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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) IPWG MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-017.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) A meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group
(IPWG) was held at the Russian Mission on November 12, 2009,
to discuss the concept of a combined approach for inspecting
ICBMs and SLBMs at operational bases, which would include
elements of a Nuclear Warhead Inspection (NWI) and a Data
Update Inspection (DUI). The U.S. side explained that this
would entail inspecting both deployed and non-deployed items
of inspection during the same inspection. The Russian
delegation said it was prepared only to discuss items of
inspection, but focused only on the inspection of deployed
items. The Russian delegation also expressed the need to
understand the details of the pre-inspection briefing and
inspection procedures prior to reviewing any text on a
combined inspection approach.


4. (U) Subject Summary: What's In a Title; and,
Pre-Inspection Data.

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WHAT'S IN A TITLE?
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5. (S) Colonel Petrov opened the meeting and stated that the
section in the Inspection Protocol setting forth the steps
involved in conducting combined inspections should have an
appropriate title for reflecting the data to be provided
during the pre-inspection briefing and inspection. Petrov
proposed the following title: "Combined Inspection at ICBM
Bases, Submarine Bases, Bases for Heavy Bombers Equipped for
Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs, and Bases for Heavy Bombers
Equipped for Nuclear Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear
ALCMs with Regard to Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA) Items
Based at Such Bases and With Regard to Warheads on Them as
well as Non-Deployed SOA Items." (Begin comment: Gravity
bombs are considered nuclear armaments other than long-range
nuclear ALCMs. End comment.) Dr. Warner stated he
understood and, although the title suggested was far too
long, he agreed that an appropriate title needed to be
developed.

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PRE-INSPECTION DATA
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6. (S) Petrov began to explain what data, in the Russian
view, should be provided during pre-inspection briefings for
Type 1 inspections by listing data on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers, the launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs and
warheads on them as well as non-deployed ICBM and SLBM
launchers. Warner asked about data on non-deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs or selected support equipment. Petrov responded that

the number of non-deployed launchers would be briefed in the
pre-inspection briefings. Support equipment is minimal, he
said, but he was not prepared to discuss elements associated
with a DUI. Warner stated that selected support equipment
should be briefed which, at a minimum, should include
training models of missiles (TMOMs). Warner added that
non-deployed SOA, such as non-deployed ICBMs, which include
spare ICBMs or those ICBMs being worked on at maintenance
facilities, should also be listed at the pre-inspection
briefing.


7. (S) Petrov attempted to avoid discussing support
equipment and focused only on deployed items under Type 1
inspections. He said that TMOMs are for training and are
usually located at training areas at the ICBM and SLBM bases.
TMOMs at silo facilities, for example, had never been
inspected because they are in training silos. The sides
could discuss TMOMs at a later date. Petrov explained that,
under the Russian concept of a Type 1 inspection of deployed
SOA, non-deployed ICBMs and mobile launchers at the
maintenance facility would not be subject to inspection.
With regard to mobile ICBMs, inspectors would have the right
to select empty fixed structures to confirm the absence of a
deployed ICBM and its launchers. However, non-deployed items
would be inspected during a Type 2 inspection. Warner
explained that such an approach was not consistent with a
combined inspection at operational bases for ICBMs and SLBMs,
where data on both deployed and non-deployed SOA would be
confirmed. Petrov stated that Warner's comment regarding
non-deployed ICBMs at the maintenance facilities required
further study.


8. (S) Petrov explained that the Russian position was to
provide the numbers regarding the following items during the
pre-inspection briefing for Type 1 inspections at ICBM bases,
submarine bases, and air bases for heavy bombers:

For an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs-

Aggregate number of deployed silo launchers

Number of deployed ICBMs loaded in deployed launchers

Aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs (total
for the base)

Number of non-deployed ICBM launchers

Number of warheads on each deployed ICBM throughout
the base

Copy of site diagram of ICBM base annotated to show
the location of each ICBM silo

For an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs-

Aggregate number of deployed mobile ICBM launchers
(total for the base, broken down for each basing area)

Specific number of deployed mobile ICBMs (by type)

Aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs (total
for base)

Specific number of warheads on each deployed mobile
ICBM

Copy of site diagrams of basing areas annotated to
show the location of each deployed mobile ICBM on its
launcher

Empty fixed structures not containing a deployed
mobile ICBM and its launcher

Submarine base; the numbers of:

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) assigned to the
base

Aggregate number of deployed launchers of SLBMs on
SSBNs (total for base)

Aggregate number of deployed SLBMs (by type)

Aggregate number of warheads on deployed SLBMs
(assigned to the base)

Specific number of warheads on each deployed SLBM

Aggregate number of non-deployed launchers of SLBMs

Specific number of SSBNs with non-deployed launchers

Coastline and Water Diagrams annotated to show the
location of SOA

Airbase for heavy bombers-

Aggregate number of warheads loaded on heavy bombers
equipped for LRNA

Aggregate number of warheads loaded on heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA

Location of absent heavy bombers by particular
location

Specific number of heavy bombers equipped for LRNA
and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
other than LRNA that are visiting the airbase

Specific number of warheads on each heavy bomber
equipped for LRNA

Specific number of warheads on each heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA

Aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments

Copy of site diagram of air base showing location
of such heavy bombers


9. (S) Petrov avoided questions concerning whether the
Russian delegation intended to declare items in an ICBM
base's maintenance facility. He stated that discussions on
maintenance facilities, submarine base weapons storage areas,
and converted submarines would have to occur later as the

Russian delegation was not prepared to share its thoughts on
these areas at this time.


10. (S) Petrov stated that, for the pre-inspection briefing
at a heavy bomber base, the total number of heavy bombers
located at a base should include any visiting heavy bombers.
Petrov added that the exact location within national
territory or outside national territory of heavy bombers
should also be provided. Petrov explained that the reason
for the requested locational data was to compare that data to
the six-month data exchange. Warner stated that the United
States was prepared to provide the exact location for heavy
bombers within the U.S. national territory; however the
United States would only provide the general region for heavy
bombers outside national territory, as was done under START.


11. (S) Petrov stated that he had just outlined the
process, stipulated in paragraph 5, of the Russian proposal
for what inspectors should expect to receive in writing
during the pre-inspection briefing. Warner reiterated what
was missing was the data for non-deployed items of inspection
and selected support equipment. Warner explained that it was
reasonable that non-deployed SOAs should be part of the
pre-inspection procedures because, during a combined
inspection, non-deployed SOAs would be monitored by
inspectors at the maintenance facility or within storage
bunkers at an inspection site, as was done during a DUI under
START. Warner provided an example of how the U.S. Navy has
non-deployed SLBMs within the storage area of an operational
SLBM base. Warner also stated that the U.S. Navy removes
missiles from the launchers on a submarine for periodic
maintenance. Lastly, Warner explained that some support
equipment should be included in the list of pre-inspection
data briefed during pre-inspection procedures, such as TMOMs
and launch associated support vehicles.


12. (S) Warner noted that the Parties agree on the majority
of data for deployed SOA to be provided to an inspection team
during a combined inspection for deployed SOA, but that the
disagreement was with regard to the data to be provided
associated with non-deployed items of inspection. Warner
stated he would be ready to discuss more about the content of
the pre-inspection procedures and the inspection process, but
recommended the working group discuss them in the context of
the U.S.-proposed text for combined inspections. Warner
stated that differences would surface as both Parties review
the text. Petrov replied that he wanted to continue general
discussions of inspection procedures to gain a basic
understanding before reviewing them in the proposed text.
Warner asserted that if we were to take the approach proposed
by Petrov, then the IPWG would need to meet everyday. Warner
closed saying he believed the IPWG was very close to
agreement and needed to look at the issues as they related to
the text.


13. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


14. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. DeNinno

LCDR Feliciano
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Mr. Rust
Ms. Pura
Mr. Smith
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Petrov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Voloskov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS