START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001080

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 16, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0979 (SFO-GVA-VI-042)

B. GENEVA 1070 (SFO-GVA-VII-017)

C. GENEVA 0803 (SFO-GVA-V-019)

D. STATE 115348

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-025.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 16, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) A meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group
(IPWG) was held on November 16, 2009. Dr. Warner and Colonel
Ilin discussed the new Russian-proposed combined inspection
of both deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA) and
non-deployed SOA at operational bases, Section VI. The key
to the Russian acceptance of a combined inspection concept
was the reduction of inspection allocations. The Russian
proposal was consistent with previous Russian positions
providing for a smaller sampling of inspectable items than in
U.S. proposals with no special procedures for mobile systems,
no inspection of heavy bomber (HB) nuclear armament weapon
storage areas (WSA),and provisions for periodic inspection
of SSGNs and converted B-1 HBs.


4. (U) Subject Summary: Russian Section VI: Not Really
"Combined"; Inspection Allocations Key to Russia Accepting
Combined Concept; Comparing U.S. and Russian Proposals on
Section VI; Russia Accepts U.S. Concept of How to Treat
Missiles With Zero Warheads; Two Missiles Provide No Extra
Confidence on Upload; Details on Mobiles: No Special
Treatment; Details on Heavy Bombers: Inspect Few and Stay Out
of WSA; Details on Submarines: SSGNs Have No SLBM Launchers;
and, All The Rest.

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RUSSIAN SECTION VI:
NOT REALLY "COMBINED"
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5. (S) Warner opened the meeting with an acknowledgement of
receiving a new proposal from Russia over the weekend for a
combined inspection of both deployed SOA and non-deployed SOA
at operational bases, Section VI. Warner noted, however,
that the Russian document seemed to focus only on deployed
systems and their warheads, and did not include provisions
for briefing or inspecting non-deployed missiles in
maintenance facilities or at submarine base storage areas.


6. (S) Ilin completely agreed with Warner that the Russian
proposal only concerned deployed SOA at operational bases.
Ilin also said that the U.S. proposal for combined inspection
(REF A) also dealt with only deployed SOA. (Begin comment:
This underscored the continued Russian confusion with the
U.S. proposal for a combined inspection that includes both
deployed SOA and non-deployed SOA at operational bases. End


comment.)

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INSPECTION ALLOCATIONS
KEY TO RUSSIA ACCEPTING
COMBINED CONCEPT
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7. (S) Ilin continued that Russia could only consider a true
combined inspection of deployed and non-deployed SOA if the
number of inspection allocations was reduced to eight. Ilin
said that if the number of inspection allocations was similar
to START, then there would be no sense in combining the
inspections. Warner said that neither the 28 total yearly
inspections under START, nor the 16 yearly inspections
proposed by Russia (8 Type 1 and 8 Type 2) for START
Follow-on was the correct number. Warner and Ilin later
agreed that inspection allocations would be the topic of a
later one-on-one meeting.

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COMPARING U.S. AND RUSSIAN
PROPOSALS ON SECTION VI
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8. (S) Warner and Ilin discussed the main differences
between the Russian and U.S. proposals for Section VI. While
there was a difference in the yearly allocation, both Parties
agreed that there should only be one such inspection at any
one time or no more than one inspection simultaneously at the
same base.


9. (S) Warner further noted that the document seemed similar
in content to the briefing that Colonel Petrov gave on
November 12 (REF B). For paragraph 6, which listed
pre-inspection briefing requirements, Ilin said there were no
real differences from Petrov's briefing. Warner noted that
there were no provisions to brief data on non-deployed
missiles.


10. (S) Ilin also confirmed that there were some
similarities between the original and new Russian proposal,
but there were also some differences; the inspection
provisions between different types of SOA were now more
symmetrical than in the initial Russian proposal. Ilin
explained that the new Russian document included elements
from the U.S. proposal, such as the data that was required
for the pre-inspection briefing.

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RUSSIA ACCEPTS U.S. CONCEPT
OF HOW TO TREAT MISSILES
WITH ZERO WARHEADS
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11. (S) The sides discussed paragraph 7 of the new Russian
Section VI. Ilin clarified several points that reflected a
change in position from their original proposal (REF C). One
deployed launcher and one non-deployed launcher would be
inspected. However, the new Russian proposal now reflected
the U.S.-proposed concept that a missile with zero warheads
or no front section in a deployed launcher would be
considered to be a deployed missile and would be subject to


nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) procedures, albeit simpler.
A non-deployed launcher would be completely empty; the
inspection team would have the right to inspect one such
non-deployed launcher. For mobile systems, the Russian
document contained procedures for inspecting all empty
"shelters" of a mobile launcher in a single basing area.
(Begin comment: U.S. term is "fixed structure." End
comment.)

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TWO MISSILES PROVIDE NO
EXTRA CONFIDENCE ON UPLOAD
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12. (S) Warner contrasted this with the U.S. proposal to
select two launchers, which could both contain a missile, or
if one launcher was empty, would also count against the
allocation. Warner stated that the U.S. side thought the
potential to inspect two deployed missiles would appeal to
the Russians because of its concerns about U.S. upload
potential. Ilin replied that one occupied launcher was
enough. The relationship between the United States and
Russia is much better than it was when START was drafted.
There was no need to track every movement. The right to
inspect was important and sufficient to provide a strong
deterrent against cheating. Inspecting two missiles did not
provide extra confidence. Ilin also said that inspecting a
single deployed missile also was less costly and created less
disruption to the inspected base.

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DETAILS ON MOBILES:
NO SPECIAL TREATMENT
--------------


13. (S) The Parties discussed provisions in the new Russian
proposal for mobile ICBMs. Warner asked what the key
components of such an inspection would be. Ilin said that
the inspection team would select a deployed mobile ICBM
launcher from any basing area and all empty "shelters" for
mobile ICBM launchers from any one basing area. The
inspection team would confirm that such "shelters" were
empty. The selected deployed ICBM launcher would return to
the maintenance facility where the front section would be
separated, the warheads covered (Begin comment: Most likely
Ilin was speaking in general terms and did not caveat that
currently SS-25 road-mobile front sections are not separated
from the missile for inspections. End comment.),and the
numbers of warheads confirmed.


14. (S) Warner noted that the U.S. proposal contained a
"return" provision for mobile ICBM launchers, and asked what
type of data on absent mobile launchers would be provided.
Ilin said that the numbers of deployed mobile launchers in
basing areas and away from basing areas would be provided,
and that the number of non-deployed launchers at the
maintenance facility would be briefed. Warner asked whether
the non-deployed launchers at the maintenance facility would
be inspectable. Ilin said no, and explained how just like a
submarine in dry dock, mobile launchers in the maintenance
facility should not be inspectable.


15. (S) Warner asked whether provisions to perform a data


update inspection of one re stricted area would be carried
over from START in the new Russian proposal. Ilin said no.
Data on all assigned mobile systems would be briefed, but
only one deployed launcher would be inspected.


16. (S) Warner engaged Ilin about the need to either inspect
inside fixed structures or open the roofs of the fixed
structures for cooperative measures. Ilin did not agree with
Warner's analogy that because silo ICBM and SLBM launchers
were in the open and could be seen by national technical
means (NTM) or inspectors that it would make sense to allow
the inspection of road-mobile launchers in their fixed
structures, nor did he agree with the analogy that fixed
structures were like heavy bomber hangars and should be
subject to cooperative measures.

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DETAILS ON HEAVY
BOMBERS:INSPECT FEW
AND STAY OUT OF WSA
--------------


17. (S) The sides then discussed heavy bomber provisions
contained in paragraph 7.b of the new Russian document, which
Warner noted were different than in the original Russian
proposal. Ilin agreed.


18. (S) Warner noted that it was not necessary to
distinguish between heavy bombers equipped for long-range
nuclear ALCMs (LRNA) and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments other than LRNA; heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments would suffice. Ilin agreed that this made sense
and the Russian Delegation would study this suggestion.


19. (S) Ilin proposed that, in order to simplify procedures
for inspecting heavy bombers, a Party would only need to
inspect a sampling of heavy bombers. Ilin noted that this
was consistent with the Russian methodology used for ICBM and
SLBM bases. The new Russian proposal included a provision to
inspect up to three each of deployed, non-deployed, and
non-nuclear heavy bombers that were captured by
pre-inspection restrictions. He agreed with Warner that this
also differed from START in that heavy bombers would not need
to be of the same type based at the designated base. Warner
asked for clarification about how Russia would treat
non-deployed heavy bombers visiting an operational heavy
bomber base. Petrov noted that non-deployed heavy bombers
attributed to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base could visit other
operational heavy bomber bases. Warner said, given the state
of the U.S. bombers at Davis-Monthan, it is highly doubtful
that any of them will be visiting U.S. operational heavy
bomber bases. (Begin comment: Warner was referring to B-52s
and B-1s not undergoing conversion. End Comment.)


20. (S) Regarding the U.S.-proposed inspection of heavy
bomber nuclear armaments weapon storage areas (NAWSA),the
Russian position did not change its position; NAWSAs will not
be inspected. Only the warheads loaded on heavy bombers will
be briefed; no other information about the nuclear armaments
in the NAWSA would be briefed. The Russian proposal to
attribute a heavy bomber with one warhead would be reported
as an aggregate only and not broken down by base. Warner
underscored the U.S. intent to require reporting of the


actual number of nuclear armaments in heavy bomber NAWSAs,
and that the United States would not accept Russia reporting
an arbitrary "X" number of nuclear armaments for each heavy
bomber base.

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DETAILS ON SUBMARINES:SSGNS
HAVE NO SLBM LAUNCHERS
--------------


21. (S) The sides discussed provisions for submarine bases
contained in the new Russian Section VI, paragraph 7. Warner
noted Russia included provisions to inspect SSGN cruise
missile launchers, and that such provisions were not
consistent with the package of solutions proposed by National
Security Advisor Jones in Moscow (REF D),which proposed a
one-time exhibition. Warner stated that the Russian proposal
for periodic checks should not be included in this section.
The C-4 SLBM, also known as the Trident I, would not be an
existing type, so there was no reason to include it as an
item of inspection. Ilin said Russia has a different logic,
and that they would treat the SSGN launcher as an empty SLBM
launcher and it should be subject to periodic inspection.
Warner noted that the SSGN launcher cannot hold or launch an
SLBM, and that any viewing of such a launcher would have to
be either a type of exhibition or fall under a Type 2
allocation, but could not be included as an element within a
Type 1 inspection.

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ALL THE REST
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22. (S) The sides discussed the transportation timelines in
the new Russian proposal; Ilin noted Russia used about 95
percent of the U.S.-proposed wording, but adjusted the times
themselves to better reflect inspection realities.


23. (S) Ilin noted that all detailed inspection procedures
would be in an annex to be determined later. Ilin said it
would be much more difficult to develop procedures for
Russian systems because Russia had many more types than the
United States. Warner said it was "time to get to work" and
the Russian side should study the U.S.-proposed Annex 6.


24. (S) Warner briefly reviewed the Type 2 inspection of
non-deployed SOA, and how the concept for such inspections
would change if the Parties returned to separate,
non-combined inspections with Type 1 inspections focused on
deployed SOA and Type 2 inspections on non-deployed SOA.
Warner emphasized that Russia must choose quickly on which
type of inspection regime to pursue; there were two choices.
The first option would be to have separate inspections of
deployed SOA and of non-deployed SOA. The second option
would be to have combined inspections of both deployed and
non-deployed SOA at operational bases, and inspections of
non-deployed SOA at other facilities. Ilin concluded that
the number of inspection allocations needed to be determined
first.


25. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


26. (U) Participants:



U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. DeNinno
LCDR Feliciano
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Mr. Rust
Ms. Pura
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Lobach
Col Petrov
Mr. Poznihir
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS