START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 16, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-027.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 16, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The fourth meeting of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group for the START Follow-On (SFO)
Negotiations Session VII was held at the Russian Mission on
November 16, 2009. The two sides discussed treaty Article
VII, silo launcher elimination provisions, the number of days
strategic offensive arms (SOA) would be available for
national technical means (NTM) of verification or on-site
inspection following completion of CorE procedures, heavy
bomber elimination procedure options, and General Provisions
of the U.S.-proposed CorE part of the treaty protocol.


4. (U) Subject Summary: Treaty Article VII, Silo
Elimination Procedures, Counting the Days, Heavy Bomber
Conversion Options, and, General Provisions.

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Treaty Article VII
--------------


5. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov started the discussion by insisting
the working group discuss treaty Article VII--specifically,
new Russian-proposed text for paragraph 3(b) addressing
verification by inspection. Ryzhkov pushed for acceptance of
the Russian text so that Article VII could be passed to
conforming. Russia wanted to ensure that either Article VII
or paragraph 6 of the General Provisions recorded that CorE
could be confirmed only after completion of the procedures.
Mr. Elliott demurred, stating that he was concerned that the
text could contradict U.S.-proposed provisions on mobile
systems that had yet to be decided; specifically, the right
for inspectors to observe final elimination procedures. He
suggested leaving Article VII as is, while considering
bringing the language into the General Provisions Section.
Ryzhkov stated that the same approach would be extended to
all SOA, for example, U.S. heavy bomber conversions. In the
Russian view, there would be no right for either Party to
observe any conversion procedures. He noted that the Treaty
Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) were discussing
Article VII as well in a concurrent meeting. Elliott
reiterated that, until the mobile missile issues were
resolved, the sides could not go further on Article VII.

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SILO ELIMINATION PROCEDURES
--------------


6. (S) Elliott turned to silo launcher elimination
procedures--specifically U.S.-proposed text for subparagraph
2(b).
Begin text:



The silo door shall be removed, dismantled or destroyed
and the silo shall be completely filled with debris resulting
from demolition of infrastructure and earth or gravel.

End text.

Ryzhkov agreed with the new subparagraph, which included
revised wording for the silo fill material. Elliott then
asked for a clarification for paragraph 9 (conversion of an
ICBM launcher for another type of ICBM) on whether the
Russians wanted the word "silo" inserted. Ryzhkov stated the
word had been deleted at the last meeting.


7. (S) The Russians clarified that they would probably use
both subparagraphs 2(a) and (b) provisions to eliminate their
silo launchers, and the U.S. side clarified that the United
States would probably use only subparagraph 2(b) provisions.
Elliott asked whether paragraph 2(c),the wild card option
for silo elimination, was still needed. Ryzhkov stated that
having the third wild card option would make ratification in
the Duma easier; they could point to the third option as a
way to develop less costly procedures, if necessary.

--------------
COUNTING THE DAYS
--------------


8. (S) Elliott directed discussion toward the issue of how
long SOA should be available for NTM verification or
inspection after completion of CorE procedures. The
possibility of a single timeframe of 20, 30, or 60 days had
been discussed previously. Elliott said that internal U.S.
CorE Working Group discussions had resulted in an assessment
that 30 days were the maximum appropriate for on-site
inspections, but 60 days made more sense for NTM
verification. Elliott pointed out that a 60-day requirement
for inspection availability following conversion would
adversely impact operations. Before Elliott could finish
walking through the various points within the CorE Section
showing where 30-day and 60-day windows each made sense,
Ryzhkov began to discuss the issue of whether and how it
could impact NTM verification, indicating an understanding
that a longer window for NTM verification was warranted, but
changing in mid-sentence to say 45 days should be sufficient
for any verification measures. Elliott provided specific
instances where a 30-day window would work for inspections;
Mr. Smirnov suggested that, because conversion required a
demonstration or exhibition of procedures, the window for
inspection or verification could be affected. Elliott stated
that, in principle, the sides had agreed that an exhibition
or demonstration would be required for the first conversion
of a type with optional inspections thereafter, as long as
the same procedures were used. Ryzhkov acknowledged
Elliott's reasoning and proposed to take the idea of
differing timelines to his superiors and discuss it with
other members of his delegation.

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HEAVY BOMBER ELIMINATION
PROCEDURE OPTIONS
--------------



9. (S) Elliott requested a review of language used in
paragraph 1 of the section on procedures for elimination of
heavy bombers. It was agreed that the paragraph would be
changed to read:

Begin text:

The elimination process for a heavy bomber shall be to
remove a basic design element of the heavy bomber (tail
section or wing) or cut the fuselage into two pieces, at a
location that is obviously not an assembly point, thereby
rendering the heavy bomber inoperable.

End text.


10. (S) Elliott suggested that the sides exchange proposed
Joint Draft Texts for Section 5 paragraphs 1 through 4(b) the
next day (November 17) so that the texts could be referred to
the Conforming Group on November 18. Ryzhkov requested that
both texts go though legal review first, preferring that the
entire section be agreed and then sent to conforming.

--------------
GENERAL PROVISIONS
--------------


11. (S) Elliott started the discussion of the General
Provisions Section by pointing out that the Russian-proposed
first paragraph discussed notification, the provisions for
which had been incorporated in treaty Article VII. This
paragraph could therefore be dropped. Ryzhkov agreed. The
sides agreed that the phrase "subject to the limitations of
the Treaty," although repeated on numerous occasions in the
text and the chapeau, should remain in each case. Therefore,
the new paragraphs 1 and 2 in the General Provisions,
accepting Russian-proposed text, were agreed. Paragraph 1
covered the location of CorE, and paragraph 2 covered General
Provisions on elimination. In reading paragraph 3 on
conversion, Elliott pointed out two bracketed phrases and,
after discussing them, suggested that he and Ryzhkov discuss
these before the Ad Hoc Group meeting scheduled for the next
day. (Begin comment: These provisions pertain to removal of
converted items from accountability versus on-going
verification following conversion of launchers or heavy
bombers. The U.S. side supports the former concept and the
Russian side supports the latter. End comment.) Smirnov
pointed out that the two bracketed phrases are
interrelated--that keeping one excludes the other. Elliott
highlighted that the final paragraph was no longer needed if
the sides agreed to paragraph three in treaty Article VII.
Ryzhkov wished to retain the paragraph until Article VII was
finalized. He indicated it should specify "the result of
conversion or elimination" and that a better verb would be
"confirmed" (podtverzhdyon) instead of "recorded." Elliott
indicated tentative agreement with Russia's proposed
paragraph 6 on exhibition of the first item of a type that is
converted.


12. (S) Elliott requested a discussion of the concepts
behind the Russian wording for wild card conversion
options--specifically, what the Russians envisioned for the
process of notification and demonstration of self-developed
procedures. After discussing three possible paths:



agreement with the process as outlined in the notification;
agreement after Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)
presentation and possible on-site demonstration; and
disagreement requiring additional explanation, Ryzhkov stated
that the Party conducting the conversion needs to adequately
explain the procedure and that, as long as the Parties are
willing to compromise, a solution is possible. He agreed the
current wording did not adequately cover the possibility of
not coming to agreement within the BCC, but suggested that
the sides not attempt to cover all possible contingencies in
the provision. Elliott offered to revise the U.S.-proposed
paragraph addressing these points and provide it to the
Russians on November 17.


13. (S) Ryzhkov commented on exhibitions of CorE procedures.
If the other Party had questions about conversion to a new
type, it would be necessary to compare it to the previous
type. Regarding the U.S. conversion of B-1B heavy bombers,
if the United States had done a better job of showing that it
was no longer possible to attach pylons for nuclear armaments
to the converted bombers, allowing measurement of the
distance between the attachment joints, Russia would not have
had further questions. Inspectors could not judge the
distance simply by viewing. Therefore, Russia still had
questions as to whether nuclear armaments could still be
deployed on the converted heavy bombers. However, the recent
exhibitions for RVOSI of SS-27 and MM-III ICBMs had been
successful in answering the questions of both sides. It was
necessary to show goodwill and think about how to convince
the other Party.


14. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of CorE Section V:
Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers.


15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
LCDR Brons
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Brown
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shevchenko
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)



16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS