Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09FREETOWN400
2009-10-14 17:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Freetown
Cable title:  

KOROMA SHOWS PARANOIA IN RESPONDING TO CRIME SPIKE

Tags:  ASEC PGOV PREL PINR SL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFN #0400/01 2871749
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141749Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2920
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 000400 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PINR SL
SUBJECT: KOROMA SHOWS PARANOIA IN RESPONDING TO CRIME SPIKE

REF: FREETOWN 393

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 000400

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PINR SL
SUBJECT: KOROMA SHOWS PARANOIA IN RESPONDING TO CRIME SPIKE

REF: FREETOWN 393

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/
d)


1. (C) President Koroma called a National Security Council
(NSC) meeting on October 6 to discuss the recent increase in
violent armed robberies in the Freetown area. Home invasions,
illegal vehicular checkpoints, and muggings are on the rise,
targeting those with known wealth or the appearance of
wealth. Koroma canceled the usual National Security Council
Coordinating Group meeting that was scheduled for October 6
in lieu of the NSC, which he chairs, to voice his concerns.


2. (C) According to one of the highest-ranked security
officials in the country, the robberies have been linked to a
cadre of career criminals who were recently released on bail.
The cadre has resumed leadership of its small crime ring, and
absorbed new members who were recruited in jail. They are
known for opportunism, and do not appear to target specific
groups of people, such as expats or the Lebanese community.
Source said that they are "notorious gangsters" who should
not have been granted bail, and said that the Attorney
General claimed in the NSC to be powerless to prevent their
release. The Sierra Leone Police intend to re-arrest the
individuals as soon as possible, but the source was unclear
about whether the judiciary agreed with this plan, or would
deny bail in subsequent hearings. Besides the re-arrests, the
President called for Military Assistance to the Civil Power
(MACP),and authorized joint military-police patrols across
the country. The need for the MACP will be reviewed every two
weeks.


3. (C) According to several NSC sources, the President stated
his view that the robberies are an SLPP plot designed to
undermine his leadership and popularity. Though sources felt
that a MACP is unnecessary at this time, and allegedly
counseled the President accordingly, the President appeared
so concerned about the "plot against him" that he would not
accept solely civilian policing solutions to the problem.
Sources stated surprise that Koroma would call an NSC
meeting, and implied that his apparent overreaction shows his
deep-seated political insecurity, rather than the belief that
the robberies reflect a breakdown of civil order.


4. (C) Poloff spoke with the UK Political Secretary on
October 7, who identified his own concerns that Koroma is
being reactionary and paranoid. He noted the two sides of
Koroma: one a mature statesman with good decision-making
capabilities, and the other a paranoid politician looking for
monsters in every corner. The High Commission believe that
some of Koroma's advisors are either feeding his "Dr. Jekyll"
side, or failing to calm him when he tends towards irrational
behavior. In their view, the paranoia is part of the
political culture and his advisors buy-in to the same
concerns the President has about possible SLPP strategies.
The UK believes that no one in the Cabinet will steer him
towards less reactionary ground, because they themselves are
paranoid about their postings, and don't want to rock the
boat. PolSec said that he believes the High Commissioner
needs to get closer to Koroma, act as a voice of reason, and
remind Koroma that he needs to focus on governing, rather
than waging war against a party that represents very little
real threat to the APC's 2012 prospects.


5. (C) Comment: Post agrees with the UK assessment that
Koroma is capable of being a strong, confident leader when he
rises above becoming mired in party politics. However,
believing that a gang of thugs are deliberately committing
crimes to cast him in a negative light and calling a MACP is
a good example of the knee-jerk side of his persona. It is
this side that threatens the efficacy of his administration,
because it pushes him to mis-direct resources and energy, and
can have indirect negative impacts (Note: Per reftel, the
more frequent use of the MACP is heightening tension between
the military and police. End Note). The Brits agree with post
that the only party the APC should fear in the 2012 elections
is their own: the SLPP is starting to show signs of
fragmentation under its new leadership, and cannot seem to
elevate their political discourse to a level above
name-calling. Koroma appears to lack a steadying influence
who can remind him that leading the country is more important
at this time than leading his party. Without this, he could
continue to allow his own fears and self-interest to dictate
his governance style, to his long-term detriment. End
Comment.


6. (C) Post continues to monitor the security situation
closely. Staff have been told to increase their vigilance,
but there is no need to alter post's security posture at this
time.
FEDZER