Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1050
2009-11-23 14:04:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1050/01 3271404
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231404Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0250
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5437
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2614
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1623
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6822
S E C R E T GENEVA 001050 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 9, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001050

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 9, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-005.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 9, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working
Group (TTDWG) was held at the U.S. Mission on November 9,

2009. The TTDWG reviewed language in the U.S.-proposed joint
draft text (JDT) for Article XIII and the associated
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) Protocol, Article
VIII, and Article XV. Discussion areas included the name for
the BCC, treatment of new kinds of strategic offensive arms
(SOA),and the framework of activities for the BCC. The
Russian Delegation lobbied for a package of treaty documents
that would require only one signature by the Presidents, and
expressed their reservations on release of information to the
public as well as provisional application of some provisions
of the treaty prior to entry into force (EIF).


4. (U) Subject Summary: Article XIII - The Commission; BCC
Protocol; Article VIII - Notifications; and, Article V -
Withdrawal.

--------------
ARTICLE XIII - THE COMMISSION
--------------


5. (S) Ambassador Ries opened discussion by providing the
Russian side a revised version of the JDT of Article XIII.
She called attention to a proposal to change the name of the
commission from BCC to BICC (Bilateral Implementation and
Consultation Commission). This was to preclude any confusion
over which treaty was being referred to, as the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) also had a BCC. Koshelev noted the

TTBT BCC had not met in the last 20 years. He was also
uncomfortable with how the new proposal of BICC sounded in
Russian. (Begin comment: The term in Russian would be
abbreviated DKVK, which the Russians said sounded offensive
to their ears. End comment.) He countered with a proposal
to use the term Standing Consultative Commission (SCC),since
the ABM Treaty was defunct and the ABM SCC would not be
meeting in the future. When the U.S. delegation expressed
hesitation at reviving the name SCC, Koshelev further
suggested calling it the Permanent Consultative Commission
(PCC). Ries offered to take the topic of the name of the
commission for further review.


6. (S) Ries pointed out a refinement in the text to
incorporate a subparagraph previously listed in Article V
that allowed a Party to raise questions concerning new kinds
of SOA. She noted the logical venue for such a question
would be the article addressing the activities of the BCC,
hence the proposal to relocate the text to Article XIII.
This provoked a lengthy discussion initiated by the Russian
Delegation concerning the need for language to discuss new


kinds of SOA if neither side was expressing a desire to
deploy such. Ries said the provision would provide coverage
for a contingency in the event a new kind of SOA was
developed. If nothing was developed, there would be no harm
in having the text included. Admiral Kuznetsov wondered out
loud how one could determine if an abstract weapon would be
characterized as SOA. He also wondered about the efficacy of
writing provisions for a new kind of SOA when neither side
could resolve the definition of new kinds of SOA. Koshelev
offered to agree to combine the language on new kinds in
subparagraphs c and d of the U.S.-proposed JDT if the United
States would identify what new SOA the United States was
developing. Mr. Taylor pointed out the Russian delegation
had already agreed to language referring to new kinds of SOA.
After some confusion and research on the Russian side,
Koshelev concurred the Russians had in fact used the term
"new kind" in their September 16 text. He then agreed to
consider a new formulation which would combine subparagraphs
c and d, which Ries undertook to draft.


7. (S) Discussion shifted to the U.S.-proposed language of
the BCC operating "within the framework" vice "holding a
session." Koshelev articulated the Russian objections to
language on activities taking place within the framework of
the BCC, saying the lawyers of the Presidential
Administration had opined the BCC could not meet anywhere but
in session. Ries offered, as an example, the fact that the
recent agreement regarding the portal monitoring facility at
Votkinsk had been signed without the JCIC in session. In
addition, Mr. Dean noted that the BCC's proposed activities
consisted of other activities, such as cost sharing,
notifications, and confidentiality, all of which might take
place outside of a BCC session. As a compromise, Ries
proposed language to the effect that the BCC would meet under
the terms of the BCC protocol, which Koshelev replied he
would take to Moscow for their reaction.

--------------
BCC PROTOCOL
--------------


8. (S) Ries provided an updated version of the
U.S.-proposed JDT of the commission Protocol. She pointed
out the U.S. desire for the commission to be able to commence
its activities upon signature of the commission protocol vice
waiting for EIF. She noted how precedent existed for
provisional application of certain provisions in other
agreements. She stressed the importance for the commission
to be able to commence operations as soon as possible to
allow for continued work on issues. Koshelev was in
agreement in principle; however, he asked how provisional
application would differ from the START bridging proposal
delivered in Moscow that morning by U.S. Ambassador Beyrle to
Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. Ries explained that the two
concepts could work in parallel, as both documents would be
concerned with different activities in the interim period
between expiration of the START Treaty and EIF of the
follow-on treaty. Koshelev reiterated a position advanced in
the previous session by Ms. Kotkova that resolution on
including language about provisional application of the
commission should only be reached in conjunction with
addressing the larger issue of whether to seek provisional
application of other portions of the treaty. He observed



other areas might also be open to provisional application,
such as notifications, exchanges of data, and even
inspections. A pressing concern for him was to craft a
document that would require only one signature by the
Presidents and avoid a number of documents needing to be
signed. He also thought the commission would not be able to
decide anything if it was not known what activities would be
provisionally applied. He concluded, stating he would have
to ask Moscow for guidance.

--------------
ARTICLE VIII - NOTIFICATIONS
--------------


9. (S) Ries provided a revised version of the U.S.-proposed
JDT for Article VIII. Discussion quickly moved to the
language in paragraphs 6 and 7, which would allow for the
release of certain information to the public. Koshelev asked
whether the United States envisioned releasing information on
both Parties or just for the United States. Ries said the
intent was to replicate the provisions found in START.
Taylor added that, under START, the Treaty had a provision
requiring the Parties to hold consultations on releasing to
the public data and other information provided in the course
of implementation of the Treaty. The Parties had met in 1994
and agreed to rules and timelines for release of certain data
elements. Koshelev observed that the Moscow Treaty did not
allow for the release of any information. He said less
information was provided under the Moscow Treaty than under
START and nobody seemed to be distressed. Finally, he
explained that Russian law prohibited the release of any
information to the public. When discussion moved toward the
interrelationship between international agreements and
national laws, Koshelev remarked that such a decision (to
allow for release of data) would be "above my pay grade."

--------------
ARTICLE XV - WITHDRAWAL
--------------


10. (S) Ries provided a revised version of the U.S.-proposed
JDT for Articles XIV through XVII, and pointed to Article XV
in that document. Koshelev agreed, in principle, with the
proposal to move language concerning withdrawal for reasons
related to missile defense into a unilateral statement, but
said he was waiting for Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and
Ambassador Antonov to make the final decision before removing
the bracketed language.


11. (S) Discussion proceeded to the final point concerning
language for the notification period of intent to withdraw
from the treaty. Ries proposed compromise language of "no
fewer than 3 months." After considerable internal discussion
from the Russian side, Koshelev offered to take the
U.S.-proposed language for consideration.


12. (S) Ries provided a revised U.S.-proposed JDT of Article
VII in preparation for the next meeting of the TTDWG.


13. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.


-- U.S.-proposed JDT of Article VII (in English and
unofficial Russian),dated November 9, 2009;

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of Article VIII (in English and
unofficial Russian),dated November 9, 2009;

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of Article XIII (in English and
unofficial Russian),dated November 9, 2009;

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of Articles XIV through XVII (in
English and unofficial Russian),dated November 9, 2009; and

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of BCC Protocol (in English and
unofficial Russian),dated November 9, 2009.


14. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Dr. Dreicer
Mr. Dean
Mr. Rust
Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Adm. Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS