START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 001015

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-010, MODIFIED PROCEDURES FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS)

REF: A. STATE 99070 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003-PART 1 OF 2)

B. STATE 99072 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003-PART 2 OF 2)

C. STATE 91018 (SFO-VI-GUIDANCE-001)

D. STATE 108618 (SFO-VI-GUIDANCE-002)

E. GENEVA 918 (SFO-GVA-VI-004)

F. GENEVA 914 (SFO-GVA-VI-016)

G. GENEVA 951 (SFO-GVA-VI-024)

H. GENEVA 958 (SFO-GVA-VI-027)

I. GENEVA 964 (SFO-GVA-VI-031)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-055 - REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-010.

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SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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2. (S) The Russian delegation has consistently made two
major points regarding the elimination of ICBMs for mobile
launchers. They have steadfastly resisted treaty language
that treats ballistic missiles for mobile launchers of ICBMs
differently than other ballistic missiles. They have also
strenuously objected to elimination procedures that require
the presence of U.S. inspectors for extended periods to
observe the process of elimination (REFS E and H).


3. (S) The U.S. delegation seeks authority to revise the
proposed elimination and monitoring procedures to be
presented to the Russian Federation and to have the
opportunity to deploy a phased series of offers, if required,
as described below. Delegation proposes to open with a
revised set of elimination procedures focused solely on
mobile ICBMs. If this approach fails, after an appropriate
interval, we would propose to broaden the application of the
revised elimination and monitoring approach to all ICBMs,
mobile and silo-based, solid and liquid fueled, on both
sides. The final position to be tabled, if required, would
cover elimination of only mobile ICBMs, but would involve a
less intrusive method of verification.


4. (U) Background and analysis are provided in paragraphs
5-8. The phased offers are provided in paragraphs 9-12.
Guidance requested is in paragraph 13.

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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
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5. (S) In accordance with the U.S. position detailed in the
U.S.-proposed draft Conversion or Elimination Protocol (REFS
A and B, as modified by REFS C and D),the U.S. delegation
has attempted to negotiate agreement on elimination
procedures for mobile ICBMs. From the outset, the Russian
side has insisted on a simplified approach to ICBM
elimination. They argue that the technical characteristics
of an ICBM (solid or liquid propellant) are the same
regardless of how it is launched (silo vs. mobile launcher),
and, therefore, elimination procedures for all ICBMs should
vary only as a function of their technical characteristics
(REFS E, F, and G). Under the U.S. proposal, elimination
procedures for silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs are very general




(i.e., elimination procedures at the discretion of the
possessing Party and no requirement for any form of on-site
monitoring of the process or its results). However,
elimination procedures for mobile ICBMs and their launch
canisters mandate specific elimination steps and require
inspectors to be present to observe the final elimination
step for all stages of the ICBM and the launch canister.
This approach continues to highlight the dramatic differences
in elimination procedures for mobile-launched ICBMs and
silo-launched ICBMs. The Russian side argues that providing
additional procedures for elimination of mobile ICBMs is
unfair, burdensome to the Russian Federation and excessive.
The Russian side has also expressed a desire for symmetrical
elimination requirements that are applied equally to both
Parties, and a reduction of what they perceive as an
intelligence gathering opportunity for the U.S. side during
extended elimination inspections.


6. (S) During the October 19-30, 2009 round of negotiations,
the Russian side presented a revised proposal for elimination
procedures of ICBMs and SLBMs, based on the type of
propellant used for the ICBM or SLBM (REF E). The Russian
approach would apply one set of procedures to all
solid-fueled ballistic missiles and apply a different set of
procedures to all liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. Under
this proposal, all solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs would be
eliminated using one of the following procedures: 1) removal
of propellant from all stages by burning; 2) removal of
propellant by other means, followed by cutting of the
remaining stage motor casings in two pieces; or 3) other
procedures developed by the Party conducting the elimination
and demonstrated within the framework of the Bilateral
Implementation and Consultation Commission (BICC) if the
other Party objects when first notified of the eliminating
Party's intentions.


7. (S) The use of procedures dependent only on the design
characteristics of each ballistic missile would be valid if
the ability to verify elimination were the same for all
missiles. The Russians, however, reject our explanations of
the need for more stringent measures for systems that are
difficult to count and monitor, such as those associated with
mobile ICBM launchers. The Russian proposal would, if
applied to U.S. solid propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, exact an
undesired financial cost and operational impact on the United
States; of which the Russians are undoubtedly aware. The
Russians also reject any arguments that call for treating all
missiles the same for the purposes of elimination,
specifically resisting extending "equal" treatment to
liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, which are only deployed by the
Russians.


8. (S) The U.S. side has already offered simplified
procedures related to the elimination of mobile ICBMs, which
shorten the time U.S. inspectors would be present at Russian
elimination facilities. START procedures for elimination of
mobile ICBMs had U.S. inspection teams on-site to observe the
entire process of elimination (elimination of all stages,
nozzles, inter-stage skirts, self-contained dispensing
mechanism, RV platform, front section, etc.). In the past,
to observe a batch elimination of up to eight missiles, U.S.
inspectors would typically spend 10-14 days at a Russian
elimination facility. The current U.S. proposal for


elimination of mobile ICBMs requires inspectors to be present
only to observe the final act of elimination for all stages
of the ICBM as well as for the missile launch canister (REF
D). The U.S. delegation believes this concession would
greatly shorten the amount of time for on-site observation by
U.S. inspection teams to an estimated 3-7 days.
Nevertheless, the Russian Federation still objects to the
burden imposed by the presence of inspectors in Russian
elimination facilities (REF H).

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NEGOTIATION PHASED OFFERS
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9. (S) The delegation has developed a three-phased
negotiating approach regarding the elimination of mobile
ICBMs as a means to maintain an effective, verifiable
elimination process while addressing the concerns of the
Russian Federation. This three-phased negotiating approach
is described in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 below.


10. (S) In the opening Phase 1 offer, the United States
would continue to focus on streamlining the specified
procedures for eliminating mobile ICBMs, their launch
canisters and the on-site inspection associated with the
elimination. This procedure would depart from the current
U.S. guidance (REFS C and D) by dropping the requirement to
eliminate all of the stages of each mobile ICBM to requiring
only the elimination of the first stage. Procedures would
still require the removal of the fuel by any means and
destruction of the remaining motor case by crushing,
flattening, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal
size or destruction by explosion and elimination of the
launch canister. Verification would remain as specified in
the current U.S. proposal: inspectors would have the right
to observe the final elimination cut of the first stage motor
case and of the launch canister (REF D). Some delegation
members believe this option should also include an
opportunity to view the burned out or washed out second and
third stage of each mobile ICBM at the time the inspection
team is on-site to observe the final elimination cut on the
first stage of the missile undergoing elimination.
Delegation believes implementation of this approach would
dramatically reduce the time required for much observation,
permitting the Russians to batch process the completion of
the mobile missile elimination process for 10-20 ICBMs in the
presence of U.S. inspectors in only 1 to 2 days. In any
case, upon completion of the inspection observing the
elimination, the items would cease to be subject to the
limitations of the treaty. This option would have no
negative impact on U.S. elimination procedures for ICBMs or
SLBMs.


11. (S) If unsuccessful in reaching agreement with the Phase
1 offer, the Phase 2 offer would seek to address Russian
objections based on the unique treatment of mobile ICBMs by
broadening elimination procedures to encompass all ICBMs,
mobile and silo-based, solid and liquid-fueled. This
approach would involve more complicated and more expensive
elimination procedures for all types of ICBMs for both Russia
and the United States. All ICBMs, regardless of how they
would be launched or are fueled, would be eliminated using
procedures requiring the elimination of the first stage and


would require removal of the fuel by any means and the
remaining motor case to be eliminated by crushing,
flattening, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal
size or destruction by explosion. Verification would remain
as specified in the existing U.S. proposal for mobile ICBM
elimination under Phase 1: inspectors would have the right
to observe the final elimination cut of the first stage motor
case and launch canister (REF D). Once again, some
delegation members believe this option should include viewing
the burned out or washed out second and third stage at the
time the inspection team is on-site to observe the final
elimination cut on the first stage of the missile undergoing
elimination. In any case, upon completion of the inspection,
the ICBM and its launch canister (if applicable) would cease
to be subject to the limitations of the treaty. While this
option would not resolve the Russian complaints of the
intrusiveness of U.S. inspectors observing the final cuts, it
would remove their argument regarding inequality since it
would have negative impact on both Russian and U.S.
elimination procedures for ICBMs by specifying the
elimination procedures to be completed and providing the
right of inspectors to observe the final cut or explosion of
all types of ICBMs. This appears to be a very heavy price
for "equal treatment" of all ICBMs on each side.


12. (S) Should Phase 2 not be successful, deployment of the
Phase 3 offer would return to specific elimination
procedures, only for the first stage of each mobile ICBM, but
would involve use of national technical means of verification
coupled with post-elimination inspections rather than on-site
observation of the final step in the elimination process.
Some delegation members believe that by eliminating the
requirement for inspectors to be present for the final cuts
will substantially address the Russian objection to intrusive
inspections. Others believe an expected decrease from 10-14
days for the elimination of up to eight missiles and launch
canisters to 1-2 days by using the first two procedures
discussed under Phase 1 should adequately address the Russian
concern about the presence of U.S. inspectors on-site for
extended periods. Phase 3 procedures would require the
removal of the fuel by any means and destruction of the
remaining motor case by being crushed, flattened, cut into
two pieces of approximately equal size or explosion. Upon
completion of the elimination procedures, the two halves of
the motor case would be displayed in the open, observable by
NTM, for 90 days following the notification of completion of
elimination. Some members believe that within that 90-day
period inspectors could come to the display site to verify
the elimination of the declared items by verifying the UID,
confirming the cutting of the motor case and the elimination
of the associated launch canisters. Others believe that NTM
will not be able to verify the elimination of individual
first stages and, without additional measures, inspections
once in a 90-day period also would not be sufficient to
verify that an individual first stage was eliminated. Upon
completion of the inspection, or upon expiration of the
90-day period, if inspection is not conducted, the
eliminating Party could remove the motor cases and the items
would cease to be subject to the limitations of the treaty.

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GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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13. (S) The U.S. delegation seeks authorization to present
the revised elimination and monitoring procedures to the
Russian Federation in the phased manner described above,
should such a step-by-step process prove necessary, for
mobile ICBMs and their launch canisters.


14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS