Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1091
2009-11-30 18:05:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001091 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001091

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-067.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 28, 2009
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) Assistant Secretary of State for Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller led the U.S.
delegation in a Plenary session with the Russian delegation,
led by Ambassador Antonov. The Russian side had called the
meeting on short notice in order to deliver a new proposal
for resolution of outstanding issues that had been approved
by Moscow earlier in the day. Antonov described the proposal
as a "package" offer and Russia's "final" offer "for the
negotiations."


4. (S) The Russian proposal included some movement towards
U.S. positions on counting rules and overall treaty limits,
but presented significant problems on missile defense and the
offense-defense relationship, telemetry, verification of
mobile launchers and their ICBMs, and the verification regime
more broadly. Gottemoeller and other members of the U.S.
delegation expressed concern with elements of the proposal,
but deferred a fuller response until after further review.
End summary.


5. (S) Subject Summary: Antonov Previews and Comments on
the Russian Package Proposal; Antonov Delivers the Russian
Package Proposal; Involvement of Capitals; U.S. Reaction; and
Exchange on Offense-Defense and Missile Defense.

-------------- --------------
ANTONOV PREVIEWS AND COMMENTS ON THE RUSSIAN PACKAGE PROPOSAL
-------------- --------------


6. (S) Ambassador Antonov opened the meeting by emphasizing

the Russian delegation's intention to complete the treaty by
December 5 or "the beginning of December." Noting the
meetings between Admiral Mullen and General Makarov and
between APSNA Jones and NSA Prikhodko, Antonov said he was
pleased that high-ranking decision makers in Washington and
Moscow understood the issues at hand. He explained that the
Russian delegation had followed these meetings by preparing a
package proposal for review by Moscow, and earlier that day
had received Moscow's approval to table the offer. Antonov
underlined that the proposal was a package and that he had
been specifically instructed to convey that it was the
"final" proposal "for the negotiations." He commented that
the proposal was based on the principles of equality and
mutual respect and that the Russian delegation had striven to
accommodate U.S. positions.


7. (S) Before delving into the substance, Antonov
highlighted several key elements of the package proposal. On
the verification of mobile launchers and their ICBMs, he
stated that the Russians could agree to additional
verification measures, provided that such measures were


applied to the same extent to all strategic offensive arms
(SOA). Despite this shift in their position, he affirmed
that their "fundamental approach" was "intact."


8. (S) On telemetry, Antonov described the Russian revised
proposal as a "good will gesture" and an opportunity to
bridge the disagreements on the matter. He referred to
Russian acceptance of the "hybrid" approach to counting
rules, specifically with respect to the concept of "deployed"
SOA. He asserted that the Russian delegation had
"drastically" changed its proposed ceilings on warheads and
strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). On missile defense, he
claimed that Russia had "accommodated" the U.S. position on
the interrelationship between offense and defense and had
agreed with the U.S. approach to dealing with the quandary.
He also stated that Russia had agreed with the U.S. approach
regarding ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration.


9. (S) He once again affirmed that the Russian position,
despite the revisions contained in the proposal, remained
intact. He warned that, if the problems were not resolved,
the package solution would make no sense. He closed the
preview by asserting that the proposal was "constructive."

--------------
ANTONOV DELIVERS THE RUSSIAN PACKAGE PROPOSAL
--------------


10. (S) Antonov then presented the Russian proposal.

Begin text of official translation of Russian counterproposal:

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION
Releasable to the U.S.
side
Document of the Russian
side
November 28, 2009

Proposal of the Russian Federation
on Fundamental Issues of the New START


1. Numerical limits on strategic offensive arms and
counting rules:

- Warhead limit: 1600
- Strategic delivery vehicle limit: 650-700
One warhead shall be counted for each heavy bomber.


2. Non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs

References to nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles of
nuclear warheads shall be removed from the text of the
Treaty. Non-nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms
shall be counted against the overall limit on deployed
warheads. All non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs shall be
counted against the overall limit for strategic delivery
vehicles.

The U.S. side shall confirm that it is not possible for
heavy bombers, converted for non-nuclear armaments, to use
nuclear armaments.


3. The relationship between strategic offensive arms

and missile defense:

The relationship between strategic offensive arms and
missile defense shall be recorded in a package of documents,
which will form future agreements (treaty, joint
statement/understanding and unilateral statements of the
Russian Federation and the United States). In addition, all
elements of the package shall be legally binding.

The following obligations shall be included in the text
of the Treaty itself:

Not to convert or use ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers
for placement of missile defense interceptors therein and not
to convert or use missile defense interceptors for placement
of ICBMs and SLBMs therein.

Not to give missile defense interceptors the
capabilities of ICBMs and SLBMs.

The following provisions shall be recorded in a joint
statement/understanding:

Regarding signature of the Treaty under the circumstances
that the sides have strategic missile defense systems;

Regarding the intention of the sides to discuss unique
distinguishing features of newly developed types of missile
defense interceptors from existing ICBMs and SLBMs;

Regarding agreement in the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(to be established under the terms of the Treaty) on
procedures for confirming the presence of such differences.

The statements of the Russian Federation and the United
States regarding the viability of the treaty shall include
the possibility to withdraw from it in the event of a
quantitative or qualitative buildup of missile defense
systems by one of the Parties.


4. Verification regime for mobile ICBMs

By mutual agreement of the Parties, additional
verification measures for strategic offensive arms may be
established. Such measures shall be applied equally to
SLBMs, ICBMs, and ICBMs for mobile launchers.

The Russian Federation shall provide data on the
boundaries of deployment areas for ICBMs for mobile launchers.

In order to confirm data on mobile launchers of ICBMs
located on an ICBM base, US inspectors shall be given the
opportunity to view one of the fixed structures within the
basing area for which the mobile launcher of ICBMs is absent
at that time.

In order to confirm elimination of mobile launchers of
ICBMs, a special mark, which can be verified during an
inspection at a strategic offensive arms elimination site,
will be placed on the chassis of eliminated launchers and the
eliminated launchers of ICBMs shall be made available to NTMV
for 60 days.

Eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be used

for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.

The U.S. side shall, for its part, withdraw all other
demands related to ICBMs for mobile launchers, including the
requirement for inspectors to be present during the
elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs and ICBMs for mobile
launchers.


5. Telemetry:

An agreed quantity of telemetry information (TI) on
test launches of ICBMs and SLBMs may be exchanged by mutual
agreement of the sides on the basis of parity. Information
shall be provided on recording media of an agreed type
prepared by the transmitting side.

The sides shall have the right to encrypt information
in a specific number of instances - up to four launches per
year for each type of missile.

The U.S. side shall undertake the obligation to provide
TI on ICBM and SLBM launches, including launches of
Trident-II SLBMs from SSBNs of the United Kingdom, and shall
make a unilateral statement on the non-use of TI provided by
the Russian Federation in the interest of missile defense.


6. Verification mechanism:

All types of strategic offensive arms, regardless of
their basing modes, and launch canisters of ICBMs and SLBMs
shall be marked with unique identifiers (UIDs) reflected in
the database and subject to inspection during inspections of
all types.

The Russian side shall provide, 48 hours in advance,
notification of the exit of an ICBM from the Votkinsk
production facility. The U.S. side shall provide, 48 hours
in advance, analogous notifications of the exit of ICBMs and
SLBMs from production facilities for solid fuel missiles. An
appropriate notification of the arrival of a missile at an
ICBM base, SLBM base or at a location for non-deployed
missiles shall be provided.

There shall be no verification of armaments for HBs at
air base storage facilities.

The number of mandatory inspections per year shall not
exceed 16.

Within the framework of inspections conducted to
confirm the core limitations of the Treaty (the number of
deployed delivery vehicles and warheads),non-deployed
missiles located at maintenance facilities of the ICBM base
or SSBN base will also be verified.

Up to two inspection events per year may be conducted
at one SOA facility. There shall be no more than two such
facilities.

The U.S. side shall afford Russian inspection teams the
opportunity to conduct mandatory periodic inspections of SLBM
launchers converted to use SLCMs and of heavy bombers
converted for non-nuclear armaments and to verify significant
differences of ICBMs and SLBMs from missile defense

interceptors as well as ICBM and SLBM launchers from missile
defense interceptor launchers.

An obligation of the Parties to provide notification of
the movement of HBs equipped for non-nuclear armaments beyond
the national territory shall be recorded in the Treaty.

Additional limitations on non-deployed ICBM launchers
and SLBM launchers as well as on non-deployed ICBMs for
mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be established.

End text.

--------------
INVOLVEMENT OF CAPITALS
--------------


11. (S) Antonov then handed over copies of the proposal,
commenting that the U.S. side would find familiar positions
incorporated therein. He claimed that the proposal reflected
the first time the Russian delegation had: accepted a
reference to Votkinsk, moved on telemetry, given ground on
the verification of mobile launchers and their ICBMs, and
conceded on the verification regime. He emphasized that
agreeing to the package offer was very hard for the Russian
delegation, and hoped that the "constructive" proposals would
be received and entertained well in Washington. He
specifically urged that Washington take into account the
Russian position on the interrelationship between SOA and
strategic defensive arms (SDA). He also reaffirmed that the
proposal constituted a package and emphasized that it was a
final offer.


12. (S) Antonov further explained that Moscow had given him
and the delegation the authority to clear up the text in
order to prepare a treaty for signature by December 5. He
continued that he did not expect any high-ranking officials
to travel to Geneva from Moscow to aid the delegation,
commenting that the capabilities and effectiveness of the
delegation had been confirmed by President Medvedev, who had
given them the authority to finalize issues remaining in
light of the package proposal. Antonov suggested that the
working groups would be the right venues to work out such
technical aspects. He closed by stating that Moscow expected
only a simple answer from Geneva regarding the proposal, not
further deliberation.


13. (S) Gottemoeller thanked the Russian side for its
proposal, noting that it reflected the high-level meetings of
the preceding week. She commented that high-ranking
officials from both sides could well be expected to play a
role in the upcoming negotiations, and judged that this would
be a beneficial influence.

--------------
U.S. REACTION
--------------


14. (S) Turning to the proposal, Gottemoeller stated that
the offer would receive immediate attention in Washington.
She began by stating that she understood well the role of
packages in negotiations, and noted that the Russian proposal
was comprehensive. She also welcomed that the Russian side
had taken note of key U.S. issues, especially telemetry and

the verification of mobile systems. She also took note of
the "steady development" of the Russian position on the
treaty central limits, assessing it as "very welcome." She
also acknowledged the Russian mention of Votkinsk, and
likewise expressed appreciation for that.


15. (S) That said, Gottemoeller said that it was apparent
that the two sides still had "clashing" views on some issues.
She pledged that the U.S. side would undertake a careful
assessment of the Russian proposal before any full response,
but invited members of the U.S. delegation to comment or ask
questions. She reserved, however, the first question for
herself, which was a request for an explanation regarding how
the Russian side reconciled its proposal regarding sharing
telemetry data from British Trident II D-5 tests with the
"long-agreed" approach regarding existing patterns of
cooperation.


16. (S) Antonov responded that their proposal did not damage
the common understanding that cooperation with third parties
was not the subject of the treaty. He emphasized that they
did not seek to interfere with the U.S. pattern of
cooperation with the United Kingdom. But, he described, the
Russian side had repeatedly expressed its concern that this
pattern of cooperation could be used to circumvent key
elements of the treaty. If, he argued, the Parties agreed on
telemetry exchanges on a basis of parity then the Parties
could not have the opportunity to violate the principles of
the treaty, especially equivalency. He added that the
Russian delegation wanted a guarantee that exchanges of
telemetric information could not be used to undermine treaty
provisions, clarifying that the Russian delegation was
particularly concerned that the United States could unfairly
profit from the results of British tests of the Trident II.
He noted also that the Russian legal advisors had analyzed
this proposal in light of the Presidents' Joint Statement of
July 6 and ruled that it would not impinge upon the
protections of existing patterns of cooperation provided for
in sub-paragraph 9 of that Statement. Separately, Antonov
stated that the Russians would also want guarantees that
information derived from telemetric exchanges would not be
used for strategic missile defenses. Such usage would damage
Russia's strategic deterrent capabilities.


17. (S) Gottemoeller commented that such proposals seemed to
contradict the protections afforded to patterns of
cooperation, especially given that the United States did not
exercise control over British flight testing. She emphasized
that such requirements would violate Antonov's rule of
equivalency by imposing a unilateral burden on the United
States with respect to its relationship with the United
Kingdom.


18. (S) Dr. Warner then sought the justification behind the
Russian proposal that the United States provide advance
notification of the exit of both ICBMs and SLBMs from a
production facility while the proposal only required that
Russia provide notification of the exit of ICBMs in such
circumstances. After an exchange in which General Poznikhir
explained that the Russian objectives was to include all
solid-fueled ballistic missiles in the requirement, he and
Warner engaged in an exchange regarding the implications of
equality in this instance.


19. (S) Mr. Trout then asked for clarification regarding the
Russian proposal to allow for four encrypted launches for
each "type" of ballistic missile. Poznikhir responded that
each type of ballistic missile, such as an SS-25, RS-12M
Variant 2 (SS-27) and RS-24 would each be permitted four
encrypted launches per year.


20. (S) Trout then asked whether the proposed SDV ceiling
included non-deployed as well as deployed systems. Antonov
answered that the limit only included deployed SDVs.


21. (S) Warner pointed out that the Russian proposal needed
to clarify that references to counting non-nuclear warheads
under overall limits. Poznikhir agreed.


22. (S) Antonov then interjected that such technical issues
could be addressed in the working groups.

-------------- --
EXCHANGE ON OFFENSE-DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFENSE
-------------- --


23. (S) Gottemoeller then raised the issue of the package of
documents that had been proposed to address the issues
related to the offense-defense relationship. She noted that
the sides had discussed providing for the Parties to explain
the distinguishing features of missile defense interceptors
in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). In this
light, she stated that it surprised the U.S. side to see the
Russian delegation proposing inspections of missile defense
interceptors, a proposal which was "new" and "surprising,"
and represented a new way of treating the issue. It did not,
she made clear, seem a step towards resolving the issue.


24. (S) Antonov retorted that he was disappointed in the
initial U.S. reaction because missile defense constituted one
of the "fundamental, key" interests for Russia. He described
the U.S. side as routinely calling attention to its
interests, such as on Votkinsk, telemetry, and the
inspections of mobile systems, but, when the Russian side
raised its key issue of the offense-defense relationship and
missile defense, the U.S. side, he contended, was not willing
to consider any steps towards the Russian position. He
emphasized that the resolution of this matter would have a
major impact onQussia, and so he felt bound to Qress this,
stating that he was ready to discuss the issue further.


25. (S) He then proclaimed that he wanted to note then that
the U.S. side had rejected all Russian proposals to insert
SOA-SDA language into the treaty text. He recounted that
this proposal was the second such package the Russian side
had offered since APNSA Jones' presentation of the U.S.
proposal in Moscow. He exclaimed that the words he had heard
the U.S. side use could not be employed in diplomacy.
Underscoring that the Russian side had made many concessions,
he once again urged the U.S. side to react in a
"constructive" fashion.


26. (S) Gottemoeller pushed back by clarifying that, from
the outset of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation had made
an important compromise in principle by agreeing, as recorded
in the Presidents' Joint Statement of July 6, to include
language on the interrelationship between SOA and SDA in the
preamble of the treaty on the interrelationship between SOA

and SDA, a step which constituted a break from past U.S.
practice and positions. Antonov replied that the Joint
Statement did not quarantine such language to the preamble.
He jested that the Russian side could pursue a comparable
line of logic from President Medvedev's statement in
Singapore that Russia trusted the United States and therefore
did not need verification to imply that verification should
be restricted to the preamble. He followed this by repeating
his request that the U.S. side make clear to Washington the
substance and importance of the problem. He stated that he
was ready to continue discussions on the missile defense
issue or other issues as needed.


27. (S) The meeting closed with the heads of delegation
noting each other's consistency in their positions on the
matter.


28. (U) Documents exchanged:

- Russia:

-- Proposal of the Russian Federation on Fundamental
Issues of the New START, dated November 28, 2009.



29. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Ms. Dreicer
Mr. Elliott
Dr. Fraley
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kirchgasser
LTC LaGraffe
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Zdravecky
Dr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artem'yev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova

Adm Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Lobach
Ms. Melikbekian
Col Petrov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Pischulov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Trifonov
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
MISSING ONE PERSON


30. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS