Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1090
2009-11-30 17:50:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1090/01 3341750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301750Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0432
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5589
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2766
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1776
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6983
S E C R E T GENEVA 001090 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER
27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001090

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER
27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-061.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 27, 2009
Time: 15:00 P.M. - 17:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador
Antonov conducted a Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting on
November 27, 2009. Antonov assessed the recent visit of NSA
Prikhodko as positive, though he qualified it stating
Prikhodko's role was to deliver a message and not work
substantive treaty details. Chairman of the Duma
International Affairs Committee Kozachev is due to visit
November 29-30, and Gottemoeller offered to meet with him and
host a lunch. Gottemoeller tabled a non-paper on Article V,
which evoked a spirited discussion on provisions related to
the treatment of heavy bombers and missile defense. Finally,
Gottemoeller requested Antonov's cooperation in setting
guidelines for Conforming Group activities to ensure more
productive and speedier results.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Prikhodko Visit Backbrief and
Kozachev to Visit Geneva; Article V - U.S. Non-Paper
Reviewed; Article V - Heavy Bombers; Article V - Missile
Defense; Getting the Conforming Group on the Right Track.

--------------
PRIKHODKO VISIT BACKBRIEF
AND KOZACHEV TO VISIT GENEVA
--------------


5. (S) Antonov reported he had spoken to Prikhodko after his
meetings in Washington. Antonov, who confided he and
Prikhodko were close friends, was pleased to note Prikhodko
had called him first prior to calling the foreign minister.
Prikhodko related that U.S. officials had told him they were

not satisfied with the outcome of the visit of CJCS Mullen
and Russian CSA Makarov. Prikhodko apparently qualified by
saying it was not a reflection on the efforts of the
delegations. Their conversation then turned to the question
of how to get to an agreement. Antonov said the work could
be done by the delegation, and it did not have to be a
"tsar's concern." He reported Prikhodko had traveled to
Washington with authorization to discuss only the treaty.
Prikhodko closed his conversation with Antonov assessing the
outcome of his visit to be positive, and the most important
thing was both sides had been given food for thought.


6. (S) Gottemoeller told Antonov that the reports she had
received from Washington matched the reports Antonov had
received. She alluded to recent U.S. proposals for resolving
the mobile missile and telemetry issues. She conveyed how
Washington was very interested in reaching an agreement, and
she alluded to an important meeting that was taking place
November 27th in Washington, on a day following a holiday
where minimal activity was normally performed. She offered


to Antonov her impression that Washington, while working hard
to reach agreement on the treaty, might be growing
pessimistic of the chances for a treaty signature by the
desired date.


7. (S) In response to Antonov's question on the window for a
signature in the December timeframe, Gottemoeller confided
the President was scheduled to be in Europe December 8-11.
Antonov quickly shifted from the potential date of the
signing to the potential location. He reported he had cabled
Moscow and lobbied hard for the signing ceremony to be in
Geneva. He had argued for Geneva as that was where both
delegations were located. He also noted the significance of
Geneva in the broader context of arms control and
disarmament. However, his impression from Moscow was that
Moscow would like another venue. He wondered out loud if
Prague might get the nod, considering Prikhodko had once
worked there and spoke fluent Czech.


8. (S) Gottemoeller reminded Antonov the most important
consideration was not the location of the signing but having
in fact something that could be signed. Antonov was
nonplussed. Referring back to Prikhodko's visit, Antonov
hinted that Prikhodko had been sent to Washington just to
convey a message, and that all of the technical issues could
and would be resolved at Antonov's level. He assessed the
treaty document itself to be approximately 40 percent
complete, and in an effort to show more progress promised
definitive answers to preamble questions on Monday.
Gottemoeller suggested that she and Antonov meet every day
from here on--including Saturday, to which Antonov readily
agreed.


9. (S) Later in the meeting, Gottemoeller returned to the
subject of Prikhodko's trip to Washington and wondered how
long before the results were briefed to the Russian senior
leadership and new guidance issued. Antonov thought it could
come as soon as Saturday, November 28, but he was not
sanguine about the prospects of such a speedy action. He
reported President Medvedev, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and
Prikhodko were all in Belarus November 27 for an event. It
was possible that the results of the visit might be
discussed, but he figured the more likely scenario would be
no new guidance would be forthcoming until Monday or Tuesday.


10. (S) Antonov advised Gottemoeller that Chairman of the
Duma International Affairs Committee Kozachev was due to
visit Geneva on November 29 and 30. Gottemoeller offered to
host a luncheon for him, which Antonov gratefully accepted.

--------------
ARTICLE V - U.S. NON-PAPER REVIEWED
--------------


11. (S) Gottemoeller passed to Antonov a copy of a U.S.
Non-Paper on Article V (Prohibitions).

Begin text of U.S. Proposal on a Treaty Article on
Prohibitions:

U.S. Non
Paper
November 27,


2009

Article ((((V))))1 ((((VI))))2


1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty,
modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may
be carried out.


2. The Parties agree that the modernization and replacement
of their strategic offensive arms shall not involve the
production, testing or deployment of nuclear weapon delivery
systems other than ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.


3. In the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind
of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of
strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to
raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the
Bilateral Consultative Commission in accordance with
subparagraph (c) of Article ((XIII))1 ((XIV))2 of the Treaty.

((4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs or SLBMs in a
non-nuclear configuration.))2

((4. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for
delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for
purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations
undertaken by the Parties.))1 ((5. In fulfilling
obligations under this Treaty, each Party shall have the
right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing a payload, other
than any kind of weapon, into space or the upper
atmosphere.))2

((5. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy
systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.))1

((6. Each Party undertakes not to convert heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments. Nuclear armaments shall not
be stored at air bases of heavy bombers converted for
non-nuclear armaments. The crews of such bombers shall not
undergo training to carry out missions involving nuclear
weapons.))2

((6.))1 ((7.))2 Each Party undertakes not to base strategic
offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty
outside its national territory.

((7. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities
associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated
facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been
provided in accordance with paragraph x of Section x of Part
Four of the Protocol, unless notification of a new facility
at the same location has been provided in accordance with
paragraph x of Section x of Part Four of the Protocol.
Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be
located at eliminated facilities except during their movement
through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at
such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at
eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with
strategic offensive arms.))1

((8. Each Party undertakes not to locate heavy bombers with
nuclear armaments outside the continental portion of national


territory.))2

((9. In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber
outside the national territory in accordance with
subparagraph 3(b) of Article VIII, notification shall be
provided.))2

((10. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or
SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors
therein.))2

((11. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use launchers
of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and
SLBMs therein.))2

((12. Each Party undertakes not to jointly base heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments at an air base.))2

End text.


12. (S) Gottemoeller proceeded to point out the differences
with a previous draft version of Article V. She recalled
Antonov had expressed concerns over how paragraph 2 had been
worded to ban new forms of strategic offensive arms (SOA).
She pointed out the paragraph had been rewritten to reflect
what was going to be permitted in the form of modernization
of SOA, namely ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. She pointed
out the text was juxtaposed between ensuring no prohibitions
on modernization while at the same time prohibiting the
development of new, exotic forms of SOA.


13. (S) Taking paragraphs 1-3 as a whole, Gottemoeller
stressed them to be the key to framing the prohibitions that
should be included in Article V: modernization was
permitted, exotic weapons prohibited, and any questions
thereof could be raised for discussion in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC).


14. (S) For U.S. paragraph 4 (Russian paragraph 5),
Gottemoeller agreed to the need for language limiting the
uses of ICBMs and SLBMs for the launching of objects into
space. However, she encouraged Antonov to consider staying
with text formulation that had been used in the START Treaty.



15. (S) Russian and U.S. versions of paragraph 7 were both
deemed to be acceptable. The HOD discussed the most logical
location for them in the treaty. The HOD also agreed to
consider moving paragraph 9, which contained language on the
need for notifications of heavy bomber movements, to the
notifications part of the protocol.

--------------
Article V - Heavy Bombers
--------------


16. (S) For Russian paragraph 6, Gottemoeller asked Antonov
whether he had any concerns about the lack of verification
provisions associated with ensuring crews of converted heavy
bombers were not being trained to carry out missions using
nuclear ordinance. Antonov said his experts had not
expressed any reservations. He and Gottemoeller then


discussed the final location of this paragraph and the
possibility of listing like paragraphs together.


17. (S) Paragraph 8 (a Russian-proposed prohibition on
locating heavy bombers with nuclear armaments outside the
continental portion of national territory) evoked a spirited
discussion. Gottemoeller began by commenting how this
paragraph went against one of the basic tenets of the treaty,
namely the ability for a Party to decide the size,
composition, and by extension, the operation of its SOA.
Antonov agreed that Article II permitted the determination of
size and structure. However, for operations, he reminded
Gottemoeller how the heavy bombers in question in this
paragraph would actually be carrying live nuclear weapons.
As such, it was logical that their movement be constrained.
He assumed this provision would not be a huge question, as he
didn't see the need for either side to have nuclear weapons
on board heavy bombers during peace time in the first place.
He wondered where the United States might want to fly its
nuclear laden bombers, Guam, or some other location.


18. (S) Comparing treatment of one type of SOA restrictions
to another, Gottemoeller pointed out how the Russian side
chafed at any proposals to curb the movements of mobile
launchers of ICBMs. Antonov replied mobile launchers were
confined to deployment areas, which he likened to small
islands in the sea that was the national territory. However,
under the Russian proposal, the heavy bombers would get to
fly over the entire national territory with no restrictions.
Antonov wondered (what the Russian Federation should think)
whether the United States had any plans to deploy heavy
bombers over the skies of Cuba or Venezuela. Gottemoeller
wryly observed that if that was an issue, the United States
would have complained every time a Russian Bear bomber flew
down the U.S. coast on its way to a landing in Venezuela or
Cuba. With that, the HOD determined to set the question
aside for the time being.


19. (S) For paragraph 12, the final paragraph of the article
which contained a provision prohibiting basing nuclear and
non-nuclear bombers together, Gottemoeller wondered if there
was a real need for such a provision. Attempting to soften
the impact of the language, Antonov noted the language said
"based," which meant lesser collocations might be acceptable.
He also offered to move the text to a less prominent part of
the treaty documents so long as the United States would agree
to the language therein.

--------------
ARTICLE V - MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


20. (S) Russian-proposed paragraphs 10 and 11 (conversion of
ICBM and SLBM launchers to ABM launchers and the reverse),
evinced another animated response from Antonov. Antonov
pointed out how the United States had converted ICBM
launchers at Vandenberg AFB into missile defense launchers.
He wanted language inserted into Article V that would clearly
prohibit them from being reconverted back into ICBM
launchers. Gottemoeller underscored the purpose of the
treaty was to cover SOA and not missile defense systems.


21. (S) Antonov replied there were many things covered in


the treaty. For example, ICBM launches of objects into space
are covered with a provision; however, if only SOA were to be
addressed, the treaty could not carry this provision either.
Gottemoeller observed that this issue had political linkage
that made it unacceptable to the United States. Antonov
noted the treatment of silos was covered under the treaty,
and this aspect of their usage should likewise be addressed.
Gottemoeller noted there was a proposal for another visit to
Moscow by Under Secretary Tauscher to continue discussion on
missile defense cooperation. Antonov was skeptical it would
take place, and he was less convinced anything new would be
discussed.

--------------
GETTING THE CONFORMING
GROUP ON THE RIGHT TRACK
--------------


22. (S) Gottemoeller expressed concerns over the operation
of the Conforming Group. She observed the Conforming Group
activities were being counterproductive in that they were
redrafting sections of agreed language that necessitated a
return to the originating working group for discussion and
approval.


23. (S) Antonov offered for a joint meeting of HOD with the
representatives of both side to the Conforming Group to
ensure they heard one set of directions articulated. As an
aside, Antonov took advantage of the moment to chide the
United States for its constant reliance on START Treaty text
and phrasing.


24. (S) Gottemoeller expressed her appreciation of Antonov's
offer, and closed by reminding him how the smooth operation
of the Conforming Group would be key to achieving the goal of
an acceptable treaty by the desired date.


25. (S) Documents exchanged:

- U.S.

-- Non-Paper on Article V (Prohibitions),dated
November 27, 2009.


26. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS