DUBAI CUSTOMS STOPS ILLICIT AIR CARGO SHIPMENT AS A RESULT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 000473

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO; NEA/ARP/BMCGOVERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/3/2019
TAGS: ETRD KIPR EFIN ECON PREL AE
SUBJECT: DUBAI CUSTOMS STOPS ILLICIT AIR CARGO SHIPMENT AS A RESULT
OF DHS TIP

DUBAI 00000473 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Justin Siberell, Consul General.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 26, Dubai Customs acted on
intelligence from Dubai-based DHS/ICE officials in seizing an
in-bound air shipment originating in Canada containing what is
believed to be dual-use nuclear technology slated for re-export
from Dubai to an undetermined destination. This interdiction
showcases Dubai CQtoms' willingness to act against the flow of
illicit goods provided it receives timely and specific
information. DHS officials have been working quietly with
Dubai's Customs Intelligence Unit for several years to improve
the unit's responsiveness to tips such as the one that led to
this interdiction. This cooperation has recently been extended
to the air cargo realm, making this seizure an important
showcase of the benefits of this growing relationship. END
SUMMARY.



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DUBAI CUSTOMS SNAGS ILLICIT CARGO WITH USG HELP

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2. (C) On October 26, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
Counter Proliferation Unit, working with DHS, tipped off local
Dubai Customs officials that a shipment of controlled dual-use
nuclear technology was in transit from Toronto, Canada to Dubai.
This intelligence sharing is part of a larger program between
Dubai Customs Authority and the USG to combat the illicit
shipment of controlled and/or dual-use goods passing through
Dubai. Canadian authorities developed information that Global
Industrial Supply, a Canadian-based shipping company, attempted
to procure pressure transducers and spinning rotor gauges from
U.S. based MKS Instruments Company. Upon arrival of the air
cargo shipment, Dubai Customs seized the package and are now
analyzing its contents. Dubai Customs has informed us it will
complete its analysis as quickly as possible in order to return
the material to Canada.



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COOPERATION AND TRAINING KEY TO SEIZURE

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3. (C) USG cooperation with Dubai Customs is still evolving.
Its leadership continues to show interest in USG training
opportunities. Recent programs have focused on upgrading local
capacity to identify and interdict illicit cargo. DHS has been
working to improve Customs' capacity to act swiftly in
responding to real time tips and intelligence from not only USG
sources, but any reliable intelligence. Abdulla Mohamed Al
Khaja, Dubai Customs Intelligence Director, has been a key
partner in facilitating enhanced customs enforcement training
for his local agents, as well as expanding the lines of
communication between the USG and the Customs Authority.




4. (C) As part of the training effort, Dubai Customs and DHS
have been working together on upgrading Dubai Customs air cargo
monitoring and inspection systems since August. The training
has focused on bridging the significant technology and human
intelligence gap at Dubai Customs. Dubai Customs' air cargo
screening systems are viewed as sub-par when compared to systems
present in developed countries; a concern for Dubai, as
expanding air cargo handling is a key element of Dubai's
longer-term development strategy. As an example, Dubai Customs
officials still analyze all air cargo manifests by hand, and
have not installed data mining technology to sift through the
enormous volume of manifests and cargo shipment receipts that
pass through its ports. Dubai Customs' Intelligence Director
has conveyed a request through in-country DHS representatives
for training on cargo inspection technology recently acquired by
Dubai Customs.



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Comment


DUBAI 00000473 002.2 OF 002


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5. (C) As a major transshipment hub, Dubai's capacity and
willingness to identify and intercept illicit and dual use goods
are key to USG counter-proliferation goals. We have seen
excellent cooperation from the UAEG in interdicting Iran-bound
vessels suspected of carrying items judged a proliferation risk.
The October 26 seizure at the Dubai airport demonstrates that
cooperation at the local level is also important to our
counter-proliferation objectives. Continued capacity-building
and real-time sharing of information are the twin pillars of
this effort. END COMMENT
SIBERELL