AMIRI DIWAN OFFICIAL DEFENDS QATAR'S ACTIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000054

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER IR QA
SUBJECT: AMIRI DIWAN OFFICIAL DEFENDS QATAR'S ACTIONS ON
GAZA

REF: A. DOHA 42

B. DOHA 24

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

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(C) KEY POINTS
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-- A public relations adviser to the Amir, Hassan Al-Ansari,
explained that Qatar's actions on Gaza stemmed from this
small state's need to "do something" to stave off "lots of
internal and external pressure" and "stay one step ahead of
the region."

-- Qatar gained nothing, he said, from hosting the Israeli
Trade Office; its closure will not change Qatar's desire to
maintain contacts with Israeli officials or accept the travel
of Israelis to Qatar.

-- Al-Ansari underscored a handful of times that former
Secretary Rice's exclusion of Minister of State Al-Mahmoud
from a January 8 meeting "insulted and disrespected" Qatar's
senior leadership, as if to link the perceived snub to
Qatar's unhelpful behavior later in the month.

-- He observed that while the Obama Administration is not to
blame for Qatar's "history of mistreatment" under the
previous Administration, the new Administration nonetheless
inherits an aggrieved partner in the relationship.

-- Despite Qatar's misgivings, it supported the U.S. in Iraq
and helped persuade Hamas to participate in Palestinian
elections that Hamas was bound to win. Qatar will stand with
the U.S. on Iran if there is trust on the end game.

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(C) COMMENTS
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-- Al-Ansari's remarks further confirm our sense that the
Amir places great value on actions he regards as honorable
and feels much aggrieved -- and angry -- at the way he and
Qatar have been treated in recent years.

-- Little thought, however, appears to have been given in
advance of Qatar's actions as to how the new Obama
Administration would perceive Qatar's behavior of the last
couple of weeks, and Al-Ansari's remarks underscore that
Qatar's leadership does not perceive the damage done to the
relationship.

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (C) P/E Chief Rice expressed disappointment January 21 to
Hassan Al-Ansari, a public relations adviser to the Amir,
over the January 17 meeting in Doha, especially the inclusion
of Iran and terrorist organizations. P/E Chief added that
against this backdrop, the GOQ decision to close the Israeli
Trade Office dealt a huge blow to perceptions that Qatar, as
a mediator, maintained relations with everyone. The timing
was especially unfortunate given that the new Obama
Administration appears inclined to engagement, traditionally
a strength of Qatari diplomacy.


2. (C) Al-Ansari, who had requested the meeting with P/E
Chief at his Qatar Tribune office (Al-Ansari is
editor-in-chief of the English-language daily) before the
above events transpired, explained Qatar's actions on Gaza by
saying, Qatar is "a small country and we have to stay one
step ahead of the region; we can't afford to do otherwise.
Something had to be done about Gaza." Turning to the closure
of the Trade Office, he observed that "the Israeli channel
did not give us anything. We opened it when there was a
peace process. There is not one now."


3. (C) Al-Ansari said the GOQ could still communicate with
Israel, and Israelis could continue to visit Qatar, in the
absence of a trade office. The holding of the January 17
Arab meeting and the closure of the Israeli office were a
response, he said, "to lots of internal and external
pressure." Al-Ansari added that there is a strong perception
that Qatar and the U.S., which enjoy wide cooperation in the
energy, education and military fields, are too close. He
suggested that Qatar needed to put distance between it and
the United States over Israeli actions in Gaza.

ACCUMULATED ANGER, FRUSTRATION, AND HURT FEELINGS
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4. (C) Al-Ansari underscored to P/E Chief (in an assertion

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that he would repeat a handful more times during the meeting)
that Secretary Rice's decision to exclude Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs Al-Mahmoud from a January 8 meeting with
Arab Foreign Ministers "really, really hurt." The former
Secretary "treated us and him like we are terrorists and an
Iranian agent. It was insulting and disrespectful."
Al-Ansari then recited a list of occasions during the
Presidency of George W. Bush when the Amir was snubbed by the
President. Al-Ansari hinted strongly that the snub of
Al-Mahmoud was the final straw for the Amir.


5. (C) P/E Chief said he appreciated Qatar's anger over
events in Gaza, stressing that none of us want to see human
suffering. That said, why does Qatar choose to align itself
more with extremists at the start of the Obama
Administration? Noting that such actions did not hurt the
previous Bush Administration, P/E Chief asked Al-Ansari to
explain Qatar's reasoning. Al-Ansari said Qatar's response
stemmed from anger and frustration.


6. (C) Pressed for how Qatar believed the Obama
Administration would react when these decisions were made,
Al-Ansari declined to respond directly. Instead, he liked
Qatar's relationship with the U.S. to a marriage. He
observed that couples "do not agree all the time, but that
does not mean that you stop the relationship." Sometimes,
though, one partner needs to "apologize to the other over
hurt feelings." Al-Ansari acknowledged that President Obama
played no role in the various snubs of the Amir, but offered
that the new President inherits the marriage and
"dishonorable" behavior of the past.


7. (C) Al-Ansari reminded P/E Chief that Qatar stood by the
U.S. in the invasion of Iraq despite Qatar's grave
reservations. Qatar's Amir also pushed Hamas to participate
in elections in the Palestinian Territories, even though
Qatar and other Arab states held the view that Hamas would
win the elections.


8. (C) Turning to Iran, Al-Ansari said "now is the time to
strike a deal with Iran while oil prices are low." He added
that, "Qatar will stand with the U.S. on Iran if you want to
take military action, but we don't trust you to share your
end game with us." He said Qatar and the Gulf states need to
know if the U.S. is serious about a diplomatic deal.

TO RIGHT THE RELATIONSHIP, INVITE THE AMIR
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9. (C) Asked for his advice on how to improve the political
relationship going forward, Al-Ansari paused and said, "The
best thing the U.S. can do to fix the relationship is show
respect for Qatar and the Amir. An invitation for the Amir
to visit the White House would probably fix everything."
LeBaron