START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) ADMIRAL MULLEN'S OPENING MEETING WITH
GENERAL MAKAROV, NOVEMBER 22, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-045.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 22, 2009
Time: 5:30 - 6:40 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael
Mullen met with Russian Federation First Deputy Defense
Minister and Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov at
the Russian Mission in Geneva on November 22, 2009, to assist
in resolving outstanding issues in the START Follow-on Treaty
negotiations. Mullen presented U.S. positions on the minimum
requirements for the verification of mobile ICBMs and their
launchers, telemetry, limits on strategic delivery vehicles
(SDVs),and counting rules for heavy bombers. Mullen
throughout emphasized the obligation of the Parties, as well
as his personal desire, to work through differences on key
issues and conclude a satisfactory treaty for both sides.


4. (S) Makarov's preliminary response, cut short by time
constraints, reflected continuing resistance to tailored
verification provisions for road-mobile systems and to
transparency on telemetry.


5. (S) Subject Summary: Outlining the Objectives of the
Visit; Admiral Mullen Introduces U.S. Approach; U.S. Position
on Mobile ICBMs and Their Launchers; U.S. Position on
Telemetry; U.S. Position on SDV Limits; U.S. Position on
Counting Heavy Bombers; and, General Makarov's Response.

--------------
OUTLINING THE OBJECTIVES
F THE VISIT
--------------


6. (S) Admiral Mullen met with General Makarov at the
Russian Mission on November 22, 2009. Mullen was accompanied
by representatives of the National Security Council,
Department of Defense, and members of the delegation in
Geneva. Makarov was joined largely by members of the Russian
delegation in Geneva and several officials from the Ministry
of Defense who had accompanied him from Moscow.


7. (S) Makarov opened the meeting by explaining the nature
of his objectives in coming to Geneva. He recounted that the
work of the delegations had clarified many issues between the
Parties, but that some technical questions had arisen that
directly related to the security of the two countries. He
sought to illuminate the reasons underlying the two sides'
positions on these problematic issues. His party had not,
however, come to Geneva to substitute for the standing
delegations but, instead, to understand the technical
essences of the outstanding differences and, if possible, to
help. He emphasized that many people in Russia were
interested in the treaty, and underlined that it should take
into account the interests of both sides. He concluded by


stating that he hoped for an open and sincere conversation
that would help to clarify Russian positions and the
rationales behind them.


8. (S) After thanking Makarov and the respective
delegations, Mullen pointed to the increasing importance of
the U.S.-Russian relationship and the impact the treaty would
have on future security. He noted that some significant
differences remained between the Parties, but that progress
on these issues offered an opportunity to move the two
nations closer together.


9. (S) Referencing their telephone call of November 20,
Mullen reminded Makarov that they had discussed keeping the
talks at the strategic level, but pointed out that there were
difficult technical issues that merited their attention as
well. Mullen emphasized his sense of personal responsibility
to do all he could to close these gaps. In this light, he
was very anxious to listen to, and to understand, the Russian
side's positions and their rationales. He also referred
again to the weighty implications the results of the treaty
negotiations would bear for the coming ten years and beyond.
The Parties, he concluded, had no greater common interest
than in this treaty.


10. (S) Jocularly judging their introductory segment
successful, Makarov then reinforced that many problematic
issues remained. The following day would offer a very
important opportunity to find areas of agreement. He
reported that he had received directions to provide a
detailed description of what he could offer so as not to
infringe the interests of either country, and agreed that the
two sides bore great responsibility. He also noted that his
Duma was a major factor in the Russian calculus, and Mullen
pointed to a similar situation with the U.S. Congress on the
American side. The two then agreed to use the remainder of
the meeting to begin substantive discussions.

--------------
ADMIRAL MULLEN
INTRODUCES U.S. APPROACH
--------------


11. (S) Mullen explained that he had been dispatched by
President Obama to resolve the remaining issues such that the
Parties could sign the Treaty by December 5, the date the
START Treaty would expire. In this light, Mullen stated that
he had brought some ideas on how the sides might move ahead.


12. (S) Before delving into the substantive positions,
Mullen underlined that the relationship between the two
countries was fundamentally different than it had been during
the Cold War. The two were no longer adversaries, which bore
significant consequences for how the Parties should proceed.
The United States had previously looked at arms control
treaties with Moscow as opportunities to limit the threat of
the opposing arsenal. Now, however, the Parties were engaged
in a cooperative effort to reduce their arsenals in a way
that would preserve strategic stability. He noted that the
United States and Russia together possessed 90 percent of the
world's nuclear weapons. He, therefore, believed that they
had a responsibility to reduce these arms, and that he and
Makarov, as leaders of their respective militaries, were


under a special obligation to lead this effort. The United
States and Russia served as an example to the nations of the
world, and both countries should therefore bring their
nuclear postures into alignment with the new world
environment and the new relationship between the two powers.


13. (S) Mullen emphasized that trust in the relationship was
critical. The United States, therefore, needed a treaty that
would provide for effective verification and transparency.
These would serve as critical elements of strategic
stability. During the Cold War, he contrasted, information
regarding the other side's strategic posture was often
fragmentary and partial, which compelled the sides to make
educated guesses that forced them to hedge conservatively and
therefore resulted in a "cycle of fear." This cycle of lack
of trust and worst-case scenario planning resulted in the
large build-up of nuclear stockpiles. Mullen stated that he
hoped this treaty would send a very strong message to the
rest of the world that the negative cycle no longer existed
and, instead, that there currently existed a positive cycle.


14. (S) Mullen continued that, although the Parties were no
longer adversaries, transparency was still necessary for
building trust and confidence between them. There were still
some who would base their assessments on worst case
scenarios. This treaty, he contended, should invalidate that
view. He reiterated that the Parties would not want to find
themselves less sure about the other side's forces ten years
in the future, which was not a long period in planning terms.

--------------
U.S. POSITION ON MOBILE
ICBMS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS
--------------


15. (S) Mullen turned to the issue of the verification of
mobile ICBMs and their launchers, noting that he viewed it as
very important to give the reasoning behind the U.S. view
that a strong verification regime and transparency measures
for these systems was required. The verification regime, he
began, should provide not only assurance that the other Party
is observing the treaty limits, but also transparency and
trust required to support the overall relationship between
the two nations. He commented that the rest of the world was
watching these negotiations, not only with respect to
numerical reductions, but also regarding how transparent the
sides would be. START, he continued, with its complex
verification regime represented the gold standard by which
the new treaty would be judged. He noted that this
perspective would also inform the ratification process in the
United States, which was very much on his mind.


16. (S) Mullen stressed that because the new treaty would be
simpler than START, so too should the verification regime be
simpler. He conceded that, in this light, the initial U.S.
verification proposal was perhaps still too complicated. The
U.S. side had listened to the Russian side's arguments and
had tabled a significant simplified proposal. By contrast,
the Russian side's initial proposal was much too lean. The
negotiating teams had been working to bridge the gap but
remained far apart. The Russian proposal not to include
special provisions for mobile systems was simply not a basis
for finishing the treaty. As President Obama had explained


to President Medvedev in Singapore, the U.S. side was very
mindful of what it would take to ratify the treaty, namely,
very effective verification and transparency measures.
Turning to Ambassador Antonov, Mullen noted that Antonov had
met with Senators Kyl and Feinstein during their visit to
Geneva, and emphasized that their concerns about verification
were representative of the broader opinion in the U.S.
Senate. Mullen underlined that he was not just making up
these ratification concerns; they were very serious.


17. (S) Mullen stated that he had heard the Russian side's
arguments that the U.S.-proposed verification regime was too
costly and burdensome. He commented that the U.S. military,
like Russia's, was not enthusiastic about the costs and
operational burdens associated with the verification regime,
but argued that in this area the militaries would need to be
willing to bear the cost in order to ensure that verification
and, ultimately, broader nuclear arms control issues were set
on the right track. Mullen specifically noted the importance
of contacts among young officers in the two militaries, even
those resulting from the formal inspection process.


18. (S) Returning to the specifics of the mobile ICBM
issues, Mullen recounted that both the United States and the
Soviet Union had recognized the special verification
challenges associated with mobile ICBMs and their launchers
when negotiating START. It remained a problem for the United
States for the simple reason that Russia fielded these
systems while the United States did not. Reiterating that
the U.S. side had heard the Russian cost and burden concerns,
Mullen reinforced that the U.S. delegation had introduced a
streamlined set of verification measures the previous week
that would meet U.S. concerns while recognizing the nature of
the new relationship between the Parties.


19. (S) For instance, Mullen continued, the United States
had incorporated Russian concerns regarding perimeter portal
continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Final Assembly Plant
and had, therefore, proposed as an alternative requiring only
60 hours advance notification of the exit of a missile from
Votkinsk ICBM Production Facility, emplacement of unique
identifiers (UIDs) on ICBMs for mobile launchers, and had
offered reciprocal rights for Russia at two U.S. facilities.
Yet, Russia had rejected these simple measures, which was
something the U.S. side could not understand. The U.S. side
was therefore interested in the rationale behind this
resistance.


20. (S) Noting that the U.S. side had worked very hard
within its Government to provide a streamlined package and
that much of the package had been presented previously in
Geneva, Mullen then presented the minimum measures the U.S.
side could accept on mobile ICBMs and their launchers.
First, advance notice of the exit of ICBMs for mobile
launchers. The United States was prepared to extend this
notification requirement to all missiles limited by the
treaty. Second, UIDs on each ICBM for mobile launchers of
ICBMs and each associated launch canister. Third, a limit on
the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers at
maintenance facilities. Fourth, requirements for ensuring
mobile ICBMs and their launchers declared at an operational
base are available for inspection. Fifth, cooperative
measures for deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers.


Sixth, a limited set of special procedures for the
elimination of mobile ICBMs, their launch canisters, and
mobile ICBM launchers. That was, Mullen underlined, a list
of all the United States needed.


21. (S) Mullen stated that an additional element of the U.S.
proposal was to drop the separate limits on non-deployed
mobile ICBMs and their launchers, with several provisos. The
United States would accept, as part of a package agreement
that resolved all issues, that ICBMs and SLBMs would count as
deployed only when loaded in launchers, and would only then
count as SDVs. In return, the United States wanted Russia to
accept a separate limit on the number of non-deployed
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs of about 150, with the exact
limit to be negotiated. Mullen emphasized that this limit
would apply to all missiles covered by the treaty, not just
those for mobile launchers. This would reduce the extent to
which the treaty would single out mobile systems, which
Mullen said he knew was important to the Russian side.

--------------
U.S. POSITION ON TELEMETRY
--------------


22. (S) Turning to telemetry, Mullen recounted that the
strategic arms control treaties between the Parties had
banned the encryption of telemetry since SALT II in the late
1970s. START, he continued, recognized that telemetry was
important both for ensuring compliance and also for
transparency, particularly through the exchange of tapes
allowing for the analysis of missile tests. START's suite of
telemetry provisions were important for verifying compliance
with the treaty's specific requirements. Equally, and
perhaps more importantly, he argued that the telemetry
provisions had helped each country understand the
characteristics of each other's missiles. At the heart of
the telemetry discussion, therefore, was transparency and the
new relationship based upon that.


23. (S) Mullen stated that he had listened to the Russian
side's arguments that the telemetry provisions proposed for
the new treaty favored the United States because only Russia
was developing new missiles while the United States was not.
He countered this by arguing that the existing telemetry
arrangements had put the Parties in a good position to
understand each other technically, and that changing those
provisions would be a complete departure from the past. He
also averred that, as the U.S. arsenal ages, the United
States would face future requirements for new capabilities in
approximately ten years. Russia should consider, he advised,
what precedent the new treaty would hand-off to the
succeeding set of negotiators. If the U.S. side were to
develop new systems in ten years, the situation could reverse
itself, he pointed out. Even today, he continued, it was
surely valuable for the Russian side to see that tests of
U.S. missiles are consistent with the past.


24. (S) Therefore, Mullen concluded, he did not have a new
proposal for Russia on telemetry. The United States believed
START's telemetry provisions were still relevant and thus
proposed including them in the new treaty. In order to work
through this matter, however, Mullen emphasized that it was
important that he personally hear directly from Makarov the


arguments for omitting the telemetry provisions. He also
commented that this was another vital issue for Senators Kyl
and Feinstein, and would be important for the ratification
process.

--------------
U.S. POSITION ON SDV LIMITS
--------------


25. (S) Mullen turned to the matter of numerical treaty
limits, noting that this was a difficult issue. He reported
that the U.S. Government had reviewed President Medvedev's
proposal outlined in Singapore that Russia might consider
negotiating a limit of 600-700 for SDVs. These numbers,
Mullen stated, were too low for the United States. He
explained that such a limit would require a significant
change in U.S. force structure and thus the United States
just could not agree to the proposal. As President Obama and
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller had stated, the U.S. offer
to establish a limit of 800 on SDVs was connected to U.S.
willingness to count conventionally-armed ballistic missiles
and the warheads on them under the treaty.

--------------
U.S. POSITION ON
COUNTING HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


26. (S) Mullen turned lastly to the issue of how to count
heavy bomber nuclear armaments. As the sides attempted to
strengthen their relationship, he explained, the U.S. side
believed it was important to increase transparency in all
facets of the respective arsenals, including weapons storage
areas for heavy bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, and
gravity bombs. The U.S. side continued to believe that the
treaty should provide for the actual counting of warheads
associated with heavy bombers, but he underlined that the
U.S. side had already shown flexibility and was prepared to
listen to the Russian side's arguments in order to find a way
forward.


27. (S) Mullen concluded his presentation by underscoring
the importance of the themes of trust, a new relationship,
transparency, and the importance of leadership in seizing the
opportunity to stabilize the relationship from a strategic
perspective while demonstrating this dynamic to the rest of
the world.

--------------
GENERAL MAKAROV'S RESPONSE
--------------


28. (S) Makarov thanked Mullen for the latter's sincere
presentation, and expressed his agreement that times had
changed and that greater understanding, mutual trust, and the
need to move forward were key themes in the Parties'
relationship. He noted that a number of the U.S. proposals
were new and, therefore, the Russian side would like to
discuss these in detail.


29. (S) Makarov then explained that President Medvedev and
the Russian military were proceeding from a set of premises.
History had developed in such a way that the nuclear arsenals


of each country endowed the sides with the ability to destroy
each other. As President Medvedev had outlined in Singapore,
one missile should not destabilize all humanity. Makarov
continued that the technical parameters of the treaty,
however, needed serious discussion. He acknowledged that
Russia understood that the U.S. position was that a limit of
600-700 on SDVs was too low, and that 800 would be
appropriate for the United States. He suggested that the
sides should develop a means to increase confidence. But, he
countered, the number proposed by Mullen would allow the
United States to maintain its current force, and this would
present a problem for Russia.


30. (S) Regarding verification and inspections, Makarov
stated that he thought the Parties could find common ground
because many of the sides' proposals were similar. Consensus
could be reached that would allow for greater understanding
for each side's positions, and provisions could be made
simpler.


31. (S) But, Makarov continued, how would the Parties define
mobile systems? Would the term mobile only apply to
road-mobile ICBMs? Or would it also apply to all mobile
systems, including submarines? Mullen responded that this
was an issue that had been discussed at length. He noted
that both sides deployed submarines, which were mobile, but
pointed out that there were appropriate verification measures
associated with these systems. Similarly, there were
verification measures tailored for road-mobile systems, which
were especially important because the United States had no
other way of verifying compliance with respect to road-mobile
systems other than through the treaty regime. Broadening the
point, he continued that the two sides had to recognize that
there were differences between the two sides' arsenals. In
this light, it was important not to try to match those
different aspects in a way that would not allow the Parties
to come together and conclude an agreement. He emphasized
that the Russians knew a great deal about U.S. submarines,
while the United States knew very little about Russia's
road-mobile systems, especially its new mobile ICBM system.
(Begin comment: This was a reference to RS-24. End
comment.) Mullen rhetorically queried whether the
relationship was built on transparency. He noted that, since
the United States knew little about Russia's new mobile ICBM
system, a new treaty built on transparency was even more
important. He also reinforced that the verification of
mobile systems would be a huge issue for ratification.
Mullen concluded by stating that the United States was
looking for measures to apply to systems without prejudice.
He emphasized that it was not realistic to look for a
complete match of measures for submarines and road-mobile
systems.


32. (S) Makarov then queried whether UIDs would apply only
to ICBMs for mobile launchers or to all missiles? Mullen
replied that, for the present, the U.S. position was that the
UID requirement would apply only to mobile ICBMs.


33. (S) Makarov stated that the telemetry issues were very
important. He explained that, when the ABM Treaty was in
force, the Parties were equally vulnerable and protective
measures were prohibited and, therefore, the issue of
telemetry was very important for transparency into the other


Party's missile developments. Makarov reminded Mullen that
the United States had withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, not
Russia, and that this decision had affected the entire
strategic relationship. He suggested that the U.S. side
consider resurrecting the ABM Treaty. Failing that, the
telemetry regime would constitute a unilateral sacrifice for
Russia, he argued. He added that Russia also had a Duma,
which was a major factor for the Russian side. He concluded
by repeating President Medvedev's statement that the best
transparency is mutual confidence.


34. (S) Mullen responded by acknowledging the U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, noting that there existed
provisions for unilateral withdrawal in all such treaties.
He contended that the sides should move ahead, but that he
would consider Makarov's proposal.


35. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


36. (U) Participants:

U.S.

CJCS Mullen
A/S Gottemoeller
Mr. Elliott
Dr. Kass
Dr. Look
Dr. McFaul
Dr. Miller
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
VADM Winnefeld
Mr. Buttrick (Notetaker)
Mr. Colby (Notetaker)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Makarov
Amb Antonov
Col Ilin
Col Knyazeva
Mr. Koshelev
Gen Kublo
Adm Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Trifonov
Col Zaytsev
Col Zudin
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


37. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS