START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 19, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-037.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:50 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of
Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of
Defense Representative Colonel Ilin, Assistant Secretary
Gottemoeller presented the U.S. streamlined package for
mobile missiles. The Russian side stated the U.S. proposal
for the elimination of Russian road-mobile ICBMS and their
associated launch canisters should also apply to U.S. SLBMs
and SLBM loading tubes. Mr. Siemon briefed the Russian
Delegation on the six components of the U.S. telemetry
proposal. The Russian side stated that it could not agree to
the U.S. proposal since telemetric information was only used
to verify ballistic missile throw-weight and warhead
attribution, which were not limited by the new treaty. The
Russian side also noted that the United States could use
Russian-provided telemetric information to improve its
missile defense systems.


4. (U) Subject Summary: Streamlined Package on Mobile
Missiles; Questions From the Russian Side; Unique IDs; U.S.
Telemetry Proposal; Russian Objections to Telemetry;
Telemetry Increases Transparency and Confidence; Issues That
Must be Resolved Before Movement Can be Made; and,
Makarov/Mullen Meeting.

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STREAMLINED PACKAGE
ON MOBILE MISSILES
--------------


5. (S) Gottemoeller began the meeting by presenting the U.S.
streamlined package on mobile missiles. She stated she was
asked to personally deliver the points.

Begin points.

- Unique Identifier: The United States continues to believe
that, in order to assist in monitoring the total number of
mobile ICBMs produced, and tracking the individual missiles
throughout their life cycles, each mobile ICBM and its launch
canister should be marked with a "unique identifier" (UID).
The United States remains willing to permit the use of the
unique tail number on each U.S. and Russian heavy bomber as a
UID for heavy bombers.

- Production Notification: In lieu of continuous monitoring
at production facilities for mobile ICBMs, the United States
has previously proposed that the Russian Federation notify
the United States, 60 hours before the exit of a mobile ICBM
from the Votkinsk Final Assembly Plant, of the impending exit
of a mobile ICBM and provide the appropriate missile UID. If
this advance notification requirement can be agreed, the

United States is prepared to drop its proposal for the
placement of a camera for remote monitoring at that facility,
the Votkinsk facility. The United States remains willing to
offer reciprocal notifications of exits of missiles from an
analogous U.S. missile production facility.

- Observation of the Final Cuts for Eliminations: The United
States proposes that for all ICBMs and SLBMs, only the
elimination of the first stage, as well as the associated
launch canister if so equipped, is required for the
elimination of the missile. U.S. acceptance of this
requirement is predicated on inspectors having the right to
observe the final cuts of the motor casing for the first
stage of a mobile ICBM and of the launch canister for that
ICBM.

- The United States could agree to a modified procedure for
elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs that would shorten
inspection time and facilitate Russia's use of the remaining
vehicle for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty as
follows: Inspectors would have the right to observe the
final step of the elimination process, i.e., cutting off the
mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism. Further, the
front leveling jacks would remain intact, but 0.78 meters of
the chassis would be cut off. Washington does not believe it
necessary to include data on eliminated launchers in the
Memorandum of Understanding, or to inspect such launchers
after they have been eliminated in this manner. The United
States could agree to this elimination procedure if Russia
will provide assurances that it will not permit the transfer
of such eliminated launchers to parties outside of Russia.

- The United States continues to maintain that special
verification measures are needed to address the unique
difficulties associated with monitoring mobile missiles. To
address Russian concerns, we propose to keep unique
provisions to a minimum. Accordingly, we have further
simplified proposed provisions affecting mobile ICBMs and
mobile ICBM launchers while maintaining what we view to be
the minimum necessary for verification.

End points.

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QUESTIONS FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE
--------------


6. (S) Gottemoeller asked if the Russian side had questions,
noting that, questions of a technical nature should be left
for the Ad Hoc Group to discuss. General Poznihir asked if
the streamlined package replaced all other measures for
mobile launchers and their ICBMs, to which Gottemoeller
replied, all other measures for mobile launchers and ICBMs
for mobile launchers remained on the table. This being the
case, Ambassador Antonov asked what was new in the U.S.
streamlined package. Gottemoeller explained that the United
States had organized its discussion of mobile ICBMs based on
the life cycle of such mobile missiles and their launchers:
the production phase, deployment phase and elimination phase.
The proposals in the streamlined package dealt with the
production and elimination phases of the mobile ICBM life
cycle. All measures dealing with the deployment phase were
unchanged and remained on the table. Colonel Ryzhkov stated
that he understood the procedures in the package dealing with

the elimination of the first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs and
the elimination of the launch canisters for mobile ICBMs. He
asked if the proposal included similar procedures for the
elimination of loading tubes for SLBMs. The question was
expanded by Ilin asking if Russian inspectors would have the
right to view the final elimination procedures for such
loading tubes, as well as, ICBMs and SLBMs.


7. (S) Mr. Elliott indicated that the new U.S. proposal
regarding mobile ICBMs included common procedures for the
elimination of all ICBMs and SLBMs and their associated
launch canisters. Because the relationship of a U.S. SLBM to
a loading tube was different than that of a mobile ICBM to
its launch canister, the package elimination procedures did
not extend to the elimination of loading tubes. Elaborating,
Elliott pointed out the mobile ICBM and its launch canister
are linked to one another. Unlike the one-to-one
relationship of the mobile ICBM to its launch canister, there
were many more SLBMs in the U.S. inventory than SLBM loading
tubes and the linked relationship did not exist. Ryzhkov
stated that the U.S. proposal was contrary to the Russian
concept of similar elimination procedures for all solid
propellant ICBMs and SLBMs and would again require Russia to
spend money it had not intended to fund U.S. observation of
Russian mobile ICBM elimination; inflicting an additional
economic burden on Russia.

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UNIQUE IDS
--------------


8. (S) General Orlov responded to the U.S. offer to provide
UIDs for U.S. heavy bombers, stating he believed the United
States should provide UIDs for its SLBMs rather then its
heavy bombers. He noted Russia could not accept the proposal
to provide heavy bomber tail numbers since Russian bombers
did not have tail numbers, they had individual names. He
asserted that the Russian side would consider the offer more
equal if the U.S. proposed to provide UIDs for all of its
SLBMs.


9. (S) Dr. Warner explained that the United States had
thought seriously about placing UIDs on its ICBMs and SLBMs,
however, they would not be visible to Russian inspectors
since only the front section of the ICBMs and SLBMs were
visible during warhead inspections once these missiles were
deployed.


10. (S) Gottemoeller suggested that further discussion of
the new U.S. proposal take place in the Ad Hoc Group and
noted she believes that these topics would be discussed at
the upcoming Genera Makarov/Admiral Mullen meeting. The
first portion of the meeting concluded, Gottemoeller and
Antonov departed, and discussion continued within the AD Hoc
Group.

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U.S. TELEMETRY PROPOSAL
--------------


11. (S) Mr. Siemon made a presentation on the components of
the U.S. proposal regarding the continued provision of
telemetry in the START Follow-on (SFO) treaty. Siemon stated
the U.S. proposal for telemetry contained six basic elements

that were similar to those contained in START: 1) A
provision on non-interference with national technical means
(NTM) of verification; 2) a ban on the encryption of
telemetric data; 3) notification of flight tests under the
1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement,
including telemetry broadcast frequencies to be expressed in
megahertz to the nearest one megahertz; information on
modulation types; and information as to whether the flight
test was to employ encapsulation or encryption; 4) exchange
of recorded media and associated playback equipment; 5)
exchange of interpretive data for the separation of the
missile stages and the operation of the post-boost vehicle;
and 6) provision for a limited number of flight tests each
year during which encryption of telemetric data could be used.


12. (S) Siemon noted the provision for non-interference with
NTM existed in the SALT I, SALT II, INF and START treaties.
In the current proposed text for the SFO treaty, this ban
existed in Article IX or Article X depending on the Russian-
or U.S.-proposed text. It was difficult to understand why
the ban was not included in the Russian-proposed text since
it was in these other treaties agreed to by the Soviet Union
and Russian Federation. Siemon indicated the information,
which would be provided associated with flight tests,
reflected the information that was required to attain the
minimum amount of information by NTM. He stated that the
proposal provided for encryption on a specified number of
flight tests on an annual basis. The U.S.-proposed SFO text
provided more flexibility in this regard than in START.
Encryption would be used only during flight tests of ICBMs or
SLBMs of existing types that were deployed as of treaty
signature, but none of which were deployed at the time of the
flight test, as well as during no more than a total of two
flight tests each year of ICBMs of existing types that were
deployed and two flight tests each year of SLBMs of existing
types that were deployed for each Party.


13. (S) Siemon stated the United States believed these
factors provided for transparency, confidence-building and
predictability, which together enhanced strategic stability
over the longer term between the United States and Russia.
This was an important objective and was consistent with the
Joint Understanding signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev
in July 2009. Siemon noted that, in the long run as each
side fielded new ICBMs and SLBMs, the U.S.-proposed telemetry
provision would prove very useful to both sides.

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RUSSIAN OBJECTIONS TO TELEMETRY
--------------


14. (S) Ilin noted on September 21, 2009, during Session V
of the negotiations, that the Russian side had made a
presentation on why it rejected provisions regarding
telemetry in the new treaty and the Russian position had not
changed since that date. In SALT I, SALT II, and START,
telemetry had a specific purpose. Telemetry was used by the
Parties to verify throw-weight which, in turn, was used to
calculate the maximum number of warheads an ICBM or SLBM was
able to carry. The new SFO treaty does not contain any
limits on throw-weight or attribution regarding the warheads
on ballistic missiles. Therefore, telemetry would serve no
purpose in SFO.


15. (S) Moreover, Ilin argued Russia believed telemetry on
Russian ballistic missile flight tests could be used to
improve the design of U.S. missile defense systems. Unlike
the INF and START treaties, which were signed when the ABM
Treaty still existed and the Parties recognized the
relationship between these treaties and the ABM Treaty, the
United States was unwilling to make a statement in SFO
recognizing the interrelationship between strategic offensive
arms and missile defense systems.


16. (S) Ilin noted that, during START, problems were
identified with the provision of telemetric information and
the equipment for playback. These unresolved issues made the
provision of telemetry in SFO impossible. He reiterated that
the rationale for the provision of telemetric information was
linked to verification and this type of verification did not
exist in SFO.


17. (S) Siemon noted that the U.S. position on telemetry
also had not changed since September 21, 2009. He emphasized
the U.S.-proposed telemetry provisions would not provide
specific details on the construction and configuration of the
missile, reentry vehicles, or penetration aids; which was the
type of information needed to develop and design a missile
defense system. The telemetric information would allow the
other side to determine the number of procedures for
dispensing penetration aids. It would not, however, reveal
information about the characteristics and capabilities of
penetration aids that would allow the other side to defeat
penetration aids, and other missile defense countermeasures.


18. (S) Telemetry, under START and under the U.S. proposal
for SFO, did not provide identification data for parameters
or information on how to convert quantities into real
physical values, except for a limited number of functional
parameters, such as stage separation, reentry vehicles
separation, and acceleration of the stages and self-contained
dispensing mechanism. The absence of such information
limited the value of the telemetry for determining more than
the basics about the operation of the missile, self-contained
dispensing mechanism, and the reentry vehicles.


19. (S) Referring back to the six basic elements of
telemetry laid out earlier, Siemon said he understood
Russia's lack of satisfaction with the U.S.-provided
telemetry playback equipment. He could also understand
Russia's position against provision of interpretive data and
the agreement not to interfere with the NTM of each side. He
could not understand why the Russian side could not agree to
a ban on telemetry encryption. Given these objections,
Siemon asked if it was Russia's intention to encrypt missile
test telemetry when the new treaty entered into force.


20. (S) Ilin said Russia had a different view on the
benefits the U.S. revived from telemetry in improving its
ballistic missile defense capabilities, especially since the
United States had plans to improve its missile defense
system. Russia's plans to encrypt missile flight test
telemetry after entry into force of the new SFO treaty would
be based on the purpose of the particular flight tests. Use
of encryption would be guided by national security needs,
therefore, Russia could not agree on a ban on telemetry
encryption. He stated that, although Russia did not have
issues with all six of the basic elements presented by

Siemon, it treated the six elements as a package and it could
not accept that package.

--------------
TELEMETRY INCREASES
TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE
--------------


21. (S) Warner explained that throw-weight would not be used
for determining RV attribution for ballistic missiles as it
had in other treaties dealing with the reduction of strategic
offensive arms. Telemetric information throw-weight in the
new treaty was important to understanding the new type of
ICBM and SLBM capabilities each side was in the process of
developing and possibly fielding. The United States believed
that telemetric information on the throw-weight of new types
of missiles was an important parameter. Access to
uninterrupted telemetric information from ICBM and SLBM
flight tests promoted increased transparency and mutual
confidence which is important for maintaining strategic
stability.


22. (S) Warner stated that the question of whether telemetry
could help in improvement of a missile defense system was
worthy of a detailed discussion, but said he doubted there
were new key insights that telemetry could provide for
improvement of U.S. BMD.

--------------
ISSUES THAT MUST BE RESOLVED
BEFORE MOVEMENT CAN BE MADE
--------------


23. (S) Ilin presented a list of issues, apparently based
upon discussions in the MOU Working Group, that the Russian
side believed must be resolved before any real movement could
be made in agreeing on treaty text. The list included: (1)
U.S. insistence on listing items in the MOU that Russia
believed were not strategic offensive arms; 2) U.S.
insistence on using the word "nuclear" in front of warhead
throughout the treaty; 3) the fact that the United States had
not responded to the Russian proposal on counting deployed
and non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers (what are we going to
count?); 4) Counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear
armaments; 5) UIDs for mobile ICBMs and possibly other SOA;
and 6) combining space launch facilities and test ranges.

--------------
MAKAROV/MULLEN MEETING
--------------


24. (S) Orlov asked whether the U.S. side could identify
possible issues that Makarov and Mullen would likely discuss
in their meeting that would occur early the following week.
Warner provided the following issues: the SDV limit; the
limit on deployed warheads; counting rules for heavy bomber
nuclear armaments; constraints and limits on mobile ICBMs;
selected inspection issues; and telemetry. He also noted
that the discussions might include attention to ICBMs and
SLBMs in non-nuclear configuration and the offense-defense
relationship.


25. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed CorE Part III Section VII Procedures
for Elimination of Facilities and Fixed Structures, dated
November 19, 2009.


26. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller (first portion of meeting)
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Hanchett
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov (first portion of meeting)
Col Ilin
Mr. Koshelev
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS