FRAUD SUMMARY - DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001204

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND SCA/CEN
FRANKFURT FOR RCO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC TI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN

DUSHANBE 00001204 001.2 OF 004


Country Conditions


1. Tajikistan's continued poverty, high unemployment and
dependence on remittances from family members abroad result in a
significant number of working age Tajiks, mostly male, who leave
Tajikistan for better prospects elsewhere. Until recently,
approximately one million Tajiks out of a population of seven
million worked abroad, most in the Russian Federation. However,
the worldwide economic crisis has forced a number of unemployed
Tajik citizens to return to Tajikistan. At the same time,
living conditions in Tajikistan have become more difficult, with
rising prices in rural and urban areas and continued energy
shortages during winter months. According to the Committee of
Statistics for the CIS countries, the inflation rate this year
will reach 24%. Some 40% of Tajikistan's working age population
is underemployed and half of the entire population live under
the poverty line, earning less than one to two dollars a day.
Unsatisfactory education and medical care, coupled with poor
employment prospects continue to drive a significant portion of
the educated working age population to seek better economic
opportunities and living conditions abroad. With the recently
signed decree on labor migration between Tajikistan and Saudi
Arabia, part of the male working population forced to return
from Russia may try to find low wage jobs in Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, the deteriorating economic situation likely will
contribute to increased fraudulent U.S. visa applications
related to labor migration and illegal immigration.

NIV Fraud


2. Fraud in Tajikistan is much more primitive than that of
fraudulent applicants in many other countries (petition-based
fraud, for example). We uncover most fraud easily at the NIV
window with a short interview. However, Post sometimes
encounters relatively sophisticated attempts which require
follow-up investigations and further action by the Fraud
Prevention Unit or Regional Security Office. During the
reporting period, Post saw two more H1B cases in which
applicants did not qualify for positions for which they had
petitions. In one case, the applicant's H1B petition was
submitted by a medium sized convenience store/payroll management
company (TFL) in Omaha, Nebraska, that was established by Tajik
immigrants. The applicant was unable to conduct the interview
in English, a requirement for the position of accounting manager
as described in the petition. This petition was sent back to
DHS for revocation. The other case is under investigation, as
the petition was not found in PIMS. Both applicants have had
previous refusals under different visa classifications.


3. Generally, when Post uncovers fraud, it is in connection
with tourist (B1/B2) or student (F1) visas. The majority of
mala fide NIV applicants intend to go to the United States for
economic reasons. Discovery often occurs during the initial
application review or during the interview when it becomes
apparent that the applicant does not intend to fulfill the
stated purpose of the trip and seeks either to work illegally
for a short time or to join relatives who have already illegally
immigrated. Post currently sees an increase of applicants
intending to emigrate to the United States. Applicants often
submit false employment and invitation letters in support of
their applications. Lexis/Nexis searches provide invaluable
information in this regard. Post has encountered fraudulent
applicants traveling in groups for various sporting events
(usually wrestling, arm wrestling or judo/taekwondo) in the
United States. During the reporting period Post adjudicated
several groups of athletes who claimed their travel to the
United States was for different sports competitions. Mala fide
applicants in these groups are sometimes well prepared for the
visa interview, often are supplied with genuine supporting
documents, and sometimes accompany legitimate travelers. The
Consular Section confirmed through local phone checks with
families and ADIS information that the majority of members of
such groups traveling with trainers or coaches have not
returned. In addition, Post received a letter from an organizer
of one of the wrestling events, Christopher Moen, and a DHS
official in Colorado expressing concern about the no-show of
Tajiks at wrestling competitions. During this reporting period,
Post learned of at least one case when a Tajik with apparent
strong ties through her international organization employer
immediately resigned her job with immigrant intent shortly after
arriving in the United States. These cases demonstrate some of
the complexities in assessing legitimate travel to the United
States under the current economic conditions in Tajikistan.


4. Documents are generally untrustworthy in Tajikistan, with
signatures and seals often forged. The consular officer can
detect many of these documents by asking for supporting
information about the individual's work, economic situation and

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financial sponsorship or details of the proposed U.S. travel.
Document forgers can be easily found in Tajikistan and provide
fake job letters very inexpensively. However, not all
fraudulent documents are necessarily forgeries. For a small
bribe an applicant can have the appropriate government official
write out a real birth or marriage certificate with false
information, including all of the appropriate seals. Data
mismatches usually make this sort of fraud easy to detect.
Corrupt government officials continue to thwart attempts to
tighten the issuance and regulations of national identity
documents. Anti-corruption laws exist, but enforcement and
implementation remain elusive, and internal controls on identity
documents are lax.


5. As was noted in previous Fraud Reports, the majority of F1
visa applicants in Tajikistan wish to study English as a Second
Language in schools or programs where large Tajik communities
exist. Tajik students often have trouble proving their ability
to fully finance their study in the United States. Post has
seen attempts to work around this by presenting suspicious
letters of support from sponsoring firms or organizations and
inflated bank statements. Tajikistan remains a cash based
economy, making it very difficult to confirm the real incomes of
applicants. One indicator of fraud is a bank statement that
shows an even number such as exactly USD 9,000 or 15,000 in the
account. Anecdotal evidence suggests that an applicant can
purchase such a statement for a hundred dollars; the money will
be deposited into the account and will remain there for
approximately a month.


6. Post frequently encounters fraudulent sponsorship letters
provided by private organizations and companies. During this
reporting period, post continued to have many cases where
applicants presented documents on legitimate letterhead claiming
that a government office, private company or local NGO would
sponsor the full cost of an individual's English study in the
United States - which made little sense in these instances.
Follow up phone calls usually reveal that employers who have
signed the letter don't really intend to fund such training
programs. In other cases, phone calls to official phone numbers
provided on company/organization letterhead reach a private
party with no relationship to the company or organization. In
some cases where a relative (usually an "uncle") is claimed as
the sponsor for the cost of study in the United States, fraud is
commonly uncovered through contradictory information regarding
trip details and financing provided by the sponsor and the
person sponsored.


7. Applications for the 2009 Summer Work and Travel (SWT)
program increased from 2008, the first year the program was
carried out in Tajikistan. Post approved 121 out of 139
applications in 2009, and 18 were refused. In 2008 Post
received 110 SWT J1 applications; 86 were granted visas while 24
were refused. Post plans to conduct a validation study based on
records of the students' return received from local implementing
agencies as well as ADIS information obtained by the Consular
Section. The results will be reported separately to the
Department of State.

IV Fraud


8. Post accepts and processes a limited number of I-130
petitions (on average one a month). Marriage fraud in
Tajikistan is not common, although we have seen some cases among
DV applicants. Tajik society is very traditional and is
generally not open to marriage to foreign citizens. In
addition, there are relatively few Tajik-Americans, eliminating
the types of marriage fraud found in connection with larger
diaspora communities.

DV Fraud


9. DV fraud in Tajikistan echoes that of the Central Asian
region. Almaty and Tashkent have seen suspected sham marriages
in Tajik DV cases they processed. Although it is difficult to
draw conclusions based on unreliable high school equivalency
documents, Tajiks fall roughly into two categories:
agricultural laborers from villages and the mountains (unlikely
to have earned a high school education) and city residents
(often have college degrees in addition to high school
equivalent education). In the past, Post saw several suspicious
cases of children added to a DV case after notification and
before the interview. In general, however, as Consular staff
learned on a recent trip to observe IV processing in Almaty,
most Tajik DV applicants are qualified.

ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud


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10. Post has not discovered any ACS or passport fraud in
Tajikistan. Due to the small American citizen community, the
Consular Officer and Embassy local staff often are personally
acquainted with resident Americans. Few Tajiks have U.S.
citizenship. Post has yet to issue more than five Consular
Reports of Birth Abroad per year, and many of the Americans
residents in Tajikistan have diplomatic or official passports.
Passports rarely are lost or stolen, and in the past few years
lost passports often were returned within one week. There are
currently twelve children registered with the Embassy born to
Tajik parents while in the United States (often as out-of-status
students). This is an area of concern for post.

Adoption Fraud


11. On May 3, 2006, Tajikistan changed its Family Code to
prohibit inter-country adoption of Tajik orphans. Though
couples which consist of at least one Tajik citizen may be still
allowed to adopt, all other adoptions by non-Tajik citizens are
forbidden by Tajik law.

Use of DNA Testing


12. Post has not needed to require DNA testing of any
applicants.

Asylum and Other DHS Benefits Fraud


13. Post provides all assistance requested by DHS to verify
documents such as birth certificates or proof of
nationality/ethnicity, many of which have turned out to be
fraudulent. No concrete asylum or other DHS benefits fraud has
come to light in the past three quarters.

Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel



14. Tajikistan is a source country for women trafficked through
Kyrgyzstan and Russia to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and
Russia for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Women
are also reportedly trafficked to Pakistan for the purposes of
sexual exploitation and forced labor. Men are trafficked to
Russia and Kazakhstan for the purpose of forced labor, primarily
in the construction and agricultural industries. Boys and girls
are trafficked internally for various purposes, including forced
labor and forced begging. There have been no reports of
trafficking in persons from or through Tajikistan to the Western
Hemisphere.



15. Supporters of terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, al-Qaida, and the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement remain active in Central
Asia, as do anti-Western, anti-semitic extremist organizations
such as Hizb'ut-Tahrir. Members of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan have been arrested and convicted for organized crime,
murder, and weapons charges in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is
primarily a transit center for illegal terrorist travel. Canada
and Mexico do not have diplomatic representation in Tajikistan,
and EU consular officials have not reported any use of
fraudulent U.S. passports or visas to assist visa applications
to EU countries.

DS Criminal Fraud Investigations


16. The Regional Security Office and Consular Section maintain
a close working relationship. Fraud, as stated above, is
relatively simple. Post's fraud prevention manager, the
consular section chief, may refer the occasional case to the
RSO. The RSO in turn conveys the disposition of each case to
the consular section chief. During the last year, the Regional
Security Office and Consular Section have cooperated on various
cases. One of these cases had been opened by the local
authorities regarding a visa fixer and concluded with arrest and
prosecution. The Consular Section also has provided information
to the RSO regarding Internet fraud, such as fake conference
invitation letters requiring advance hotel payment using State
Department letterhead, which were seen several times this
period.

Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry


17. Post continues to have serious concerns about both the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'
capacity in terms of the security and accountability of the
passport issuance process. For example, physical presence of
the passport applicant is often not necessary. All Tajik civil
documents must be scrutinized carefully. Post encountered cases

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of previously issued applicants receiving new Tajik passports
with identities to which they had no legal claim.


18. Many members of the Tajik elite have returned to using
traditional names, eliminating the Russian variants of surnames
(the "-ev" and "-ov" endings for example) and patronymics. Post
continues to be cognizant of possible name variations to
recognize any fraud such as visa reapplication under the "new"
name to avoid discovery of adverse information or previous
refusals.

Cooperation with Host Government Authorities


19. Document fraud is technically a criminal offense in
Tajikistan. In combating these crimes, the Tajik Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is at best an occasionally competent partner.
The MFA periodically informs us by diplomatic note about the
numbers of lost or stolen Tajik passports and also cooperates
with Post's requests for verification of civil documents (though
usually months later than requested). However, endemic
corruption, shoddy record keeping, and lack of prosecution for
document fraud limit the usefulness of cooperation.

Areas of Particular Concern


20. Despite some slowdown in applications during 2009, post has
seen a steady increase in NIV applications since visa issuance
began in 2006. This results from the overall low living
standards in the country and increased awareness of the
possibility of applying for a U.S. visa. Due to various factors
mentioned above, Post expects that the number of applicants will
increase in FY2010, albeit perhaps at a slower rate than in
previous years. We will remain vigilant about potential group
based fraud such as the recent cases of athletes. Post is also
looking towards its third year of the Summer Work and Travel
program in Tajikistan - and anticipates the number of applicants
to continue to rise. Local facilitators already have expressed
interest in promoting other programs such as au pair and the
intern program. The increasing awareness by Tajiks of the
opportunities a U.S. visa present combined with the difficult
living situation in Tajikistan undoubtedly will lead to a rise
in fraud, and Post expects that more sophisticated methods may
be used to attempt to obtain visas fraudulently in the future.

Staffing and Training


21. Consular Chief and Fraud Prevention Manager is Elisabeth
Wilson. Fraud Prevention FSN is Tahmina Dehoti. Tahmina Dehoti
has taken PC542 - FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop in Washington
and recently traveled to Uzbekistan to observe IV fraud
prevention practices.
GROSS