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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) LAWYERS' MEETING ON U.S.-PROPOSED
AGREEMENT ON INTERIM MEASURES, NOVEMBER 13, 2009

REF: A. STATE 115348

B. GENEVA 1028 (SFO-GVA-VII-020)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-019.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 13, 2009
Time: 4:30 - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

Mr. Brown Mr. Lobach

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) Following the Conforming Group meeting earlier in the
afternoon, Mr. Brown met briefly with Russian lawyer Mr.
Lobach to receive additional information on Lobach's views
concerning the U.S.-proposed agreement on interim measures
(REF A). Lobach repeated the points he had made the previous
day (REF B) on the need, under Russian law, to style any such
agreement as an "inter-State" agreement that required
ratification prior to entry into force. He also claimed that
there was no Russian legislative practice that would provide
privileges and immunities via separate legislation (rather
than by means of a treaty approved by the Duma). He also
claimed that the nuclear-related agreements contained in the
list provided to him earlier by U.S. lawyers were not models
for how to proceed on granting simplified privileges and
immunities for the type of agreement that the United States
was now proposing. Finally, he admitted that he did not know
when there would be an official Russian response to the
substance of the U.S.-proposed agreement.


4. (u) Subject Summary: Further Thoughts on U.S.-Proposed
Agreement; Precedents from Previous Nuclear-Related
U.S.-Russian Agreements Not Applicable; When to Expect
Official Russian Response; and, List of U.S.-Russian
Nuclear-Related Agreements.

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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON
U.S.-PROPOSED AGREEMENT
--------------


5. (S) Lobach remarked to Brown at the conclusion of the
Conforming Group meeting that he had some additional points
to make concerning the U.S.-proposed agreement on interim
measures. He emphasized that he was talking just as a legal
advisor and was not going to say anything about the
substance, noting that it was a political matter.


6. (S) Lobach asserted that the subject matter of the
proposed agreement made it an "inter-State" rather than
"inter-Governmental" agreement, referring again to the
Federal Law on International Agreements and mentioning
another (unspecified) federal law that addressed the


competence of the Government within the Russian
constitutional structure. He again stated that the subject
matter of the proposed agreement made that agreement subject
to approval by the Duma (REF B). He explained that there was
no Russian legislative practice (comparing it to the Lugar
bill, which he had heard about in a discussion with Senator
Kyl the previous evening at the U.S.-hosted reception--
SEPTEL) where the legislature would be able to provide
privileges and immunities through the enactment of separate
legislation; instead, privileges and immunities would be
approved as part of a treaty that the Government would submit
to the Duma.

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PRECEDENTS FROM PREVIOUS
NUCLEAR-RELATED U.S.-RUSSIAN
AGREEMENTS NOT APPLICABLE
--------------


7. (S) With respect to the list provided earlier (see
paragraph 9) containing the titles of U.S.-Russian agreements
involving inspection or monitoring without full privileges
and immunities that were not subject to ratification, Lobach
claimed that there have been considerable changes since the
time that many of these agreements had been signed, in terms
of the authority of the Russian legislative branch, and he
noted that some of the privileges and immunities granted U.S.
inspectors at that time under those agreements were greater
than those afforded to other foreigners, which had become a
political issue in Russia later when that fact became known.
He also asserted that at least one of the agreements on that
list was an implementing instrument for an "umbrella"
inter-State agreement, thus the Duma could be considered to
have approved it in advance, but he admitted that he was not
well versed in these agreements and that this was only his
preliminary view.

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WHEN TO EXPECT OFFICIAL
RUSSIAN RESPONSE
--------------


8. (S) Brown asked when the U.S. side could expect an
official Russian response to the U.S. proposal. Lobach
responded that he did not know and that in any case it would
be a political decision in terms of how to respond to the
substance of that proposal, while repeating that he had been
talking only about some of the legal difficulties under
Russian law posed by the U.S.-proposed instrument.

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LIST OF U.S.-RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR-RELATED AGREEMENTS
--------------


9. (U) The following list of U.S.-Russian nuclear-related
agreements involving inspection or monitoring without full
privileges and immunities was provided to Lobach by U.S.
delegation lawyer Mr. Dean.

Begin list:

-- HEU Purchase Agreement (1993);



-- Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (1997);

-- Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation for
Plutonium Disposition (1998); and

-- Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (negotiations
ongoing).

End list.


10. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS