START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001017

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING,
NOVEMBER 9, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

B. STATE 115348

C. GENEVA 1013 (SFO-GVA-VII-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-004.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 9, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On November 9, 2009, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller
met with Ambassador Antonov at the U.S. Mission. The Heads
of Delegation (HODs) discussed details of the upcoming U.S.
CODEL visit (Senators Feinstein and Kyl),the Russian
counter-proposal on the U.S.-proposed package solution (REF
A),and provisions for a potential bridging agreement (REF
B). Antonov also gave details on the reports from the
Russian chairs of the working groups, which included the
Russian view on what major issues were still outstanding in
the negotiations.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Upcoming CODEL Visit; More on the
Russian Counter-Proposal; The Bridging Agreement; Chairs of
Russian Working Groups: What Delegations Will Not Solve by
December 5; Scheduling For The Week; and, Draft Outline of
the Treaty.

--------------
UPCOMING CODEL VISIT
--------------


5. (S) Gottemoeller opened the meeting by providing
biographies of Senators Feinstein and Kyl to Antonov.
Antonov said he would like to talk to them both during the
working lunch the Russian Delegation would host on November
12, and later at the U.S.-hosted reception. Gottemoeller
confirmed that the lunch would be from 1:00 to 3:00 P.M. on
Thursday, November 12, and should not run any later than that
because of briefings the CODEL would receive from the U.S.
Delegation in the late afternoon.

--------------
MORE ON THE RUSSIAN
COUNTER-PROPOSAL
--------------


6. (S) Gottemoeller said there were two issues she would
like to discuss in detail concerning the Russian
counter-proposal that was made earlier in the day (REF C).
The first were comments on the Russian counter-proposal to
the U.S.-proposed Package Solution.


7. (S) Gottemoeller stated that the two sides were supposed
to be working toward a reasonable compromise, thus the U.S.
Delegation was "shocked" at the Russian-proposed 550 SDV
limit. It was very close to what the Russians offered in


July. Gottemoeller asked how the Russian side arrived at
their numbers. Antonov answered that he did not participate
in the President's meeting at which the Russian position was
decided; it was a closed meeting. All he received was the
official document reporting on the meeting's outcome, and he
counted himself fortunate that it was signed by the President
himself.


8. (S) Antonov stated that U.S. upload capability factored
significantly in determining the Russian-proposed 550 SDV
limit. Antonov stressed the need for predictability, and the
best way to achieve that was to "grab the bull by the horns"
and limit SDVs.


9. (S) On the interrelationship between offense and defense,
Antonov said the Parties should strive to find a solution,
and the details could be worked out later in separate
documents. He had shown his minister, Sergei Lavrov, the
draft exchange of letters that the U.S. side had prepared in
the preceding round, and the minister had said that they
could be the basis for a solution. He and Gottemoeller
agreed that they would resume discussion of this approach on
November 10.


10. (S) On conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, Antonov
stated that Russia was more concerned with future such
systems and, therefore, was willing to let the matter of a
ban drop for this treaty. He said Russia did not intend to
convert nuclear-armed missiles to conventionally-armed
missiles.


11. (S) Antonov said the second big issue concerned mobile
missiles and it was the most sensitive issue. He said the
two Presidents may have to decide on this issue either by
telephone or when they meet in Singapore on November 15. He
continued that because there is so little time to finish the
treaty, if the Russian President refers any matter back to
his experts, it would have to be considered dead for this
treaty. There would not be time to complete the interagency
work in Moscow.


12. (S) Concerning telemetry, Antonov stated it was
unfortunate that National Security Advisor General Jones did
not have an opportunity to talk directly with the Minister of
Defense on this issue, as only the Ministry of Defense
understood the issue and cared about it.


13. (S) On SSGN reconversion, both Heads of Delegation
agreed that this issue should not be difficult to solve.


14. (S) Gottemoeller pointed to a contradiction in the
language of the Russian counter-proposal, in that it called
for a "real picture" of warheads associated with heavy
bombers, but then called for an attribution of one warhead
for each deployed heavy bomber. The issue of how
verification of nuclear armaments in the ALCM storage area
could be accomplished is one that will not be resolved, noted
Antonov. He had not even referred it for interagency
consideration because not enough time is available to work
it. Antonov said the U.S. proposal to continue monitoring at
Votkinsk was one-sided, although the military men on his
delegation had considered the idea of taking up the U.S.
offer to begin continuous monitoring at Promontory, Utah, and


a second site, the name of which he could not remember.
However, he said, after some consideration, they decided it
was not worth it.


15. (S) Antonov opined that if time was adequate, the joint
draft text (JDT) of the treaty could be thoroughly discussed
and that some solutions to points that might be dismissed due
to lack of time could be found. He said he has never had to
work under such time constraints.

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THE BRIDGING AGREEMENT
--------------


16. (S) Antonov inquired about the Bridging Agreement,
noting that United States Ambassador to Russia Beyrle had
handed it to Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov in Moscow that
very afternoon. He asked if it was meant to take the place
of the treaty currently under negotiation. Gottemoeller
responded that it was simply an agreement to put in place
general confidence-building measures for the period from when
START went out of force until the new treaty could be brought
into force. (Begin comment: The Russians might be slightly
confused by the use of "Bridging Agreement" for this interim
arrangement, since the U.S. HOD has consistently described
the new START treaty as providing a bridge between START and
further nuclear reduction negotiations. End comment.)
Antonov asked about provisional application of the new
treaty. Gottemoeller stated that provisional application of
the new treaty could only be done if the treaty had been
signed. She gave a copy (in English) of the proposed
Bridging Agreement to Antonov, who sent it for immediate
translation. Gottemoeller suggested that Karin Look could go
to Moscow to work this agreement, since both Geneva
delegations were so busy completing the treaty. Antonov said
it would most likely be his own group in Geneva that would
work the Bridging Agreement, as all of their experts were in
Geneva. He said much of it could be worked out between the
lawyers and suggested that Mr. Lobach' and Mr. Brown could
take the lead as Ms. Kotkova is working on other matters in
Moscow. He asked that all matters affecting the START
negotiations be passed to the Russian START Delegation in
Geneva.

--------------
CHAIRS OF RUSSIAN WORKING
GROUPS: WHAT DELEGATIONS
WILL NOT SOLVE BY DECEMBER 5
--------------


17. (S) Antonov stated that he had held a meeting with the
chairs of the Russian working groups, who reported their own
take on the issues they felt could not be resolved at the
delegation level by December 5. Gen Maj Orlov, Memorandum of
Understanding Working Group Chairman, reported their main
issues were the counting rules and the ceilings on SDVs.
Antonov said only the Presidents could resolve this issue,
either by telephone or in Singapore. The Inspection Protocol
Chairman, Col Ilin, had reported that their main issue was
monitoring of mobile missiles. Ilin reported that he felt
all other issues could be resolved. Col Ryzhkov, Conversion
or Elimination Working Group Chairman, reported that their
main issues were elimination of mobile missiles and the


intrusiveness of the verification regime.


18. (S) Gottemoeller noted that Antonov had mentioned no
particular issues with the treaty text itself but, for the
U.S. side, Article V and the bans that it contained on modes
of deployment and new kinds of weapons were very important.
She suggested that she and Antonov take up this issue
directly in their one-on-one discussion on November 10.
Antonov agreed. Gottemoeller said she agreed that the
delegations can solve all of the issues themselves, except
for the SDV ceiling and monitoring of mobile missiles.

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SCHEDULING FOR THE WEEK
--------------


19. (S) The HODs confirmed the schedule for the remainder of
the week. At 3:30 P.M. on November 10, they would discuss
the issue of the relationship of offensive and defensive
strategic offensive arms, which Gottemoeller believed could
be resolved at the delegation level. Treaty Article V could
also be discussed.

--------------
DRAFT OUTLINE OF THE TREATY
--------------


20. (S) Gottemoeller gave Antonov a notional outline (text
follows bnlow) of the treaty and said the United States had
based it on the Russian-proposed format. She said that if
the issue of the outline was resolved, many items of
bracketed text could be resolved. Antonov stated that the
outline looked good and logical, but fell short of accepting
it outright, saying he wanted to check it with his lawyers.

Begin text:

Notional Outline of the Complete START Follow-on
Treaty Structure

Treaty

17 - 18 Articles

- Including central limits, counting rules,
verification obligations, etc.

Protocol to the Treaty

Sections:

- 1. Terms and Definitions

- 2. Database and Reporting Requirements Regarding
Strategic Offensive Arms

- 3. Conversion or Elimination

- 4. Notifications

- 5. Inspections, Visits, and Exhibitions

- 6. Bilateral Implementation and Consultative


Commission

- 7. Telemetry

Technical Annexes to the Protocol

Section A: Database
Section B: Conversion or Elimination
Section C: Notifications
Section D: Inspections
Section E: Telemetry

Associated Documents

Joint/agreed statements
Unilateral statements
Letters
Related agreements
Etc(

End text.


21. (S) Antonov noted that the Joint Understanding from the
July Moscow Summit included a range for SDVs (500-1100). He
noted that he would like to settle on a single number in the
actual treaty, rather than a range.


22. (S) Gottemoeller raised the issue of telemetry,
referring to the Russian counter-proposal to the
U.S.-proposed Package Solution. She asked if the Russian
side was objecting to the continuation of START procedures,
or to the actual ban on telemetry itself. Antonov stated
that the Russian side did not want even the ban on telemetry
encryption. When Gottemoeller noted that this ban had been
in place since SALT II and the two Parties should not want to
be seen as backsliding in this treaty, Antonov complained
that a presentation by Col Novikov was ignored and that the
previous Administration had done much to make the situation
worse. Gottemoeller reiterated that the real issue was about
the quality of this new agreement, and how the two Parties
should bear that in mind, particularly as the NPT Review
Conference is approaching.


23. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.

-- U.S.-proposed draft Memorandum of Agreement Between
the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Russian Federation Regarding Certain
Interim Measures Relating to Their Strategic Offensive Arms,
dated November 6, 2009; and

-- Notional Outline of the Complete START Follow-on
Treaty Structure.


24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS