START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING,
NOVEMBER 17, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-029.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov
Mr. Connell

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On November 17, 2009, U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD)
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller met with Russian HOD
Ambassador Antonov at the Russian Mission. Antonov provided
a heads-up about a possible visit of several Duma and other
Government officials in the coming week. He also expressed
his preference that a planned visit next week of other senior
Russian officials to Washington be held in Geneva instead.
The HODs discussed outstanding issues related to the preamble
language, and a number of outstanding issues related to
various treaty articles. Finally, the HODs discussed the
various options and considerations related to implementing a
bridging agreement or provisional application of the treaty.


4. (U Subject Summary: High-Level Visits in Geneva and
Washington; Reviewing Upcoming Treaty Work; and, No to
Bridging, But Provisional Application is Possible.

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HIGH-LEVEL VISITS IN
GENEVA AND WASHINGTON
--------------


5. (S) Antonov began by discussing the forthcoming meeting
of Russian and U.S. officials on treaty-related matters
scheduled to take place next week in Washington, D.C. He
said he had sent a "tough telegram" to Moscow against having
such a meeting in Washington. To his mind, the relevant
experts needed to be present to provide information and
support, and they were also needed in Geneva to continue the
negotiation activities. Gottemoeller replied that the
meeting was scheduled for Washington because that is where
the Presidents agreed it would be. She noted the meeting
should be very productive and involve very senior level U.S.
Government officials. She thought CJCS Mullen would meet
with Russian Chief of the General Staff Makarov, and APNSA
Jones would be meeting with Russian National Security Advisor
Prikhodko. Be that as it may, Antonov insisted that he would
send another, even more strongly-worded, cable to Moscow
arguing against the value of meeting in Washington and the
necessity of keeping Geneva as the focus of the negotiations
and related discussions.


6. (S) Antonov reported that three Duma members were due to
visit the Russian delegation next week in Geneva. He noted


the value in having U.S. Senators come and familiarize
themselves with negotiation activities, and thought it would
be a good idea if members of the Duma did as well. AHe said
three officials would likely be visiting next week. (Begin
comment: Last names are believed to be Ozerov, Kosachev, and
Dzasokhov. A review of Duma web sites revealed Duma members
named Ozerov and Kosachev. Dzasokhov is a member of the
Federation Council. End comment.) Returning later in the
meeting to the upcoming Duma member visit, Antonov confided
that he was unsure how to best handle this visit. He related
how his guidance for negotiating the treaty was classified,
releasable to members of the Executive Branch only. He was
unsure whether he had authorization to discuss any of his
guidance with the Duma members, joking "even if they are
friends of Putin or Medvedev." He was also reticent to host
visiting senior officials so close to the projected
completion date.


7. (S) Gottemoeller shared with Antonov the U.S. approach to
work between the Executive and Legislative Branches of
Government. She explained to him how negotiators receive
guidance on releasability of information to visiting members
of Congress. In addition, members of Congress are sensitive
to the negotiations process and will go to great lengths to
ensure their visit does not impede the progress of
negotiations. Antonov was appreciative of the insight and
said he would continue to ponder an appropriate plan for the
Duma members' visit. Gottemoeller, for her part, offered to
host a lunch for the visit.

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REVIEWING UPCOMING TREATY WORK
--------------


8. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov then conducted a review of
the treaty text and discussed several issues. Looking at the
Preamble, Antonov felt the draft subparagraph expressing
appreciation to Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan was
acceptable. He inquired whether Gottemoeller had any
thoughts on how to respond to a letter from Ukrainian
President Yushchenko to President Obama, in which Ukraine
appealed for continued security assurances. He also
mentioned a letter from Belarus asking to participate in the
START Follow-on Treaty. Gottemoeller replied she had not
seen either, but would inquire into both. Antonov advised
that the Russian Federation was preparing responses, but he
assured Gottemoeller that Russia would discuss its proposals
in advance with the United States.


9. (S) As for the preambular reference to the Moscow Treaty,
Antonov opined that the language needed to be more upbeat.
He thought the last paragraph in the Preamble should finish
on a high note, and he also thought the language referring to
the Moscow Treaty should celebrate the accomplishments of
this accord. He expressed a willingness to consider a more
upbeat start of "welcoming" (reductions under SORT) vice
"noting."


10. (S) While reviewing individual articles, the HODs
discussed release of information to third parties or the
public (Article VIII). Antonov thought the United States
wanted this text in order to release its own data.
Gottemoeller, citing the precedent from START, pushed for


recognition of the presumption that information could be
released unless the Parties determined otherwise. She
thought the public and the international arms control
community would have a keen interest in the efforts and
progress of this agreement. Antonov expressed his doubts
that such language would be acceptable, though he did think
the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) might be able to
play a role in determining what information could be
released. Gottemoeller asked Antonov for consideration of
more positive language that would help facilitate release of
information.


11. (S) The HODs, also reviewed the Russian-proposed article
on voluntary measures (Russian Article IX). Gottemoeller
thought it was a good idea and felt it would find support
from the U.S. delegation. At the same time, she cautioned
Antonov not to misconstrue this to think it would be a
replacement for any verification measures proposed elsewhere.


12. (S) This led to discussion on the use of national
technical means (U.S. Article IX, Russian Article X).
Gottemoeller asked why the Russian delegation would not want
to support language strengthening the effectiveness of NTM by
precluding the use of concealment at locations such as space
launch facilities. Antonov at first was willing to defend
the Russian position until it became clear to him that this
provision was not referring to telemetry. He promised to
take the question for study.


13. (S) For telemetry (Article X),Antonov recalled this was
the proposed topic of the upcoming session of the Ad Hoc
Group. He did not consider telemetry a useful topic, and
felt it would be little more than a political discussion.
Antonov reminded Gottemoeller that the telemetry issue was a
red line for Russia. Gottemoeller pointed out that this was
a topic of similar import to the United States, hence, the
proposal to examine the topic some more. Antonov agreed, but
proposed the time be kept to one hour to allow for other
discussions.


14. (S) The HODs then examined the issue of cooperative
measures (Article XII). Gottemoeller noted there was
something for both sides to gain from this article. She
pointed out that Russia had used this provision frequently
under START to track U.S. heavy bombers, and the United
States had used it to track mobile launchers of ICBMs.
Antonov wondered if it would not be more appropriate for a
similar arrangement between mobile missile launchers and
SSBNs, to which Gottemoeller pointed out the long-standing
relationship between heavy bombers and mobile launchers of
missiles in the arms control calculus.


15. (S) Prior to concluding discussion on the treaty issues,
Gottemoeller pointed out how the combined limit on deployed
and non-deployed launchers was problematic in setting
counting rules. She wondered about the efficacy of creating
a separate limit for non-deployed launchers. Antonov quickly
pointed out that this concept would run counter to what
Russia had proposed for Article 2, paragraph 2. (Begin
comment: This paragraph allows the Parties to determine for
themselves the composition of their strategic offensive arms.
End comment.) Antonov said using this article, a Party
might want to have 200 deployed and 400 non-deployed systems


to meet a limit of 600 strategic delivery vehicles. Under
the U.S. idea, such would no longer be possible.

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NO TO BRIDGING, BUT PROVISIONAL
APPLICATION IS POSSIBLE
-------------- --------------


16. (S) Turning to the subject of a bridging agreement,
Gottemoeller advised Antonov that the Russian delegation may
be asked about it during their visit next week to Washington.
Gottemoeller reviewed four possible options: reciprocal
political commitments, an executive agreement that the United
States would sign and the Russian Federation would sign and
ratify, provisional application of the new treaty, and
ratification of the treaty itself. Antonov reported that an
executive agreement would require ratification by the Duma.
Antonov felt the best course of action would be, in fact, to
push for ratification of the new treaty. Working on the
assumption that tier three documents (Begin note:
Implementation Annexes. End note.) could be completed before
February 1, Antonov estimated the Duma could be persuaded to
consider and ratify the agreement by as early as May 1. He
recognized, nevertheless, the U.S. interest in ensuring a
bridging agreement is in place, but the executive agreement
proposed by the U.S. would not work under Russian law. This
was the Russian side's official response to the U.S. proposal.


17. (S) Continuing the discussion of a bridging agreement
for the new treaty, Antonov stated that it is possible under
Russian law to provisionally apply a treaty for up to six
months without requiring ratification in advance. He asked
for a proposal of provisions that the United States was
interested in seeing provisionally applied. He felt it
would be useful to have this list available while working
through the final points of the treaty. Gottemoeller
observed that the provisions of Russian Article IX might
serve as the model for a treaty provision that would address
activities during the interim period between agreements.
(Begin comment: This article, which appears only in the
Russian draft of the treaty, addresses voluntary measures to
enhance confidence, openness and predictability. End
comment.) She added that a temporary article with a sunset
clause could also support execution of visits as confidence-
and security-building measures.


18. (S) While provisional application might prove to be a
viable course of action, Gottemoeller cautioned Antonov that
U.S. participation would be limited to the scope of what
could be agreed to in an executive agreement. As a result,
reductions in armaments called for in the treaty could not
take place during provisional status, nor could warhead data
be released or privileges and immunities be accorded to
inspectors. Antonov replied that an arrangement must have
reciprocal and equal application of provisions. That being
said, his first reaction was to deem this a serious question
worthy of further study. The two HODs agreed to ask their
lawyers to meet to study the questions related to the
bridging arrangement.


19. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.


GRIFFITHS