UAE'S RAS AL KHAIMAH: ROGUE OR REFORMER?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 000447

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER KNNP ETRD ECON ETTC AE IR
SUBJECT: UAE'S RAS AL KHAIMAH: ROGUE OR REFORMER?

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CLASSIFIED BY: Justin Siberell, Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate General, Dubai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: Ras Al Khaimah (RAK),the UAE's
northern-most emirate, has emerged into the media spotlight
amidst a blitz of recent accusations by a deposed former Crown
Prince that, among other things, RAK facilitates illicit trade
with Iran, in particular cargo related to Iran's nuclear and
missile programs, and that RAK authorities are negligent in
guarding against Al Qaeda infiltration of the UAE. Timing of
the accusations appears linked to the approaching deadline
(approximately October 25) for Congressional consideration of
the US-UAE "123 Agreement" related to civilian nuclear
cooperation, and is perhaps aimed to engender doubt about the
UAE's ability or willingness to control Iran-related trade of
proliferation concern. USG agencies at post, to include GRPO,
have no evidence to suggest RAK is being used as a transshipment
point for material related to Iran's weapons or nuclear
programs. In fact, the UAE, of which RAK is a part, has emerged
as one of the USG's closest partners in interdicting Iran-bound
shipments identified as a proliferation risk. Similarly, there
is no evidence to suggest RAK authorities had prior knowledge
of, or were in any way complicit in, a recently-disrupted Fatah
al Islam cell composed of non-UAE citizens located in the RAK.
Covert Iranian presence in RAK ports is a noted concern by UAE
Federal Intelligence Authorities. Drug-related transshipment
through RAK is a concern for DEA elements at post, which
maintain an ongoing dialogue with RAK authorities on the matter.
End Summary.




2. (C) Known in earlier times as the "Pirate Coast" for the
support allegedly provided to seafarers that harassed
India-bound British shipping, Ras Al Khaimah is today a
relatively sleepy backwater within the UAE's seven-emirate
federation. The population of roughly 260,000 is 60 percent
Emirati, the highest proportion of UAE nationals within any of
the emirates that comprise the federation. RAK relies upon UAE
federal government (read: Abu Dhabi) support for energy,
housing, hospitals, and schools. It lacks significant oil or
gas deposits and has therefore pursued a development strategy
featuring trade and port services and light manufacturing.
Significant limestone deposits have made RAK a primary supplier
of rock and stone throughout the world. While the RAK
Government has voiced its desire to one day compete with Dubai
as a destination for investment and tourism, the Emirate remains
underdeveloped. (Note: While RAK has talked to Iran about
possible future gas supplies, there are no indications either
side is currently pursuing a deal. Crown Prince Saud Al-Qassimi
told Ambassador that negotiations had fallen apart because the
Iranians were too difficult. End note.)



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The Pretender: Khalid bin Saqr al Qassimi

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3. (C) In recent weeks, the former Crown Prince of Ras al
Khaimah, Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr al Qassimi, has pursued meetings
with Congressional and Executive Branch officials to raise
questions about the policies and allegiance of his half-brother
and current Crown Prince, Shaykh Saud bin Saqr al Qassimi.
Shaykh Khalid was removed as Crown Prince by a Royal Decree
issued in 2003 by his father, the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah,
Shaykh Saqr bin Mohamad al Qassimi. The same decree appointed
Shaykh Saud as the new Crown Prince. Shaykh Khalid had remained
relatively quiescent (and in exile in Oman) until about a year
ago when he began a campaign to influence US public opinion.
While post is unclear on Shaykh Khalid's aim, it would appear
that the timing of his accusations is intended to influence
Congressional views with regard to the pending US-UAE "123
Agreement" to enable US civilian nuclear cooperation. This
agreement is due to enter into force about October 25 upon the
completion of Congressional review.

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The Current Crown Prince: Saud bin Saqr al Qassimi

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4. (C) Since his ascent in 2003, Ras Al Khaimah's current Crown
Prince, Shaykh Saud bin Saqr al Qassimi, a graduate of the
University of Michigan, has embarked on a development strategy
focusing on an expansion of port and maritime services,
manufacturing, and tourism. Saud's mother is from one of
Dubai's well-established merchant families and Saud is said to
be close to Dubai's Ruler Mohamed bin Rashid al Maktoum,
pursuing reform and development policies that mirror in reduced
scale the strategy pursued by Dubai. Saud refers to himself as
a "friend of the United States;" his eldest son recently
returned to RAK after receiving a Political Science degree from
UCLA. He has invited Consulate General Dubai staff to review
RAK port's "open books" and expresses frustration with the
allegations of his half-brother Shaykh Khalid which he holds
responsible, among other things, for sinking RAK's bid to host
the America's Cup yacht race.



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Facilitating Illicit Trade with Iran?

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5. (S/NF) Northern Emirates ports of Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah and
Dubai maintain a robust re-export trade with Iran, some of which
is organized by Iranian front companies to evade U.S. and other
international sanctions regimes. However, USG elements at post,
including GRPO, have no reason to conclude RAK is being used as
a transshipment point for material related to Iran's weapons or
nuclear programs, as is alleged by Shaykh Khalid. Rather, the
UAE, of which RAK is a part, is one of our closest partners in
interdiction cooperation of Iran-bound shipments identified as a
proliferation risk. Ras Al Khaimah's ports lie within the UAE
and are staffed by Emirati nationals, not controlled by Iran and
staffed by Iranian customs, as alleged in one particularly
sensational report circulated by the deposed Crown Prince. That
said, Federal UAE officials, including at the Directorate of
Military Intelligence, have voiced concern to Embassy Abu Dhabi
Naval Attache of possible Iranian "infiltration" of RAK's ports,
including covert elements of the IRGC Quds Force. (Comment:
this local concern is consistent with broader UAEG concern over
a covert Iranian presence in the UAE which might be activated in
the event of conflict between Iran and Israel over the Iranian
nuclear program. End comment.) According to figures released
by RAK customs, Iran is fifth in terms of export trade volumes
from RAK (measured in value) behind Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and
Kuwait. Iran is tenth in RAK re-export trade behind Oman,
Ukraine, Qatar, Lithuania, Russia, Bahrain and RAK's duty free
stores. RAK's port director told Consul General in September
that cargo to Iran is "scanned", though the extent of such
scanning is unclear and is unlikely to include bulk or
non-containerized cargoes.




6. (C) Resident DEA attache in Dubai engaged Ras Al Khaimah
Narcotics Unit in October to raise concern about information
that RAK had emerged as a staging point for Afghan-origin heroin
and hashish. Such cargoes are reportedly stored in RAK until
buyers in Africa or Europe can be located for onward shipment.
RAK officials acknowledged that storage of such contraband may
occur in the RAK free zone, and agreed to investigate the

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allegations. They vehemently denied, however, that such goods
arrived via RAK ports. Brigadier General Abdullah al Haddidi
asserted at an October 6 meeting with DEA Attache, attended by
RAK Royal Family member Major General Talib bin Saqr al Qassimi,
that drugs must be smuggled into RAK from other Emirates. DEA
continues to investigate and has agreed with the RAK Narcotics
Bureau to initiate a first-ever joint training program aimed at
deepening counter-narcotics cooperation.



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Facilitating Al Qaeda?

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7. (S/NF) Another of Shaykh Khalid's accusations is that RAK is
a staging ground for Al Qaeda operations in the Emirates. The
charge presumably relates to the March 2009 discovery of a Fatah
al-Islam cell with plans to attack targets in the UAE. The cell
was identified by UAE intelligence and special operations forces
and disrupted before its planning reached the operational phase,
however, the cell had stockpiled explosives. As with the
previous allegation regarding RAK complicity in Iran
proliferation activity, there is no evidence to suggest that RAK
officials had prior knowledge of or provided any support to the
Fatah al-Islam group, which was composed of non-RAK citizens.
Within the UAE's federal structure, intelligence
responsibilities for all Emirates apart from Dubai are handled
by the State Security Department (SSD) in Abu Dhabi. Extremism
born of discontent remains a concern in Ras Al Khaimah, as it
does in each of the UAE's poorer regions. One of the two
Emirati 9/11 hijackers came from Ras Al Khaimah at a time when
the former Crown Prince now lodging the allegations was in
power.



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Comment

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8. (C) It remains unclear to post what Shaykh Khalid, the
deposed Crown Prince, intends with his current campaign to
discredit his half-brother. Internal rivalry is a common, but
ordinarily discreet feature of Royal family politics in the UAE.
A Washington, DC-based lobbyist told a CG Dubai political
officer in late 2008 that his services had been sought by Shaykh
Khalid to wage a publicity campaign "shining a light" on the
RAK-Iran relationship in order to gain (presumably USG) support
for a return to power on the promise of a harder line towards
Iran. The threat of these accusations to derail the strategic
US-UAE 123 Agreement cannot have endeared Shaykh Khalid to the
Abu Dhabi leadership, upon whom he would presumably have to rely
were he to be restored to his former position. Irrespective of
his motivations, the allegations are serious and bear continued
monitoring and investigation. It is not beyond reason that
Iran, and others who seek to evade trade restrictions, would
attempt to exploit a distant port like Ras Al Khaimah for a
variety of purposes. Links to Iran are long-standing throughout
the Emirates. But that does not mean that UAE officials,
including in RAK, have any interest in furthering Iran's
proliferation agenda.
SIBERELL