Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1096
2009-12-02 11:05:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHGV #1096/01 3361105
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O 021105Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0453
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5604
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2781
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1791
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6998
S E C R E T GENEVA 001096 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S. RECEPTION FOR CODEL, NOVEMBER 12,
2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001096

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S. RECEPTION FOR CODEL, NOVEMBER 12,
2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-018.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2009
Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The U.S. delegation to the START Follow-on (SFO)
negotiations hosted a reception on November 12, 2009, in
honor of the visit to U.S. Mission Geneva of Senators Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA) and John Kyl (R-AZ). Also present were the
Senators' two staffers, U.S. delegation members and experts,
and Russian delegation members and experts. Discussions at
the reception covered the U.S.- and Russian-proposed limits
on delivery vehicles, Russian reaction to Jones' visit to
Moscow in October, the mechanics of bridging the period
between the expiration of START and the entry-into-force of
the new treaty, the significance of verification in the new
treaty, whether the sides would benefit from START experience
in applying certain technical procedures in SFO, and the
status of agreeing on a closeout exchange of Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) data under START. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: SFO Treaty Limits; U.S. Tactics
Upset Russian Delegation; Seeking Forward Movement, Not
Backward; Legal and Legislative Perspectives on Bridging;
Purpose of Verification; Tridents in Loading Tubes - What to
Expect?; Trident II NWI - A Hardcover Dilemma; No Time for
Final JCIC - Status of START Closeout MOU; Arms Control
Beyond START Follow-On.

--------------
SFO TREATY LIMITS
--------------


5. (S) LT Sicks asked General Poznihir for the Russian
rationale for such a low proposed strategic delivery vehicle

(SDV) limit, since it would encourage MIRVing. Poznihir
responded that SDVs actually were the destabilizing item in
the nuclear realm. Mr. Colby countered that MIRVing missiles
was traditionally considered more destabilizing. Col Zaitsev
then stated warheads meant nothing if they did not have a
missile to fly on, and he said that the United States seemed
to only care about warheads. Russia, he claimed, chose an
SDV limit that forced true reductions while the United States
chose a SDV limit that suited the current U.S. force
structure. (Begin comment: Broadly, the Russian
participants did not appear willing to engage on this level.
It seemed that they did not accept even in principle the
notion that land-based MIRVed ICBMs were destabilizing.)

--------------
U.S. TACTICS UPSET RUSSIAN DELEGATION
--------------


6. (S) Mr. Koshelev told Mr. Taylor that APNSA General
Jones' trip to Moscow had created a great deal of discomfort


on the Russian delegation. Koshelev was very uncomfortable
with the response the delegation had to give to the proposal
Jones had made. The number of 550 strategic delivery
vehicles was not what had been recommended by the delegation.
Furthermore, with the U.S. response characterizing
disappointment with Russia's response to the offer, all
decisions were now being made in Moscow. Hopefully, the
delegations would be able to get back to work resolving
issues the following week after the two Presidents met in
Singapore on November 15. (Begin comment: The meeting
between the two Presidents was on the margins of the APEC
conference. End comment.)


7. (S) Mr. Shevchenko stated a number of times to Colby the
United States had made a serious mistake by taking the
package proposal to Moscow. He believed this U.S. action had
taken discretion out of the Russian delegation's hands by
pushing negotiations to a political level. He further said
that there was little the delegation could do now other than
follow the specific direction of the Russian President.

--------------
SEEKING FORWARD MOVEMENT, NOT BACKWARD
--------------


8. (S) Taylor told Koshelev that he was disappointed at the
results of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group
meeting on November 11, 2009, where it appeared that agreed
text was being questioned by the Russian lawyer because she
did not like the text as it had been conformed in the START
Treaty. Taylor cautioned that the Parties did not have time
for this kind of discussion. The Parties should make better
use of their time discussing and agreeing on substance rather
than trying to find pretty words. Taylor was very concerned
that the ratification process would prove very difficult if
concepts taken from the START Treaty would use different text
to explain the provisions. The U.S. Senate would question
the change, wanting to know what was different. Koshelev
said he agreed. He observed there were individuals who
wanted to make such changes in the text, but he was working
hard to prevent such diversions.

-------------- -
LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON BRIDGING
-------------- -


9. (S) Mr. Brown and Mr. Lobach noted they had just finished
a discussion of Russian law concerning the requirement for
Duma approval of certain types of international agreements,
including those dealing with military forces, disarmament and
verification. Kyl asked whether the issue of granting
privileges and immunities was within the purview of the Duma
under this law; Lobach responded in the affirmative, adding
that, if the Russian Government wanted the legislature to
approve an agreement on this subject, he had no doubt the
legislature would do it; it could be done relatively quickly,
but would ultimately be a legislative action. Kyl noted
there was a bill before the Senate specifically addressing
privileges and immunities of Russian inspectors who might
come to the United States, and he stressed the importance of
not having a gap in the rights and obligations of both sides
with respect to their strategic relationship, for political
reasons. (Begin comment: Kyl was referring to the bill


"S.2727, the START I Treaty Inspections and Monitoring
Protocol Continuation Act of 2009," submitted by Senator
Lugar on November 5, 2009. End comment.)

--------------
PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION
--------------


10. (S) In discussion with legal advisers Brown and Lobach,
Senator Kyl cited his legal career prior to his election to
Congress as providing a framework for his approach to
international agreements: that the rules should be clear as
to what was expected. He explained his view that detailed
verification provisions were not just for adversaries who did
not trust each other but were also to ensure that neighbors
remained friendly, quoting Robert Frost that "good fences
make good neighbors." Brown, noting that he was from the
same state as Frost, commented to Lobach that fences in New
Hampshire were actually quite low but were desirable to
provide predictability and thus avoid disputes and ambiguity,
thereby keeping the neighbors friendly. Lobach responded
that fences in Russia were not normally low but were used
specifically to keep people out of areas where they did not
belong.

--------------
TRIDENTS IN LOADING TUBES - WHAT TO EXPECT?
--------------


11. (S) LCDR Feliciano opened the discussion with Col Petrov
regarding inspection expectations for the new treaty.
Feliciano asked whether the Navy should expect the same
inspection issue surrounding Tridents in loading tubes as had
occurred under START. Petrov acknowledged the issue was
complex under START, but went on to explain how the current
delegation had the benefit of 15 years of START inspections
in moving forward with the new treaty. Petrov stated he
understood the hardship placed on the sailors and others who
must go through the long process of removing a Trident II
from a loading tube. He said the process would not only put
a strain on the people, but on the base as well. Petrov went
on to say the proposed combined inspection would further put
a strain on the people, base and submarine.


12. (S) Feliciano stated that not having to remove a Trident
from a loading tube would help with the combined inspection
timeline. Petrov agreed and stated the combined inspection
concept was even more burdensome on the escorts than on the
inspectors. Removing a Trident from its loading tube would
put additional stress on the base because since it would
prolong the inspection. Under the Russian concept, the
non-deployed Tridents would be located in storage bunkers.
Inspectors would only inspect them during an inspection of
non-deployed SOA; it would put less stress on the base, since
SLBMs on submarines would not be inspected. Feliciano asked
whether Russia would plan to carry out the same Trident II
inspection procedures or whether there was a better way.
Petrov stated he was confident the inspection team could
continue to confirm missile type using the combination of the
technical data in the MOU and the photos already provided by
the Navy.


13. (S) Feliciano asked whether 15 years of inspecting



Tridents in loading tubes under START could substitute for a
technical exhibition under the new treaty. Petrov nodded in
agreement while stating the missile type removed from the
loading tube was confirmed as a Trident II almost every time
when compared to the reference aid pictures. Mr. DeNinno
asked Petrov what he meant by "almost" and for specifics on
times Petrov thought the Trident II had not matched the
photos. Petrov admitted there was only one inspection when
the inspected Trident II had not matched the photos and only
because the TRIDENT II was rotated on the stand in comparison
with the photo. Feliciano stated he would provide feedback
to Navy to ensure it did not occur again.

--------------
TRIDENT II NWI - A HARDCOVER DILEMMA
--------------


14. (S) Feliciano stated the Navy was already thinking about
how to implement the new procedures associated with nuclear
warhead inspections (NWIs),and explained it was possible
inspection teams would see the same reentry vehicle hardcover
as under START or a modified version of the hardcover.
Petrov stated the aim of the NWI was to confirm the number of
warheads actually deployed on a particular missile, including
whether a missile had no deployed warheads. Petrov informed
Feliciano and DeNinno he had personally done the calculations
to determine whether the number of U.S. deployed warheads was
under 2200 as the United States had briefed at the last
Moscow Treaty Bilateral Implementation Commission. According
to his calculation, the number of U.S. warheads was not below

2200. He went on to explain the Trident II hardcover made it
difficult to calculate the actual numbers of warheads on a
Trident II. DeNinno mentioned START was based on attribution
and the United States had similar concerns about the large
covers used on the SS-25 and SS-27 ICBMs. Petrov
acknowledged the point and explained Russia had used a
conformal soft cover during the recent reentry vehicle
inspection in Teykovo which had allowed inspectors to confirm
and resolve a long-standing issue (Petrov and DeNinno had
been present for that inspection). He explained a conformal
soft cover made it easier to confirm actual warheads
deployed. Petrov said the method the sides used to cover
warheads under SFO would be an important issue. He went on
to explain that the current Trident hardcover posed some
doubt about how many warheads were actually deployed.
Feliciano said he would take that feedback to the people
implementing the inspections on the U.S. side.

-------------- --------------
NO TIME FOR FINAL JCIC - STATUS OF START CLOSEOUT MOU
-------------- --------------


15. (S) Koshelev asked Taylor whether the United States had
heard anything from the other JCIC Parties about the U.S.
proposal to have a close-out MOU for the START Treaty.
Taylor said he was not aware of any responses, and that he
had just received a copy of the proposal from Washington.
Koshelev said the Ambassador from Belarus had asked him that
day what Belarus should do with regard to the proposal, and
thus Koshelev was seeking Taylor's view of whether or not
there would be a JCIC.


16. (S) Taylor said he did not believe there would be time


for a full JCIC session given the anticipated pace of work
that would be necessary on the SFO Treaty. Taylor asked
Koshelev whether it would be possible for Brown and Kotkova
to conform the document, get it ready for signature, and then
ask representatives in Geneva from the Missions of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to sign the document on instructions
from their Governments. Koshelev said he did not believe
Belarus or Kazakhstan would be willing to take on such a
task. Nikonenko would likely want to come to Geneva instead
of relying on the Ukrainian Mission. Taylor asked Koshelev
whether the document could be signed in capitals, that is,
once the United States and Russia had agreed on the text,
whether it would be possible to send the document through
diplomatic channels for signature. Koshelev said he felt
that would the best way short of a JCIC session to get the
document signed. Taylor asked Koshelev whether he had any
concerns with the document. He said that Col Ryzkov would
have some comments, but he was not certain the extent of
those comments.

--------------
ARMS CONTROL BEYOND START FOLLOW-ON
--------------


17. (S) Colby discussed arms control policy and European
security matters with ADM Kuznetsov (Ret). Kuznetsov offered
a different take on arms control between the United States
and Russia, arguing for greater flexibility and noting the
United States had not sought formal arms control agreements
with Great Britain or France. The two Parties, he argued,
should design their forces as they saw fit while seeking to
cooperate on broader security matters. Kuznetsov also
dismissed recent calls (presumably including by President
Medvedev) for broader European security architecture to
replace CFE, NATO, et. al., and argued the current security
architecture worked quite well for all concerned. He noted
he would have no wish for Russia to enter into NATO and
therefore have to deal with all the committees in Brussels.


18. (S) Kuznetsov offered Colby his assessment of Russia's
view on nuclear abolition. Speaking apparently for himself,
Kuznetsov described the idea with a common colorful epithet.
Konstantin Vorontsov noted there were differences on this
point between the MOD and the MFA. Kuznetsov pointed out
abolition would be complicated by the fact that there were
many nuclear powers, not just the United States and Russia,
and reminded his interlocutors of the cold but effective
peace that nuclear weapons had secured since World War II.


19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS