Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1088
2009-11-30 16:38:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1088/01 3341638
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301638Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0425
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5582
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2759
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1769
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6976
S E C R E T GENEVA 001088 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP, NOVEMBER 20, 2009

REF: A. A) GENEVA 00856 (SFO-GVA-V-044)

B. B) GENEVA 01012 (SFO-GVA-VI-052)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001088

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP, NOVEMBER 20, 2009

REF: A. A) GENEVA 00856 (SFO-GVA-V-044)

B. B) GENEVA 01012 (SFO-GVA-VI-052)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-043.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 20, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On November 20, 2009, the Treaty Text and Definitions
Working Group (TTDWG) met at the U.S. Mission. The TTDWG
discussed the provisions in Article VIII on disclosure of
information. Though agreeing in principle for the need to
release information, the sides were not able to agree on
language allowing for release to the public of initial data
submitted after signature and prior to entry into force
(EIF). The TTDWG also began initial discussion on Article
IV, and agreed to consider convening a sub-working group to
work through locational restrictions found in this article.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Article VIII - Disclosure Issues;
and Article IV - Initial Work Begins.

--------------
ARTICLE VIII - DISCLOSURE ISSUES
--------------


5. (S) Ries began discussion on Article VIII by proposing a
new formulation to the language concerning release of data
acquired through implementation of the treaty. The new
language would allow for release of data at EIF, and would
contain provisions for subsequent releases of information
within certain parameters. The language also recognized the
need for agreement with the two Parties on data release, and
it noted the sensitivity of certain types of data that would
not be released unless the Parties agreed otherwise.

Koshelev, for his part, noted the extensive experience both
sides had acquired in the area of data release during the
life of the START Treaty. However, taking into consideration
Russian legislation on security of information, the best
course of action to his mind would be to postpone discussions
of data release until the first session of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC).


6. (S) Koshelev also pointed out there would be a final
submission of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data at the
end of the START period, and that information would look very
similar to the information submitted at EIF. Admiral
Kuznetsov added that, for the MOU, all of the data fields had
yet to be decided let alone populated with data. Taking into
consideration all fields would have to be completed prior to
signature, he felt it premature to begin discussions on what
to release and not release until it was known what
information would be available for such consideration. He
also argued for pushing any discussion of data release to the
BCC, which would convene after all matters had been decided



and treaty EIF.


7. (S) Ries agreed with Kuznetsov on the need to complete
all database fields and affirmed the intention of the United
States to provide such data. She added there were in fact
three separate releases of data that would need to be
considered: the final START data, which the BCC would
address; an initial release of START Follow-on (SFO) data to
take place during the provisional application phase; and
subsequent releases of data taking place on a recurring basis
throughout the life of the treaty. However, she felt it
important for Article VIII to address the initial release of
information and also address what would happen subsequently.
She reminded the Russian side this treaty possessed an added
dimension over START in that it would also address nuclear
warheads. As this aspect of the treaty involved highly
sensitive information, it was important to craft language
limiting releases to the aggregate numbers of nuclear
warheads. Regardless, it was important to be clear all other
data would not be released unless otherwise agreed.


8. (S) Koshelev thought any activities related to
provisional application should take place at a separate
discussion and not be framed in the treaty text. He argued
for more concise language and avoidance of listed inclusions
and exceptions. He also thought the BCC would be the best
venue for determining release of information. With that in
mind, he noted how the Russian-proposed language provided the
broad context for determining future releases of information
via the BCC.


9. (S) Mr. Dean observed the key difference in positions was
that the United States wanted the right to release
information vice a release being subject to consent. He
thought the BCC would then be able to address further details
concerning such release. Ms. Zdravecky stressed the
importance of Article VIII language in establishing
expectations for outside observers about what would be
released, as well as what was too sensitive and therefore not
likely to be considered for release.


10. (S) Koshelev said the only hard and fast requirement in
the treaty involving information release was the requirement
for both sides to meet the limits set forth in Article II
within 7 years. He stipulated to the obligation for both
sides to report that information. Mr. Taylor pointed out how
both the START Treaty and Moscow Treaty also had goals of
lower limits and both sides reported on a recurring basis the
progress they were making towards those goals. The language
the United States sought to insert in Article VIII would
assure treaty implementation would occur with maximum
openness and transparency. Koshelev said he would think over
the matter and consider what practices (i.e., release of
information) would be desirable to carry over from the START
Treaty. At the same time, he lobbied for a shorter
formulation to the language. Ries agreed, but noted it
equally important to fence certain areas of data from any
release.

--------------
ARTICLE IV - INITIAL WORK BEGINS
--------------



11. (S) Dr. Fraley began a discussion of U.S.-proposed
locational restrictions in Article IV. He noted the Russian
proposal contained several restrictions in Article V that
could also be discussed at the same time and might be more
appropriately located in Article IV. Regardless of the
location in the text, he urged the Russian side to begin
discussion soonest. Fraley also pointed out that the Russian
text did not contain all locations where strategic offensive
arms (SOA) might be located under this treaty, and he asked
whether the Russians had thought about this omission.
Finally, he noted the concepts of prototypes and transit
rules for SOA should also be discussed.


12. (S) Kuznetsov opined the MOU Working Group should decide
first what data will be placed in the MOU, then the
Definitions Subgroup should build definitions for deployed
and non-deployed SLBM, ICBM, and heavy bombers, and only then
should the TTDWG examine Article IV. Koshelev wondered
whether the matter should not be referred to another working
group prior to discussion by the TTDWG. Ries suggested both
sides consider including experts from other working groups.
After the meeting ended, Koshelev and Ries agreed to consider
forming a subgroup to examine location re strictions in
Article IV.


13. (S) Documents exchanged: None


14. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Sims
Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS