Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1038
2009-11-18 17:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA ROUND VIII: NO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF PREL GG RS 
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VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1038/01 3221748
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181748Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0205
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6793
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0706
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0662
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3175
C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 001038 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA ROUND VIII: NO
CONCRETE PROGRESS

REF: A. GENEVA 822

B. GENEVA 592

C. GENEVA 494

D. GENEVA 409

Classified By: Peter F. Mulrean, RMA Counselor, Reason 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 001038

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA ROUND VIII: NO
CONCRETE PROGRESS

REF: A. GENEVA 822

B. GENEVA 592

C. GENEVA 494

D. GENEVA 409

Classified By: Peter F. Mulrean, RMA Counselor, Reason 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (SBU) Summary. At round VIII of the Geneva talks, held
November 11, Georgia noted its serious concerns about recent
Russian rhetoric suggesting an increasing threat from
Georgia; Russia and the South Ossetian de facto
representatives countered that Georgia was preparing for
renewed aggression. In a discussion of the Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs),it emerged that
the Abkhazia IPRM is making better progress on concrete
concerns than the South Ossetia IPRM, which the South
Ossetians threatened to boycott if missing persons cases were
not resolved. Detentions were also a major topic, with the
Georgians concerned about the recent arrest of four minors in
South Ossetia; the Abkhaz de facto representatives announced
the imminent release of recently detained fishermen, for
which the Georgians expressed appreciation. In general the
Abkhaz were much more constructive than the South Ossetians,
who regressed to obstreperous statements and name-calling.
This was generally true in discussions on humanitarian and
displaced issues, where some initial progress on the text of
Agreed Understandings was later scuttled by South Ossetian
attempts to insert security-related issues. The co-chairs
managed to steer the group through a relatively short
discussion of the Tagliavini report on the August war without
major incident. Regarding a possible non-use of force (NUF)
agreement, Assistant Secretary Gordon emphasized the
importance of fulfilling the existing ceasefire commitments,
including the withdrawal of forces, and the necessity of
international security arrangements. The Russians again
balked at such new arrangements, saying the existing
situation with the EUMM and themselves was sufficient, and
insisted the key point of a non-use of force agreement was
for Georgia to declare it would not seek to re-establish its
territorial integrity by force. The next round will take
place January 28, 2010. End summary.



2. (C) Comment. Round VIII did not see any concrete
progress, and the stark differences in the positions on a NUF
agreement and international security arrangements between
Georgia on the one hand and Russia and South Ossetia on the
other are discouraging. Nevertheless, it seems that the IPRM
for Abkhazia is making some progress at the ground level, and
Abkhazia's overall constructive attitude in Geneva suggests
that it wants to find ways to move forward. It may be that
we can use its constructive approach to prod South Ossetia
toward a more helpful attitude. It may also be, however,
that we can explore some of Abkhazia's overtures more
efficiently outside the Geneva context. End comment.

IPRM update
--------------


3. (SBU) UN Representative Johan Verbeke provided a briefing
on the Abkhazia IPRM. He said the parties had established
procedures to facilitate an ongoing conversation through
bi-weekly, business-like meetings. He noted the meetings had
provided explanations and clarifications of incidents along
the administrative boundary line (ABL) and had succeeded to
some degree in deflating, de-dramatizing, and even to some
extent de-politicizing issues. At meetings, Verbeke said
parties had agreed to to limit discussion to verifiable facts
(as opposed to accepting various allegations or media reports
at face value). One major achievement was agreement in
principle to conduct joint visits to schools in Gali, which
have been a particular concern to the Georgians. Another has
been an agreement in principle to allow students and people
requiring urgent medical care to cross the ABL. Regular
items on the agenda have been ABL crossings in general,
education issues in Gali, maritime issues, and helicopter/UAV
overflights.


4. (SBU) Head of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Hansjoerg
Haber said the South Ossetia IPRM had met a total of seven
times, including twice since the last Geneva round; they were
not yet meeting on a regular, bi-weekly schedule. Every
meeting has been in either Ergneti or Dvani, on the
undisputed Georgian side of the ABL. Participants have
disagreed on procedural elements, including the chairmanship
and the process of compiling an agenda and notes. He said
discussions were dominated by detained and missing persons
cases, with an unhelpful link being increasingly made between
the two sets of issues. Other regular issues include

shootings (though there have not been any casualties for some
time) and military exercises. South Ossetian de facto
representative Boris Chochiev complained that the EUMM was
biased against them, saying that the IPRM "did not help to
prevent incidents, but only helped the Georgians live well."
Although he said his colleagues would attend the next
meeting, they said they would cease further participation if
no progress was made on five missing persons cases. In
making this statement, Chochiev noted that his Russian
colleagues might not be pleased with the prospect of South
Ossetian non-participation.


5. (SBU) Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria
expressed serious concerns about detentions, including in
particular the four minors detained November 5. Arguing that
children should not be pawns in political disputes, he pushed
the South Ossetians and the Russians to secure their swift
release. Neither party agreed to do so, but rather countered
that the Georgians have not provided for the humanitarian
needs of people, including children, in Akhalgori by blocking
their access to gas; Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory
Karasin made the same point about the Georgian "blockade" of
Abkhazia. Bokeria also expressed concern about the detention
the day before of nine fishermen by Abkhaz de facto
authorities; in response, de facto representative Viacheslav
Chirikba said six had been released already, and the other
three would be released shortly. Bokeria expressed his
appreciation.


6. (SBU) After lunch, the three co-chairs joined most of the
participants in an impromptu discussion of the South Ossetia
IPRM in an effort to avoid a breakdown of the mechanism. On
the procedural concerns, EU Special Representative for the
Conflict in Georgia Pierre Morel agreed to ask his staff to
prepare a paper on some options to consider for the
chairmanship and agenda-setting and note-taking roles. Back
in the general session, Morel made a special appeal that
specific, complex cases not be allowed to block the work of
the IPRM. Although he seemed willing to consider the
procedural options that would be presented, Chochiev made
clear that his main concern was the investigation into the
five missing persons cases, and that his threat to boycott
still stood. Georgian representative Shota Utiashvili noted
that his side awaits information on 38 cases of missing
persons, but was still willing to participate.

Tagliavini report
--------------


7. (SBU) Despite expressing surprise at Russian insistence on
the topic being included in the agenda, Bokeria accepted
Morel's invitation to begin the discussion of the Tagliavini
report by discussing the findings in some detail.
Predictably, he cited those parts of the report that upheld
Georgian positions on the war. He challenged the report's
judgment that the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali was
unjustified by noting that the report itself admits the
arrival in Georgia of Russian forces before the Georgian
attack, which constituted an invasion, because, according to
Bokeria, the definition of invasion required no minimum
number of troops. He also asked why the Russian side, after
requesting a discussion of the report at the OSCE in Vienna,
was not willing to answer follow-up questions or engage in an
actual exchange after their initial statement.


8. (C) Karasin offered a short intervention, noting only that
the report found that Georgia initiative hostilities, and
that the Georgian nationalistic movement under Gamsakhurdia
helped create the conflicts. South Ossetian representatives
repeated several times that the report clearly identified
Georgia as the "aggressor," adding that the Geneva process
should reevaluate its approach based on this fundamental
finding. The South Ossetians and Abkhaz noted that the
report blamed other countries for arming Georgia, and the
South Ossetians repeated earlier allegations that the
Georgians were even now rearming and must be stopped. At one
point Chochiev referred to the Georgia as an "American
client," and called Bokeria the ideological architect of
Saakashvili's "clear field" policy. (Note: Before the talks,
Morel told Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow that he
thought, as did Heidi Tagliavini herself, that the Russians
were contemplating using the report as the basis for a legal
challenge to Georgia. During the talks, however, only
Chochiev referred to the report as an authoritative document
that should change the terms of the discussion. End note.)


9. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Gordon pointed out that the
report said clearly that no one side could be held

responsible, that there no winners in the conflict, and that
the Geneva participants should use it to identify ways to
look forward to resolving the conflict, not to apportion
blame. Verbeke noted that the report found that the conflict
had multiple layers, including on level an inter-state
conflict between Georgia and Russia, and on another level an
intra-state conflict between the Georgian government and the
regions. He also cited the report's suggestion that the
circumstances required the re-establishment of an
international presence on both sides of the ABLs.

Non-use of force
--------------


10. (SBU) As promised at the Geneva VII round, the co-chairs
circulated a paper entitled "Basic Elements of a Framework
for an Agreement on the Non-Use of Force and International
Security Arrangements" before the talks, and various sides
provided also written responses beforehand. A/S Gordon began
the general discussion by saying that the United States did
not object to a new NUF agreement if the sides found it
necessary, but noted that the August 12, 2008 ceasefire
agreement already contained such a commitment. He said
compliance with all the elements of that ceasefire, including
the withdrawal of forces and free access for humanitarian
assistance, was still required, and any new agreement should
indeed call for that compliance. He added that another
crucial element of such an agreement was the implementing
international security arrangements to ensure the NUF
commitment itself. Kaidanow added that all sides perceive a
threat; for any discussion of an agreement to be credible, it
should include a step-by-step approach to increase confidence
on all sides as well as international security arrangements
to ensure stability.


11. (SBU) Bokeria reiterated that Georgia saw the ceasefire
agreement as the only legally binding agreement relevant to
the conflict and said that Georgia could begin to get
creative on an NUF agreement if an international presence
could be established and the process of de-occupation begun.
As he has for several rounds, Karasin again insisted that a
NUF agreement could only be signed between Georgia and the
regions, but added the new point that the key element must be
Georgia's assurance that it would not seek to restore its
territorial integrity by force. He suggested that the EUMM
and Russia's own forces constituted a sufficient
international presence. Abkhaz de facto representative
Viacheslav Chirikba said that any NUF agreement that did not
include Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto representatives as
signatories would not be binding on the regions. He also
said, however, that a compromise might be found involving
Georgia, the regions and Russia. (Note: This is the first
time at Geneva that one of the defactos has suggested Russia
could be a signatory; Russia has steadfastly refused to
consider the idea. End note.) Verbeke concluded the
discussion by echoing the idea that the ceasefire argument
must lie at the heart of any new NUF agreement, citing the
general principle of international law of "pacta sunt
servanda," i.e., that agreements already made must be honored
by all the signatories, even if inconvenient. He also echoed
Kaidanow's comments that the credibility of any new
commitment was paramount -- hence the importance of
international security arrangements.

Refugees and Displaced
--------------


12. (SBU) In Working Group 2, the co-chairs deflected South
Ossetian attempts to introduce into the text of the draft
Agreed Undertakings select references to the Tagliavini
Report. The US delegation quashed language (different but
equally unacceptable versions offered by South Ossetia and
Russia) that would have linked humanitarian activity to
progress in the political sphere. In this second session
devoted exclusively to the Agreed Undertakings and with
notable flexibility by the Georgian delegations, WG2 reached
what appeared to be agreement on the introductory paragraph,
which includes the following principles and objectives
(abbreviated below):

- Promotion, respect and protection of human rights of
refugees, IDPs and other persons of concern;

- Promotion and respect of the right to safe, voluntary and
dignified return in a secure environment;

- The need to improve the humanitarian situation of all
affected populations;


- The need to build trust and confidence among the parties at
all levels;

- The need for concrete interventions to benefit all those
affected by forced displacement since 1989, notably to
facilitate returns and the full enjoyment of their rights,
including property rights.


13. (SBU) There was a surprisingly constructive discussion
in WG II in the hour before lunch on the subject of
registration of refugees and IDPs. Participants agree on the
need to establish a database capturing information on the
total population in need of assistance and/or wishing to
return home. UNHCR addressed technical questions, such as
how to protect personal information. There appeared again to
be agreement on a text regarding this matter, though the
Georgians refused to conclude discussion of the section and
consent to a workshop on registration until there was
consensus on the principles and objectives (see Para 12
above). Discussion deteriorated sharply after lunch, with
the South Ossetians re-opening previously agreed language and
attempting to insert unacceptable references. In the end,
there was no final agreement on any of the text.

Next steps
--------------


14. (SBU) At the end of the session, Morel distributed two
non-papers on specific areas, to serve as the basis for
discussion at the next round: joint visits and crossing
points. Verbeke noted that the Abkhazia IPRM has already
considered both these issues to some extent, and he hoped to
regularize an approach on both issues. Chochiev said that
South Ossetia was not bound by the ceasefire agreement to
open its so-called "state borders," suggesting he would not
be open to that discussion.


15. (U) DAS Kaidanow has cleared this cable.
GRIFFITHS