START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 001012

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) A/S GOTTEMOELLER'S MEETING WITH UKRAINIAN MFA OFFICIAL,
OCTOBER 30, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-052.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 30, 2009
Time: 4:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. UKRAINE

A/S Gottemoeller Mr. Nykonenko
Amb Ries Mr. Shenchenko
Ms. Purcell
:

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At an October 30, 2009 meeting in Geneva with
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Ries,
Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) official Mr.
Nykonenko urged the United States to agree to begin
negotiations with Ukraine on enhanced security assurances.
His goal was a political, if not legally-binding, P-5
declaration specifically for Ukraine to ensure its security
until it joined NATO. Gottemoeller countered that Ukraine
was not facing threats alone; Ukraine's participation in
NATO's Partnership for Peace and strong bilateral
relationship with the United States gave it a role in the
international security fabric. Gottemoeller made clear that
the United States and Russia were ready to reiterate the
ongoing security assurances contained in the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.


4. (U) Subject Summary: Nykonenko Describes Ukraine's
Deteriorating Security Situation; Ukrainian-Proposed
Agreement on Security Assurances; Don't Forget Budapest;
Budapest Means the UN and There Could Be a P-5 Veto; Ukraine
Needs a Separate Declaration; and, Ukraine's Proposals.

--------------
NYKONENKO DESCRIBES UKRAINE'S
DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION
--------------


5. (S) On October 30, 2009, Gottemoeller and Ries met at the
U.S. Mission in Geneva with Nykonenko, Director, Directorate
of Arms Control and Military and Technical Cooperation,
Ukrainian MFA, and Mr. Shenchenko from Ukraine's Geneva
Permanent Mission. Nykonenko expressed his gratitude for the
opportunity to meet Gottemoeller. The reason for his request
to meet was to discuss security assurances for Ukraine.


6. (S) Nykonenko explained Ukraine's sense that it faced a
deteriorating security situation. He pointed to the Russian
invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the large size of
Russia's Black Sea fleet located in Ukraine, and Russian
pressures on Ukraine's gas supply as reasons why Ukraine
needed enhanced security assurances. Ukraine was also unique
in being the largest regional state not party to any military


alliance. Ukraine was on the dividing line between NATO and
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).


7. (S) Nykonenko spoke of Ukraine's concern about statements
made by senior Russian officials and changes in Russia's
defense law on using troops abroad and employment of nuclear
weapons in local conflicts. Putin had threatened publicly
that if Ukraine joined NATO, Russian missiles would target
Ukraine. The President of Romania also had said that some of
Ukraine's territory rightfully belonged to Romania. Ukraine
had almost 2500 km of unprotected, often unmarked, borders
with Russia, and over 1000 km of unprotected borders with
Belarus. Russia was opposed to marking the borders. These
security challenges caused tensions, giving rise to calls by
some Ukrainian politicians to reacquire nuclear weapons.
While this was unrealistic, it could become an issue in
Ukraine's presidential campaign.


8. (S) Nykonenko continued that Ukraine needed the ability
to respond to potential aggression. Reflecting its
perception that there would be a security void following the
expiration of START, until Ukraine was able to join NATO,
Ukraine was requesting a new arrangement that would enhance
security assurances for it. Nykonenko admitted he could not
realistically expect legally-binding security assurances.
Ukraine would be grateful for a political declaration
reconfirming the commitments in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum,
but it should be extended by multilateral guarantors solely
to Ukraine. Ukraine believed that if the United States would
agree to new security assurances, then Russia would likely
agree to join in the document and, in any case, would be more
cautious about pressuring Ukraine.


9. (S) Nykonenko had already consulted several times with
Russian START Follow-on Head of Delegation Antonov in Geneva.
Russia was not inclined to grant security assurances, since
Ukraine's argument for security assurances was the need for
security from Russian aggression. Nykonenko claimed,
however, that the Chinese Vice President had visited Ukraine
and told President Yushchenko that China was ready to begin
consultations on the matter. President Yushchenko planned to
send a message to the embassies of all the P-5 states on
December 5 proposing talks on enhancing security assurances
for Ukraine.

--------------
UKRAINIAN-PROPOSED AGREEMENT
ON SECURITY ASSURANCES
--------------


10. (S) Nykonenko reminded Gottemoeller that Ukraine had
provided a non-paper and a draft text for a legally-binding
agreement on security assurances during the semi-annual
U.S.-Ukraine Non-Proliferation Working Group (NPWG) meeting
on September 23-24, 2009 in Kyiv. He provided additional
copies (texts provided below). Ukraine recognized that
negotiations on the agreement would be lengthy, but sought to
begin talks before the expiration of the START Treaty and to
make that fact public. Such an announcement would itself
provide a very good signal. It would show the Ukrainian
public and Ukraine's neighbors that Ukraine was not left
alone to deal with its problems and was an important player
in Europe. Nykonenko argued that a security assurances


agreement would play an important role in enhancing European
security space.

--------------
DON'T FORGET BUDAPEST
--------------


11. (S) Gottemoeller expressed her awareness that security
assurances were an important issue for Ukraine. She recalled
that the 1994 Budapest Memorandum security assurances, which
she had participated in negotiating, were recognized by the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation
as an important, successful accomplishment, marking the very
important decision by Ukraine to accede to the NPT and join
the European security fabric. Although not a member of any
alliance, Ukraine's intensive participation in the NATO
Partnership for Peace (PfP) was highly appreciated and helped
ensure that Ukraine did not face its security threats alone.
Ukraine's PfP participation contributed to NATO and should
continue.


12. (S) Gottemoeller emphasized that the upcoming NPT Review
Conference in 2010 made this a good time to review security
assurances. Security assurances deserved to be discussed in
the NPT context. As Vice President Biden had said recently
in Kyiv, the Budapest Memorandum did not expire with the
START Treaty in December 2009. The United States, Russia,
and the United Kingdom had signed it, and France and China
later supported it, so Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had
received multilateral security assurances that would not
expire. This was very important.

--------------
BUDAPEST MEANS THE UN AND
THERE COULD BE A P-5 VETO
--------------


13. (S) Gottemoeller informed Nykonenko that the United
States and Russia were both ready to reiterate the Budapest
Memorandum security assurances for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine upon the expiration of START. Nykonenko said Antonov
had promised to try to persuade the United States to accept a
statement of some kind. Ukraine had no doubts about the U.S.
commitment to the Budapest Memorandum or U.S. reliability as
a partner. However, he stressed that Ukraine's situation was
different from that of Belarus and Kazakhstan, since they
were members of the CSTO. Ukraine needed an anchor, a
mechanism to implement security assurances that was not
provided by the Budapest Memorandum. He asked the United
States to help persuade Russia that Ukraine needed special
treatment. Gottemoeller recalled there was a consultation
clause in the Budapest Memorandum. Nykonenko asserted that
consultations to assist Ukraine could only occur in the UN
Security Council, where any P-5 state had a veto right.


14. (S) Gottemoeller emphasized that the United States and
Ukraine had a productive bilateral relationship, which would
continue to strengthen with the arrival of new U.S.
Ambassador Tefft. Ukraine also had a strong partnership with
NATO that would continue. The security situation in Europe
should calm down as NATO worked with its partners and
cooperated with Russia more effectively than before.
Ukraine's security situation was not so unique--many


non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) considered they had the
same needs. The NPT Review Conference should consider what
the substance of security assurances should be for NNWS.
Ukraine had made a powerful contribution to the NPT in
removing nuclear weapons from its territory. Ukraine
deserved recognition for that act, as did Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Ukraine's contribution should be highlighted at
the Review Conference and at the April 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit in Washington. In addition, the United States and
Russia were willing to reiterate the Budapest Memorandum
security assurances. It was time to think about when and
where to do that.

--------------
UKRAINE NEEDS A
SEPARATE DECLARATION
--------------


15. (S) Nykonenko requested a separate declaration just for
Ukraine. Ukraine needed a new signal of solidarity from all
the P-5 states, albeit less so from the United States.
Gottemoeller said the request would have to be discussed in
Washington. She did not see Ukraine as particularly unique.
Ukraine's security was best served by interweaving with all
European structures, political and security-related.


16. (S) Nykonenko asked whether Ukraine could publicize that
the United States was beginning negotiations with it.
Gottemoeller firmly replied that would be premature.
Finally, Nykonenko requested another meeting with
Gottemoeller, preferably in mid-November. Gottemoeller was
unable to confirm her availability as yet, given her schedule
of shuttling between Geneva, Washington and Moscow. At
Nykonenko's request, Gottemoeller provided a brief
characterization of the status of the START Follow-on
negotiations following National Security Advisor General
Jones' October 28-29 visit to Moscow.


17. (S) Nykonenko closed by proclaiming Ukraine's continuing
readiness to cooperate with the United States on missile
defense, despite Russia's objections. Ukraine had technical
potential in this area. Gottemoeller promised to report the
offer to Washington, noting she had walled herself off from
missile defense issues, since the START Follow-on treaty
would cover only strategic offensive arms and not defense.

--------------
UKRAINE'S PROPOSALS
--------------


18. (S) The text of a Ukrainian non-paper (in unofficial
English, as provided by Nykonenko--no Russian language text
was provided) follows.

Begin text:

On the development of the legally binding mechanism to
confirm security guarantees for Ukraine since the START
Treaty expires in December 2009

The expiration on December 5, 2009 of the Treaty Between
the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) of July 31 1991


creates ambiguity upon the further validity of the assurances
in accordance with the provisions of the Trilateral statement
by the Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and the Russian
Federation of January 14, 1994, and the Memorandum on
Security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to
the NPT of December 5, 1994 as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

During last years Ukraine was several times close to the
possibility of real use of the mechanism, envisaged by
paragraph 6 of the Memorandum on Security assurances in
connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT, namely during
the provocative discussion around the Tuzla island belonging
and Kerch strait delimitation, in connection with the Russian
"gas" pressure and after the statement of the former Russian
President V. Putin concerning the redirection of the Russian
missiles on the objects in Ukraine in connection with
Ukraine's NATO aspirations.

Present realities, in particular the context of the last
summer events in Georgia, approval on July 12,2008 of the new
Russian Foreign policy concept and on May 12, 2009 of the
Russian National Security Strategy up to 2020, as well as
suspended Russian participation in the CFE Treaty, create
completely new geopolitical matrix for Ukraine. Today
Ukraine appears to be in the midst between NATO in the West
and CSTO in the North-East. We also take into consideration
the Russian moratorium on implementation of the CFE Treaty
obligations, which creates hypothetical threat of
conventional armed forces use against Ukraine, including via
the Russian Black Sea fleet in Crimea.

Analysis of these realities shows that security
assurances provided to Ukraine 15 years ago can not be
considered as sufficient since they are not complemented by
the mechanism to guarantee in the practical way the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The existing security assurances according to the "UN
Charter", "CSCE Final Act" and "Memorandum on Security
assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT"
envisage only the mechanism of consultations when a threat
appears.

Ukrainian Side would like to draw attention to the
following key aspects of such assurances.

Firstly, the immediate actions are required from the UN
Security Council only if there is a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or Ukraine becomes a victim of the
aggression. According to the international law, the country
could be considered as such victim only upon the UNSC
decision. But any nuclear power, being the UNSC permanent
member, can veto such resolution, which means that the status
of victim could be formally not recognized.

Secondly, assurances are given only if Ukraine becomes a
victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of
aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. It means that
if Ukraine is attacked or is threatened to be attacked by
conventional weapons, no measures whatever would be required
from the guarantors.

Hence it appears that, in spite of declared by the five


nuclear-weapon states commitments in connection with
Ukraine's accession to the NPT, as of today Ukraine as a
country that does not belong to any existing system of
collective security, remains face-to-face with growing
threats and challenges to its independence.

Recent conflict in Caucasus has clearly proven the
inability of one country to defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity by its own means against a powerful
opponent. Thus Ukraine becomes the weaker link in the chain
of European security.

In such circumstances, before the time to join NATO, it
is vital to fill the emerging "security vacuum" by making
other arrangements which we consider not the alternative to
the Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine but its strong component.

Therefore, Ukraine is seeking for support from the
United States of America concerning development and adoption
of the new multilateral international legally binding
document on the security guarantees for Ukraine, in
connection with the START expiration. The document should be
opened for signature by all P5 states parties of the
Budapest Memorandum and include the clear mechanism of the
guarantees implementation. We are confident that the new
document will become the practical substantial development of
the Ukraine-United States Charter on Strategic Partnership,
signed on December 19, 2008.

Ukrainian Side considers the realization of this
initiative as an important step in a spirit of the strategic
character of relationship between our states in the field of
global security.

End text.


19. (S) The text of the Ukrainian-proposed agreement (in
unofficial English, as provided by Nykonenko-no Russian
language text was provided) follows.

Begin text:

Draft
Agreement on Security Guaranties to Ukraine

(PREAMBLE)

(States) hereinafter referred to as the Parties to this
Agreement

being the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature in London, Moscow
and Washington on July 1, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as
the NPT);

desiring to contribute to the reduction of nuclear
weapons and strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime;

noting the changes in the world-wide security situation;

taking into account the fact that, according to Article
2.4 of the Charter of the United Nations, all UN Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the


threat or use of force against territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

reaffirming the inherent right of the UN Member for
individual or collective self-defense, in accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, until the
Security Council takes action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain the international peace and security;

highly appreciating the decision of Ukraine to
voluntarily foreswear its nuclear weapons and to adhere to
the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state;

taking into account complete and timely fulfillment by
Ukraine of its commitments to foreswear all nuclear weapons
which were on its territory;

taking into account the expiration of the Treaty between
the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991;

recognizing the legitimate aspiration of Ukraine, which
voluntary foreswore its nuclear weapons, to reaffirm and
strengthen its security assurances;

desiring to take effective practical steps in order to
provide security to the states, which foreswear their nuclear
weapons;

encouraging the states, which intend to achieve the
nuclear status in the future, to deny such decision;

recognizing, that stability in the region of Central and
Eastern Europe is the important constituent of global peace
and security;

(states) (hereinafter referred to as States-Guarantors)
and Ukraine agreed on the following:

Article I

Commitments


1. States-Guarantors reaffirm their commitment to
Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final
Act of August 1, 1975, to respect independence, sovereignty
and existing borders of Ukraine.


2. States-Guarantors shall refrain from the threat or
use of force against territorial integrity, political and
economic independence of Ukraine, and reaffirm that none of
their weapons shall be used against Ukraine, except for the
purposes of self-defence, or otherwise in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations.


3. States-Guarantors commit, in accordance with the
principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic
coercion aimed to subordinate to their own interest the
exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent to its sovereignty
and thus to secure advantages of any kind.


4. In case of act of aggression against Ukraine by one


of States-Guarantors, or in case of a situation, threatening
the territorial integrity, political and economic
independence of Ukraine, the States-Guarantors undertake, at
the request of Ukraine, to assign the national armed forces
and facilities in order to provide assistance to Ukraine.

The number and the list of the armed forces and
facilities, as well as the mechanism of providing such
assistance shall be determined in the specific bilateral
documents in accordance with the domestic constitutional
procedures.


5. The threat or use of force against territorial
integrity and inviolability of borders, or political
independence of Ukraine as well as the use of economic
coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the
exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent to its
sovereignty, shall be considered by Ukraine as extraordinary
circumstances, which jeopardize its supreme interests.

Article II

Mechanisms


1. The Parties establish by this Agreement the
Consultative Commission, which shall usually convene on the
level of the permanent representatives of the Parties to the
United Nations in the UN headquarters in New York.


2. The Consultative Commission shall hold regular or
extraordinary consultations concerning the purposes, measures
and procedures, and shall exercise control over the
implementation of commitments, provided by this Agreement.


3. The regular meetings of the Consultative Commission
shall be convened annually no later than January 31 of each
subsequent year.


4. In case of a situation, provided in p. 2 - 4 of
Article II of this Agreement, the Parties shall convene
extraordinary meetings of the Advisory Commission, initiated
by one of the Parties immediately after receiving the request.


5. The Consultative Commission shall be authorized to
take decisions on the response to the situation, provided in
p. 2 - 4 of Article II of this Agreement.


6. The UN Security Council shall be immediately informed
on the decisions taken at the meetings, as well as about all
actions taken in response to the situation, provided in p. 2
- 4 of Article II of this Agreement, including on providing
military assistance. The execution of the relevant actions
shall be stopped after the UN Security Council takes
necessary measures to resolve the situation, restore and
maintain peace and security.

Article III

Responsibility


1. The Parties shall take responsibility for violation
of their obligations arising from this Agreement in
compliance with the rules of international law.



Article IV

Amendments


1. On mutual consent of the Parties the amendments and
additions can be made to this Agreement.


2. Amendments and additions shall be adopted as separate
protocols, which shall become an integral part of this
Agreement and shall enter into force in the manner provided
by Article VII of this Agreement.

Article V

Disputes Resolution

The Parties shall resolve the disputes, arising from
interpretation and implementation of this Agreement, at the
meetings of the Consultative Commission or otherwise in
accordance with the international law.

Article VI

Entry into Force


1. This Agreement is subject to ratification by the
Parties in accordance with their national legislation.


2. The Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth
day after depositing the instrument of ratification by
Ukraine and no less than two instruments of ratification of
the other Parties to the Depository.


3. For any other Party the Agreement shall enter into
force on the thirtieth day after depositing its instrument of
ratification to the Depository.

Article VII

Withdrawal


1. Any Party may withdraw from this Agreement by sending
a notification to the Depository. The withdrawal shall enter
into force on the 180-th day after receiving the notification
by the Depository.


2. If Ukraine withdraws from this Agreement, it expires
from the moment of such withdrawal.

Article VIII

Depository


1. The Depository of the Agreement shall be the
Government of -------------- .


2. The Depository shall notify all other Parties on:

a) the deposit of any instrument of ratification;

b) the date of entry of the Agreement into force, on
any amendments and additions to it, as well as on the date of


the entry of the Agreement into force for any other Party;

c) any notification on the withdrawal from the
Agreement and the date, when such withdrawal shall come into
force for the Party concerned.

Done at -------------- on -------------- " ", 2009

End text.


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS