Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1073
2009-11-28 10:59:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1073/01 3321059
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O 281059Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0349
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5511
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2688
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1698
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6905
S E C R E T GENEVA 001073 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 13, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001073

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 13, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-022.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 13, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M.. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The third Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group
(TTDWG) meeting of the session was held at the U.S. Mission
on November 13, 2009. The working group discussed Article II
of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) (central limits).
Also discussed were counting rules for heavy bomber (HB)
armaments, the term "and their associated launcher," and the
wording for the composition and structure of each side's
strategic offensive arms (SOA). Both sides tentatively
agreed on the text in Article II with the caveat that the
proposal required further study before finalizing.


4. (S) The sides also discussed Articles VII (Conversion or
Elimination) and VIII (Notifications). The United States
provided a more concise version of Article VII for
consideration by the Russian Delegation. The Russian side
explained their rationale for proposing Article IX (voluntary
measures). The U.S. side took the Russian-proposed Article
IX for further review. Finally, the sides discussed the
U.S.-proposed Article IX (national technical means (NTM)),
paragraph three, on the use of concealment measures.


5. (U) Subject Summary: Article II: The Central Limits;
Article VII: Conversion or Elimination; Enhancing
Confidence, Openness, and Predictability; U.S. Article IX:
Verification and Concealment; and, Wrap Up.

--------------
ARTICLE II: THE CENTRAL LIMITS

--------------


6. (S) Ambassador Ries opened the meeting by proposing to
start at the beginning and discuss any article or portion
thereof that either side would like to discuss. Since
Article I had already been discussed in detail, the sides
began with Article II. Mr. Koshelev stated that there was
some confusion on the Russian side as to which side had
placed the word "nuclear" in the term "heavy bomber nuclear
armaments." He added that he needed to consult with his
delegation to determine whether it was a Russian proposal.


7. (S) Koshelev asked for the U.S. Delegation's reaction to
the Russian-proposed paragraph two, (Begin comment: A
provision mirroring the U.S. proposal for Article V,
paragraph 3, on each side determining for itself the
structure and composition of its forces. End comment.) and
to explain why it objected to the text. Ries explained that
the basic substance of the text was not in question, as the
origin of the statement was the Presidents' Joint
Understanding. Only the location of the language in the
treaty was in question. The U.S. side had not determined if


it belonged in Article II or another article such as Article

V. Koshelev asked if there was a legal difference between
the words "provided for" and "set forth." Mr. Dean answered
that both phrases have the same meaning and he did not see
any problem with either phrase so long as it was consistent
throughout the treaty.


8. (S) Dean stated the language in paragraph two should be
adjusted so it did not appear that the right for each Party
to determine the structure of its SOA emanated from the
treaty, rather it should acknowledge that the Parties already
have the right to determine the structure of its SOA.
Koshelev agreed to change the text to read "Each Party has
the right to determine for itself..." but then asked why the
words "for itself" needed to be included. After some
discussion, both parties agreed the final text would read
"Each Party shall exercise its right to determine the
composition of its strategic offensive arms, based on the
limitations set forth (Qprovided for) in the Treaty." Ries
stated that the placement of the paragraph in the treaty
should wait for the outcome of the discussion on Article V.
Koshelev agreed.


9. (S) Admiral Kuznetsov questioned the need for the phrase
"and their associated launchers" for both ICBMs and SLBMs in
paragraph one, sub-paragraph (a). He stated the concept was
no longer needed now that the two sides had agreed to
counting rules for the two systems. He reiterated the
Russian argument for deployed and non-deployed launchers and
missiles and asked if the position of the U.S. side was
unchanged. Ries responded that there had been no agreement
on the counting rules and that the U.S. position remained the
same. Kuznetsov asked if the U.S. position was still the
same on the use of the term "nuclear" when describing
warheads in paragraph one, sub-paragraph (b). He stated
that, since the sides had agreed to count both nuclear and
non-nuclear warheads together, there was no need to specify
"nuclear" warheads. Ries explained that, since Russia had
not agreed to the package deal, the United States could not
remove the word "nuclear" and the sides would have to defer
the discussion. Kuznetsov pressed the topic by providing a
hypothetical scenario in which Russia agreed to the U.S.
proposal and floated the question whether the United States
would change its wording. Ries stated that the language in
the paragraph should be consistent with the final package.


10. (S) Koshelev asked why the United States had proposed
the word "nuclear" in reference to HBs when the sides had
almost agreed to remove the word from paragraph one. Dr.
Fraley stated that both sides were discussing, as part of the
package, how sub-paragraph (b) would provide limits on
warheads. However, there was a difference between
ICBMs/SLBMs and HBs. For the numerical limits, neither side
wanted to count conventional arms for HBs, only nuclear
warheads. Neither side had agreed on how to do that yet.
Koshelev stated that this was exactly why the Russian side
had proposeQ attribute only one nuclear warhead toward
each HB. Fraley responded by acknowledging that this was why
both sides were still discussing the counting rules for HBs.
Koshelev agreed to come back to this topic as soon as the
counting rules were agreed upon.

--------------


ARTICLE VII: CONVERSION
OR ELIMINATION
--------------


11. (S) Ries addressed Article VII and informed Koshelev
that the United States had developed new, simplified language
for Article VII, which the U.S, side believed the Russian
Delegation would be very happy with. Koshelev stated that
Colonel Ryzhkov had showed him the U.S.-proposed text for
Article VII earlier that morning and that Ryzhkov had been
pleased by it. This caused some confusion for the U.S. side
as Ries noted she had only finished writing the draft that
morning and was not sure how Ryzhkov could have seen the
text. Koshelev did not have a copy of the draft text that
Ryzhkov had showed him because Ryzhkov would not allow him to
keep it. Ries then handed over a copQf the U.S.-proposed
text for Article VII to the Russian side.


12. (S) Koshelev stated he was very happy with the text
except for the word "facilities." He stated he was confused
as to whether or not facilities were subject to the
limitations of the treaty. As worded, it appeared that
facilities were subject to something other than the
limitations of the treaty, something different than "items
subject to the limitations of this Treaty." Ries stated that
facilities were definitely subject to the limitations of the
treaty as much as SOAs and other items; she suggested moving
the term up to the second position in the series of items
listed in the sentence. Koshelev stated he was not sure what
Ryzhkov would think so he would discuss this with him to get
a better idea of the text required.


13. (S) Ries moved to a discussion about notifications,
saying the U.S. side had added notifications in Article VII
to ensure the link to conversion or elimination. She pointed
out that the United States had accepted the Russian use of
the term "strategic offensive arms" in this paragraph in an
effort to include everyone's ideas. Koshelev stated this
loQed like the same language as in Article VIII and asked if
the United States wanted to repeat the text here or if the
United States planned to remove the text in Article VIII.
Ries stated the United States intended to place the
information in both places. The concept of removal from
accountability by means other than conversion or elimination
was a good point previously brought up by the Russian side
and it should be addressed in Article VIII, paragraph 8(e).
Koshelev agreed the item belonged there and suggested adding
the words "or other removal from accountability" to the end
of that paragraph in Article VIII. Ries offered to have the
United States prepare a new version of Article VIII with that
addition.

--------------
ENHANCING CONFIDENCE,
OPENNESS, AND PREDICTABILITY
--------------


14. (S) Koshelev explained that the rationale behind Article
IX on voluntary measures was to extend current
confidence-building measures already practiced by the two
sides. Kuznetsov reiterated several times that this Article
was a great opportunity for both sides to agree to act
voluntarily to solve issues that would undoubtedly arise with


the implementation of this new treaty, even with the sides'
best efforts to take into account lessons learned from START.
Mr. Kamenskiy gave the example in START of exchanging data
about diagrams of "space launch vehicles" through diplomatic
channels because the original treaty did not cover this
specific information. This information was needed to provide
enhanced confidence, openness and predictability between all
Parties. With the Russian-proposed article, there would be
no need to use political channels to solve these types of
issues. It could and would be done on a voluntary basis
outside of diplomatic channels.


15. (S) Kuznetsov continued the discussion by explaining
that, with the cancellation of the ban on encryption and no
telemetry, this article would be extremely important in order
to solve the many questions and issues he believed would
arise. Ries explained this discussion brought up the more
serious issue of the role of verification versus the role of
voluntarily providing information. To keep away from these
areas of uncertainty and to enhance the degree of confidence,
openness and predictability between the two sides, the United
States felt continuing the ban on encryption of telemetry was
necessary. The United States did not see an emphasis on
voluntary dissemination of information as a better option
than the obligation to provide the information. Ries
concluded that voluntarily providing extra information was a
good idea, but it was not a substitute for a strong
verification regime. Koshelev explained that using
diplomatic channels would attract further attention to a
problem. By using this new proposed article, there would be
a different avenue in which the sides would not have to
involve the politicians and would not have to attract
attention. Ries asked whether the Russians saw the use of
the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center as a diplomatic channel.
Koshelev stated that he did see that as a diplomatic channel
and mentioned the recent exchange of data between the two
sides on the Minuteman III and the SS-27 RVOSI demonstration
as examples of exchanges of voluntary information that had
occurred but could have been made much simpler by the use of
this type of article. Ries concluded this discussion by
emphasizing that the United States valued a solid
verification regime and that the voluntary exchange of
information could be a good compliment to that regime. She
said the U.S. side would take the Russian proposal under
consideration in that context.

--------------
U.S. ARTICLE IX: VERIFICATION
AND CONCEALMENT
--------------


16. (S) Ries moved to the U.S.-proposed paragraph 3 of
Article IX on NTM. She stated that preventing the use of
concealment measures to inhibit verification by NTM was a
long-standing commitment between the two sides. She further
emphasized that nothing written in the U.S.-proposed text
would distract from or impede operations and should not
impede training. She further stated that this was also
consistent with transparency in development of systems and
applied equally to both sides. Kuznetsov thundered back that
the language the United States requested was drafted 20 years
ago and was not required to be here as the three sentences
did nothing but restate the same information over and over


again. Mr. Taylor stated that all three sentences were in
fact three separate distinct requirements, all of which
needed to be included in the paragraph. He pointed out the
first sentence was a commitment not to impede NTM, the second
was a prohibition on concealment measures at test ranges and
the third specifically pertained to training and
environmental shelters to exclude them from the concealment
ban. Koshelev interrupted and said he wanted to push this
issue over to Colonel Ilin and Dr. Warner in the Inspection
Protocol Working Group. Taylor disagreed and stated that
this was a treaty issue and should be worked here. Kuznetsov
changed his initial argument by stating that the issue was
with the third sentence only and that it drew specific
attention to bases for mobile ICBM launchers and separated
them out from bases of ICBM launchers. He further stated
that a basing area for mobile launchers was what Russia
considered to be the same as a base for any other ICBM
launcher.

--------------
WRAP UP
--------------


17. (S) Koshelev jumped in at this point to state that he
thought this was a good time to stop and that he liked the
way the group was addressing the remaining issues in the
text. He said that he would like to see more integration of
the other working groups into this one as it got closer to
the final agreed text. Ries agreed that the group would
continue to work in this manner.


18. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed Article VII JDT.


19. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Lt Col Blevins
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Kvavilashvili (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Kamenskiy
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Evarovskya (Int)


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS