Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1065
2009-11-25 12:13:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001065 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) ADMIRAL MULLEN AND GENERAL MAKAROV
MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 1061 (SFO-GVA-VII-045)

B. GENEVA 1064 (SOP-GVA-VII-037)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001065

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) ADMIRAL MULLEN AND GENERAL MAKAROV
MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 1061 (SFO-GVA-VII-045)

B. GENEVA 1064 (SOP-GVA-VII-037)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-047.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 23, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


4. (S) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Mullen, and Chief of the Russian General Staff, General
Makarov met for a second time to discuss differences in the
sides' approach to completion of the START Follow-on (SFO)
Treaty. There were no breakthroughs, with both sides
reiterating their basic positions. Makarov reaffirmed that
the number of strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs) Russia could
agree to, as President Medvedev has proposed, was 650. They
offered to consider a number in the 600-700 range, but were
steadfast in their view. The Russians also reaffirmed that
they could not accept an asymmetrical verification regime
associated with mobile ICBMs, nor could they accept a
telemetry regime. The Russians asserted that the United
States could use telemetric information obtained from Russia
to aid with the U.S. missile defense (MD) system that is
being developed.


4. (S) Mullen reinforced that, because of U.S. force
structure, it was not possible for the United States to get
to the number of SDVs that the Russians had proposed. The
United States also had issues with regard to treaty
ratification that need to be considered. The U.S. side
offered a modified proposal on non-deployed launchers,
offering to include in the treaty an overall limit on
non-deployed launchers of nominally 150, which would include

non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers. The U.S. side offered
additional rationale for the inclusion of a telemetry regime,
and additional rationale on counting heavy bomber armaments.


5. (U) Subject Summary: Greetings and Salutations;
Offense-Defense Relationship; Converting Interceptors in to
SOA; NPR Review; Turning to Verification; Capability of One
U.S. Submarine Equals the Entire Russian Mobile ICBM Force;
Heavy Bomber Counting Rules; and, Telemetry Revisited.

--------------
GREETINGS AND SALUTATIONS
--------------


6. (S) Mullen provided Makarov with the opportunity to make
remarks and respond to U.S. presentations delivered the
previous evening. Mullen encouraged an open and engaging
discussion that would help facilitate negotiations. Makarov
said the Russian delegation listened to the U.S. presentation
with great interest, analyzed the issues within the framework
of the current international situation, and believed that
Russian and U.S. positions were similar. Makarov explained


that the Russian people are simple and that, after the fall
of the Soviet Union, Russia had taken numerous steps to make
improvements in its policies. He noted cooperation with the
United States in the realm of disarmament, stating that,
despite emerging threats and changes to the positions over
the years, Russia did not view the United States as
threatening. Makarov said the attitude in Russia has changed
since the times of the Cold War and Russia was taking steps
to improve relations and pragmatically approach the state of
affairs. He specifically noted that the Obama Administration
gave new hope for improved relations.


7. (S) Makarov said that, as Mullen had stated, in order to
resolve issues, the sides must engage in fair and open
dialogue. In approaching SFO, Russia agreed with President
Obama's notion of starting with a fresh sheet of paper, while
at the same time adopting useful measures from START. The
"old treaty" produced positive results and served its
purpose. However, some provisions interfered with current
Russian interests. Makarov emphasized that any
discriminatory proposals in relation to SFO would not lead to
productive dialogue. The Russian and U.S. militaries must
analyze the situation in order to find solutions suitable to
both Parties. Makarov agreed with statements by the Heads of
Delegation (HODs) that SFO was on the world stage, and
success would demonstrate that two great powers were united
and capable of reaching consensus. He stressed that the
treaty should be equal on all fronts and serve the mutual
interests of both sides. He then thanked Mullen for the U.S.
presentation from the previous evening (REF A) and offered to
make presentations clarifying the Russian position. Makarov
turned to Colonel Ilin who presented Russia's position on the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms (SOA) and
strategic defensive arms (SDA).

--------------
OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
--------------


8. (S) Ilin addressed Russian concerns regarding the
relationship between SOA and SDA. He reiterated the Russian
view that the process of reducing SOA (delivery vehicles and
reentry vehicles) was interrelated with the scale and
deployment of MD. Ilin said the U.S. unilateral development
of MD undermines Russian strategic deterrence. He outlined a
series of provisions Russia proposed to include in the SFO
treaty.


9. (S) First and foremost, Ilin explained, Russia wanted to
confirm in the treaty that there was a relationship between
SOA and SDA. Second, Russia proposes an obligation not to
convert MD interceptors or their silos into SOA or visa
versa. Ilin said that the capability to convert such arms
exists, and the United States had already done so.
Therefore, in order to ensure that such measures were not
taken, Russia proposed to include in the treaty methods to
distinguish MD interceptors from ICBMs or SLBMs. Russia also
proposed the right for the Russian Federation to
unconditionally withdraw from the treaty if U.S. MD impacts
Russian deterrence. Missile defense is a political concern
in the Russian Federation, so absence of the stated
interrelationship between SOA and SDA issues would impede
ratification. Russian negotiators, Ilin said, were prepared


to work with the United States to develop language
acknowledging the relationship.


10. (S) Mullen stated that the United States had already
taken steps to acknowledge the relationship between SOA and
SDA in the treaty preamble. U.S. Senate ratification, Mullen
said, was also an issue if the United States were to make the
linkage between SOA and SDA too strong. The United States
had taken significant steps when it published its MD plan. A
big part of that plan was to acknowledge Russian
concerns--the spirit and intent of that plan was focused on
Russian issues and the broader extent of MD in relation to
the SFO treaty.


11. (S) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said the United
States and Russia had discussed this issue many times in both
Geneva and Moscow. She emphasized the U.S. and Russian
Presidents' guidance that SFO would be focused on
SOA--underscoring the word "offensive." The United States
had been open to a statement concerning the relationship
between SOA and SDA in the preamble, Gottemoeller said, and
reminded the Russian delegation that the United States was
very keen on discussing MD in another venue. Gottemoeller
stated that Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security Tauscher would discuss cooperation in
the area of MD on December 7, 2009, during meetings in
Moscow. Gottemoeller expressed hope that cooperation in the
area of MD would be underway by the time the SFO treaty
entered into force. In preparing SFO, the sides discussed
ways to reflect Russian concerns regarding the relationship
between SOA and SDA outside of treaty documents. Those
discussions, including legally-binding options, would occur
in another setting.


12. (S) Ambassador Antonov attempted to clarify the logic
behind the Russian position, explaining that the relationship
between SOA and SDA was a key issue during the Bush
Administration. Antonov said the so-called third MD site
was, at the time, a source of decreased confidence and
suspicion. Russia was not attempting to resolve all issues
associated with MD in SFO. Antonov agreed with
Gottemoeller's assessment that additional discussions should
occur in a separate format. The Russian goal was to add
language in SFO to reflect the influence of MD on SOA.
Antonov said that President Medvedev took an important step
in agreeing with the United States to reflect those concerns
in treaty-associated documents which was a change to the
Russian position.

--------------
CONVERTING INTERCEPTORS INTO SOA
--------------


13. (S) According to Antonov, Russia was initially asking
that points presented by Ilin be included in the treaty.
President Medvedev made a decision to adopt the U.S. proposal
to reflect those points in an associated document, but
insisted that there be a ban on converting SOA into MD
interceptors or launchers and vice versa. Antonov said U.S.
military experts would agree that the conversion process was
possible but not efficient. As such, Russia insisted that
the point on conversion be included in the treaty, but the
other points could be dealt with in associated documents.




14. (S) Mullen said that he understood the history with the
previous U.S. Administration and the lingering suspicion,
even given the change in Administrations. He acknowledged
that, while not optimal, the potential existed for those
weapons to be engineered for a different threat. Mullen
reiterated the importance of our Presidents' agreement to
focus SFO efforts on SOA. He expressed trust in Gottemoeller
and Antonov to resolve the details. Mullen emphasized that
there are very clear limits on what the United States
considered acceptable on the MD issue for the United States
to ratify the SFO treaty. Steps the United States had taken
on the third site were very significant in recognizing
Russian concerns. The United States, had "no plan--no plan"
to convert interceptors into ICBMs. Makarov agreed that
negotiators had hard work ahead, but there was a potential
for resolution.

--------------
NPR REVIEW
--------------


15. (S) Dr. Miller introduced himself and informed the
Russian delegation that he was overseeing the U.S. Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and reiterated that the United States
had no plans to convert SOA into MD interceptors or vice
versa. He said the United States had already addressed
Russian concerns by reducing the number of interceptors from
44 to 30 and cancelled the multi-kill vehicle project.
Miller also explained that the United States was committed to
defense against the North Korean threat, as well as
U.S.-Russian relations in the area of strategic stability.
Makarov responded that if there were no plans for conversion,
then it should be written into the treaty. Dr. McFaul
responded that it would be noted, but not in the SFO treaty.

--------------
TURNING TO VERIFICATION
--------------


16. (S) Mullen turned the table over to Dr. Warner who
presented the U.S. position on mobile missiles. Due to the
unique challenges in verifying mobile ICBMs and their
launchers, the United States proposed a limited number of
verification measures focused on mobiles. The United States
sought to make verification measures applicable to all ICBMs
and SLBMs wherever possible. He repeated the three measures
delivered last week by the U.S. delegation and clarified by
Mullen the previous evening. The United States withdrew its
proposal on a limit of 80 non-deployed ICBM launchers under
the condition that each side agreed on separate aggregate
limits for all ICBM and SLBM launchers. The number of
non-deployed launchers, Warner said, should be approximately
150, though the exact number was negotiable. He explained
that the limit applied to non-deployed silo launchers, mobile
launchers and SLBM launchers. Warner said the U.S.-proposed
limit on non-deployed launchers was similar in nature to the
Russian proposal made in the fall. He informed the Russian
delegation that the United States was prepared to discuss
this and other limits on mobile launchers.


17. (S) Makarov explained that Russia was looking for
additional clarification on how the 800 SDV limit was


connected to the proposal on non-deployed launchers. The
previous day, he said, Russia needed clarification as to
whether the 150 was in addition to the 800 limit, but now
they understood. General Poznihir reiterated the Russian
position that ICBMs for mobile launchers should be equivalent
to all mobile systems--ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers. There
was no reason, Poznihir expounded, to speak of the special
nature of mobile ICBMs as all mobile SOA had the ability to
hide and survive. The new treaty would allow both sides to
determine for itself the composition of its forces and would
not place any limits on the number of mobile systems.
Therefore, there should be no restriction on the number of
mobile ICBM launchers.

--------------
CAPABILITY OF ONE U.S.
SUBMARINE EQUALS THE ENTIRE
RUSSIAN MOBILE ICBM FRCE
--------------


18. (S) Poznhir underscored that Russia would not agree to
ay limits on non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. U.S.
suspicion of a rapid breakout potential fo mobile systems,
he continued, was unfounded. Rferring to Mullen's statement
to move on from th Cold War mentality, he said, the new
treaty shold not be based on hypothetical scenarios but on
reality. It was important to take into account pratical
isses such as economics production capabiity, military
requirements and political will. oznihir stated that
Russian mobile ICBMs require their own regime. The regime
was unique and coud not be hidden, as it required its own
infrastrcture, training, facilities and other aspects. He
said the disagreement was based on the serious effect special
provisionshad on combat readiness. Certain measures such as
"cooperative measures" were burdensome and affeced combat
readines, specifically under circumstnces of significant
reductions in SDVs. He state that such provisions
unilaterally limited Russin forces. Poznihir expressed
Russia's concerns bout the U.S. SSBN force, stating that the
Unite States had 14 SSBNs with 7 of them constantly on uty.
Each of them was capable of carrying more Rs than all the
Russian mobile ICBM force. He cocluded that at any given
time the U.S. SSBN forc had more capability than the Russian
mobile fore. As the total number of SLBMs increased, all
Russian ICBM launchers would be needed. Poznihir argued that
it was easier to track a mobile ICBM in the field than it was
to find an SSBN on patrol. If the sides were to apply the
same approach to all mobile systems, he opined, we should
place limits on SSBNs and their patrol zones and have
provisions to display them in the open.


19. (S) Poznihir then called the U.S. proposal for advance
notification of missiles departing the Votkinsk production
facility "senseless." He said notification would be provided
upon arrival of a new missile at the operational base or
storage facility. As such, the United States would have all
the required information on total numbers and locations for
all missiles. The amount of time for transportation is
minimal, he said. Poznihir explained that unique identifiers
(UID) for mobile ICBMs would only be acceptable if they were
applied to all SOA, including U.S. SLBMs, and if such
information would be included in the notification.



20. (S) Poznihir opined that elimination of mobile launchers
using special procedures carried out under supervision of an
inspection team would be redundant. When taking into account
actual numbers of SOA to be eliminated, he said Russia would
be undertaking enormous financial costs. He asserted that
only Russian items would be subject to such constraints.
Russia believed it was sufficient that all solid ICBMs could
be eliminated by burning out the propellant and verified by
national technical means (NTM). The United States would have
a right within its inspection quota to confirm the results of
elimination, repeating the word "results." He emphasized
that unilateral provisions for Russian mobiles were
unacceptable. He finished by stating that provisions must be
equal across-the-board including U.S. SSBNs and SLBMs.


21. (S) Makarov claimed he did not understand the U.S. focus
on Russian mobile systems, reiterating the concept that the
nuclear potential of a mobile launcher was not comparable to
that of an SSBN. Makarov said such an approach was logical
when the United States was also looking to field a mobile
system and the sides had mutual concerns. Now, however, it
was not logical to focus on mobile systems unless U.S.
systems were also captured. If all mobile systems fell under
the same verification regime it would be fair. However, it
was not fair to focus on one component of the force. "This
approach seems like nostalgia carried over from START," he
said.


22. (S) Warner reiterated that the U.S. proposal to withdraw
separate limits on mobile ICBM launchers and the new
proposal, much like the Russian proposal, covered all
systems. The 150-proposed limit included silo launchers,
SLBM launchers and mobile launchers. This approach was more
consistent with the Russian proposal. In response to
Poznihir's statement about a systems ability to avoid
detection, Warner stated that a road-mobile launcher was much
smaller than an SSBN or heavy bomber. Although, when SSBNs
are on patrol, the goal was for them not to be found, there
was not any doubt regarding the total number of SSBNs. The
sides easily confirmed the total number of SSBNs using NTM
and over the course of one to two years; inspectors would
have the ability to verify the numbers during inspection. It
was also easy to track the number of heavy bombers, Warner
explained. Finally, he said, mobile ICBMs are designed to be
hidden, and were successfully hidden when deployed to the
field, which was a key aspect to their survivability and
stability for both sides. Warner explained that the ability
to obtain an accurate count in the absence of Votkinsk was
why the United States needed limited verification for the
total size of the Russian mobile force.


23. (S) At our level, Mullen said to Makarov, trust and
transparency are fundamentally resident in the issue of
verification. He said that Warner addressed the details
which are important to achieving an accurate count. The
other piece, as he understood, was based on a previous
conversation which identified new opportunities for
verification. While the Russian side offered additional
points to study, he understood that the issues raised were
consistent with historical points and views. Speaking
directly to Makarov, Mullen explained that he understood his
point of view from a military perspective and offered his own
military perspective, in the importance of maintaining an


accurate count. Mullen recognized that although each system
was different, effective verification of each system should
be fundamentally the same. Mullen said he was hopeful that
the sides could move forward on the mobile verification issue.


24. (S) Makarov responded that Russia looked to create a
verification regime equal for all systems. When we talk
about trust, he said, "the more we verify the more we trust."
Makarov said it would be logical if this adage was applied
to all systems that were mobile. Information on the number
and location of SOA was provided for within the verification
regime, he said, so to claim it was easier to hide a
ground-based mobile launcher as opposed to an SSBN, did not
make sense. Makarov asked again why the United States was
concentrating on Russian mobile systems.


25. (S) Makarov suggested applying a verification regime to
all types of mobile systems or to none at all. He said it
was time to depart from the old stereotypes surrounding the
mobile ICBM system. Referring to U.S. comments that
verification was important to treaty ratification, he
explained the difficulty in explaining to the Duma why Russia
had accepted unfair verification measures focused solely on
Russian mobile ICBM launchers. Makarov emphasized that
Russia was not attempting to depart from a verification
regime, but wanted to ensure the regime was fair and equal.
In regard to the U.S.-proposed limit of 150 non-deployed
launchers, Makarov said it was a serious issue that required
discussion within the context of limits on SDVs.


26. (S) Russia has no intention to cheat, Makarov continued.
If the President of Russia says that there will be no
cheating, then he will stick to his word. If a military man
were to take it upon himself to cheat, then that person would
be fired. The President's team, Makarov said, sticks to its
word and there would be no reason to cheat. Mullen
acknowledged Makarov's remarks and said the issue of
verification was concerned more with counting than how a
system was deployed. The United States was also looking to
apply limitation that would be fair for all systems, and the
reason for exploring a limit on non-deployed launchers was
because Russia had initially proposed such a limit. Mullen
clarified that the U.S. proposal applied to all systems and
returning to a proposed SDV limit of 500 would be a step in
the wrong direction. Mullen explained to Makarov that his
guidance came from the U.S. President, and suggested
continuing the discussion in a small group. He offered to
provide a paper on the U.S. position to facilitate dialogue.


27. (S) Gottemoeller said she had provided a main portion of
the U.S. minimized package on mobile missioes (REF B)
presented by Mullen to Antonov, and a copy translated into
Russian would be handed over to them at this meeting (Begin
comment: Gottemoeller handed the points to Antonov at the
end of her remarks. End comment.) Mullen, she continued,
had added a new proposal regarding a limit on non-deployed
launchers. She agreed that a small working group could be
held to discuss the issue in more detail. McFaul sought
clarification as to why Russia was against providing advanced
notification for newly-produced missiles departing Votkinsk.
He said the United States had agreed to provide the same
notification for U.S. missiles departing U.S. production
facilities. Presenting a scenario, McFaul speculated that,


if relations were to sour within the next ten years, concerns
could increase if the sides did not know how many missiles
exited or where they were headed.


28. (S) Poznihir responded by saying the sides were not
playing a card game looking for ways to deceive one another.
He said the sides were negotiating a treaty which would
provide effective verification measures and exchanges of data
and information. Poznihir claimed he did not understand the
problem because when a missile departs the production
facility it heads to an operational base or storage facility.
The United States would receive notification of this fact
and changes would be reflected in the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). The MOU would reflect locations and
numbers on all deployed and non-deployed systems which would
be verified during inspections. McFaul responded that it was
one thing to verify when a missile arrives but another when
it does not. "Why should we just rely on trust?" he asked.
Poznihir said the sides were supposed to be developing a more
streamlined approach and additional notification would be
burdensome to Russia.


29. (S) Antonov said he was confused by the conversation.
The United States had stated that relations between the
countries, especially between the Presidents, were improving,
yet the feeling in the room was reminiscent of the Cold War.
If the relations were truly improving, he said, there should
be more trust. Russia could not produce missiles as easily
as pencils. Judging from the conversation between our
Presidents, we should be searching for a more logical
approach. Antonov said there was no reason for the U.S.
President not to trust the Russian President. Russia would
not ask to receive special provisions that Russia was not
willing to agree to itself. He finished by saying the
Russian President was only looking for a treaty that would be
fair.


30. (S) Mullen, bringing the conversation back to specifics,
explained that discussions of hypothetical situations could
sometimes be helpful in achieving a better understanding of
each side's position. He agreed that it was important to
find parity, but the U.S. and Russian systems were different,
making it difficult to compare them side-by-side.
"Verification reinforces trust," he said. Mullen explained
that the verification regime for mobile ICBMs was important
for both internal and external consumption, underscoring the
bilateral relationship in connection with how it is viewed on
the world stage. If we assume these positions are taken
because of lack of trust, Mullen asserted, it would not be in
the spirit of our negotiations to this point and we would not
be able to move forward. He said the sides were dealing with
a broad audience which consisted of military personnel,
politicians and diplomats, and it was essential to take all
views into consideration. As U.S.-Russian relations evolve,
Mullen continued, there could be a time when a verification
regime is no longer necessary. However, we have not reached
that point. He affirmed that the verification regime had
been successful in the past and it was up to the negotiators
to determine the best verification regime for the future. We
have spoken of trust, transparency and engagement, Mullen
said, and we need to build on those concepts.


31. (S) Makarov agreed with Mullen and stated that the


details could be worked out in smaller groups. He understood
all concerns and agreed that verification should continue as
long as it is clear and equal. He then turned the floor to
General Orlov to discuss the Russian position on counting
rules.


32. (S) Orlov, taking into account the high level of the
military experts present, emphasized Makarov's comments that
counting rules were extremely important. He referred to the
Joint Statement signed in Moscow by the Presidents
emphasizing that the new treaty should serve the mutual
interest of both sides and provide stability and
predictability with respect to SOA. He reiterated a
statement made by President Medvedev that, in order to
accomplish this task, both sides must reduce their SOA by
several times. Such an approach would allow the sides to
carry out real reductions, resolve issues surrounding upload
potential, eventually leading to stability and peace. As
such, the Russian position on SDVs was 500 but, after
receiving the package proposal from Gen Jones, we agreed to
raise the limit to 550. He noted that President Medvedev had
offered to raise the limit to 600-700 during the Presidents'
meeting in Singapore. At the same time, President Medvedev
decided to reduce the warhead limit to 1600. He said these
were very complex decisions that required a review of
Russia's future force structure and objectives. He made
these decisions regardless of the military's opinions and in
an attempt to come to agreement with the United States. The
Russian President did not mention how difficult it would be
to ratify the new treaty because that is an internal problem.
Orlov stated that discussions about ratification during
plenary sessions, in his opinion, were not connected to the
delegations' task. Russia understood the U.S. proposal of
150 non-deployed launchers. However, Russia was concerned
how it would fit into the aggregate limits. He said
non-deployed launchers plus delivery vehicles and the number
of warheads available in reserve equated to an upload
potential. He asserted that 800 U.S. SDVs could potentially
be uploaded with 4500 warheads, which was more than 3.2 times
the agreed warhead limit.


33. (S) According to Orlov, the Russian approach did not
necessarily resolve Russian concerns with upload potential,
but attempted to reduce them. As such, the sides needed to
focus on counting rules and central limits before SDVs or
SOA. Russia accepted the U.S. proposal to count as deployed
only those SDVs with warheads loaded on them. This reflects
the real situation of forces--if there is a missile in the
launcher it would be counted. However, the U.S. side changed
its position.

--------------
HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULES
--------------


34. (S) Orlov shifted the discussion to heavy bomber
counting rules and concluded that, according to the
U.S.-proposed counting rules, heavy bombers should count for
zero warheads. This was the initial Russian position but it
was received negatively. Therefore, Orlov said, our
President proposed to count heavy bombers as one SDV, which
was a change to the Russian position. The Russian position
did not propose to inspect weapon storage areas (WSAs)


associated with heavy bomber bases. The U.S. proposal to
remove cruise missiles from operating bases to some other
area, 1000 KM away, was not a solution. Simply moving
weapons to another location would not remove the capability,
Orlov asserted, because weapons could be returned to the base
or the bomber could be flown to them. The U.S. proposal
would require significant financial expenditures by Russia.
This was due to different operating procedures and the need
to create separate support units for such an endeavor. Orlov
concluded that this would not add to the implementation or
purpose of the SFO treaty. He closed by stating that Russia
was prepared to discuss a limit of 650 SDVs.


35. (S) Makarov said that the United States understood
Russia's force structure. It consisted of fewer SDVs and
warheads and, as such, posed less of a threat. When the
Russian President informed the military that we needed to
find a number between 600-700 SDVs, it was unacceptable from
a military standpoint. Such numbers would force Russia to
reconsider Russian nuclear force structure--a very expensive
undertaking. Makarov said it might be more logical to ask
the United States to make changes to its force structure. If
we adopt the U.S. position, he said, we do not disarm but
rather build up, returning to the arms race. The
U.S.-proposed limit of 800 SDVs is too high and hard to
reach. Even with limits between 600-700 the United States
would have flexibility in its nuclear and conventional SOA
force structure. Makarov cited the U.S. President's
statement on the necessity to deter other states from
developing nuclear arms, but was confused by the U.S. SDV
numbers. He implied that proposing such a high limit on SDVs
encouraged Russia to build up its nuclear forces. We are
entering bilateral negotiations, he said, and need to think
about decreasing our nuclear potential in order to deter
others from creating nuclear arms.


36. (S) Mullen reiterated that the United States would not
be able to reconfigure its nuclear forces under the treaty
for reasons unconnected with the military, and similar to
those mentioned by Makarov, such as economics and politics.
Mullen added that the United States recognized the fact that
both sides had made changes to their initial proposals on SDV
limits and reminded Makarov that the U.S. President had made
the decision to decrease U.S. SDV limits from 1100 to 800.
Mullen then turned the floor to Miller to explain the U.S.
approach.


37. (S) Miller followed up on Orlov's statements, referring
to the Moscow Joint Statement, and offered to share current
results of the U.S. NPR. As long as we are stuck in a
situation of mutual vulnerability, he said, stability is
critical. Miller said the United States had reached two
conclusions regarding SDVs and force structure. The first
conclusion regarding stability was that the United States
required a balance between all three legs of the triad. In
an effort to remove first-strike incentives, the United
States planned to de-MIRV the MMIII. Miller said the United
States currently possesses 450 MMIII which would be de-MIRVed
to carry a single warhead. In order to do so, the platforms
would be changed to accommodate the de-MIRVing such that only
one warhead could be loaded.


38. (S) Makarov responded that a level of 650 SDVs would not


need to be accomplished in one year. The treaty obligations
are to be accomplished over ten years. The Russian proposal
was based on a realistic Russian force structure that could
not be achieved in a short period of time. Makarov then
asked whether the treaty would be based on a reduction or
build-up of SOA. Makarov said he agreed in principle with
Miller's point that confidence was especially important. If
you remember in the 1990s, Makarov said, Russia had a large
number of SOA. However, Russia eliminated its rail-mobile
force, which was much more dangerous than the road-mobile
force, and had eliminated 40 submarines. Russia, along with
the United States, eliminated its intermediate-range nuclear
missiles, which were critical to Russian security,
considering its geographic location, noting that no state
around the United States was developing a nuclear potential.
In summary, he said, this is a difficult situation from a
military prospective.


39. (S) In response to Makarov's statement on how to
characterize the SFO treaty, Mullen said he would
characterize the treaty as a commitment to reductions.
Miller referred to the President's emphasis on the importance
of reducing nuclear weapons with the long-term goal of
complete elimination. Miller stated that U.S. analysis shows
a limit of 1600 warheads and 450 single warhead MMIII ICBMs
would lead to a balanced triad for the United States.


40. (S) Warner remarked that the Russian ICBM force, both
present and future, consisted of silo and mobile systems
capable of being MIRVed. The sides agreed that they should
have the right to determine the composition of their own
forces. Warner calculated that, if Russia deployed 100 RS-24
ICBMs with 4 warheads each ICBM, Russia would have 400
warheads on launchers. Conversely, the United States would
have 400 warheads on 400 launchers. Therefore, Russia would
have the same nuclear potential with 100 ICBMs as the United
States had with 400 MMIII launchers. Miller also added that,
from a stability perspective, Russian mobiles were survivable.


41. (S) Makarov agreed in principle with Miller's statement
of stability, but said the technological potential of the
United States was greater than that of Russia, both now and
in the future. This was particularly true when taking into
account precision-guided weapons and advanced command and
control. Therefore, Makarov concluded that for both sides,
the numbers of SDVs and warheads should be lower than what we
are discussing. Makarov said nuclear weapons were its only
guarantor of security and the United States needed to
understand that.


42. (S) Mullen said he understood and turned the floor to
Mr. Elliott to explain the U.S. position on heavy bomber
counting rules.

Begin points:

- Under START, all warheads were attributed to their
respective strategic delivery systems.

- Today we have agreed to count ICBM and SLBM warheads,
and to confirm our declarations in the memorandum of
understanding, which provides a sound verification mechanism
for both sides.



- In a similar fashion, we have proposed counting nuclear
armaments on or associated with deployed heavy bombers.

- We fully understand that neither side loads warheads on
their heavy bombers today--this is a good thing. But we also
understand that both sides have substantial numbers of
long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles and nuclear
gravity bombs stored near their heavy bombers.

- We draw several conclusions from this reality:

-- It is unrealistic for the sides to report they have
no nuclear armaments under this treaty.

-- Use of an attribution rule, as proposed by the
Russian Federation, would provide no verification mechanism
at all.

- The U.S. side believes firmly that counting warheads
associated with deployed heavy bombers is the most
transparent approach for both sides.

End points.


43. (S) Orlov responded that he and Elliott had discussed
the issue many times already. The Russian proposal for
verification allowed inspectors to look in the weapons bay to
verify there were no weapons loaded on the heavy bomber. We
know you can upload and download a bomber very quickly, Orlov
asserted, therefore, inspectors would not see weapons.
Makarov stated that he did not understand the U.S. logic.
According to U.S. logic, he asked, would all heavy bombers on
duty be loaded with weapons? If they are loaded with zero,
he said, they should count as zero. The heavy bomber would
count as the SDV, but there would be zero nuclear weapons.


44. (S) Elliott responded that the U.S. approach was based
on the normal mode of operation for heavy bombers on both
sides. For this treaty, the United States did not believe
loading warheads on heavy bombers or returning to alert from
the Cold War years was an acceptable approach. Heavy bomber
crews required flight training to maintain their skills. The
United States keeps weapons near the bombers, but not loaded
on the bombers. Noting that both he and Orlov were former
planners and understood that, if weapons are available,
commanders will make contingency plans for their use.
Therefore, the U.S. proposal begins with the reduction of
such weapons. Makarov said Russia is not against
verification measures for heavy bomber, but re-emphasized
President Medvedev's proposal that they count as either one
or zero.


45. (S) Mullen moved on to a presentation on telemetry.
Referring to a conversation he had with Makarov the previous
day, Mullen acknowledged that there were issues associated
with telemetry and he hoped the discussion would lead to a
better understanding of the Russian position. Mullen said he
believed there is a possibility for compromise and would like
Makarov to keep that in mind while discussing the issue. He
turned the floor over to Mr. Siemon, who presented the U.S.
points on telemetry.


Begin points:

- The START and U.S.-proposed START Follow-on telemetry
provisions have six basic elements:

1) Provisions on the non-interference with National
Technical Means of Verification - largely agreed in current
treaty text and based on similar language in
previously-signed arms control treaties,

2) A basic ban on the encryption of telemetric data - a
concept that was first agreed in the SALT II Treaty,

3) The notification of flight tests under the 1988
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement - largely
agreed in current treaty text except for additional telemetry
broadcast information,

4) The exchange of recorded media and associated
playback equipment,

5) The exchange of Interpretative data for the missile
stages and the post-boost vehicle, and

6) A provision for a limited number of encrypted flight
tests each year.

- The U.S. Delegation seeks to understand Russia's position
on each of these elements to consider developing a potential
compromise solution as mentioned by Admiral Mullen.

End points.

--------------
TELEMETRY REVISITED
--------------


46. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov responded that the telemetry issue
was complex and he did not see a possibility for resolution.
In the Russian view, he said, the U.S. position to include
telemetry in the SFO treaty was excessive because it was not
connected to the SFO verification regime. The Russian
position was based on three fundamental principles. Under
START, the exchange of telemetry was part of the verification
regime necessary in calculating throw-weight and verifying
the total number of warheads attributed to each ICBM and
SLBM. Telemetry was necessary, he explained, because NTM was
not capable of verifying the number of re-entry vehicles
(RVs) a system could carry.


47. (S) Ryzhkov stated that there were no provisions in the
SFO treaty requiring telemetry. Russia also believed that
the criteria to determine a new type, which includes
throw-weight, should be excluded from the treaty. If the
goal was to count the actual number of warheads deployed on
ICBMs and SLBMs then there would be no sense in having a "new
type." That term would only be applicable in verifying the
type of missile, not the number of RVs. Any ballistic
missile of an existing type under the SFO treaty could be
tested with any number of warheads and any throw-weight,
Ryzhkov asserted. The actual number of RVs could be
confirmed during inspection. Therefore, Ryzhkov continued,
the exchange of telemetry under the SFO treaty is unrelated


to provisions of the treaty.


48. (S) Ryzhkov explained that the second component of the
Russian position dealt with the United States testing Trident
II SLBMs from United Kingdom SSBNs. The United States had
modernized many components of its nuclear systems over many
years, he said, updating systems including the Trident II in
cooperation with the United Kingdom. He said the United
States had tested Trident II SLBMs from United Kingdom SSBNs,
but did not provide telemetry information from those tests.
This, Ryzhkov stated, created the opportunity to avoid
contractual provisions concerning telemetry.


49. (S) The third and most important point from the Russian
perspective was the relationship between MD and telemetry.
Ryzhkov said that telemetry information received from Russia
on ICBM and SLBM launchers could be used to support the
development of U.S. MD. In this case, he said, telemetry
becomes less an issue of verification and more an issue of
Russian national security.


50. (S) In response to Siemon's reference to the
relationship between SALT II and telemetry, Ryzhkov said the
ban on encryption was raised under SALT II to avoid
deliberate interference of information related to treaty
verification. Russia is prepared to discuss this issue in a
small group.


51. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Paper containing points used by Adm Mullen at the
first meeting on November 22, 2009.


52. (U) Participants:

U.S.

ADM Mullen
A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Dr. Miller
Dr. Warner
Dr. Kass
Dr. McFaul
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Trout
Dr. Look
Mr. DeNinno
Lt Col Goodman
VAdm Winnefeld
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Makarov
Amb Antonov
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ilin


Col Ryzhkov
Col Knyazeva
Gen Kublo
Adm Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Trifonov
Col Zaytsev
Col Zudin
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


53. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS