START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 13, 2009

REF: STATE 116297 (SFO-VII-GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-021.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 13, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:15 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The third Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working
Group meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Colonel Ryzhkov,
continued the review of the U.S.-proposed joint draft text
(JDT) of the CorE part of the treaty protocol. The sides
addressed procedures for the elimination of silo ICBM
launchers, CorE procedures for heavy bombers and SLBM
launchers, and the elimination of facilities and fixed
structures, with some discussion on the General Provisions
Section. Several paragraphs of text were agreed upon during
the meeting.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Your Text or Mine--Where do we
Begin?; Section III: Procedures for CorE of ICBM Launchers;
Section V: Procedures for CorE of Heavy Bombers; Section IV:
Procedures for CorE of SLBM Launchers; and, SectiQ VII:
Procedures for Elimination of Facilities and Fixed Structures.

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YOUR TEXT OR MINE--
WHERE DO WE BEGIN?
--------------


5. (S) Ryzhkov opened by stressing his desire to review the
latest Russian-proposed text for the General Provisions
Section of the CorE Protocol, which he said had been provided
at the previous evening to the U.S. Delegation. Elliott
demurred, citing a lack of time to translate the document
into English and review it. Ryzhkov cited several new items
in the Russian proposal which he believed were important to
discuss before discussing the other sections. Elliott
finally agreed, with the proviso that the General Provision
Section discussion could be held at the end of the meeting or
at the next discussion on Treaty Article VII, the CorE
Article of the treaty. Ryzhkov reviewed paragraphs one
through three of the Russian proposal and asked whether
Elliott would agree. Elliott again demurred and reminded
Ryzhkov that the General Provision Section would be discussed
in detail later in the day, during a short meeting of the two
working group chairs. Ryzhkov stressed the need to define
the term "other items" that the U.S. side had proposed in the
General Provision Section. Elliott explained that the term
was considered useful to add because the term "Strategic
Offensive Arms" was not defined. The next phrase, "subject
to the limitations of the Treaty," was key. Elliott
emphasized, however, that the text was not yet agreed.

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SECTION III: PROCEDURES


FOR CorE OF ICBM LAUNCHERS
--------------


6. (S) Elliott and Ryzhkov returned to the U.S.-proposed JDT
of Section III: Procedures for CorE of ICBM Launchers.
Elliott proposed increasing the allowable time period for
displays from 30 to 60 days to permit adequate time for the
use of national technical means (NTM). Ryzhkov replied that
Russia would prefer a single time period for all CorE
verification activities--NTM, inspections, and exhibitions.
Elliott responded that the U.S. side would study the idea,
but stressed, in most cases, where NTM would be used, it
would be necessary to have a longer time window. Hence, it
would be difficult to have one time period for all CorE
verification activities.


7. (S) Ryzhkov agreed with the U.S.-proposed text concerning
the material to be placed into silos to carry out their
elimination. However, instead of the U.S. phrase "filled
with debris resulting from demolition and earth," the Russian
side proposed the phrase "...filled with debris resulting
from demolition of infrastructure, soil, or gravel." Elliott
agreed to study the proposal. Ryzhkov indicated Russia had
moved most of the language from paragraph four of Section III
to the General Provisions Section and the chapeau of the CorE
part of the Protocol. Elliott responded that he was not
against moving this particular language to wherever it made
the most sense--either the General Provisions Section or the
chapeau of the CorE part of the Protocol, but noted further
study was necessary so items such as specific notifications
and verification activities would not be deleted
inadvertently.


8. (S) The sides discussed paragraph nine of Section III and
agreed the text, as written, should stand (on conversion of
an ICBM launcher from one type of ICBM to another). Russia
supported not specifying "silo" in this paragraph. Elliott
reminded Ryzhkov when the outstanding mobile launcher CorE
issues were decided, the text of this paragraph might be
affected. Ryzhkov agreed, noting that the Russian delegation
did not know what the United States would propose on mobile
launchers.

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SECTION V: PROCEDURES
FOR CorE OF HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


9. (S) Turning to Procedures for CorE of heavy bombers,
Ryzhkov explained that Russia had removed the term "sever" in
regard to the fuselage, as it had medical, not technical,
connotations and, as such, did not fit in the text. He
stated that all of the issues with paragraph one were all
linguistic and the overall elimination concepts of both sides
were similar.


10. (S) Ryzhkov proposed moving the text in paragraph two on
remaining visible to NTM to the General Provisions Section,
but then immediately withdrew his request after Elliott
reiterated his earlier concerns that some inspection or
notification activities might be inadvertently deleted from
the individual sections if care was not taken when moving
them to the General Provisions Section. There remained a


disagreement over whether the time period would be 30 or 60
days. Both sides agreed to the draft text for paragraphs
three and four--procedures for conversion of heavy
bombers--with the exception of part of subparagraph "c" of
paragraph four, "that render the heavy bomber incapable of
employing nuclear armaments in a manner that the other Party
can confirm, which shall be recorded within the framework of
the BCC." Again, Ryzhkov proposed moving this text to the
General Provisions Section. Again, Elliott responded he had
yet to read the revised Russian-proposed text and as such
could not comment until later.


11. (S) Ryzhkov noted the remaining paragraphs of Section V,
paragraphs five, six, and seven, were compressed into one
paragraph which, for the Russian side, was its paragraph
five. He added that the newly-proposed paragraph five is an
abbreviated version of the U.S.-proposed paragraphs six and
seven. The Russian-proposed paragraph five contained new
language about the right to view a heavy bomber after it had
been converted.

Begin Text:

Upon completion of the procedures provided for in
paragraph 4 of this Section, the converted heavy bomber shall
not be flown, but shall be moved directly to the viewing site
at the conversion facility. Notification thereof shall be
provided and the heavy bomber shall remain on the viewing
site for a 30-day period.


End Text


12. (S) Ryzhkov proposed providing a right to view any item
after the completion of either CorE procedures. The right
might not be exercised often, but it would enhance confidence
for both sides. Elliott responded that the U.S. side would
review the Russian proposal.

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SECTION IV: PROCEDURES FOR
CONVERSION OF ELIMINATION OF
SLBM LAUNCHERS
--------------


13. (S) Elliott acknowledged the differences between the
sides concerning SLBM launcher elimination procedures. One
Russian proposal in particular stated SLBM eliminations could
take place at either existing CorE facilities or "other
facilities." Ryzhkov replied "other facilities" were
declared facilities where CorE activities took place, but
were not uniquely associated with SLBM eliminations. He
continued, stating that Russia wanted flexibility built into
the elimination process. Elliott agreed to review the
Russian proposal further. Elliott read through U.S.-proposed
JDT paragraphs two, three, and four (implementing the new
guidance in REFTEL paras 1 and 2). Ryzhkov asked some
questions for clarification, but had little negative
feedback. Elliott noted the U.S. position requiring
eliminated SLBM launchers to remain in the open for
verification by NTM. He added that U.S. Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) funding would remain available to Russia for
SLBM launcher elimination.



14. (S) Ryzhkov queried the U.S. side about the lack of a
"wild card" procedure in the U.S.-proposed text for
elimination of SLBM launchers. Elliott rejoined that the
U.S. position was to have a wild card option for conversion
of SLBM launchers, but not for SLBM launcher elimination.
Ryzhkov opined this was due in large part to the United
States not intending to eliminate any of its SLBM launchers
over the next ten years. He further noted that the lack of a
"wild card" option for SLBM launcher elimination did not give
Russia flexibility and the elimination procedures were
one-sided in nature, since the United States would not
eliminate any of its SLBM launchers. He reminded the U.S.
side that Russia did not intend to convert its SLBM launchers
during the life of the new treaty and asked the U.S. side to
reconsider its position: "Perhaps we can have additional
elimination procedures listed, such as placing the submarine
hatches and gas generators in an open area where NTM could
view them. This would be a confidence-building measure. Why
do we need all these additional procedures and strict
timelines?"


15. (S) Elliott responded that the core issue was to gain
and build confidence aQthat the United States was willing
to address alternate proposals, especially with respect to
use of NTM for verifying eliminations. Ryzhkov emphasized
that the Russian side believed the scope of the U.S.-proposed
verification and inspection measures was too great. Russia
had compromised by agreeing to allow SLBM launcher
conversions in order to save the U.S. money. The United
States should be responsive to Russia's needs in this regard.
Russia did not want to depend on the largesse of Senator
Lugar, who could always withdraw his funding offer. He
concluded by stating that, "'Trust but verify' was an adage
under START. Perhaps the philosophy in the new treaty should
be 'Verify but trust'."


16. (S) The Russian side agreed to the procedures outlined
in paragraphs five and six of the U.S.-proposed JDT regarding
SLBM launcher conversion. (Begin comment: These paragraphs
cover compulsory conversion procedures. End comment.)
Elliott offered to review the current JDT to see if any
language in paragraphs seven through nine could be moved to
the General Provisions Section. (Begin comment: These
paragraphs cover the "before and after" notifications and
exhibitions. End comment.) Ryzhkov replied he had to review
the text further before agreeing.

--------------
SECTION VII: PROCEDURES
FOR ELIMINATION OF FACILITIES
AND FIXED STRUCTURES
--------------


17. (S) Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that text in Section II,
Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, still required
high-leQl guidance from the respective sides before moving
forward. Therefore, he proposed to discuss some of the
paragraphs in Section VII, Procedures for Elimination of
Facilities and Fixed Structures. Ryzhkov immediately
commented that Russia bracketed the term "Fixed Structures"
in the section heading.


18. (S) The two sides agreed to remove the requirement to


eliminate facilities and fixed structures "in situ," since
there was no possibility to do otherwise. Elliott opined
that, once the definition of "support equipment" was agreed,
many brackets in the section could be removed. Ryzhkov
agreed, and replied that, as it stood, the term "support
equipment" was too broad for the Russian side to agree to--it
could mean anything from heavy bomber support equipment and
submarine docks, to common trucks and specific tools.


19. (S) Ryzhkov felt the Russian-proposed text was clear on
what support equipment would be eliminated: training
launchers of ICBMs; driver training vehicles; training models
of missiles; launch-associated support vehicles; and fixed
structures. There was no need to detail any other items. He
asserted that Russia did not have such a thing as a
"transporter-loader of mobile ICBMs"; it was an item only
used with INF forces. Elliott noted that the main concern of
the United States was that eliminated facilities related to
SOA could not be used again in the future. As long as the
SOA and all items associated with the SOA were removed or
eliminated, both sides should be satisfied.


20. (S) Both sides agreed the remaining contentious issue
with respect to "fixed structures" was the reinforced
concrete pad the mobile launcher rested on while in its
garage. Ryzhkov confirmed that Russia intended to eliminate
fixed structures when eliminating a facility where they were
located. The procedure would be to take down the
superstructure and remove it. It did not make sense to
Russia to destroy the foundation as well. As an analogy,
Russia was not asking the United States to eliminate the
heavy bomber hangars when eliminating an airbase.


21. (U) Documents exchanged, None.


22. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
LCDR Brons
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Trifonov
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Voloskov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


23. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS