START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001013

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-002.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 9, 2009
Time: 10:00 - 11:00 A.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Russian side presented its response to the
package proposal conveyed by U.S. National Security Advisor
General Jones to the Russian Federation on October 28, 2009.
(Begin comment: U.S. proposal was also conveyed to the
Russian Delegation in Geneva on October 29, 2009 (REF A).
End comment.)


4. (S) The Russian side accepted the U.S. proposals for an
aggregate limit of 1600 deployed warheads and a "permit and
count" approach to ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear
configuration. The Russian side stated that it would drop
its insistence for a third aggregate limit on non-deployed
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs if the U.S. side would accept
the revised warhead limit of 1600 and the revised strategic
delivery vehicle (SDV) limit of 550.


5. (S) The Russian side proposed an increase in the number
of inspections from 10 to 16. They also asked that treaty
prohibitions on conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to
missile defense interceptor launchers and vice versa appear
in the treaty text. Additionally, the Russian side refused
to consider any special verification provisions pertaining
only to mobile ICBMs, would not acknowledge any special
difficulty in monitoring mobile ICBMs, refused a continued
ban on the encryption of telemetry using procedures similar
to START. Finally, they stated that the four converted
Trident I SSGNs remain subject to additional on-going
verification measures. Regarding counting rules, the Russian
side also proposed that each deployed heavy bomber be
attributed with one nuclear warhead.


6. (S) The U.S. side agreed to study the Russian proposal
and prepare a response, but immediately characterized the
Russian-proposed SDV limit of 550 as "not acceptable." The
U.S. side noted that both sides were committed to completion
of the work on the new treaty by December 5, 2009. The U.S.
side also noted a difference still remained on the issue of a
verification regime for road-mobile ICBMs, as well as
differing views on the value of continuing the ban on
encryption for flight tests for ICBMs and SLBMs. On a
positive note, the U.S. side said that it was welcome news
that Russia considered a larger quota on the number of
inspections, but the increase was far below what was needed
by the U.S. side.


7. (U) Subject Summary: The Focus of the Final Round; The
Russian Counter-Proposal; U.S. Reaction; Two Important Dates;
and, Russian Compromise Significant.

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THE FOCUS OF THE FINAL ROUND
--------------


8. (S) Amb Antonov opened the meeting by emphasizing the
intention of the Russian Delegation to work constructively
with its U.S. counterparts on the way forward to completing
the new treaty by December 5, 2009.


9. (S) A/S Gottemoeller responded that the sides had entered
the decisive and concluding round of negotiations and the
U.S. side was ready for intensive work. She asserted that
the United States was also looking forward to our Presidents
signing documents on December 5th. Recalling a recent public
statement by an unnamed administration official regarding the
package presented by General Jones, she stated that the
negotiations were headed to a conclusion based on "judicious
compromise," and the United States was looking for an outcome
in keeping with both nations' security interests.


10. (S) Antonov observed that the U.S. and Russian
Presidents were scheduled to meet in Singapore on November
15, 2009, and commented that, if the negotiating teams were
unable to resolve certain topics during the coming week, he
was sure the political leaders would speed the talks to their
resolution.

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THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL
--------------


11. (S) Antonov presented the Russian counter-proposal to
the U.S. compromise offer. He emphasized that the Russian
side had worked very hard on the U.S. proposal to find the
most positive aspects and to develop the other American
ideas. He reminded the U.S. Delegation that the Russian side
had proceeded in accordance with Russian national security
interests, and stressed that the Russian counter-proposal had
been confirmed and accepted at the highest political level.
Finally, the Russian side had attempted to mirror the
structure of the original U.S. proposal in framing its answer.

Begin text (Russian Counter-proposal):

Official Translation


To be transmitted to the U.S. Side
Document of the Russian Side
November 9, 2009

Russian Counter-Proposals on the U.S. Proposed Package of
Solutions of October 28, 2009, for Core Issues in the
New START Treaty


1. Numerical limits on strategic offensive arms:

- Limit on warheads: 1600 warheads.

- Limit on strategic delivery vehicles: 550.

- If such ceilings are established, the Russian
side is prepared to abandon a separate limit of
600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM

launchers.

- Counting rules shall be recorded in the Treaty
that reflect a real picture of the deployed
strategic offensive arms available to the sides
and, in particular, of heavy bombers. The
provision on counting one nuclear warhead for
each deployed heavy bomber, which is a carrier
of nuclear armaments, shall be included.


2. Non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs:

The Russian side withdraws its demand for the inclusion
of a provision in the new treaty banning deployed non-nuclear
ICBMs and SLBMs.

The Sides shall agree on the formulation in the Treaty
to include all converted, existing, and newly developed
non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs in the overall limit on strategic
delivery vehicles, and to include their associated warheads
in the overall limit on warheads established for each side.


3. The relationship between strategic offensive arms and
missile defense:

The Russian side agrees with the U.S. proposal on how to
record the existence of a relationship between strategic
offensive and strategic defensive arms in a package of
documents, which will form future agreements (treaty, joint
statement, and a unilateral statement of the Russian
Federation) with two changes.

- A requirement not to convert ICBM or SLBM
launchers into interceptor-missile launchers of
a missile defense system and vice versa throughout
the entire duration of the Treaty shall be
included in the Treaty text because it is directly
linked to its subject matter;

- The Parties shall include in the joint statement
a provision on the intention to discuss the unique
features of newly developed types of missile defense
interceptors, which would distinguish them from
existing ICBMs and SLBMs.


4. Mobile ICBM Verification Regime:

The Russian side does not agree with the use of a
limited number of verification measures that would apply only
to mobile ICBMs and their launchers. The Russian side also
does not recognize special difficulties in tracking these
missile systems.


5. The ban on encryption of telemetry data for flight tests
of ICBMs and SLBMs, using similar procedures to those
contained in START, shall not be introduced.


6. The Russian side agrees to an increase in the number of
inspection events for confirmation of the Treaty verification
parameters (the number of deployed delivery vehicles and
warheads) and inspections of non-deployed strategic offensive
arms from 10 to 16.

Additional verification procedures for the four "Ohio"

class SSBNs, which are to be converted for non-nuclear
sea-launched cruise missiles, shall be agreed upon. Within
the framework of the annual quota, such procedures would
confirm that the capability to deploy ballistic missiles is
not being restored on these SSBNs.

End text.

--------------
U.S. REACTION
--------------


12. (S) Gottemoeller stated that the Russian
counter-proposal contained some interesting items of a
positive nature and some "not so interesting" items. She
offered her initial concerns with the Russian
counter-proposal. She noted that the U.S. offer presented in
Moscow was a package deal. The Russian-proposed limit of 550
SDVs was unacceptable. The United States had proposed a
compromise of 800 SDVs and, at this level, the Parties would
not need a separate limit for non-deployed launchers.


13. (S) Gottemoeller agreed that the counting rule for heavy
bombers was complicated and required further discussion. The
Russian proposal to remove the ban on ICBMs and SLBMs in
non-nuclear configurations was positive news. In terms of
the interrelationship between missile defense and offensive
strategic arms, she reiterated the U.S. position that this
should be addressed only in the treaty's preamble. She noted
that worthwhile discussion regarding this subject had begun
at the heads of delegation level, and that this dialogue
should continue.


14. (S) Gottemoeller noted that a difference still remained
on the issue of a verification regime for road-mobile
systems, as well as differing views on the value of
continuing the ban on encryption for flight tests for ICBMs
and SLBMs. On a positive note, she said that it was welcome
news that Russia considered a larger annual quota on the
number of inspections.

--------------
TWO IMPORTANT DATES:
NOVEMBER 15TH AND DECEMBER 5TH
--------------


15. (S) Antonov stated that his respect for Gottemoeller as
a brave negotiator had increased because of her immediate
response to the Russian President's counter-proposal. He
offered that the Russian side was ready to work at all levels
to resolve any differences and stated what was most important
was to sign the new treaty by December 5th, as directed by
the two Presidents.


16. (S) Gottemoeller replied that her instructions were also
approved by the U.S. President, and noted some areas of
common interest. First, the Presidents of both sides had
repeated their intent that the new treaty would be signed by
December 5, 2009. Second, both sides now had a precise
mutual understanding where difficulties still remained. And,
finally, the job of each delegation was to analyze what was
required to resolve the existing differences and request
instructions from their respective capitals.


17. (S) Antonov again reminded Gottemoeller that the
Presidents would meet in Singapore on November 15, 2009, and
Russian senior leadership would help resolve any issues that
the delegations could not resolve. Dr. Warner noted the SDV
limit did not correspond to how U.S. forces had been
developed and would continue to be developed in the future.
He noted the increase in the number of inspections in the
Russian counter-proposal; however, the new number was still
well short of that needed by the United States He said that
heavy bomber counting rules remained a key issue and noted
that the Russian side had officially tabled its support of
attribution. This position had previously been discussed
with the U.S. side on an informal basis.

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RUSSIAN COMPROMISE SIGNIFICANT
--------------


18. (S) Antonov stated any compromise in the number of
inspections had to address the issue of the relationship of
the compromise to the national security of both sides. The
Russian side had considered this relationship when developing
its decision to increase the number of inspections from 10 to

16. He noted that the Russian side had stated its concern
with the U.S. approach to counting heavy bomber nuclear
armaments several times during the previous negotiating
session. As a result, the Russian side proposed to attribute
only one nuclear warhead to each heavy bomber.


19. (S) Antonov emphasized the Russian counter-proposal to
increase the inspection quota from 10 to 16 was a significant
increase and that, although the Russian President had
publicly advocated an SDV limit of 500, Russia had offered a
compromise. He agreed to continue discussion on these
issues, including talking to Gottemoeller about the
offense-defense language, and recommended that the Russian
counter-proposal be analyzed by the U.S. Delegation.


20. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian Counter-Proposals on the U.S.-Proposed Package
of Solutions of October 28, 2009, for Core Issues in the New
START Treaty, passed to the U.S. side on November 9, 2009 in
the original Russian with unofficial English translation.


21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
LCDR Brons
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Hanchett

Mr. Johnston
Mr. McConnell
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artemiev
Ms. Chernyavskaya
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Adm Kuznetsov
Mr. Lobach
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Mursankova
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Mr. Pischulov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS