SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART III: SECURITY SECTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 FREETOWN 000471

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PINS SNAR KCOR SL
SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART III: SECURITY SECTOR

REF: A. FREETOWN 465

B. FREETOWN 466

C. FREETOWN 34

D. FREETOWN 393

E. FREETOWN 424

F. FREETOWN 462

G. FREETOWN 400

H. FREETOWN 435

FREETOWN 00000471 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons
1.4 (b/ d)


1. (C) Summary: This cable is the third in a four-part series
(reftels A/B) that highlights risks to Sierra Leone's
stability. Given recent events in the sub-region and Sierra
Leone's own blighted history, the ability of the security
sector to maintain peace is an ongoing, critical concern.
While capacity and budgeting issues are well-documented
(reftel C),expected shake-ups in the civilian arm of the
security apparatus could pose a new threat to their efficacy,
with leadership changes anticipated in the Office of National
Security (ONS),Sierra Leone Police (SLP),and the
Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). Agencies here often succeed
or fail based on the actions and integrity of their leaders;
the potential for Sierra Leone to backslide into instability
is high if the coming period of transition within ONS, SLP,
and the ACC is not properly managed. This could be
particularly deleterious as the country sets its sights on
the 2012 elections. End Summary.

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ONS: THE OFFICE WE CAN'T AFFORD TO LOSE
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2. (SBU) ONS, the umbrella agency that provides policy and
intelligence direction and oversight for the security sector,
is arguably the most important civilian agency in the
security apparatus. Led by Brigadier (Rtd.) Kellie Conteh,
who serves as the National Security Coordinator (NSC),ONS is
responsible for managing the country's most important
security concerns, including intelligence-gathering, maritime
security, and international liaising and negotiation on
relevant issues. ONS benefits from significant UK support,
which funds operational costs (including salaries). It has a
robust recruitment progress, relying on recommendations
generated from current ONS personnel and talent-spotters,
plus multiple examinations and interviews. As a result, ONS
has a relatively high-quality, well-educated team, which they
can afford to compensate accordingly.


3. (C) ONS has a reputation for integrity, and many attribute
this to Conteh's leadership. While ONS has a strong fraternal
network among its personnel, corrupt officers are not
protected: one recent example was the conviction of an ONS
intelligence officer who played a significant role in the
Perez narco-trafficking organization. While the salary
supplements from the UK no doubt help, even the lower-ranking
ONS officers cite Conteh as the reason the office is
relatively impenetrable to criminal and political pressure.
Despite his success, or perhaps because of it, Conte has
begun complaining of burn-out, and expressing his desire to
leave his position. A UK contact close to Conteh indicated
that he intends to leave in 2010, to allow a new NSC to
settle-in before the elections.


4. (C) Conteh's departure will undoubtedly impact ONS,
particularly since there is no one waiting in the wings
prepared to replace him. The Deputy, Christopher John, is an
APC political appointment, placed within ONS as the party's
watch-dog. John does not have the skills or reputation
required to take over Conteh's position, and will likely
continue on as Deputy indefinitely (Note: John has reportedly
angled for the Inspector General of Police position, but is
unlikely to receive that appointment. End Note.). The UK, who
intend to continue to heavily invest in ONS until at least
2012, would like to see an outsider brought in - someone
known to have a strong backbone, with a willingness to serve
in the position apolitically. Dr. Christiana Thorpe, the
National Election Commission Chairperson, was identified as
an example of someone with the intellect to quickly absorb
the issues, as well as the demonstrated fortitude to
withstand political pressure. People like Thorpe, however,
are hard to find and retain in Sierra Leone, and Conteh's
shoes will be very difficult to fill.


5. (C) The ramifications of Conteh's departure are vast: ONS
officers have anecdotally said that they will leave their
positions if he goes; Conteh's military background gives him
legitimacy with the Ministry of Defense, and helps prevent
military encroachment of civilian authority (Note: This has
been a burgeoning problem in recent months, per reftel D. End

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Note.); and APC designs to use ONS as a party instrument
could come to fruition without his push-back. The latter
point is the most troubling, especially leading into the
election period. The APC party executive has made numerous
quiet requests for ONS' intelligence arm, the Central
Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU),to gather damaging
information regarding their rivals, as well as bury the
corrupt practices of APC members. Losing or ceding its
independence to the ruling party would make ONS ineffective
and dangerous.


6. (C) Though aware of the risks, Conteh can't be convinced
to stay: besides burn-out, the opportunity cost to him of
turning down international positions is high. The UK is
attempting to meet all needs by creating a position for him
in their new security sector reform program. Conteh will
become the President's "Special Advisor" on security issues,
and be paid entirely by the UK. This will at least keep
Conteh in the country, and will hopefully counter-balance any
inadequacies in the replacement NSC. It will also provide
some necessary oversight for CISU, which will likely lose its
Director General, Abdullai Mustapha, in 2010 as well. As with
Conteh, Mustapha has been a strong agency head, with numerous
contacts across the country and sub-region. His Deputy,
Gabriel Moni, is a political appointment like John, put in
his position to keep an eye on CISU, rather than
substantively contribute to its mission. CISU has capable
junior officers, but none are yet ready to make the leap into
senior positions. Without Mustapha, who indicated fatigue as
being a top reason for moving on, it is unclear how CISU will
continue to operate - he is very much a one-man intelligence
force, who delegates minimally. Again, there is strong
potential for political interference, which is particularly
problematic for an organization responsible for guiding the
military and police intelligence arms.


7. (C) Conteh and Mustapha were both hold-overs from the
Kabbah administration, and new appointees would no doubt feel
compelled to repay political favors for their selection.
President Koroma demonstrates a lot of faith in both men, who
are the best antidote to the poison spread by the advisors
who gain from inciting the President's concerns about his
political rivals. The outlook is bleak for ONS if appropriate
replacements cannot be found: without effective ONS
oversight, the varied self-interests within the larger
security framework will come to the fore, likely bringing
with them greater levels of corruption, dissent, and
operational ineptitude.

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SLP: A Weak (and Weakening) Link
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8. (C) Per reftel E, Inspector General of Police, Brima Acha
Kamara, was on leave in the UK for medical treatment. Many
feel Kamara has outlived his usefulness, and his departure
was accompanied by rumors that he may be placed on indefinite
leave to enable a dignified (but forced) departure from the
IG position. Assistant Inspector General Francis Munu was
initially selected to be Acting IG during Kamara's absence,
but correspondence to that effect was recalled by the
President, who instead chose AIG Morie Lengor. Kamara's
return hints that he has a bit more to go in the position,
and perhaps the rumors were planted as a bit of
"encouragement." If Kamara is actually forced out, Lengor is
by far the best man for the job, but Munu, as an APC
supporter, is more likely to fill the position in the
long-term.


9. (C) Regardless of who sits in the IG position, they will
be challenged by endemic corruption, poor management of
limited resources, and a legacy of impunity. Police at all
levels are known for taking kick-backs, and must pay into a
larger system by sharing their "fees" with their supervisors.
Even Kamara, who is known to demand USD 250.00 in advance of
meetings with local businessmen, is expected to share his
take with former IGs, Deputy IGs, and the Police Council.
Many cite the poor compensation for officers, relative to
ONS, as the reason (and even justification) for police
corruption, and few are caught or disciplined. Several recent
cases of police impropriety, however, put a spotlight on the
issue: 3 SLP officers stationed at Lungi Airport were
arrested the week of November 23 for corruption and narcotics
possession (reftel F),while 4 other SLP officers have been
arrested for providing weapons to those responsible for the
recent spate of armed robberies (reftel G). In the former
instance, the three officers arrested a Nigerian on suspicion
of cocaine trafficking. After he expelled 26 capsules of
cocaine, the officers took 16, likely with the intent to sell
them. They were arrested after the Nigerian's statement did
not correspond to the officers' report. The latter case

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involved the Assistant Superintendent responsible for the
SLP's Mobile Armed Response Unit within the Operations
Support Division, and three underlings. They provided police
weapons to those individuals currently being prosecuted for
armed robbery. The Assistant Superintendent is a known
associate of wanted drug trafficker Gibrilla Kamara, and was
likely taking directions from an APC henchman (unnamed),
whose involvement in the case was reportedly quashed by the
Attorney General.


10. (C) These incidents, as well as others throughout the
year, have damaged the SLP's image. This makes it easier for
others, notably the military, to consolidate their own power
by assuming some civilian policing activities, which
undermines the police at a time when they need reform and
support to enable them to take on their security
responsibilities for the election. Without honest and
visionary leadership, the SLP will continue to be the weakest
link in the security sector, with little hope of improvement
before 2012.

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ACC: LOSING GROUND?
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11. (C) The ACC has made great strides since Abdul Tejan-Cole
became Commissioner and the 2008 revised legislation passed.
Recent high-profile cases (reftel H) prove that at least some
of the "big fish" are up for grabs. Post has learned,
however, that Tejan-Cole is leaving his position in December
to take an unknown job in South Africa. His Deputy, an APC
selection, will assume the helm for an indefinite period. The
reasons for Tejan-Cole's seemingly sudden departure are
currently unknown, but rumored to be linked to his refusal to
investigate his good friend, Foreign Minister Zainab Bangura
(Note: Bangura has been fingered for possibly using her
position to profit from a donation of rice from the Indian
Government. High-level contacts have indicated that there is
credence to the rumors. End Note.),and frustration at the
machinations that delayed his indictment of the former
Ministry of Health. The latter incident appeared to
demonstrate that the ACC's independence from the Ministry of
Justice is only accurate in the technical, rather than
practical, sense.


12. (C) Regardless of the reason, Tejan-Cole is a huge loss
for the ACC, which he completely reformed and re-built after
his appointment. The UK recently gave an additional two
million pounds to the Commission to support operational
costs, and did so in part because of their faith in
Tejan-Cole: without his leadership, and with no acceptable
replacement in sight, the UK contribution could be for naught.

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COMMENT: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A LEADERSHIP VACUUM
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13. (C) The pending loss of three effective leaders in the
civilian security sector highlights some of the inherent
problems plaguing the system: over-reliance on a few
individuals; a shallow (if not non-existent) pool of possible
successors; and political interference that places party
"spies" in deputy positions and prevents the promotion of
effective leaders. Conteh's, Mustapha's, and Tejan-Cole's
departures ought not pose such a great threat to the
legitimacy of their respective officers; the fact that they
do highlights the immaturity of the security sector in Sierra
Leone. Further, Kamara's likely firing should be an
opportunity to increase SLP legitimacy, but probably will
not, demonstrating the limited independence afforded to
entities that should be apolitical. With Guinea a continued
source of anxiety, and political tension already rising in
advance of the 2012 elections, this is a critical time for
civilian authorities in terms of preparation and instilling
confidence. With a void in terms of judicious counsel,
President Koroma may be forced to seek advice from a group of
self-interested people with a still undeveloped sense of
pragmatic responsibility: his own party. End Comment.
FEDZER