START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER
10, 2009

REF: STATE 115348

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-008.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 10, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:15 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

A/S Gotemoeller Amb Antonov
Mr. Brown
Ms. Purcell

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On November 10, 2009, Assistant Secretary
Gottemoeller and the delegation Legal Adviser Mr. Brown met
with Ambassador Antonov at the Russian Mission. Antonov made
clear that Russia would have to submit any interim "bridging
agreement" to its legislature for approval, a process that
would take over six months. He noted that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) Legal Department was putting together a
legal evaluation of the U.S. draft (others were contributing
to the political evaluation) and that he would ask the deputy
chief of that department--who was arriving in Geneva on
November 12--to speak with the U.S. legal advisers on the
legal concerns. He also saw no benefit to Russia in such an
agreement. Moreover, it would not be possible for his
delegation, which would have to do all the work, to take on
another negotiation at the same time as it was negotiating
the new treaty. Antonov agreed that Russia could issue a
unilateral statement to condition its treaty signature on the
Parties' maintenance of their current level of strategic
missile defenses. But he was not ready to accept the format
of an exchange of Ministerial letters for commitments not to
convert between offensive and defensive systems. President
Medvedev had directed that such commitments be reflected in
treaty text. The heads of delegation (HODs) had a
preliminary discussion of Article V prohibitions, but Antonov
showed no readiness to compromise before receiving a proposed
text.


4. (U) Subject Summary: Missile Defense Opener; Negative
Reaction to U.S.-Proposed Bridging Agreement; Conforming
Questions; Offense-Defense Relationship; Counting Rules
Again; and, Treaty Article V Prohibitions.

--------------
MISSILE DEFENSE OPENER
--------------


5. (S) Referring to a list of potential treaty-related
documents the U.S. side had provided earlier, Antonov
emphasized that associated documents addressing Russia's
missile defense concerns must be assigned an importance at
least as high as the new treaty's Protocol, i.e., "second


tier." They must not appear to be relegated to a "fourth
tier" in the list of treaty documents. Gottemoeller
sympathized with the concern about the optics of listing
associated documents after Tier 3 documents. Antonov stated
that Russia did not plan to submit the third tier documents,
which he characterized as the technical annexes, for
ratification, while the associated documents would be
submitted for ratification. Antonov asked whether all
documents and annexes associated with the treaty should be
completed by February 1, 2010, and expressed his concern that
some technical issues might not be solved by then. He added
that perhaps after February 1 the technical working groups
could continue working, but in the absence of both himself
and Gottemoeller. Gottemoeller affirmed that February 1
would be the delegations' deadline for completing all the
Tier 3 annexes, which led Antonov to state that it would then
be necessary for the two HODs to determine the most urgent
issues prior to February 1.


6. (S) Antonov mentioned that Ambassador Kislyak had asked
for his recommendations on how to respond to Under Secretary
Tauscher's proposals on missile defense cooperation, which he
characterized as some sort of "affirmative arrangement."
Kislyak wanted to respond to the United States by December 5.
Antonov mused that it would great if a document on missile
defense cooperation could be ready for signature at the same
time as START Follow-on treaty signature.

--------------
NEGATIVE REACTION TO U.S.-
PROPOSED BRIDGING AGREEMENT
--------------


7. (S) Gottemoeller solicited Russia's questions about the
U.S.-proposed "bridging agreement" on interim measures
following START expiration (REFTEL). Antonov said that he
would need to consult with MFA Legal Department Deputy Chief
Dmitriy Lobach, who would arrive in Geneva on November 12.
Lobach was Russian Delegation Legal Adviser Ms. Kotkova's
supervisor and would be able to provide a definitive legal
view of the U.S. draft on behalf of the MFA. He also needed
to consult his lawyers about provisional application, which
he claimed would be very difficult for Russia to do. Brown
explained that the bridging arrangement was different from
provisional application; the bridging measures would be
temporary and therefore could be less detailed than the
provisional application of certain provisions of the new
treaty once signed. In addition, the bridging arrangement
would not have to be ratified.


8. (S) Antonov interrupted Brown to assert that, for Russia,
the interim arrangement would require approval by the Duma.
He claimed it could not be just an agreement between heads of
Government but must be an inter-state agreement subject to
ratification. He then outlined the steps necessary to obtain
approval of the interim arrangement: first, he had a
six-month period to get an interagency approved package up to
the Duma. Within that period, the MFA would send the
documents to the departments and agencies most involved in
the negotiations (within one month),then to the Ministry of
Finance (within two months),then the Ministry of Justice
(within one month),then to the legal department of the Prime
Minister's office, noting that it was always possible that


the whole package could be sent back to the MFA, to do it
over again. After Prime Minister Putin signed off, the
agreement would go to Ms. Brychyova in the Presidential State
Legal Directorate ("GPU"). Finally, the President would sign
it and it would go to the Duma. If the process took even a
single day over six months, Antonov claimed, the Duma would
reprimand him. He contrasted this process with what he
admitted was a much faster route--an exchange of notes as was
done under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program--but he did not elaborate on exactly how that would
work in the context of a bridging arrangement.


9. (S) Scanning through the text of the bridging agreement,
Antonov commented that it contained some provisions that
conflicted with Russia's concept for START Follow-on. These
included telemetry measures, which he claimed were
unacceptable and could certainly not be agreed by December 5.
The inspection provisions of START Follow-on also were not
yet agreed, and it was not clear what the United States had
in mind for the proposed "visits" under the bridging
agreement. Russian law prohibited giving inspectors access
to military bases except under a ratified treaty; even the
treatment of "visitors" had to go to the Duma for approval.
Brown recalled there were some preliminary visits prior to
START entry into force that were permitted under an executive
agreement, but Antonov retorted that the legal system was
different at that time. Even notifications provided to the
United States were classified. Pursuant to treaties, Russia
could remove the classification markings and transmit
notifications to the United States, but that information
could not be made public or be passed to third parties.


10. (S) Antonov concluded that the main point was that
Russia had no ability to issue the interim agreement on
December 5. He and the delegation lawyers would examine
possible alternatives. Any idea approved by Lobach would be
easier to submit to Foreign Minister Lavrov, as he had full
authority to sign off on legal documents on behalf of the
Ministry. Another option, a Government-to-Government
agreement, would not be subject to ratification, but it would
have to be approved interagency and analyzed by experts in
the various ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice
(which he noted was responsible for ensuring legal "purity")
and the Prime Minister's legal department, before the Prime
Minister would sign it. Such a process would take a minimum
of three months.


11. (S) Antonov questioned what the value of the agreement
would be. Gottemoeller explained it would provide a smooth
transition between the expiration of START and the entry into
force of the new treaty, without loss of transparency and
mutual confidence. She noted in this connection also the
value of the close-out exchange of Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) updates under START. She was concerned
that Russia's deployment of the new RS-24 MIRVed ICBM after
START expiration would produce a strong political blowback
affecting ratification of the new treaty in the United
States. The continuation of transparency measures was
necessary to counter political arguments that might otherwise
accumulate after START's verification regime expired.


12. (S) Antonov dismissed such concerns, claiming the
deployment of the RS-24 ICBM would not, and could not, be


hidden from the United States. He asked what was the real
concern about a gap between December 5 and May 1: was the
United States concerned about Russian violations? In that
case, he suggested that the two Presidents could declare upon
treaty signature that they would refrain from any acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Brown
noted that such a commitment would likely already be presumed
in accordance with customary international law, noting
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.


13. (S) Antonov acknowledged that the interim agreement
would provide some political benefit to the United States,
but said he had to write a political evaluation of the
document, and he could not yet say what benefit it would
provide to Russia. He noted that MFA Legal Department Chief
Kolodkin was already working on the legal evaluation. He
added that personally he trusted the United States to live up
to its obligations and that he saw the main value of the new
treaty as improving bilateral relations between our two
countries. For its part, Russia was planning to implement
the new treaty, not violate it.


14. (S) Concluding his evaluation of the U.S.-proposed
bridge, Antonov stressed that it would take too much work for
the Russian Delegation to deal with such a negotiation, as it
would be as though the people on his delegation would be
conducting two negotiations at the same time.


15. (S) As an aside, Antonov gave his opinion that Russia
would await the U.S. lead on ratification of the START
Follow-on treaty, but would ratify it as soon as the United
States did so. Russia was unlikely to ratify first, because
of its experience with START II. He asked how long
ratification would take in the United States. Gottemoeller
expressed the hope for a Senate vote on advice and consent to
ratification by May 2010, which Antonov thought would require
a terribly intensive work tempo to achieve. Gottemoeller
noted that the United States would begin working on the
ratification package immediately after signature, and Antonov
promised that Russia would work equally hard on ratification.

--------------
CONFORMING QUESTIONS
--------------


16. (S) Antonov raised questions that his delegation's Chief
Translator, Mr. Artemyev, had about the Conforming Group. He
provided a paper on the subject, which Artemyev had written.
Antonov did not know what documents were ready for conforming
yet, but sought a common understanding about the work of the
Conforming Group.


17. (S) Begin text of Russian paper:

The Conforming Group in START Treaty Negotiations

The Conforming Group (as it was called) included, from
each Party: the Group chair (delegation Member),senior
translator-editor, legal advisor, and other translators if
needed.

Prior to a meeting of the Conforming Group, each Party
transmits to its translators a text agreed in the relevant


working group - both a U.S. text in English and our text in
Russian. The translators of each Party independently conform
these two texts, and afterwards take them to the meeting of
the Conforming Group along with possible questions and
comments for the other side. There is no proofreading aloud
at the meeting. The questions and comments are discussed and
agreed. The result is a finally conformed text "ad
referendum" to the delegations.

Question: How does the U.S. Delegation currently
envision the operating procedures of the Conforming Group?
After some discussion, Gottemoeller and Antonov agreed that
the first meeting of the Conforming Group, to be held on
Wednesday, November 11, would discuss this organization
question and come to some decision on it.

--------------
OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
--------------


18. (S) Gottemoeller turned to a set of proposed statements
and side letters on the offense-defense relationship, which
she had provided to Antonov in late October. Antonov said he
had no problem with the unilateral statement. Russia would
issue the unilateral statement and the United States would
issue a statement acknowledging it.


19. (S) Begin text of U.S.-proposed unilateral statements:

U.S. Non-Paper
October 26, 2009

Statement of the Russian Federation:

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
the Russian Federation states the following:

The Russian Federation assumes the obligations under this
Treaty under conditions that the Parties have strategic
missile defense systems at the level existing at the time of
Treaty signature.

Statement of the United States of America:

The United States takes note of the statement of the Russian
Federation concerning the conditions under which the Russian
Federation has assumed obligations under the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms.

End text.


20. (S) Antonov was less certain about the proposed exchange
of letters between the Secretary of State and the Foreign
Minister containing commitments not to convert between
offensive and defensive systems for which the U.S. had
provided drafts on October 27. He noted that the lawyers
still needed to review the texts, but the Russian side had
some flexibility on the form. He suggested an additional
joint statement that would address the issue of discussing



the distinguishing characteristics between offensive and
defensive systems within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC),explaining that the problem he
faced was that President Medvedev had signed instructions
that stated the issue of the distinguishing characteristics
would be contained in a joint statement. However, the
commitment not to convert between the two systems also had to
be recorded in the treaty. Brown responded that similar
commitments had been contained in letters exchanged in
connection with START, and that there was no need to insist
that they be recorded in the treaty itself. Antonov retorted
that his proposal did not impose any limitations on missile
defense within the treaty text.


21. (S) Begin U.S.-proposed letters:

U.S. Non-Paper
October 27, 2009

Exchange of Letters concerning missile defense interceptors
and their launchers

His Excellency Sergey V. Lavrov
Minister of Foeign Affairs
of the Russian Federation
Moscow

Dear Sergey:

My arms control experts have informed me that we are
making good progress in the START Follow-on negotiations in
Geneva, and that many issues are on the road to resolution.
However, I understand that the issue of missile defense
interceptors and their launchers remains an issue at the
negotiations. I know that we agree that these negotiations
are about strategic offensive arms. However, havig heard
the Russian Federation's stated concernsabout U.S. missile
defense interceptors and their launchers, I am willing to
state the following:

First, the United States has no plans to covert or use
ICBM and SLBM launchers for placemen of missile defense
interceptors therein.

Second, the United States has no plans to convert or use
launchers of missile defense interceptors or placement of
ICBMs or SLBMs therein.

hird, the United States has no plans to give missie
defense interceptors the capabilities of ICBMsand SLBMs.

Finally, the United States plansto make existing types
of ICBMs and SLBMs and thir launchers distinguishable from
missile defense interceptors and their launchers, and will be
prepared to discuss and detrmine such distinguishing
characteristics withinthe framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commssion.

I believe these points should allevate your concerns.

Sincerely,

(s)


Hillary Rodham Clinton

Her Excellency Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
of the United States of America,
Washington

Dear Hillary:

In response to your letter concerning missile defense
interceptors and their launchers, we are prepared to accept
the solution which you proposed in your letter. For its
part, the Russian Federation states the following:

First, the Russian Federation has no plans to convert or
use ICBM and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense
interceptors therein.

Second, the Russian Federation has no plans to convert
or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for
placement of ICBMs or SLBMs therein.

Third, the Russian Federation has no plans to give
missile defense interceptors the capabilities of ICBMs and
SLBMs.

Finally, the Russian Federation plans to make existing
types of ICBMs and SLBMs and their launchers distinguishable
from missile defense interceptors and their launchers, and
will be prepared to discuss and determine such distinguishing
characteristics within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.

In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction
with the solution we have found to this problem.

Sincerely,

(s)
Sergey V. Lavrov

End text.

--------------
COUNTING RULES AGAIN
--------------


22. (S) Antonov referred to the discussion the Ad Hoc Group
had had that morning on counting rules. On that topic as
well, even if the Russian Delegation were to agree with the
U.S. logic, it could not change Russia's position because a
decision had been made at the highest political level.
Changing subjects, Antonov expressed concern that making a
submarine accountable only when it arrived at a submarine
base could create a loophole for both sides' militaries. The
United States understandably had proposed limits on
non-deployed mobile launchers, because that was what the
United States was most concerned about. Russia had not
proposed strict limits on submarines, however.


23. (S) Moving on to heavy bomber forces, Antonov argued
that, although one weapons storage area (WSA) near an air
base might be inspectable, there could be ten WSAs elsewhere


where ALCMs could be hidden. It was very easy to move ALCMs
between WSAs. He questioned the U.S. insistence on ALCM
verification when it could not be effective. Since heavy
bombers took much longer to deliver weapons than ICBMs and
SLBMs, they should not be subject to identical treaty
provisions. Gottemoeller noted U.S. STRATCOM's view that,
when an ALCM was transferred to central storage and placed on
racks with its warhead removed, it would begin to
deteriorate. This was what the U.S proposed doing with most
of its nuclear ALCMs.

--------------
TREATY ARTICLE V PROHIBITIONS
--------------


24. (S) Gottemoeller informed Antonov that the United States
was looking into shortening treaty Article V, since Russia
had objected to the long list of prohibitions it contained
and had claimed the prohibitions were contained in other
existing treaties. Brown pointed out that START's Article V
contained some prohibitions that went beyond those in other
treaties, but he acknowledged there was some redundancy that
the U.S. side was prepared to address. Antonov argued that
Russia's proposed ban on the use of ICBMs or SLBMs to deliver
a weapon into space obviated many of the U.S.-proposed
Article V prohibitions. He proposed that perhaps the two
sides could develop a joint statement that neither Party
would do anything that would conflict with existing
international obligations. If any questions or suspicions
arose, they could be discussed in the BCC. The Parties
should try to create a simplified treaty, and not repeat all
the provisions contained in START.


25. (S) Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. Delegation was
compiling a list of provisions that were not contained in any
other treaties. The United States would simplify Article V,
but did not want to remove all prohibitions from it. Article
V needed to contain a sufficient commitment to arms control
priorities to satisfy the participants in the upcoming NPT
Review Conference. Antonov claimed that the Russian
Federation had taken a step backwards by dropping its
insistence on banning non-nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs. He
further remarked that there was no time left for him to
return to Moscow to participate in another high-level
U.S.-Russian bilateral visit seeking to resolve outstanding
issues.


26. (S) Antonov closed by seeking Gottemoeller's views on
when to issue the Joint Statement for Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine upon expiration of START. He also asked whether
it should be issued jointly by the Department of State and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gottemoeller suggested that the
Presidents could issue the joint statement when they signed
the START Follow-on treaty. Antonov responded with the idea
that the White House and the Kremlin might issue the joint
statement simultaneously upon START Follow-on treaty
signature.


27. (S) Antonov said he had heard from reliable sources,
which had been corroborated, that Ukrainian arms control
official Nykonenko had claimed that the United States and
Russia were going to provide Ukraine new security assurances,
and he commented that he had no idea what had created the


basis for such a claim. Gottemoeller said that she also had
no idea where it had come from. Gottemoeller confirmed to
Antonov that the United States had not provided the text of
the draft joint statement to Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine.
Antonov indicated he would soon provide the text to
representatives from these countries; Gottemoeller assented.


28. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed unilateral statements on
Offense-Defense, dated October 26, 2009; and

-- U.S.-proposed exchange of letters concerning missile
defense interceptors and their launchers, dated October 27,

2009.

- Russia:

-- Russian non-paper, "The Conforming Group in START
Treaty Negotiations," undated.


29. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS