Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1085
2009-11-29 18:04:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1085/01 3331804
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291804Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0410
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5572
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2749
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1759
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6966
S E C R E T GENEVA 001085 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING,
NOVEMBER 19, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

B. GENEVA 1082 (SFO-GVA-VII-035)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001085

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING,
NOVEMBER 19, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

B. GENEVA 1082 (SFO-GVA-VII-035)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-038.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2009
Time: 11:20 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov
Ms. Purcell (Notetaker) Mr. Vorontsov (Notetaker)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the November 19, 2009, one-on-one meeting with Amb
Antonov, A/S Gottemoeller previewed current Washington
thinking about reducing strategic delivery vehicles below

800. In such a case, Washington believed compensation for
conventionally-armed launchers would be needed. Washington
also believed the warhead limit should go down to 1500 if the
delivery vehicle limit went below 800. Antonov considered it
impossible for Russia to explicitly recognize
conventionally-armed launchers in the treaty. Antonov also
said the Presidents had discussed delivery vehicle numbers
between 600 and 700.


4. (S) Antonov was adamant that it was critical for the
joint statement on missile defense to be legally-binding and
ratified in the United States as well as in Russia.
Gottemoeller identified offense-defense as a key issue that
needed to be resolved, along with numerical ceilings,
telemetry, and measures for mobile ICBM systems. The U.S.
side hoped to resolve these issues during CJCS Mullen's
meetings with General Makarov and National Security Advisor
Jones' meetings with Mr. Prikhodko. Those meetings would

determine whether there would be a treaty to sign by December

10.


5. (U) Subject Summary: Negotiating Lower Numbers; Planning
Mullen-Makarov and Jones-Prikhodko Talks; Missile Defense
Commitments Must Be Legally-Binding; Releasability of Treaty
Data, May I?; and, And On Top of That, The Duma Is Coming.

--------------
NEGOTIATING LOWER NUMBERS
--------------


6. (S) Gottemoeller conveyed to Antonov that she had just
received confirmation that Presidents Obama and Medvedev had
discussed limits on strategic delivery vehicles below 800
during their November 15 meeting in Singapore. Washington
was now considering numerical limits lower than 800. In such
a case, the United States would need compensation, an
allowance for launchers carrying conventional warheads. The
limit of 800 delivery vehicles proposed by Jones in October


(REF A) was high enough so that conventionally-armed
strategic delivery vehicles could be counted as if they were
nuclear-armed. If the limit were lower, for example 750, the
United States probably would need a separate allowance of 50
conventionally-armed delivery vehicles that would not count
as nuclear-armed. This was an on-going discussion in
Washington, not yet decided.


7. (S) Antonov considered such an allowance completely
unacceptable. Russia had agreed to close its eyes to U.S.
conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs by counting them as
nuclear. Russia could never agree, however, to recognize
conventionally-armed strategic delivery vehicles explicitly
in the START Follow-on treaty. Instead, the word nuclear
would be removed from in front of warheads in the treaty
text. Russia did not object to research and development on
conventional warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs, but its goal was
for them not to be deployed.


8. (S) Gottemoeller acknowledged U.S. understanding of
Russia's position, and that the treaty would reflect
constructive ambiguity regarding conventional warheads. But,
the question had just arisen of how to reduce below 800
delivery vehicles. It would be very difficult to break that
barrier, so the U.S. side was considering compensation.
Antonov insisted that the Presidents, or at least President
Medvedev, had discussed reductions to 600 to 700 delivery
vehicles. Gottemoeller acknowledged that President Obama had
expressed willingness to explore a limit below 800.


9. (S) Gottemoeller also conveyed Washington's consideration
that, if the delivery vehicle limit was reduced below 800,
the deployed warhead limit should be lowered as well, to

1500. Antonov asked why that had to be so. Gottemoeller
explained that reducing deployed warheads down to 1500 would
make the reductions more significant in comparison with the
Moscow Treaty and, therefore, be viewed more positively by
the international community. If the United States had a
separate allowance for conventional warheads, it would not
need a warhead limit as high as 1600. Another, potentially
important, reason was that Russia would soon deploy a new
MIRVed ICBM. The United States did not yet know how many
warheads Russia planned to deploy on it. Antonov argued that
the United States could use warhead inspections to count the
number of warheads on Russian ICBMs. Gottemoeller clarified
that the concern was over the total number of warheads
deployed on the new mobile ICBM. The United States needed
some certainty as to the limits of Russian MIRVing.

--------------
PLANNING MULLEN-MAKAROV
AND JONES-PRIKHODKO TALKS
--------------


10. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed plans for the
arrival of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Mullen and Russian Chief of the General Staff General Makarov
on November 22. Gottemoeller planned to host the visitors
for dinner at her apartment the evening of November 22, and
Antonov planned to hold a reception at the Russian Mission
the evening of November 23. Gottemoeller provided Antonov a
list of the delegation accompanying Mullen and the schedule
she had proposed. Antonov conveyed that Makarov would be


accompanied by a number of three- and four-star generals,
including the commanders of the Russian Navy, Air Force, and
Strategic Rocket Forces.


11. (S) Antonov asked what should be covered during the
opening plenary meeting. Gottemoeller suggested that she and
Antonov first provide their views on the status of the
negotiations, and then the visiting military leaders could
each give a presentation. Antonov demurred, saying that he
did not represent the military and could only speak at their
meeting if they requested. Antonov was supportive of the
visitors convening small group meetings in any composition,
but he saw no reason for a closing plenary meeting. His view
was that the Russian visitors' role was to help the
negotiators, but not interfere in the negotiating process.
They would convey the results of the meetings to President
Medvedev, who would make decisions that would form the basis
for Russian foreign policy adviser Prikhodko's subsequent
visit to Washington.


12. (S) Antonov asked whether Mullen would discuss limits on
numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles.
Gottemoeller thought so, but said she would have more details
later. Antonov doubted that Makarov would say anything about
numerical limits that would differ from President Medvedev's
statements. Medvedev had first stated a delivery vehicle
limit of 500-550, then had changed his position to 600-700.
The President determined the limits of Russia's ability to
compromise, and neither Makarov nor Prikhodko would
contradict the President. There would be no surprises from
the Russian side on this point. Moscow was wondering why
White House officials were included on Mullen's delegation,
since the discussion would be on military-technical issues.


13. (S) Gottemoeller reviewed the key U.S. goals for
Prikhodko's visit to Washington November 25-26. The United
States hoped that at least the main parameters of the treaty
would be decided in order to give guidelines to the
negotiators on the direction of the treaty regarding:

- numerical ceilings;
- measures relating to mobile ICBM systems;
- telemetry; and
- the offense-defense relationship.

The U.S. considered these meetings critical for determining
whether or not there would be a treaty to sign by December 10.


14. (S) Antonov asked about press availability during
Mullen's visit. Gottemoeller advised against it, being
certain that Mullen would not want publicity and would not
give any interviews. Antonov agreed, saying he would also
advise Makarov not to give any interviews. However, if
asked, the Russians would tell the press that the visit was
taking place as directed by President Medvedev, that
military-technical issues were being discussed, that the goal
was to help move the negotiations forward, and that they
would report back to President Medvedev. Perhaps there would
also be some warm words about what a great job the
negotiators were doing. The Heads of Delegation both noted
that the press was very interested in the negotiations.
Gottemoeller warned that a U.S. journalist would shortly
publish an article about U.S. portal monitoring activities at


Votkinsk.

--------------
MISSILE DEFENSE COMMITMENTS
MUST BE LEGALLY BINDING
--------------


15. (S) Gottemoeller requested confirmation that Russia
wanted the associated documents on missile defense to be
equivalent to the Treaty Protocol because Russia would ratify
them. They did not need to be ratified under U.S. law, but
the Administration would provide them to the Senate on a
voluntary basis. Antonov became very serious and said that
the missile defense documents must be legally-binding and
ratified by both sides as an integral part of the treaty
package. He had understood that the United States had agreed
to do so and had reported that to Foreign Minister Lavrov and
President Medvedev. If the United States was not going to
ratify the missile defense documents, that changed
everything. Russia's concerns about U.S. missile defense
would return and the Parties would be back to square one on
this issue. Antonov explained that the reason why he had
earlier said that the missile defense documents must be
considered second tier documents was because Gottemoeller had
said that the United States would ratify at least the first
and second tier documents.


16. (S) Gottemoeller clarified that all three tiers would be
subject to ratification in the United States, although she
understood Russia would not ratify the third tier documents.
Associated documents had been concluded successfully under
START, even though they had not been subject to ratification
in the United States. Antonov emphasized the importance of
obtaining a legally binding-guarantee that, for the duration
of the START Follow-on treaty, the United States would not
build up missile defenses to a level that would threaten
Russia's deterrent forces.


17. (S) Antonov clarified that he was not referring to the
draft unilateral statements. He knew they were not
legally-binding. His concern was with the joint statement;
if it were not legally-binding, the value of the treaty would
be negated for Russia. Russia insisted that obligations
regarding both offenses and defenses must be law for both the
United States and Russia. Gottemoeller assured him the
United States was working hard to address Russia's concerns,
reminding him that the U.S. position always was that the
START Follow-on treaty would address only strategic offensive
arms, and not defensive systems. START provided a very good
precedent, in that missile defense concerns were resolved
through statements associated with the treaty and, therefore,
the withdrawal clause in START did not specify any examples
of extraordinary events.


18. (S) Antonov promised to prepare Makarov and Prikhodko
for discussions of the offense-defense issue and requested
that Gottemoeller prepare Washington officials. Russia did
not want to begin offense-defense discussions from the
beginning all over again. Russia wanted to resolve the
issue. Russia was not asking for limitations on missile
defense, but only for a binding Presidential level commitment
that ICBMs, SLBMs, and their launchers would not be used for
missile interception, so that Russia would not face


technological surprise. This would significantly enhance
trust between the sides.


19. (S) Gottemoeller expressed concerns about treaty
ratification. Antonov countered that Russia had a similar
difficulty in obtaining treaty ratification. The treaty must
be seen in Russia as providing parity in order to be ratified.

--------------
RELEASABILITY OF
TREATY DATA, MAY I?
--------------


20. (S) Gottemoeller provided the U.S. Delegation's reaction
to Russian-proposed treaty text on releasability of treaty
data, which Antonov had provided on November 18 (REF B). The
U.S. side believed it was a step in the right direction, but
not yet acceptable. In Gottemoeller's view, the United
States would agree that data would be released as mutually
agreed, but a routinized procedure for releasing data was
needed. Russia's proposed text would require requesting
approval for each release of data, with potentially long
delays. Under START, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data
was automatically releasable after three months. Antonov
asked for details on releasability procedures under START,
taking careful notes. He promised to check further with his
delegation. Gottemoeller noted that the Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group was discussing this provision, and
would continue to work on it.


21. (S) Begin text:

Russian Proposal for paragraph 6 of Article VIII
(in place of paragraphs 6 and 7 of U.S. draft text)

Each Party shall have the right to release to the public
or a third Party the data acquired in the implementation of
this Treaty subject to the consent by the other Party.

End text.


22. (S) Gottemoeller then raised the proposed outline
structure for the treaty documents. Russia had proposed an
outline that was not consistent with the U.S. approach in
terms of which headings used Roman numerals and which used
letters. Using Russia's outline structure would require too
many changes in the various texts being developed. Antonov
said he would check with his legal advisor, recognizing it
was not a substantive issue.


23. (S) Antonov recommended against listing specific
examples of when the Parties should not use concealment
measures in Article IX of the treaty. The U.S.-proposed text
of Article IX included such a list. He argued that such
illustrative examples should be discussed in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC). The overall commitment not to
use concealment measures that impede verification covered it
all--a total ban. Gottemoeller argued that the provision
came from paragraph 3 of Article IX of START. Antonov
recommended that the experts work further on that paragraph.

--------------
AND ON TOP OF THAT,


THE DUMA IS COMING
--------------


24. (S) Antonov had just received confirmation by phone that
a group of Duma members planned to arrive in Geneva the
evening of November 22 to meet with the Russian Delegation.
It was not a request, but a fait accompli. He was at a loss
as to what to do with them, especially on November 23, when
his delegation would be fully occupied with the
Mullen-Makarov meetings. He was concerned, however, not to
offend them or let them feel neglected. One of the visitors
was named Ozerov, who was very important and influential.
Kosachev was not coming. They would be invited to the
reception at the Russian Mission the evening of November 23.
Gottemoeller agreed to arrange a lunch for the Duma members
on November 24, after Mullen's departure.


25. (S) Antonov hoped for good results from all these
visits. He commented that many additional officials in
Moscow were now seeking to participate in the negotiating
process, and cited two relevant Russian proverbs: Victory
has many fathers, but defeat is an orphan; and Generals take
cities, while privates surrender cities.


26. (S) Documents exchanged. None.


27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS