START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 11, 2009

REF: STATE (SFO-GVA-V-026)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-012.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 11, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working
Group (TTDWG) was held at the Russian Mission on November 11,

2009. The TTDWG discussed Articles I, VII, and XIV. For
Article I, the Russian Delegation agreed to drop its proposed
language on openness and accept the U.S.-proposed wording for
the paragraph. The Russians also indicated their proposed
language on missile defense might soon be removed from the
text in favor of recording the offense-defense relationship
in a joint statement or other suitable format. The sides
also agreed to include a pointing reference in Article I to
Treaty Terms and Definitions that were included in the
Treaty, the Protocols and their Annexes.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation could not agree to the
U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) for the article on
elimination (Article VII) due to differences with the U.S.
Delegation on whether fixed structure foundations for mobile
missiles would need to be destroyed when the facility was
converted to another use. The Russians also differed with
the U.S. Delegation on whether or not notifications were a
part of verification and needed to be recorded in the treaty
Articles The U.S. side asserted that notifications were
necessary for verification, but that an event could not be
verified by means of notification.


5. (S) The U.S. Delegation indicated U.S. acceptance of the
term "Parties" in lieu of "States" regarding the ban of
transfer of strategic offensive arms (SOA) in Article XIV,
thereby broadening the prohibitions and the text of that
Article was therefore completely agreed. However, at the
last minute, the Russian Delegation insisted on bracketing
the entire Article to allow for further non-substantive
polishing.


6. (U) Subject Summary: Article VII - Paragraph 1, Article
VII - Paragraph 2, Article I, and, Article XIV - Agreed, Or
Not.

--------------
ARTICLE VII - PARAGRAPH 1
--------------


7. (S) Mr. Koshelev expressed his appreciation to members of
the Conversion and Elimination (CorE) Working Group for being
present to participate with the TTDWG in the discussion of
Article VII. Discussion began on the U.S.-proposed draft for
the Article on Elimination and initially focused on the
objects of the conversion or elimination procedures. At


issue was whether the focus should be on the Russian-proposed
"Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA)" or of the U.S.-proposed
"items subject to the limitations of this Treaty" as a means
of including both SOA and fixed structures. Colonel Ryzhkov
argued for a definition of whichever term was used, and
suggested the TTDWG undertake to write one. Ambassador Ries
reminded all that the previous version of the U.S.-proposed
Joint Draft Text contained language referring to fixed
structures and SOA, to which the Russian side had not agreed.
She noted the word "item" had been proposed by the U.S. as a
compromise to reflect both sides' concerns.


8. (S) Ryzhkov explained the Russian concerns. He felt
"items" to be a broader term than the Russian side desired.
He agreed training models of missiles (TMOM),driver training
vehicles, and even fixed structures would be appropriately
addressed in the CorE Protocol. The U.S.-proposed wording in
the Treaty Article would require that all support equipment
be eliminated or removed. For fixed structures, the Russian
side was reluctant to eliminate the buildings and wanted to
retain the pad or foundation. They felt it was an
unnecessary expenditure of resources to destroy something
that could no longer be used for its intended purpose, but
which could be used for other purposes such as storage.


9. (S) Ryzhkov illustrated his point on fixed structure pads
by citing the fixed structures located in Belarus. He stated
that the buildings had been destroyed, but the pads remained.
The U.S. side could verify by national technical means (NTM)
that they were not being used in a manner inconsistent with
the START Treaty. Mr. Taylor reminded Ryzhkov that Belarus
continued to declare in its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
submissions that it possessed fixed structures because the
pads had not in fact been eliminated under the START Treaty.
Ryzhkov downplayed the value of the pads for launching
missiles. He noted that when the START Treaty was written,
the pads had been necessary to provide the precise location
for launching the missile. He reported advances in military
technology now allowed for Russia to quickly launch a mobile
ICBM from any location. As a result, Russia wished to retain
the fixed structures, not so much for missile-related
activities, but to provide for other uses of the existing
space and to save expenses and reduce damage to the
environment.


10. (S) Ryzhkov offered another example in the elimination
of a heavy bomber base. He said there was no need to blow up
the runway, which both sides should be able to agree was
totally unnecessary. Mr. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov the intent
of the language in the elimination article (Article VII) was
not to describe the process but merely to provide for one.
Ries added that there was a need nonetheless for the word
"items" to establish the activities to be carried out.
Ryzhkov changed his line of reasoning to point out that fixed
structures were not subject to the limits of the treaty, nor
were the stairs for heavy bombers. When bombers were
eliminated, the stairs (Begin comment: Ground support
equipment to assist aircrew into the airplane. End comment.)
are not eliminated. He asked why the fixed structures should
be eliminated. Mr. Smirnov also said he wondered whether
cranes should be eliminated when a submarine base is
converted or eliminated.



11. (S) Mr. Dean in turn reminded Ryzhkov that the words in
Article VII needed to correspond with the activities proposed
by the CorE Working Group. Article VII would describe the
goals of CorE. The purpose of Paragraph 1 was to establish
that CorE applied to an item within the purview of the
treaty, hence the use of "items and facilities."


12. (S) Admiral Kuznetsov suggested "means" in lieu of
"items." He rationalized the choice by linking it to things
which would be accountable, but not counted against the
limits of the treaty. He argued if one were to use "items,"
a submarine would have to be eliminated. However, if "means"
were used, conversion would be possible. When Ries asked
whether a pad was considered as "means," Kuznetsov replied in
the negative. Ries also noted that "items" were used in the
title of the CorE text of the Protocol. (Begin comment:
U.S. Delegation determined the word "items" in the English
text and the word "means" in the Russian had been conformed
in the START Treaty as having the same meaning in this
phrase. End comment.)

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ARTICLE VII - PARAGRAPH 2
--------------


13. (S) Ryzhkov was not in agreement with the U.S.-proposed
language for paragraph 2 because it did not offer the word
"or" to allow for any one of the possible means of
verification to be selected. He also wanted to add
notifications as means of verification, offering up a
submarine accident as an example of something that would be
notified but not separately verified. Elliott explained that
the U.S. understanding of verification did not include
notifications. Notifications were provided to the other
Party about an event taking place, but verification provided
the supporting facts to substantiate the statement. He
indicated the value of notifications, but indicated it could
not be considered a complete form of verification. Ries
agreed, arguing verification also required concrete evidence.


14. (S) Smirnov provided and explained the Russian-proposed
version of the Article on Elimination (Article VII),which
described verification as combining any two methods chosen
from notifications, inspections, and NTM. As an example, a
missile launched for any reason would cease to be counted.
Its elimination could be confirmed by a combination of
notifications and NTM. In other cases, the verification
might be achieved through a combination of notifications and
inspections.


15. (S) Ries responded notifications were certainly
necessary, that was agreed, but did not fit within the
definition of verification. Verification, either NTM or
inspection, was normally preceded by notifications. Ries
also pointed to the inconsistency in the Russian-proposed
language which stated that CorEs would be of the SOA
facilities "where they are located." This would create a
situation in which the SOA could be removed and obviate the
need for elimination of the site, since SOA were no longer
located there.


16. (S) Ries suggested the need for broad language for the
treaty consistent with law and appropriate for a solemn


undertaking. She proposed using "conversion and elimination
of items and facilities," and continuing with the article
wording using the proposed Russian text. Kuznetsov
reiterated his belief that SOA required a definition. Ries
stated the United States did not think a definition for SOA
was necessary. Koshelev responded that he would take the
language away to think about and proposed moving on to
Article I.

--------------
ARTICLE I
--------------


17. (S) Ries reviewed Article I and observed how the
Russian-proposed addition to paragraph 1 on strengthening
trust and openness sounded like language was positive but
more appropriate for placement in a preamble. She noted
similar language could already be found in the proposed
preamble, as well as the Russian-proposed Article IX.
Koshelev stated that the first article of a treaty was
especially important, as many people never read past it when
looking at a treaty. However, he recognized how political
statements, such as that found in the Russian-proposed text
for paragraph 1, were better located in a preamble, and
Article I was meant for enumerating obligations. With that,
he agreed to drop the Russian-proposed language in favor of
the U.S. proposal.


18. (S) Looking at paragraph 2, which contained language
related to missile defense, Koshelev reported the Heads of
Delegation were working on the question of how missile
defense language would be addressed in this treaty. He
suggested leaving the text of paragraph 2 in brackets, but he
anticipated a forthcoming solution in which this text would
be removed and located in another document, such as a joint
statement.


19. (S) Concerning paragraph 3, which referred to the
location of terms and definitions, Koshelev lobbied for this
paragraph to be retained. He said it was the only reference
in the treaty to the terms and definitions, and he thought it
was important there be a reference somewhere to guide the
reader. Ms. Melikbekian pointed out how other articles, such
as Article VII which was discussed earlier in the meeting,
made a reference to information contained in the protocol.
Dean replied Article VII made such a reference because both
Parties were agreeing to be bound by certain obligations, and
the procedures for such were spelled out in the protocol.
Ries proposed compromise language in which the language in
paragraph 3 would be broadened to note the use of terms and
definitions, not only in the treaty but in the accompanying
protocol and annexes, and agreed to provide draft language to
that effect at the next meeting.

--------------
ARTICLE XIV -
AGREED, OR NOT
--------------


20. (S) Ries asked the Russian Delegation to briefly return
to Article XIV. She noted that this text was virtually
agreed, with exception to a single bracket of text concerning
the question of transfers of SOA to Russian-proposed "third


parties" in lieu of the U.S.-proposed "third states." She
recognized how the Russian-proposed version contained the
broader language of "third parties." Ries agreed that
broadening the language to prohibit transfers of SOA to
non-State recipients was a constructive idea, and she
accepted the Russian-proposed version. With the removal of
this last bracket, Article XIV was agreed.


21. (S) At this point, after a lengthy discussion within the
Russian side, Koshelev wondered, at the behest of his lawyer,
if the agreed text could not be "made more beautiful." He
thought repetitive wording, especially the use of the phrase
"the Parties agree" in each of the sentences could be
eliminated by restructuring the article to contain a chapeau
with sub-paragraphs. In response to Dean's question as to
whether the intent was to change the substance of the text,
Koshelev replied his intent was to streamline the document
and make it shorter and easier to read. Dean urged Koshelev
not to change the text. He pointed out that this text had
been drawn from language that had been ratified in the START
Treaty. He explained that when ratified language was changed
in a subsequent treaty, the ratifying bodies would focus on
these changes with a view to discern if there was a change to
the treaty obligations. He also voiced concern that the use
of a chapeau could introduce a risk of uncertainty as to the
meaning of the language.


22. (S) Ries expressed her appreciation for Koshelev's
concern for brevity in treaty text, and she offered to keep
this in mind when conducting subsequent discussions of treaty
articles. As the number of meetings was limited in this
negotiating session, she felt better use of the remaining
time could be made in discussing the other treaty articles
and sending Article XIV to the Conforming Group. Koshelev
indicated he preferred that the text not go to conforming yet.


23. (S) Ries provided a new U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Test
of Article IX in preparation for the next meeting of the TTDWG


24. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of Article IX (in English and
unofficial Russian),dated November 9, 2009.


25. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Mr. Elliott
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Rust
Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA



Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Adm Kuznetsov
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


26. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS