 10, 2009, which was based on
informal discussions with Gottemoeller in September. The
HODs reviewed the bracketed text in the preamble. Guided by
the U.S. package proposal that National Security Advisor
Jones had presented in Moscow in October (REF B),
Gottemoeller agreed to Russia's preamble paragraph on the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and
strategic defensive arms, which added the phrase, "and that
this interrelationship will become more important as
strategic nuclear arms are reduced." Antonov complained that
the U.S.-proposed adjective continuing in front of
interrelationship sounded very awkward in Russian.
Gottemoeller undertook to search for a better sounding word.
(Begin comment: The Russian language text proposes the words
"existence of" in place of "continuing." End comment.)


16. (S) Antonov clarified Russia's objection to the U.S.
preamble paragraph, "Desiring to create a mechanism for
verifying compliance with the obligations under this treaty
drawing on that experience." Russia believed the existence
of a verification mechanism went without saying. If the
United States insisted on such a paragraph, it should reflect
the July 6 Presidential Joint Understanding along the lines
that the verification mechanism should be simpler than in
START. Gottemoeller remarked that the U.S. side had thought
Russia wanted not to refer to START, so as not to give the
impression that the Parties were reconstructing START.
Antonov averred that he was not concerned about a reference
to START and Russia was not opposed to verification
mechanisms. Rather, Russia's view was that the current
verification mechanism was too costly and there were too many
inspections, obstructing the operations of Russian
facilities. Gottemoeller replied that she had made sure that
the President was informed of this Russian concern. She
urged Antonov to provide alternate wording for the paragraph,
based on the July 6 Presidential Joint Understanding. It
would be useful to retain a reference to verification
mechanisms in the preamble.

--------------
REVISED ARTICLE ON
PROHIBITIONS
--------------


17. (S) The HODs discussed a shortened version of the treaty
Article on Prohibitions that Gottemoeller had provided to
Antonov on November 13.

Begin text (U.S. proposal on a Treaty Article on
Prohibitions):

U.S. Non Paper
November 13, 2009

Article (V)1 (VI)2


1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty,
modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may
be carried out.


2. The Parties agree that the modernization and replacement


of their strategic offensive arms shall not involve the
production, testing or deployment of nuclear weapon delivery
systems of kinds other than those existing at the time of
signature of this Treaty.


3. In the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind
of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of
strategic offensive arm, including, but not limited to:

(a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600
kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation
on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;

(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for
emplacement on or for tethering to the beds of internal
waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for
tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such
missiles that move only in contact with the beds of internal
waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction
into a fraction of an Earth orbit;

(d) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600
kilometers, that are installed in an aircraft or on its
external mountings for the purpose of being launched from
this aircraft;

(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more
nuclear weapons; and

(f) aircraft that are not airplanes, or airplanes that
were not initially constructed as bombers, that have a range
of 8000 kilometers or more or an integrated platform area in
excess of 310 square meters,

that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such
an arm for consideration by the Bilateral Consultative
Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article
XIII of the Treaty.

((4. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy
systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.))1

((5. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive
arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its
national territory.))1

((4. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall
not be based outside the national territory of each Party.))2

((6. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities
associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated
facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been
provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the
Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility
at the same location has been provided in accordance with
paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be
located at eliminated facilities except during their movement
through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at
such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at


eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with
strategic offensive arms.))1

((5. Each Party undertakes not to locate heavy bombers with
long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments outside
the continental portion of national territory.))2

End text.

Paragraph 1 was the same as before: allowing modernization
and replacement of strategic offensive arms (SOA),except
where prohibited by other treaty provisions. Paragraph 2 was
completely new. It would state the Parties' intent not to
develop new kinds of exotic nuclear-armed strategic offensive
arms (SOA). It would reassure the international community in
the run-up to the NPT Review Conference that both countries
remained committed to move toward denuclearization.


18. (S) Gottemoeller explained that the new paragraph 3 of
the Article would express Russia's Article XII proposal that
allows for new kinds of SOA to be discussed in the BCC.
Antonov questioned the subparagraphs listing examples of new
kinds, taken from paragraphs 8 and 10 of the earlier U.S.
proposal (REF C). He argued that treaty articles should be
reserved for basic concepts; such a list should be moved to
the second or third tier. Gottemoeller reiterated her
concern that the Parties not appear to be backsliding on
commitments they had made in START.


19. (S) Gottemoeller proposed retaining the provision
banning rapid reload. The United States was concerned about
creating conditions permitting rapid reload. Antonov
acknowledged this logic, but argued there was no danger of
rapid reload from Russia. It would make more sense for this
provision to be a U.S. unilateral statement, although Russia
was not proposing that.


20. The HODs agreed that the U.S.-proposed paragraph 5 and
Russian-proposed paragraph 4 were substantively the same.
Both contained a commitment not to base SOA outside national
territory. Paragraph 6 was the U.S.-proposed commitment not
to have SOA or support equipment at eliminated facilities,
identical to paragraph 27 of Article V of START. Antonov
expressed concern about the reference to support equipment,
claiming it would require that all infrastructures at an
eliminated facility be destroyed, including power plants,
filling stations, trucks, and cabling. Gottemoeller was
willing to review and simplify the paragraph. Antonov
suggested moving the paragraph to the second tier.


21. (S) Gottemoeller questioned the need for Russia's
proposed paragraph on not locating heavy bombers with nuclear
armaments outside the continental portion of national
territory. Antonov explained this meant not just the
capability to carry nuclear armaments, but actually carrying
them while flying outside national territory. He had been
told that nuclear weapons had accidentally fallen off a U.S.
bomber. Gottemoeller noted that the accident had occurred 40
years ago during the Cold War. Now, U.S. heavy bombers no
longer routinely carried nuclear armaments. If they did so,
it would be a war or major crisis requiring a higher level of
readiness. Therefore, this requirement was not necessary for
the treaty. Antonov suggested that both HODs consult their


military advisors further. In general, the Russian
delegation would continue studying the U.S.-proposed Article
on Prohibitions.

--------------
NOT TO FORGET UKRAINE
--------------


22. (S) Antonov asked again how Russia and the United States
should handle the Joint Statement on the Expiration of START
for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Gottemoeller indicated
she had sent the agreed text to Washington for approval.
Antonov commented that Ukrainian President Yushchenko said
during a recent campaign event that he would send a letter to
Russia and the United States requesting security guarantees.
The issue had become caught up in Ukraine's Presidential
campaign. Russia's position was that any such talks should
be held under NPT auspices. In any case, Russia could not
negotiate with Ukraine during the Presidential campaign.
Gottemoeller concurred, noting she had told Ukrainian
official Mr. Nykonenko that discussion of security guarantees
should be conducted in the context of the NPT Review
Conference and should consider all the non-nuclear-weapons
states (REF D). Special guarantees for Ukraine would be
counterproductive.


23. (S) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:
-- U.S. Non-Paper: U.S.-proposed text for the Treaty
Article on Prohibitions, dated November 13, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Document of the Russian Side: "Proposal of the
Russian Federation on the Formulation of Treaty Provisions on
the Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and
Strategic Defensive Arms," datee November 16, 2009;

-- Document of the Russian Side: "Joint Statement of the
United States of America and the Russian Federation regarding
Missile Defense," dated November 16, 2009;

-- Document of the Russian Side: "Statement of the
Russian Federation on Missile Defense, and a Statement of the
United States on Missile Defense;" dated November 6, 2009. and

-- Russian-proposed text of the treaty preamble, dated
Novembe 10, 2009..


24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS