START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001075

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 17, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-028.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of
Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of
Defense Representative Colonel Ilin, the Russian side
presented comments on the U.S. concept for specific, separate
treaty provisions for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and ICBMs for road-mobile launchers; the U.S.
counterproposal for continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk
Missile Assembly Plant; and the Russian concept for counting
rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments.


4. (U) Subject Summary : Disadvantages Based on System
Characteristics; START's One-Sided Obligations; Comments on
Votkinsk; Why the Need for Focused Mobile Provisions; U.S.
Has Addressed Russian Build-Up Concerns; Additional Russian
Concerns; and, Russian Concept for Counting Rules for Heavy
Bomber Nuclear Armaments.

--------------
DISADVANTAGES BASED ON
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
--------------


5. (S) Ilin began the meeting with a review of the agreed
agenda items: ICBMs for road-mobile launchers; Russian
comments on continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Missile
Assembly Plant and the U.S. reciprocal offer for continuous
monitoring; and, the Russian concept for counting rules for
heavy bomber nuclear armaments. Ilin stated the negotiations
thus far demonstrated the most difficult and controversial
issue that remained was ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and the road-mobile ICBM launchers themselves. The
Russian Delegation presented its logic relating to the
Russian position indicating there should be no special
procedures specifically focused on mobile ICBMs. Ilin turned
to General Poznihir for the presentation.


6. (S) Poznihir stated that the Russian Federation proceeded
from an understanding of the U.S. concern regarding the
possible covert creation of a Russian road-mobile ICBM force
which would affect the strategic stability between the
Russian Federation and the United States. Russia could not
seriously consider separate procedures focused on these
forces guided by an idea that was far from reality.
Procedures in the new treaty should be based on the
U.S.-Russian relationship, which significantly reduced the
possibility of a nuclear conflict, by reducing strategic
offensive arms (SOA),as well as, a realistic view of
Russia's financial and defense production capabilities.
Poznihir noted the nuclear force structure of the two Parties
had changed significantly over the life of the START Treaty.
Russia chose to emphasize a land-based road-mobile ICBM

capability, whereas the United States chose to emphasize a
mobile force based on the SSBN. Since the Russian treaty
concept treated all mobile SOA equally, the same measures
needed to apply to both road-mobile ICBMs and SSBNs.


7. (S) Poznihir noted the difference in force structure
philosophy also placed Russia at a disadvantage on several
levels. Since the SSBNs operated under the sea, Russia had a
more difficult task of monitoring and tracking SSBNs than the
United States had monitoring and tracking Russian land-based
road-mobile ICBMs. Although both weapon systems reduced
vulnerability through mobility and concealment, Russia's
road-mobile force was confined to deployment areas, whereas
the U.S. SSBN force was free to roam the seas. Russia was
also placed at a disadvantage because the United States had
fewer of these mobile systems to operate and also because
this smaller SSBN force could be deployed with SLBMs that
contained far more nuclear warheads than Russia's road-mobile
ICBM force. Russia's road-mobile force was characterized by
a unique operating regime that required specialized storage
structures providing environmental and power needs, a
specialized infrastructure of trained personnel, and
pre-surveyed launch sites. These characteristics constrained
operations of the road-mobile ICBM force; characteristics
which the United States did not have to deal with regarding
its SSBNs.


8. (S) To address the U.S. concern of an expanded
road-mobile ICBM capability, Poznihir stated Russia had no
interest in developing such a capability. This would involve
an increased production capability and very significant
costs. Russia sought rather to invest its monies to finance
other projects.

--------------
START'S ONE-SIDED OBLIGATIONS
--------------


9. (S) Poznihir remarked on the effect START's allegedly
one-sided obligations had on Russia. Regarding cooperative
measures (CM),Poznihir noted that the requirement to display
road-mobile launchers in the open outside of their fixed
structure groups was not only burdensome, but also affected
the operational readiness of the road-mobile ICBM force.
Moving the launcher out of its fixed structure degraded the
operational readiness of the launcher-missile combination.
As he stated previously, road-mobile launchers had unique
requirements even for day-to-day operations. The open
display requirements required road-mobile launchers to be
taken off the fixed structure power system, necessitating the
launcher generators to provide the power required to operate
the launcher's electrical and environmental systems; which
increased costs due to fuel consumption. On the other hand,
Russia believed U.S. obligations for bomber cooperative
measures actually increased the readiness of the U.S. heavy
bomber. When a heavy bomber was removed from its hangar for
the required display in the open, it was one step closer to
launch. In closing, Poznihir stated that the sides also
differed on the issue of elimination procedures for mobile
ICBMs. Whereas the United States wanted unique detailed
procedures for these eliminations, Russia believed the
elimination procedures should be the same for all solid
propellant ICBMs.

--------------
COMMENTS ON VOTKINSK
--------------


10. (S) Poznihir next provided Russia's response to the
U.S.-proposed streamlined procedures for continuous
monitoring at the Votkinsk Missile Assembly Plant. Russia
believed the U.S. proposal to install specialized camera
equipment, combined with the 60 hours in advance exit
notification, to monitor the exit of road-mobile ICBMs from
the Votkinsk Plant would be ineffective. Russia would not
accept the proposal since the proposal was impractical. The
installation of a specialized camera system would not provide
useful information because the exit of ICBMs took place in
special, covered railcars. Monitoring through the use of
these cameras would only result in more ambiguities.


11. (S) Poznihir indicated Russia did not understand the
value of the U.S. offer for reciprocal monitoring of nuclear
weapons storage areas (NWSAs) at U.S. submarine bases; it was
not an even trade for the information the United States
gathered at Votkinsk. Nor did Russia accept that the U.S.
offer to provide heavy bomber tail numbers would be
equivalent to Russia's continued provision of unique
identification numbers on all mobile ICBMs. Tail numbers had
been on the bombers for many years and had been available to
Russian inspectors. Russia would consider the offer if the
United States would provide unique identification numbers for
all of its strategic offensive arms.

--------------
WHY THE NEED FOR FOCUSED
MOBILE PROVISIONS?
--------------


12. (S) Dr. Warner explained why the United States believed
there was a need for a focused set of provisions for
monitoring mobile ICBMs. The mobile ICBM had been and would
remain a significant component of Russian strategic nuclear
forces. He noted that by the end of ten years the proportion
of warheads assigned to mobile ICBMs would be much larger.
There were two reasons for this proportional increase.
First, the RS-24, which would be in service in a matter of
months, would be the first mobile ICBM deployed with multiple
warheads. Second, the overall number of deployed strategic
warheads would be reduced by the treaty, which would increase
the value of a MIRVed ICBM and increase its importance to
Russian strategic capabilities.


13. (S) Warner stated that the issue for the United States,
given the relatively small size of the mobile ICBM and its
launcher compared to other strategic systems such as SSBNs
and heavy bombers as well as its mobility, the mobile
launcher/ICBM combination, was difficult to track and monitor
the actual number of the mobile ICBMs and their launchers
that were deployed. Various steps in both START and the
START Follow-on (SFO) treaties were designed to provide
confidence of the number of mobile ICBMs and their launchers
available to the Russian side. Warner noted that several
treaty provisions applicable to fixed ballistic missiles were
also applicable to mobile ICBMs. An example of this was the
requirement to provide data on the location of deployed and
non-deployed ICBMs which were mobile and silo-based, and the
right to conduct periodic inspections to confirm this data

for both types of ICBMs. Nevertheless, specific procedures,
focused solely on mobile ICBMs, were required because of the
unique monitoring challenges presented by mobile ICBMs.


14. (S) Warner noted that, under START, specific procedures
were in place throughout the life cycle of a mobile ICBM.
Continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk final assembly facility
and the assignment of unique identifiers provided confidence
at the birth of the missile. Special requirements for
inspection activities were in place in START and the United
States had proposed these requirements be carried over in
START Follow-on. One of these was the concentration or
recall requirement for the inspection of bases for
road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Special requirements for the
elimination of the mobile ICBMs mark the end of the life
cycle.


15. (S) Warner indicated further that the United States
understood Russian concerns with overly detailed and
demanding mobile ICBM requirements in START and took this
under consideration when developing the U.S.-proposed SFO
provisions for mobile ICBMs. Because the Russian Delegation
had objected to the U.S.-proposed requirements, the U.S.
Delegation was working with colleagues in Washington to
develop more streamlined procedures. These streamlined
procedures will be concise and represent a more limited
number of appropriate measures. Warner said the U.S.
Delegation planned to provide the streamlined package of
procedures relating to mobile ICBMs to the Russian side as
early as Thursday.

--------------
U.S. HAS ADDRESSED
RUSSIAN BUILD-UP CONCERNS
--------------


16. (S) Mr. Elliott noted the Russian presentation
referenced U.S. expressed concern about Russian capability to
build up a covert mobile ICBM force, absent adequate
verification measures. Elliott confirmed the U.S. side
believed that due to the unique characteristics of the mobile
launcher-ICBM combination it was possible, if not probable,
that the Russian Federation could build up a covert mobile
force. Elliott noted further that, while the Russian side
characterized the U.S. concern as imaginary, it expressed
similar concern over the U.S. capability to covertly
reconvert previously converted SSGNs and B-1Bs back to a
strategic nuclear delivery capability. The U.S. Delegation
could have dismissed the Russian concerns as imaginary;
however, instead it was considering periodic exhibitions of
converted SSGNs and B-1Bs to assuage these Russian concerns.
Elliott concluded by noting that U.S. concerns, over a
possible Russian build-up potential, were no less than the
Russian concerns and the U.S. request for various
transparency measures applied to mobile ICBMs no more than
the Russian request for transparency measures regarding the
potential reconversion of converted U.S. systems.


17. (S) Mr. Trout noted that, for the last three years in
post-START negotiations until the previous fall, Russia had
expressed concern over U.S. SLBM upload capability. He
stated the U.S.-proposed treaty text provided to Russia in
October 2008 had not addressed these concerns. The U.S.
proposal for reciprocal monitoring of the NWSAs at submarine

bases in exchange for continued permanent portal monitoring
at Votkinsk had attempted to address this Russian concern.
The concept of having a permanent presence of Russian
monitors on U.S. submarine bases was not being taken lightly
by the U.S. military. The United States was trying to offer
a proposal that would balance U.S. concerns with a possible
mobile ICBM reload potential with the Russian concerns over a
possible Trident SLBM uploading scenario. Trout said he was
coming to the conclusion that it was more important to the
Russian side to protect its operations from outside
observation than to monitor U.S. Trident upload capability.
Trout asked whether the Russian side could help the U.S. side
understand Russian concerns.

--------------
ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN CONCERNS
--------------


18. (S) Ilin reiterated that both sides had to be subject to
the same treaty provisions. He believed the U.S. side was
not ready to apply the same procedures and provisions to U.S.
SSBNs as it was proposing to apply to Russian mobile ICBMs.
For a long time the main concern for the Russian side was the
SLBM upload capability. Russia had asked the United States
many times to respond to its concerns and that request had
been ignored. Therefore, Russia had changed its approach.
For the new treaty, Russia proposed to reduce the number of
SDVs and, therefore, the number of launchers, in order to
reduce the upload potential of each side.


19. (S) Ambassador Ries commented that the U.S. side had
listened carefully to Russian concerns about the need for
streamlining and simplification of the treaty and for
attention to the impact of verification measures on readiness
and cost. The U.S. proposed a simplified approach to
monitoring at Votkinsk. In the course of the negotiations,
each side had noted that it was necessary to recognize the
other side's legitimate concerns. Ilin responded that the
situation brought to mind the image of having your hand in a
vise. One side says they were willing to loosen it, but it
was impossible to escape. He extrapolated from this example
that if one side was subjected to limits, the other side
should be similarly limited. He did not get the feeling, he
said, that the U.S. side was willing to accept limits similar
to those it proposed to apply to mobile ICBMs to SSBNs,
which were treated like a sacred cow, even though it was
extremely hard to verify their upload capability. The issues
of most serious concern to the Russian side were the
conversion of the Trident I SSBNs to a conventional role and
the treatment of missile defense in the SFO treaty. The
Russian concern with the Trident I SSBNs was not only the
issue of reconversion. It also included the fact that U.S.
precision conventional weapons essentially served the same
purpose as nuclear weapons. Both missile defense and
precision conventional weapons affected parity between the
United States and the Russian Federation.


20. (S) Ilin remarked, in reference to the U.S. offer of
reciprocal monitoring at the NWSAs at Kings Bay and
Silverdale submarine base, that the Russian side after 20
years of U.S. monitoring at Votkinsk knew what information
could be gained. He said he did not understand what
information Russia would gain through monitoring at Kings Bay
and Silverdale and how that information would equal the

information gained by the United States at Votkinsk.
Nonetheless, he requested additional details of the U.S.
offer.


21. (S) General Orlov questioned what was more important,
the number of ICBMs produced or the number of missiles
deployed. For the SSBN, Russia was not concerned with the
number of warheads that could be carried; it already knew the
maximum number. Russia was more interested in the location
of the SSBNs when they were deployed at sea. Orlov stated
this information could be an equitable exchange for
information gained through monitoring at Votkinsk. Warner
stated the U.S. side had addressed Russia's concern over the
number of warheads deployed on SLBMs and was certainly not
prepared to provide locational information on SSBNs at sea.
The U.S. side had told Russia that it was under the limit for
operationally deployed nuclear warheads set by the SORT
(Moscow) Treaty. The United States would be required to
continue this reduction to get under the deployed warhead
limit in SFO. He stated the United States was not willingly
responsible for the one-sided application of specific
procedures for mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers in START.
The United States had seriously considered mobile systems of
its own in the late 1980s; the rail-mobile system for the
already existing Peacekeeper ICBM and the so-called Midgetman
mobile system. The end of the Cold War and domestic politics
helped the United States to decide not to deploy these
systems. This decision helped lead to the very different
strategic force structures of the two sides 20 years later.
Warner reiterated the main point to be taken away from the
discussion was that when the United States considered
ratification of the treaty, it believed it was important to
have a small separate set of treaty provisions focused on
mobile ICBMs.

--------------
RUSSIAN CONCEPT FOR
COUNTING RULES FOR HEAVY
BOMBER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS
--------------


22. (S) Ilin presented a new Russian concept for counting
heavy bomber nuclear armaments. The concept was based on
definitions, counting rules, and inspection activity.
Airbases would be categorized by their association with heavy
bomber weapons employment capabilities, those airbases for
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and those for
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Heavy
bombers would be categorized both by their association with a
heavy bomber airbase (deployed or non-deployed),and by their
association with the capability to employ or not employ
nuclear armaments (heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments). Nuclear armaments would be defined only within
the scope of this treaty.


23. (S) Ilin explained that. in the Russian concept, each
airbase would have a declared number of warheads that would
count against the limit on deployed warheads. The declared
number would be determined by the number of heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments located at the base. Each
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments would be declared
to have one warhead that counted toward the declared number
for the airbase.



24. (S) The concept included inspection activities to
confirm the declared number of strategic delivery vehicles at
each airbase. At airbases for heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armament, the inspecting Party would count the number
of heavy bombers of this category and inspect a number of
these bombers to view nuclear armaments deployed on the
bomber. At airbases for heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments, the inspecting Party would view a
sample of the non-nuclear heavy bombers to confirm
reconversion had not taken place. During both inspections,
the inspecting Party would not have access to the weapons
storage area. Responding to a question from Warner, Ilin
stated a sample of the non-nuclear heavy bombers would be
inspected to confirm the absence of nuclear weapons and the
fact that reconversion had not been accomplished. Ilin noted
the Russian concept was just a preliminary suggestion.


25. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


26. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Hanchett
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Koshelev
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS