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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0978 (SFO-GVA-VI-039)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-003.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 9, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The first meeting of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group (WG) for Session VII of the Start
Follow-on (SFO) Treaty was held at the Russian Mission on
November 9, 2009. The U.S CorE WG Chair, Mr. Elliott,
provided and discussed the General Provisions Section of the
U.S.-proposed CorE Protocol. Elliott also provided and
explained a revised U.S.-proposed treaty text for Article
VII. The WG was bogged down discussing specific English and
Russian terms and ultimately decided to bracket most of the
text in the General Provisions Section of the CorE Joint
Draft Text (JDT).


4. (S) The WG did agree that Section VI of the CorE JDT
(Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability) could be
sent to the Conforming WG, as it had been agreed on the last
day of the previous SFO Session (REFTEL).


5. (U) Subject Summary: General Provisions; and, Treaty
Article VII.

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GENERAL PROVISIONS
--------------


6. (S) Elliott opened the meeting and described U.S.
proposals for the content of Subsection I on General
Provisions for the CorE Protocol. The U.S. side explained it
had included most of the ideas that the Russian Delegation
had proposed, but used fewer words. Colonel Ryzhkov said he
wished to review the proposed chapeau for the overall Annex
or Protocol, to determine whether the CorE Section required
its own chapeau. Elliott suggested deferring discussion of
the overall chapeau to the Treaty Text and Definitions WG.


7. (S) Ryzhkov sought clarification on the U.S. term "item"
vs. the Russian term "strategic offensive arm (SOA)," which
would be followed by the phrase "and facilities subject to
the limitations of the Treaty." The Russian side felt SOA
added certain necessary specificity. Elliott replied that
the term "item" was more inclusive. (Begin comment: The
United States has sought to employ this terminology to
address fixed structures as the term SOA does not encompass
fixed structures. End comment.) Both Parties discussed and
tentatively agreed to delete repetitive usage of this phrase
from the paragraphs in the "General Provisions" Section,
since it would be included in the chapeau.


8. (S) The delegations generally agreed on the content of


the General Provisions paragraph one on CorE notifications.
They noted that the U.S. reference to a Protocol and the
Russian reference to an Annex had to remain bracketed pending
a decision on what to call the overall Tier 2 document.


9. (S) For paragraph two, on where CorE shall be carried
out, Ryzhkov said Russia continued to prefer its proposed
phrase "at a site determined by the Party carrying out CorE."
He noted that SOA may be located only at declared facilities
in any event, and recalled he had agreed to the term "at
declared facilities" at the October 29 CorE WG meeting
(REFTEL),but he still needed to obtain his delegation's
approval.


10. (S) Concerning paragraph three of the General Provisions
Section, Ryzhkov felt that Russia's phrase "rendered
inoperable to preclude use for original purpose" was more
complete and precise than the U.S.-proposed language of
"rendered inoperable." Elliott explained that to render
something inoperable meant that it could no longer be used
for any purpose and therefore was eliminated, while the
Russian phrase applied more to conversion than to
elimination. Ryzhkov used the example of an eliminated
mobile launcher of ICBMs, which later might be used as a
crane. Under the Russian proposal, the launcher was
eliminated but still usable for a purpose other than its
original purpose. Ryzhkov continued that he was unsure what
Russia would do with eliminated items, but wished to have the
United States review the language. Elliott stated that the
phrase would remain bracketed until mobile launchers had been
discussed. (Begin comment: The U.S. CorE WG is awaiting
guidance on a new proposal to introduce the concept of
conversion for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Elliott did not
want to continue discussion on a subject that could have new
terminology in just a few days. End comment.) Mr. Smirnov
argued further that it was not necessary to state in
paragraph three that an eliminated item shall cease to be
subject to the provisions of the treaty, because Russia had
proposed to include such a provision in Treaty Article III.
Elliott concluded that the provision should be retained in
brackets until it was confirmed that it was covered in the
treaty text.


11. (S) On paragraph four, Elliott sought clarification of
the Russian statement, "Converted item must have either
external or functional differences from the item prior to its
conversion." He noted that external differences would be
easy to confirm but functional differences might be more
difficult. The U.S.-proposed language tried to capture the
idea by stating that the other Party must be able to confirm
the differences.


12. (S) Ryzhkov introduced the topic of exhibitions of
converted items, asking whether they were necessary in all
cases. Ryzhkov said the U.S. side had explained the
principles the United States had for the first conversion of
a type using procedures developed by a Party. He added that
this led to the realization that both sides envisioned the
same procedures, but were getting confused by the different
wording used. The United States would seek to record the new
procedures in the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC). An exhibition might also be necessary.
Ryzhkov and Smirnov explained that Russia's vision was that




some new procedures, such as exploding a missile, would not
require further explanation. In other cases, the other Party
might ask for clarification, so the Party carrying out the
CorE would show slides and explain in the BCC how the
procedures would be carried out. If accepted, a document
would be finalized in the BCC. If the demonstration was
considered insufficient, agreement could be reached in the
BCC to conduct a one-time exhibition of the item.


13. (S) Elliott pointed out that the Russian sentence, "In
this case, the Party, which received notification from the
Party conducting the conversion or elimination about the use
of such discussed procedures, shall not object to their use."
could be interpreted to mean that the Party conducting the
CorE could proceed without the other Party's acceptance of
the procedure, leaving the Party receiving the notification
without further recourse. However, since he now understood
the Russian intent, the U.S. side would propose new language
that expressed the intent of both sides. Ryzhkov requested
that Russian paragraphs three through six and U.S. paragraphs
four through five be bracketed for now, and that the U.S side
consider that Russian paragraph five stipulated very clearly
the tasks set forth in the treaty; specifically that, in any
case, it would be required of both Parties to conduct
exhibitions to confirm the completion of conversion. Elliott
agreed with the concept that some form of confirmation was
needed, but stated that the United States believed the
provisions for such confirmation should be included in the
other subsections on CorE, since they could vary depending on
the item being converted or eliminated. For instance, the
use of national technical means (NTM) for confirmation might
be appropriate in some cases but not in others.

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TREATY ARTICLE VII
--------------


14. (S) Elliott provided the Russians with the latest
U.S.-proposed text for Treaty Article VII. Ryzhkov expressed
pleasure with the brevity of the proposed text. After
Elliott presented the proposed text, Ryzhkov stated that the
Russian version of paragraph 2 was clearer in reference to
verification of CorE, while the U.S. version of paragraph 2
included only references to other parts of the treaty,
including Article IX of the treaty. Ryzhkov pointed out that
the U.S. version did not include verification by NTM. (Begin
comment: Treaty Article IX will cover NTM. End comment.)
While Ryzhkov reminded the U.S. side that Russia had agreed
to remove all references to NTM throughout the CorE Protocol
and include such a reference only in Article VII, he
emphasized that NTM was a key mode of verification in the
Russian proposal. Elliott noticed the confusion and replied
that he felt it was important that Ryzhkov review Treaty
Article VII carefully. It would be discussed at the next
meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group on
November 11, 2009.


15. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text, Section I. General
Provisions of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, dated


November 9, 2009; and

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text, Article VII, dated
November 9, 2009.


16. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Brown
Mr. Dwyer
LCDR Feliciano
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shevchenko
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS