Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DURBAN50
2009-05-07 10:37:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Durban
Cable title:  

WHITHER INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

Tags:  PGOV SF 
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R 071037Z MAY 09
FM AMCONSUL DURBAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1448
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNSAD/SADC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0822
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DURBAN 000050 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR AF/S, INR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SF
SUBJECT: WHITHER INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

DURBAN 00000050 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DURBAN 000050

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR AF/S, INR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SF
SUBJECT: WHITHER INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

DURBAN 00000050 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) continued
its decade-long demise in KwaZulu Natal (KZN) by losing the
recent election to the ANC. An anachronistic leader, a tough
ANC opponent, a shift in KZN traditional leadership, and a poor
track record of service delivery worked against the IFP. The
IFP may yet hold on to power by replacing its current leadership
and focusing on service delivery. End Summary.

Snapshot of IFP's Rule in KZN


2. (SBU) The IFP has a long history of governance in KZN,
beginning in 1970 when it governed the former KwaZulu homeland.
Post apartheid, it governed KZN for 10 years from 1994 to 2004,
but the IFP has seen its power decline with each subsequent
election. In 1994, the IFP received 50.3 percent of the KZN
vote, in 1999, 41.9 percent, and in 2004, 36.8 percent. In the
most recent election, the IFP won only 22.4 percent of the votes
in its former stronghold. This is a great loss for the IFP. It
means that it has lost five of the nine wards it previously
controlled and will see its number of seats in the provincial
legislature drop from 30 to 18.


3. (SBU) After the first two elections, the IFP formed a
coalition government with the ANC that endured even after the
ANC won control of KZN in 2004. This coalition came to an abrupt
end when ANC Premier Sibusiso Ndebele fired all IFP ministers in
November 2006 after the IFP formed a coalition against the ANC
in northern KZN. Since then, the ANC has governed the province
without the IFP, and relations have soured between the parties.
Final election results show that the ANC made significant
inroads throughout KwaZulu-Natal, including traditional IFP
strongholds such as Zululand and Northern KZN. Based on these
results, local political analysts such as Protas Madlala have
concluded that the once influential IFP has been `obliterated'
as a political force.

Why the IFP Lost:
-Leadership


4. (SBU) The IFP pinned its hopes on a man who is well liked
but is not seen by KZN voters as a hope for the future. Since
he founded the IFP, Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi has been the
face and soul of his party, so much so that he has not allowed
for the development of other leaders within the party. Voters
see the party as a one-man show and wonder what the IFP has left
to offer as Buthelezi journeys into his eighties. For some,
Buthelezi and his party are a painful reminder of KZN's violent

political past, while others even blame the deaths of thousands
on the IFP's former alignment with the apartheid regime during
the early 1990s.


5. Younger forces within the IFP seem poised to demand new
leadership. KZN-based newspaper The Mercury reported on April
30 that many within the IFP Youth Brigade have called for
Buthelezi to step down in light of the recent defeat at the
polls. Although officially denied by the IFP Youth League
(IFPYL),former IFPYL President, Thulasizwe Buthelezi (no
relation to Prince Buthelezi),reported to Pol/Econ Assistant
that many IFPYL members are concerned about the party's future
and are indeed eager for a change of leadership.

-Formidable ANC Opponent


6. (SBU) The IFP had a tough opponent in the ANC. The ANC in
KZN managed its internal differences well and after the
Polokwane leadership nomination process, opted to retain
Mbeki-appointed leaders in KZN and avoid potentially damaging
in-fighting. The ANC also had strong election organization and
mobilization throughout the province and spent approximately
R60, 000,000 ($7,000,000) on its KZN campaign effort, reported
ANC parliamentarian Chris Mlotsha to Pol/Econ Assistant.

-Zulu Pride


7. (SBU) For many Zulus in KZN, the prospect of a Zulu
president who is from Zululand was reason enough to abandon the
IFP and vote for the ANC. Jacob Zuma is the first non-Xhosa and
Zulu leader of the ANC since Albert Luthuli in 1967.
Historically, the IFP is known for Zulu nationalism, but the ANC
eroded much of the IFP base by pushing the idea that its
candidate stood a better chance of winning and would be the
first Zulu to rule South Africa since Shaka.

-Traditional Leadership


8. (SBU) Traditional leaders in KZN still wield a great deal of
political influence and, historically, the IFP could always

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count on the support of these leaders. Although the IFP made
some improvements to the lives of traditional leaders during its
rule, it took their support for granted. The ANC, on the other
hand, was strategic in currying favor with traditional leaders.
For example, since it took control of KZN in 2004, the ANC
provided free medical insurance and new housing to all
traditional leaders, and increased their salaries by about 70
percent. Also, because of the ANC, members of the House of
Traditional Leaders are now elected by peers rather than
appointed, as was the practice under the IFP. More recently,
the ANC began providing stipends to the influential headmen of
traditional leaders. In the end, the ANC was rewarded with an
outright electoral victory.

-Service Delivery


9. (SBU) One of the biggest factors in IFP's defeat, however,
is the successful delivery of public services under the ANC.
Although the IFP relentlessly harped on the issue of poor
service delivery in KZN, the ANC has actually managed in five
years of rule to deliver development to the province in ways the
IFP did not during its tenure. Since the ANC took control of
KZN, roads have improved significantly in rural and peri-urban
areas, many rural towns and villages have been electrified,
clinics have been established, and sanitation and access to
water has greatly improved. While residents still expect more
improvements, the IFP could not convince voters that a switch
away from the ANC would lead to continued development. In
contrast, the IFP has struggled to get many of its councilors to
deliver basic services at the municipal level -- a fact that
Buthelezi painfully acknowledged in his concession speech.

-Other Mistakes


10. (SBU) The IFP also made other tactical mistakes that cost
it votes at the polls. For example, the party nominated the
inexperienced Zanele kaMagwaza Msibi as the IFP's KZN premier
candidate. She could not compete against ANC candidate Zweli
Mkhize (former KZN Finance Minister and soon-to-be KZN Premier),
whose popularity and outstanding track record in government
could not be denied. The IFP did not effectively lure young
swing voters whose allegiance is still being determined. Also,
the IFP did not take seriously the possibility that it might
lose votes to upstart party Congress of the People (COPE).

Comment


11. (SBU) IFP leaders have declared that the party is still a
force to be reckoned with but have not offered any specifics on
how it will regroup. What is clear, however, is that the IFP
must move beyond the personality of its 80-year-old leader,
Buthelezi, and focus on service delivery in its remaining local
strongholds. KZN-based newspaper The Witness reported the story
of a defaced Buthelezi poster in Cape Town which read in Xhosa,
`Dedela banye, suba uMugabe,' (Give others a chance, don't be
another Mugabe). This sentiment captures accurately the
reality that Buthelezi no longer offers his party a vision for
the future, and, if he continues on as leader, will drive the
party to extinction. Buthelezi denied media reports that he
has been offered a cabinet position in Zuma's administration,
but when asked by Pol/Econ Assistant if he would consider such
an offer, Buthelezi said that it would be up to the party.


12. (SBU) If the IFP is to establish a strong record of service
delivery, it must effectively address the non-performance of its
own councilors. Buthelezi admitted in his concession speech
that his party failed to correct the errant behavior of its
councilors. While corruption may play a role in this problem,
it is more likely that IFP councilors simply lack the management
capacity to make good on its promises. In the past, the IFP has
not mustered the will to fire its faithful councilors; but this
time around, supporters will likely demand that the party fill
its ranks with competent workers.


13. (SBU) As the ANC's development agenda continues to focus on
urban issues, however, taking up the cause of the forgotten
rural populace may yet keep the IFP from complete annihilation.
While the ANC campaigned vigorously in rural areas and promised
to make rural development a priority, it remains to be seen if
rural concerns such as land redistribution, and access to basic
public services and health care will become priorities for the
ANC.
DERDERIAN