GOB ON MADAGASCAR DEMARCHE

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/S, AF/E
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM MA BC
SUBJECT: GOB ON MADAGASCAR DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 45783

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Nolan met with Botswana Foreign
Minister Phandu Skelemani on May 11 to deliver reftel
Madagascar demarche. Ambassador was accompanied by Pol/Econ
Chief and Skelemani was accompanied by MFA Director for
Europe and the Americas Mr. Nkoloi Nkoloi. Because Minister
Skelemani traveled to Cuba for a Non-Aligned Movement meeting
and Brazil, he was not available to meet sooner to receive
our demarche. Skelemani offered useful insights and his
opinion on how deposed President Ravalomanana remains "out of
touch" to what has transpired and oblivious to SADC processes
and procedures. Skelemani seemed to imply that use of the
SADC brigade in Madagascar would be a non-starter. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Skelemani listened intently to the demarche points,
but made no specific reply. However, he offered some
interesting background information about the inner workings
of SADC and comments on his views on Ravalomanana. First,
Foreign Minister Skelemani noted that the SADC fact-finding
delegation which was sent to Madagascar has returned but has
not yet reported its findings. Per Skelemani, the delegation
must first submit its report to the Organ Troika, then the
Troika must process the report before calling a full SADC
summit to make decisions on policy toward Madagascar.
Skelemani said that he was not sure when a summit might take
place, but he hoped to call SADC Executive Secretary Salomao
later on May 11 to inquire. According to Skelemani, deposed
Madagascar President Ravalomanana had been pushing SADC to
hold a summit quickly, perhaps in Pretoria on May 10, but his
proposal was not acted upon because the necessary preparatory
work has not been completed, and there was no point having a
summit if the leaders would not have accurate information
from the SADC fact-finding team to consider.


3. (C) Minister Skelemani and President Khama both attended
the May 9 inauguration of Jacob Zuma in Pretoria. Skelemani
reported that Ravalomanana also attended the inauguration,
and at the event he continued to lobby SADC leaders to urge
them to hold a kind of impromptu summit on the margins of the
inauguration, perhaps on May 10. According to Skelemani,
former South African President Thabo Mbeki spoke to
Ravalomanana during the inaugural celebrations and offered to
bring him directly to President Zuma to push for an immediate
SADC summit. Skelemani seemed surprised that Mbeki became
involved, and it was not clear why he went out of his way to
try to help Ravalomanana. Ravalomanana also approached
President Khama in Pretoria to push for an immediate summit.
However, Skelemani reports that Khama told Ravalomanana that
it was not appropriate to have a summit yet, as SADC leaders
would not have sufficient information to take any useful
decisions or action. Foreign Minister Skelemani said that
President Khama then approached President Zuma before
Mbeki/Ravalomanana could reach him, and Khama reportedly told
Zuma that there is no point in having a SADC summit until the
report of Madagascar fact-finding team has been submitted and
then processed by the Organ Troika. Also, Khama reportedly
told Zuma that he should not disrupt his festivities
(especially when he had so many VIP guests to attend to) with
SADC business. Per Skelemani, Zuma agreed with Khama's
points and later said "no" to Ravalomanana's request.


4. (C) Helpfully, Minister Skelemani said that SADC "must be
pragmatic" and read the situation on the ground as it decides
what to do about Madagascar. (Note: This seemed a clear
signal that he personally agrees with the USG position--
though he did not come out and say he supports early
elections or is against use of the brigade). Always
legal-minded, the Foreign Minister noted that according to
SADC's own protocols, they may not use their brigade without
the express agreement of the African Union and the UN
Security Council. He seemed to imply that this would mean
the use of the SADC brigade in Madagascar would be a
non-starter.


5. (C) Foreign Minister Skelemani complained repeatedly that
Ravalomanana is out of touch, and that he "still believes he
can just take a brigade and immediately be reinstated."
Skelemani said that Ravalomanana "has no idea what is

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happening on the ground, only knows what he sees on CNN, and
is totally cut off, isolated." Skelemani also said that
Ravalomanana seems to have no idea what the SADC protocols
require, and that Ravalomanana believes that if President
Zuma or the Swazi King agree to give him SADC troops, he can
immediately return to Antananarivo and resume his presidency.
Skelemani seemed shocked at this naivety and lack of
understanding of SADC processes and procedures.


6. (C) The Ambassador asked the Foreign Minister whether he
had heard anything about a letter from the Swazi King to
President Obama or a proposed, Swazi-led SADC delegation to
Washington to discuss Madagascar. Skelemani was not aware of
either of these initiatives.
NOLAN