Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1081
2009-11-29 10:24:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1081/01 3331024
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291024Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0393
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5555
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2732
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1742
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6949
S E C R E T GENEVA 001081 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 17, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 1075 (SFO-GVA-VII-028)

B. GENEVA 0963 (SFO-GVA-VI-030)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001081

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 17, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 1075 (SFO-GVA-VII-028)

B. GENEVA 0963 (SFO-GVA-VI-030)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-032.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
met with their Russian counterparts at the Russian Mission on
November 17, 2009. This was the second meeting of this
session and the ninth meeting overall. The U.S. side handed
over a revised version of joint draft text (JDT) of the MOU
and the two sides discussed issues stemming from the JDT.
The United States also handed over its planned facilities
declaration for the MOU.


4. (U) Subject Summary: Discussion of JDT and U.S.
Facilities Declaration; "Returned" ICBMs and Notifications
and JDT Clarifications; and, Discussion of Mobiles and Next
Steps.

--------------
DISCUSSION OF JDT AND U.S.
FACILITIES DECLARATION
--------------


5. (S) Following a brief discussion regarding proposed START
Follow-on (SFO) related meetings in Washington and the
impending visit of three Duma members the following week,
General Orlov and Mr. Trout turned to the opening section of
the MOU. Trout agreed to consider Orlov's proposal to title
the MOU "Protocol to the Treaty, Section 2."


6. (S) Trout handed over the latest version of the
U.S.-proposed JDT of the MOU, which incorporated the last
round of Russian and U.S. changes. Trout and Orlov agreed
not to proceed line-by-line through the most recent

iteration, as both sides were aware of the outstanding
issues. Orlov asked, in light of the earlier discussion of
the Ad Hoc Group (REF A),what Trout thought of the Russian
proposal on heavy bomber counting rules. Trout responded
that the U.S. side was looking at the whole issue of counting
rules, but that no decision had yet been reached.


7. (S) Colonel Pischulov stated that the Russian Delegation
had not introduced any new changes into MOU subsections 1, 2,
or 3, but had not accepted any U.S.-proposed text. He then
briefly surveyed the Russian Delegation's positions on
Sections 4 and 5 and the Annexes to the MOU. Trout queried
for the rationale behind the Russian inclusion of so much
technical data pertaining to heavy bombers, as the U.S.
position was that only data required to distinguish between
heavy bomber types was needed. Orlov stressed that the
additional data, which was the same as in START, was


necessary for inspectors. Pischulov stated that the Parties
needed technical data to determine how many missiles can be
located on the aircraft. LT Lobner pointed out that
technical data was included in START for purposes of
attributing warhead numbers. In light of the dropping of
such an attribution system, the technical data no longer
served a purpose, while distinguishing data was still
salient. Orlov replied that, if the United States accepted
the Russian proposal on heavy bomber counting rules proffered
that day at the Ad Hoc Group, Russia would agree to drop the
technical data requirements. Under the Russian proposal,
each heavy bomber would be attributed with a single warhead.
Trout replied that the United States was looking at a
construct of deployed heavy bombers, non-deployed heavy
bombers, and deployed heavy bombers with non-nuclear
armaments, and would respond to the Russian proposal soon.


8. (S) Trout proposed that the sides drop the categories for
measurements of fixed structures for mobile launchers of
ICBMs in Annex A and instead exchange photographs that show
the front and side of such fixed structures. Orlov stated
that the Russian Delegation would consider the proposal. Mr.
Shevchenko questioned what the Russian Federation derived
from such an exchange. Trout responded that the Parties
achieved a means to resolve brackets.


9. (S) Both Trout and Orlov noted that they had been tasked
by their Heads of Delegation with referring text to the
Conforming Group as quickly as possible. The two chairs
agreed to consider specific texts for referral at the next
MOU Working Group meeting.


10. (S) The Parties then discussed the category of "other
airplanes" in Annex D and agreed that the heading and
associated data would be included under a revised title of
"inspection airplanes."


11. (S) Trout handed over a Facilities Declaration for the
United States. Orlov said that the Russian Delegation would
consider the document and be prepared to discuss it at the
following session. He also stated that he had the same data
with him but it was not ready to be turned over to the U.S.
side at that time.

--------------
"RETURNED" ICBMS AND NOTIFICATIONS
AND JDT CLARIFICATIONS
--------------


12. (S) Pischulov raised the issue of "returned" ICBMs at
production facilities for ICBMs, stating that the Russian
side believed that this was an agreed issue. (Begin comment:
"Returned" ICBMs are those treaty-accountable missiles that
have returned to a production facility, usually for
maintenance. ICBMs that have never left a production
facility are not treaty-accountable. End comment.) Trout
queried whether the Russian side would continue the START
practice of including in notifications whether an ICBM
leaving a production facility is a newly-produced or a
"returned" missile. Trout stated that, if the Russians
agreed to continue such notifications, the U.S. would accept
the inclusion of the word "returned" in the MOU. Orlov
initially responded that the Russian side would continue


doing so, but then subsequently stated that they would
consider the issue.


13. (S) Orlov noted that Mr. Elliott had agreed to delete
all references in the treaty to "items subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty" and queried why the
text remained in the MOU heading. Trout replied that he
would look into the matter, but noted that the MOU covered
more than only strategic offensive arms, as the Russian
heading suggested.


14. (S) Lobner raised a number of detailed issues. He first
confirmed with Pischulov that the Russians agreed to remove
"training heavy bombers." He noted that the United States
was moving toward the deletion of references to training
heavy bombers, their related items, and deployment areas, but
that completing such deletions would take some time.


15. (S) Orlov agreed to include the phrase "variant of a
type" in Section III. He also agreed to add the category of
"repair facilities for ICBMs," as the United States would
have to declare a facility under this heading. Lobner noted
that the United States would also place brackets around
"training models of missiles" to reflect Russian opposition
to including the category. Lobner also pointed out that the
U.S. position on the title for Annex B, as well as various
opening paragraphs for sections in Annex B, were changed to
reflect the U.S. view that the section should emphasize heavy
bomber distinguishing features. Lobner noted that the United
States had not seen any data under Annex C, Section 4, on
non-nuclear ALCMs.


16. (S) Lobner stated that the United States agreed with the
Russian reorganization of facilities in Annex D. In light of
the reorganization, the United States had added sub-headings
for ease of following the data. He also noted that some
differences remained regarding which facilities to include in
this section. Trout added that production facilities for
SSBNs, a category the Russians proposed including, were not
typically subject to inspection. Pischulov replied that the
Russian Delegation had included this category because such
facilities could be used for conversions or eliminations and
therefore needed to be listed, but understood that they were
not normally subject to inspection. Orlov affirmed this
point and suggested moving those facilities not inspectable
elsewhere. Pischulov noted that the Russian Delegation had
included the category of "flight test centers" for the same
reasons. Trout floated the idea of creating a category of
bases not subject to inspection, and Orlov agreed to consider
the proposal. Mr. Luchaninov queried whether definitions
would need to be provided for the U.S.-added sub-headings;
Lobner replied that, because they were purely organizational,
the U.S. side did not envision creating such definitions.

--------------
DISCUSSION OF MOBILES
AND NEXT STEPS
--------------


17. (S) Colonel Voloskov asked why the U.S. side had
included a category on ICBM and SLBM production facilities.
Trout responded that this reflected the U.S. position that
the Votkinsk Final Assembly Plant was still subject to


inspection. This prompted a discussion on the issue of
Votkinsk and the wider matter of the verification of mobile
ICBMs and their launchers. The Russian Delegation expressed
their opposition to special verification provisions for
mobile ICBMs and their launchers. Trout asked the Russian
Delegation for suggestions for a verification regime that
would provide adequate confidence to the United States.
Sidestepping the question, Orlov dismissed the idea of
installing cameras at Votkinsk, noting that such a system
could be easily cheated by the Russians, and the U.S.
proposal to allow the Russians to enjoy comparable rights at
what Orlov referred to as "two provisional storage
facilities." (Begin comment: Orlov was referring to the
U.S. offer to permit Russian monitors outside the U.S.
Strategic Weapons Facilities in exchange for extending
continuous monitoring at Votkinsk (REF B). End comment.)


18. (S) Mr. Shevchenko, pointing out that Votkinsk produced
ICBMs for fixed launchers as well as for mobile launchers,
challenged Trout that the United States would not be able to
differentiate types among the ICBMs produced. Trout
responded that the United States would use multiple means,
including notifications and national technical means, to
confirm types. Shevchenko pressed Trout that relying on
notifications implied that the United States would have to
trust the Russian side because there would be no way to see
inside identical railcars used to transport different kinds
of ICBMs. Trout agreed that the U.S. side would have to
trust the Russian side to some degree, and that such trust
would lessen the strain on national technical means.
Shevchenko then queried whether, if Russia began producing
liquid-fueled ICBMs at another facility, the United States
would demand equivalent rights there. Trout replied that the
United States would not, because the United States' concern
was with ICBMs for mobile launchers, which would only be of
the solid-fueled kind.


19. (S) The chairs concluded the meeting by agreeing that at
the next meeting they would look to determine text that could
be sent to the Conforming Group. Queried by Trout, Orlov
admitted that he had not yet studied Annex J, but would do so
in the near future. Again, questioned by Trout, Orlov also
said that the Russian Delegation would consider providing, at
the next meeting, a list of Russian facilities that would be
declared.


20. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of the MOU, dated November 12, 2009;
and

-- U.S. Facilities to be Declared Under START Follow-on,
dated November 17, 2009.


21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
Lt Col Blevins
LCDR Brons


Mr. Colby
Mr. Coussa
LTC LaGraffe
LT Lobner
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Pischulov
Mr. Shevchenko
Col Voloskov
Ms. Vodopolova
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS