US EMBASSY DOHA COUNTRY TEAM ASSESMENT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000522

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019
TAGS: PREL QA
SUBJECT: US EMBASSY DOHA COUNTRY TEAM ASSESMENT FOR
APPROVAL TO RELEASE LAIRCM FOR QATAR HEAD OF STATE AIRCRAFT

Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Mirembe Nantongo, for reasons 1.4(A),
(B),and (D).


1. (U) Summary: On 24 August 2009 the Government of Qatar
(GOQ) re-submitted a Letter of Request (LOR) to purchase the
AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure System
(LAIRCM) for Qatar Head-of-State (HoS) Aircraft. Embassy
Doha Country Team concurs with the proposed acquisition of
this system by the QEAF.


2. (U) The following country team assessment is provided in
support of the GOQ request and answers mandatory questions
required for all significant military sales and the required
exception to national disclosure policy for Qatar.


3. (C) Why does Qatar want to purchase the AN/AAQ-24(V)
system? Qatar desires LAIRCM to protect HoS aircraft from
infrared missiles. GOQ operates in an unstable region of the
world and its leaders often travel to countries where
conflict, civil disturbance, and the proliferation of
man-portable infrared missiles elevate the risk to civilian
aircraft. The AN/AAQ-24 (V) is a proven technology
specifically designed for large, slow-moving aircraft that
automatically counters advanced IR missile systems with no
action required by the crew. GOQ believes it is the most
effective defensive system to counter any IR missile threat.


4. (C) How would these items affect Qatar's force structure
and Qatar's ability to contribute to mutual defense or
security goals? Although the AN/AAQ-24 (V) would be adapted
to civilian-model aircraft assigned to the QEAF, the system
would not materially affect Qatar,s force structure since
those aircraft are civilian-model planes used solely for the
transport of the Head of State, his son (the Heir Apparent),
and the Prime Minister. The system would contribute to
mutual defense and security goals in that its protection of
key government personnel would contribute to the stability of
an ally who for years has contributed to regional stability
both through coordinated action with United States forces and
through independent initiatives. Besides hosting U.S. forces
on two of the largest U.S. military facilities in the Gulf,
since 2005 Qatar has contributed to humanitarian efforts in
Lebanon, Pakistan, and Yemen. Qatar and its key leaders have
also served as mediators in conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen, and
the Sudan. Though not always in line with U.S. policies,
Qatar,s actions often serve as a moderating force in a
volatile region and bolster American strategic interests by
promoting dialogue and the peaceful resolution of conflict.


5. (C) LAIRCM will contribute to U.S. and Qatar
Defense/Security goals. Authorizing release of the system
will support several USG regional strategic objectives.

-- Deter and defeat adversaries
-- Assure regional access
-- Strengthen regional stability
-- Build self-reliance of partner nation security forces
-- Protect vital interests of the U.S. within the area of
responsibility.

Ultimately, sale of this system will help strengthen U.S.
efforts to promote regional stability by enhancing protection
of governmental leadership to a key U.S. ally.


6. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or
services requested: Qatar seeks to be able to protect HoS
during travel outside the State of Qatar. Despite having
between seven and eleven dedicated Emiri Flight
civilian-model aircraft, Qatar is asking for LAIRCM on only a
critical few aircraft.


7. (C) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations: None.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait already have LAIRCM on their HoS
aircraft. The Country Team does not anticipate adverse
reaction from any of Qatar,s neighbors.


8. (C) Assessment of Qatar's ability to account for,
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: QEAF
will be able to maintain and operate this system and its
components throughout its life cycle due to its strong
economic base, institutional knowledge, and anticipated
long-term financial stability. Additionally, future QEAF
expansion includes a move to Al Udeid Air Base. Coexistence
of QEAF and U.S. military assets at Al Udeid Air Base
provides an ideal logistical support base for a QEAF LAIRCM.
Even without a U.S. presence, our assessment is that the QEAF
has the means to stand on its own with regard to operating
the system.


9. (C) Training required either in-country or in the United
States and the anticipated reactions resulting from the
presence of U.S. trainers in-country: Installation and
maintenance of the AN/AAQ-24 (V) system will likely take
place in country, by and under the supervision of U.S.
military and contract industry personnel.


10. (C) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that
might be required as a result of providing the article: Due
to the large presence of U.S. personnel already in Qatar, the
presence of any additional subject matter experts is not an
issue.


11. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the
proposed acquisition: Qatar's national defense budget will
be the source of funding for this purchase. There will be
no negative economic impact from this sale.


12. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed
acquisition: There are no human rights considerations
relevant to this acquisition.


13. (C) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and
advanced warfighting technology and the SAO's plan for
compliance verification: GOQ has taken steps to address U.S.
concerns over transfer of the technology and has promised to
do &whatever it takes8 to meet U.S. export control
requirements. QAF will require education on end-use
monitoring program, as applicable. QAF will comply with
end-use monitoring as outlined in chapter 8, DOD 5105-38-M,
Security Assistance Management Manual, 3 October 2003, as
necessary. OMC Qatar will fulfill its responsibility and
ensure compliance with end-use monitoring requirements under
the Golden Sentry program by conducting periodic
accountability inventories and monitoring operational use and
control during day-to-day military-to-military contact, when
required.


14. (C) Recommendation whether the USG should approve
transfer of the classified data and justification: The U.S.
Government should approve transfer of this technology to the
GOQ. Release of LAIRCM is in the best interests of both
nations economically, militarily and politically. Qatar is a
reliable military ally of the U.S. who shares many of our
regional strategic interests. GOQ has legitimate concerns
over the safety of its HoS aircraft and desires to protect
its key personnel using technology already in use by other
countries in the region. If GOQ is not allowed to purchase
LAIRCM it will have a negative impact on interoperability
with U.S. and coalition/regional forces, our security
assistance portfolio, and future U.S. defense product
acquisition.


15. (C) The Ambassador and the Country Team strongly support
Qatar's request for the AN/AAQ-24(V)LAIRCM system.


16. (C) U.S. Central Command Endorsement: U.S. Central
Command concurs with U.S. Embassy Qatar,s assessment
regarding the release of LAIRCM to Qatar. Release of LAIRCM
to Qatar will increase protection for the head of state of a
strategically important nation and is in the interests of
U.S. Central Command. U.S. Central Command anticipates no
adverse regional, political, or military effects as a result
of providing this capability to Qatar. Failure to approve
release will result in a strain on our bilateral
relationship.

Nantongo