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09GENEVA1063
2009-11-24 20:19:00
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Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001063 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
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JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001063

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-016.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:20 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of
Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of
Defense Representative General Orlov, the entire meeting, at
Russian request, was dedicated to heavy bomber (HB) nuclear
armaments counting rules. The U.S. side described its
proposed concept for counting nuclear armaments for HBs. It
explained that the concept included declaring and recording
deployed and non-deployed HB nuclear armaments in the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),locating non-deployed
long-range nuclear-armed ALCM (LRNA) bodies at a declared
central storage facility that could be subject to inspection,
and inspecting nuclear armaments stored in weapons storage
areas (WSA) associated with HB bases for HBs equipped for
nuclear armaments. The U.S. side also discussed the
unrealistic Russian 550 strategic delivery vehicle (SDV)
limit.


4. (S) The Russian side commented on Russia's inability to
implement the concept discussed by the U.S. side based on the
cost to Russia for an additional storage facility, and their
inability to create the separate infrastructure needed to
support the additional storage facility for non-deployed LRNA
bodies.


5. (U) Subject Summary: Counting Rules for HB Nuclear
Armaments; Deployed and Non-Deployed Nuclear Armaments;
Concept of Inspection; Clarifying the Concept; The Concept is
Practical; Practical Does Not Involve Spending Money; Double

Jeopardy; Let Me Set You Straight; and, Re-Direct to
Realistic SDV Limit.

--------------
COUNTING RULES FOR
HB NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS
--------------


6. (S) Orlov began the meeting with the assertion that the
warhead counting rules for deployed ICBMS and SLBMs were
clear. However, further discussion was needed on the
counting rules for HB nuclear armaments. Warner stated the
U.S. side would discuss the potential inspection activity and
the concept of non-deployed LRNA as related to its concept
for counting HB nuclear armaments.


7. (S) Warner noted both the U.S. and Russian counting
concepts recognized the fact that nuclear armaments on or
associated with deployed HBs should be counted. However,
discussion in the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG)
revealed there were differences in how the inspection
activity to verify these armaments would be conducted. The
Russian side said it would allow the inspection of only one

HB uploaded with nuclear armaments to verify the HB nuclear
armaments declared for an air base. This was irrespective of
the number of HBs uploaded with nuclear armaments. Since
this concept did not reflect the reality that both sides did
not load nuclear armaments on its HBs on a day-to-day basis,
the U.S. side proposed a different concept for counting HB
nuclear armaments. To reflect the reality of both sides, the
U.S. concept included inspection of not only the nuclear
armaments loaded on the HBs, but also inspection of nuclear
armaments stored in the WSA associated with the air base.

--------------
DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED
NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS
--------------


8. (S) Warner explained that the U.S. concept included both
deployed and non-deployed nuclear armaments. Nuclear
armaments located on an air base would be considered to be
deployed. Under the U.S. concept, deployed nuclear armaments
would include LRNA and nuclear gravity bombs, both those
loaded on the HBs and those stored within the WSA associated
with the bomber base. Excess LRNA would have the warheads
de-mated and would be removed from the air base to be stored
at a declared central storage facility, located hundreds of
miles from the HB base. These LRNA bodies would be
considered to be non-deployed armaments. Warner noted that
the U.S. concept recognized the Russian concept for counting
nuclear armaments loaded on a deployed HB and also the
Russian practice of storing its LRNA with the nuclear warhead
de-mated from the LRNA and stored at a separate nuclear
weapons storage area located off the air base. Warner made
clear this non-deployed concept focused on the ALCM body that
is stored in a separate storage area located on the air base
without its nuclear warhead, since this was the crucial
component in delivering the warhead to a target. The focus
was placed on the cruise missile body for both the purpose of
accountability and counting.

--------------
CONCEPT OF INSPECTION
--------------


9. (S) Warner described potential inspection procedures
under the U.S. concept. He noted the U.S. practice of
storing its LRNA on pylons and rotary launchers. These
pylons and rotary launchers were stored in bunkers within the
base WSA. Proposed inspection procedures could include the
principle of sampling, under which inspectors could view the
armaments within a specified number of designated bunkers in
addition to those that were loaded on HBs. Warner noted that
the procedures for these inspections could be discussed in
the IPWG. He envisioned the sides would declare the number
of deployed HB nuclear armaments located at each base for HBs
equipped for nuclear armaments within the MOU. During an
inspection of a U.S. HB base for example, the base would
identify the bunkers which contained nuclear armaments and
the number of such armaments contained in each bunker.
Russian inspectors would then be permitted to verify the
number declared for a specified number of designated bunkers.
He noted that these procedures were similar to what was
currently used to inspect non-deployed SLBMs during data
update inspections for submarine bases under START. He added
that these were just his thoughts which still required

approval.

--------------
CLARIFYING THE CONCEPT
--------------


10. (S) Orlov was concerned with a potential requirement to
relocate all the non-deployed cruise missile bodies to a
separate storage facility. He stated that Russia could not
accomplish this type of movement in the short term. Warner
acknowledged the number of non-deployed LRNA would initially
be quite large. However, movement of non-deployed LRNA to
the central storage facility could be made over the first
seven years of the treaty as the sides reduced to the agreed
limit for deployed nuclear warheads.


11. (S) Warner described how the inspections might be
conducted at U.S. bases for HBs equipped for nuclear
armaments. Since B-2s only employ nuclear gravity bombs, at
Whiteman AFB only nuclear gravity bombs would be inspected in
the WSA. Although the B-52H was once capable of employing
nuclear gravity bombs, the only nuclear armament employed
from the aircraft currently was the LRNA and, therefore, only
LRNA would be inspected within the WSA at the B-52H bases in
a manner which he had previously described.

--------------
THE CONCEPT IS PRACTICAL
--------------


12. (S) Mr. Elliott noted that, in considering this concept,
two options had arisen. The first was to remove the nuclear
warheads from the LRNA and then move the warheads to a
separate storage facility. This option complicated
verification of the declared numbers at the facility, since
the warhead was small and would be difficult to prove their
absence in a WSA. The second option would be to separate the
warhead from the ALCM body and move the excess cruise missile
bodies to a separate central storage facility hundreds of
miles from the air base. The missiles at the central storage
facility would be considered to be non-deployed and not count
toward the central nuclear warhead limit. Each side's
declared non-deployed and deployed LRNA could then be
verified. This option presented a realistic option for
counting HB nuclear armaments and acknowledged the Russian
concern over upload capability.


13. (S) Elliott noted the proposed U.S. concept for counting
HB nuclear armaments was similar to the current practice used
in counting deployed and non-deployed strategic ballistic
missiles under START. Parties declared the number and
location of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs in the
MOU. The number of non-deployed missiles are verified when a
Party conducted a data update inspection and ballistic
missile movement was monitored via notifications. Warner
noted under START Follow-on this would be a Type 2 inspection
of non-deployed items. An important feature of the potential
U.S. concept was that LRNA movement was easily observable by
national technical means since the security required to move
a nuclear-armed LRNA was different than that required to move
cruise missile bodies. Warner added that the storage concept
for storing non-deployed LRNA bodies and their extracted
nuclear warheads in separate central storage facilities,
which was being proposed in the U.S. concept, was actually

the current Russian storage practice for LRNA and their
warheads at HB bases.


14. (S) In responding to a question by Orlov, Elliott stated
that the U.S. concept might require a distinguishability
exhibition of the nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs. Warner
added another way to discriminate between nuclear and
non-nuclear ALCMs could be through the use of radiation
detection equipment.

--------------
PRACTICAL DOES NOT
INVOLVE SPENDING MONEY
--------------


15. (S) Orlov stated the Russian concept for attributing
each HB with one nuclear warhead came directly from
Presidential instructions. The Russian side admitted it had
more cruise missile bodies than warheads. It was not
possible to move excess/non-deployed cruise missile bodies to
a separate central storage facility because of the great
financial burden involved. The U.S. concept would require
Russia to construct both additional storage facilities and
generate the manpower infrastructure to support the new
storage facilities. In addition, he believed the appropriate
distance the storage facility was to be from the air base
would be difficult to negotiate. Orlov also questioned the
idea of a mandated inspection of the LRNA central storage
facility and whether the warheads would also be susceptible
to inspection. Elliott noted the inspection would be a Type
2 inspection of a storage facility for non-deployed items.
The inspection would be a right of the sides but would not be
mandatory. Warner stated that in no case would the warheads
be susceptible to inspection. If verification could be
accomplished without an inspection, that would be acceptable
to the United States. The United States was not committed to
the idea of an inspection of the central storage facility
containing non-deployed LRNA.


16. (S) Warner addressed Orlov's comments on the potential
difficulties in implementing the storage of non-deployed
cruise missiles in the near future by reminding Orlov that
the concept could be implemented anytime during the first
seven years of the new treaty, that is, during the period of
reductions. A side may choose to move the excess cruise
missile bodies toward the beginning of the seven-year period
or may decide to delay the movement to the end of the
seven-year reduction period. Elliott reminded Orlov that the
concept of storing non-deployed HB armaments referred only to
LRNA. The U.S. concept would also consider deployed nuclear
gravity bombs inspectable at an HB base, if such weapons were
declared for the HBs based there.

--------------
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
--------------


17. (S) Colonel Zaytsev questioned the need for Russia to
move toward a U.S. concept that would require Russia to spend
additional money when the United States could move toward the
Russian concept of simply counting one nuclear weapon for
each deployed HB that was essentially free. The Russian
delegation would not only be moving away from its
instructions, but also committing itself to spend more money.

He believed the U.S. side had ulterior motives for proposing
its counting concept for HB nuclear armaments. Elliott
stated that Zaytsev was correct, the United States did have
an ulterior motive for proposing its concept for counting
heavy bomber nuclear armaments and that was that the United
States was attempting to explore ways to further reduce
strategic offensive arms as was the core purpose of the new
treaty.


18. (S) Zaytsev stated that technical data for LRNA and
nuclear gravity bombs, among other things, would be required
to implement the U.S. concept and did the United States
propose to provide this technical data. Photos would also be
required. Warner agreed that the sides would need to record
the number of deployed and non-deployed items and may also be
required to conduct exhibitions of items not previously
exhibited under START. Mr. Trout reminded Zaytsev that the
proposed MOU provided this data, as well as the requirement
to provide photos necessary for the implementation of the
treaty.


19. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side did not
oppose the U.S. concept because it did not hear and
understand the U.S. explanation. It opposed the U.S. concept
because it did not reflect reality. The Russian concept to
declare zero HB nuclear armaments reflected reality. This
was the same situation that existed under START for SLBMs.
When the SLBM was stored without the warhead, it did not
count toward the aggregate limit on warheads. The Russian
side knew the U.S. practice of storing its LRNA. It
suggested that the United States accept the Russian
compromise to attribute each heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments with one warhead in order to move the issue
forward. The U.S. concept did not reflect the new
relationship between the two nations and countermanded the
agreed objective of making the new treaty less complicated to
implement. The U.S. concept was in effect double jeopardy
for Russia; the concept not only required new procedures, but
also new procedures that would cost Russia more money to
implement. Russia would not allow U.S. inspectors in its WSA
and it could not move its "excess" cruise missiles to central
storage facilities.

--------------
LET ME SET YOU STRAIGHT
--------------


20. (S) Warner acknowledged that the U.S. concept would
involve additional expenditures and also involve the effects
resulting from the requirement to maintain an additional
storage facility. He had trouble believing that even the
Russian LRNA stored in a separated condition could not be
brought to an operational state and loaded aboard Russian HBs
in a matter of a few days. The potential of the HB was still
significant, even though it was not considered a first-strike
system. The idea of zero-declared HB nuclear armaments just
did not appear sensible. Warner reminded the Russian side
that Senate ratification of the treaty in the United States
was a political process. Senate ratification required a
two-thirds vote to pass. This was 67 votes and when one
considered that 6 of these votes came from three states with
missile bases, the concept of realistic counting rules was
important for ratification.



--------------
RE-DIRECT TO REALISTIC SDV LIMIT
--------------


21. (S) Warner re-directed the discussion on counting ules
for HB nuclear armaments based on reality t SDV limits that
similarly need to be based on rality. He reminded the
Russian side that both Paties based their negotiating
positions on their plans for future strategi force
structure. The U.S. side had stated that it planned to go to
an ICBM force of 450 silos al equipped with a single
warhead, 12 Trident II SBNs and approximately 100 heavy
bombers equippedfor nuclear armaments. So, reality was the
Russan-proposed SDV of 550 was impossible for the U.S. to
attain. Bottom line was that Russian proposal had to be
realistic or there would be no U.S. Snate ratification.
Orlov responded by asking theU.S. side to consider how the
sides could implement a one warhead attribution for HB for
nuclear armaments.


22. (U) Documents exchanged,

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed JDT Conversion or Elimination Section,
Sections II, V and VI, dated November 11, 2009.


23. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Hanchett
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Mr. Koshelev
Col Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS