START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
(IPWG) MEETING, NOVEMBER 10, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-009.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 10, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group
(IPWG) was held on November 10, 2009. The U.S. Delegation
reviewed the general procedures contained within the
U.S.-proposed Section VI of the Inspection Protocol entitled,
"Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs at Operational Bases and the
Nuclear Warheads on Them." This proposal was tabled for the
first time and introduced the concept of a combined
inspection for ICBMs and SLBMs which included elements of a
Nuclear Warhead Inspection (NWI) and a Data Update Inspection
(DUI),and which would entail inspecting both deployed and
non-deployed items of inspection. The Russian Delegation
continued to express concerns about any provisions specific
for mobile ICBMs. It also expressed concerns over the level
of effort to conduct this type of inspection and the overall
time needed to conduct it. The Russian Delegation agreed to
study this new approach and consider how it would apply to
non-deployed systems.


4. (S) Subject Summary: General Theme of Section VI;
Beginning the Walk Through the Document; An Inspection
Discussion; How Many Launchers Are We Going to Inspect; RV
Covers Are Still a Problem; and, Review and Wrap Up.

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GENERAL THEME OF SECTION VI
--------------


5. (S) Dr. Warner opened the IPWG meeting by explaining that
his intent was to go through the general flow of events in
the U.S.-proposed joint draft text for Section VI of the
Inspection Protocol entitled, "Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMS
at Operational Bases and the Nuclear Warheads on Them." He
noted the approach taken within Section VI was that of a
combined inspection which included elements of both a NWI and
a DUI. Colonel Ilin acknowledged that the sides had already
recognized some differences in inspection approaches and that
it was important for the sides to understand the combined
approach so that there will be no room for misinterpretation
about the process. He also questioned the title of the
section asking why the term "nuclear warhead" was used rather
than just "warhead." He opined that the term nuclear should
not be used. Warner noted that the United States had
proposed to count non-nuclear warheads as nuclear but, since
that issue had not been fully agreed to, the term "nuclear"
should be included in the title until the issue of the
central limits is resolved.

--------------
BEGINNING THE WALK
THROUGH THE DOCUMENT


--------------


6. (S) Warner explained that paragraph 1 described the
purpose of this type of combined inspection, which was to
inspect both silo and mobile ICBMs as well as SLBMs and that,
in accordance with paragraph 2, the inspections would be
conducted at ICBM and SLBM operational bases. He noted the
differences between the Parties in paragraph 2 regarding the
number of inspections to be conducted. The Russian position
was that five such inspections would be conducted annually,
while the U.S. position was that the annual quota should be

14. He further explained that, despite the difference in the
numbers for the quotas, the United States and the Russian
Federation had agreed that the final quota for Type 1 and
Type 2 inspections should be moved to Article XI of the
treaty.


7. (S) Warner continued to describe the general flow of
events discussed in Section VI, pointing out the similarities
between the U.S. proposal and the standard practices for NWI
and DUI conducted under START. He noted that he was well
aware that the Russian Federation did not agree that mobile
ICBMs should be subject to recall to their re stricted areas
so that they could be inspected, as was described in
paragraph four. Ilin noted that Warner had a good grasp of
the Russian position and pointed out that it was the U.S.
view that such recall provisions would not apply to SLBMs.
Warner took note of Ilin's point, stating that it would be
impossible to recall submarines within 24 hours and, in any
case, such recall of SSBNs was totally unacceptable. Ilin
also asked if SLBMs would be affixed with unique identifiers
and reminded everyone that it was important to the Russian
Federation not to include special provisions for mobile ICBMs
within the treaty.

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AN INSPECTION DISCUSSION
--------------


8. (S) Ilin expressed concern about the paragraphs
referencing items of inspection that might be missing from a
site and had to be returned to the inspection site to be
inspected. He asked why items would be absent if the
inspection was all about deployed systems and their warheads.
Mr. Rust explained that the combined inspection included
aspects of a DUI and that it was possible that an item of
inspection might be in transit on roads between the
inspectable areas of a site, and this provision ensured that
an item of inspection was returned to the site and did not
remain on the road so that it could not be inspected. Warner
emphasized that it was important to remember that both
deployed and non-deployed items of inspection would be
subject to inspection using this combined approach. He
reminded Ilin that three weeks ago the approach being
proposed was to conduct separate deployed and non-deployed
inspections of deployed and non-deployed SOA, but the United
States had moved to a combined approach which included the
inspection of both deployed and non-deployed items within the
Type I inspection.

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HOW MANY LAUNCHERS ARE
WE GOING TO INSPECT?


--------------


9. (S) During the discussion of those paragraphs related to
NWIs, Ilin asked how many launchers U.S. inspectors would
want to inspect. He understood that Russian bases would have
to allow the inspection of two launchers to confirm the
number of RVs, as well as one empty launcher if one was
declared at the base. Warner (incorrectly) acknowledged that
this was correct and that such an inspection would be
lengthy, but that the inspection of an empty launcher would
not take much time. Colonel Petrov cautioned that if the
inspection of three launchers was conducted at one of
Russia's SS-18 ICBM bases it would be a difficult task in the
winter, since the SS-18 front section had to be removed from
the missile and taken a long distance back to the base for
inspection. (Begin note: Warner subsequently told Ilin that
he had been mistaken regarding the maximum number of
launchers to be inspected under the U.S. NWI proposal. The
U.S. proposal calls for the inspection of up to two launchers
during an NWI. The U.S. inspection team could designate two
launchers loaded with missiles carrying RVs or one launcher
with a missile carrying RVs and one launcher that was empty.
End note.)


10. (S) Petrov also asked whether he scope of the inspection
site would be the same at a U.S. submarine base and would
also include seeking to confirm data on SLBM first stages in
the missile storage bunkers. Warner stated that it would
include both the RVOSI and DUI elements, but the expectation
would be that inspectors would conduct parallel inspection
activities to make the inspection less time-consuming and
more efficient. He used the example where, during an NWI at
a U.S. submarine base while the front section was being
prepared, inspectors could look at those areas close to the
wharves while a subgroup observed the submarine being
prepared for inspection. Once the NWI was complete the
entire team could then complete the DUI part of the
inspection.

--------------
RV COVERS ARE STILL A PROBLEM
--------------


11. (S) Warner began the discussion of paragraph 18 of
Section VI, related to the use of RV covers during the NWI,
by explaining that 15 years of START experience had been
taken into account, as well as some of the problems the sides
had experienced during START. He noted that covers were used
to protect sensitive elements of the RVs, but that they
should not inhibit an inspector's ability to accurately
determine the number of RVs on a front section. Ilin asked
how an inspector could accomplish this task if a single hard
cover which covers the entire front section could be used as
stated in the U.S. proposal. Warner called Ilin's attention
to the rest of the paragraph, which stated that the cover
would consist of a base portion with individual towers to
cover the RVs. Ilin expressed concern over the use of such
hard covers on U.S. SLBM front sections as had been done
under START. His inspector colleagues had told him that the
covers should be soft and conformal because it was hard for
inspectors to determine how many RVs were present during an
inspection when a hard cover was used. Warner countered that
the towers were conformal and were more like cones and that


the single issue that had arisen related to hard covers that
had been resolved within the context of the JCIC under START.
Petrov asked whether the covers would be changed so that the
number of towers would be equal to the number of RVs on the
front section, to which Warner responded in the affirmative.
Both Warner and Ilin acknowledged that the details of types
of RV covers to be used during an NWI would require
additional discussion.

--------------
REVIEW AND WRAP UP
--------------


12. (S) Ilin thanked Warner for the general overview of the
U.S.-proposed combined inspection of ICBMs and SLBMs. He
noted that he was not sure that the sides had a common
understanding and that the issue would require further study.
From his viewpoint, there were three configurations within a
launcher whether it was one for silo ICBMs, mobile ICBMs, or
SLBMs. There is a deployed missile in the launcher with RVs
on it, a missile in the launcher without RVs, and an empty
launcher. Warner agreed and explained that the U.S. proposal
would treat the first two configurations in the same way so
that NWIs would be conducted on either of these
configurations and an empty launcher would be inspected to
simply confirm that it was empty.


13. (S) Warner reviewed the combined inspection proposal
pointing out that, for any ICBM or SLBM during an NWI, the
steps were the same. The launcher would be designated, the
front section would be prepared at a site and in a way of the
inspected Party's choosing, covers can be applied in a way
that allows for the confirmation of the number of RVs, the
front section can be viewed by each inspector for 15 minutes,
and a report will be completed. The big difference is the
inclusion of DUI elements, that is, non-deployed items and
selected support equipment, which make this an inspection of
deployed and non-deployed items of inspection. Ilin asked
why heavy bombers had not been included in the combined
approach. Warner noted that there were still significant
differences between the sides on heavy bombers which had to
be resolved but, beyond that, trying to combine heavy bombers
into the combined approach would make things too complex and
that heavy bomber inspections lent themselves to being
conducted as a single inspection.


14. (S) In conclusion, Warner asked for Ilin's impressions.
Ilin replied that the Russian side has been thinking in terms
of two types of inspections, one for deployed items and one
for non-deployed items. We will need to consider how your
Section VI would apply to non-deployed items. Ilin also
stated that exhibitions should be conducted on a voluntary
basis and not be considered mandatory.


15. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S-proposed Joint Draft Text for Inspection Protocol
Section VI, Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMS at Operational
Bases and the Nuclear Warheads on Them


16. (U) Participants:



U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Feliciano
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Col Petrov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS