QATAR'S ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF LAMENTS BUDGET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000503

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR MASS MCAP QA
SUBJECT: QATAR'S ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF LAMENTS BUDGET
CUTS; MILITARY EXERCISES COULD BE AFFECTED

Classified By: Ambassador Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron for reasons 1.4
(b and d).

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Key Points
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-- Major General Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah, Chief of Staff,
told Ambassador August 10 that the Qatar Armed Forces might
cut or combine some military exercises already scheduled,
given the significant budget cuts levied by the Amir.

-- Al-Attiyah said defense spending is the lowest priority
within the GOQ: "We are the shortest man" in the budget
process, he commented, with an air of resignation more than
rancor, in response to Ambassador's question about the GOQ's
progress in building a second runway at Al-Udaid.

-- Other subjects in the meeting included: the SECDEF letter
notifying Qatar that the USG will be unable to provide the
LAIRCM system for its new C-17s, the related issue of a
LAIRCM system for the Amir's aircraft, intra-GCC military
cooperation, and the proposed dates for the next MCC.

-- Also attending the meeting were Lt Col Max Sears, OMC
Qatar, and Brig Gen Khalfan A. al-Sowaidi, Assistant to the
Chief of International Relations.

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COMMENTS
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-- The budget cuts to the military were already known. That
they were disproportionately larger than the cutbacks to any
other part of the GOQ was not known.

-- It is at least remotely possible that the Amir's cuts in
Qatar's defense budget lie behind the recent rumors about an
attempted coup, or at least coup plotting, by senior members
of the Qatar armed forces.

-- There just might be rising resentment among Qatari
military officers that Qatar's armed forces are getting less
while the Al-Thani continue their (unchecked) spending. That
resentment alone could have lead to the rumors, even without
any actual coup plotting.

-- That said, Qatar has been one of the last affected by the
global Great Recession, and it will probably be one of the
first to emerge from it.

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (C) Below are subjects covered during the nearly
hour-long meeting August 10th.

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2nd Runway at Al Udaid Air Base
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2. (C) Ambassador referenced a letter dated 3 Aug 09 that he
had received from LTG North, recent AFCENT Commander. LTG
North's letter emphasized the importance of building a second
runway at the air base and his concern that progress there
had slowed in recent months. Ambassador relayed these
concerns and asked Major General al-Attiyah to share his
thoughts on the project.


3. (U) (Note: In response to projected growth at Al Udaid,
Qatar originally proposed and contracted to build a second
taxiway to the west of the current runway. AFCENT encouraged
GOQ to build a second runway as well to deal with increased
traffic expected as QEAF moved its Doha-based military planes
to Al Udaid. Qatar agreed to fund and build the second
runway. However, in recent months its negotiations to revise
the original construction
contract have stalled, reportedly due to the slowing economy.
End Note.)


4. (C) Major General al-Attiyah acknowledged Ambassador's
concerns over the slow progress on the runway project. He
affirmed that negotiations over a new contract with the
builder have been put on hold and he doesn't see them moving
anywhere for the rest of this year. He said that it is all
due to funding and budget issues, that Qatar has been
affected by the worldwide economic downturn and that every
GOQ expenditure is being considered carefully in that light

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DOHA 00000503 002 OF 003


C-17
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5. (C) Ambassador presented a letter dated 22 Jul 09 from
Secretary of Defense Gates to Major General al-Attiyah
concerning Qatar's C-17s and the LAIRCM system that Qatar had
requested to be installed on them. The Ambassador emphasized
three points from the letter: 1) the USG commends GOQ for
its purchase of the aircraft and the consequent increase in
its strategic airlift capability, but is unable to approve
sale of the LAIRCM system for the aircraft due to export
controls; 2) there was regrettable confusion early on in the
sale over whether LAIRCM was an integral part of the aircraft
construction or a post-market addition (it was the latter);
and 3) the refusal of the USG to approve LAIRCM export in no
way signals a change of policy toward Qatar.


6. (C) The COS made no substantive comment to the letter. He
knew it was coming. He had already expressed his deep
concern and frustration about the issue. Ambassador had the
sense that, even though Al-Attiyah made no comment, for
Al-Attiyah the matter was not resolved and would not be
forgotten.
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Head of State Aircraft
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7. (C) To offset the C-17 letter, Ambassador said he had
some possibly good news about Qatar's obtaining LAIRCM for
at least some of its Head of State (HoS) aircraft. He noted
that he had been in contact with General Petraeus and that
both he and the general supported USG taking a new look at
Qatar's request, recently renewed. Qatar's efforts to
address previous USG concerns over the purchase were
appreciated, and would help pave the way for another look.


8. (U) (Note: Qatar requested LAIRCM as early as 2004 for
its HoS aircraft. The request was approved then, but for
unknown reasons Qatar never signed the Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA). The LOA subsequently expired. Qatar
submitted another Letter of Request (LOR) in 2006 but a
decision on that request suffered lengthy delays and finally
came back negative. In their objection to the sale,
Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs (SAF/IA)
mentioned several concerns over providing Qatar with LAIRCM,
including: 1) the relevant aircraft were not used solely for
Head of State travel; 2) the aircraft were owned by Qatar
Airways; 3) Qatar designated upwards of 11 aircraft as HoS
vessels, which SAF/IA thought excessive; 4) Qatar had no
secure facilities or procedures to store the aircraft; and 5)
Qatar had no vetting process for the technicians who would
maintain and service the LAIRCM systems.)


9. (C) Ambassador referenced a letter dated 23 Jul 09 from
Major General al-Attiyah to SecDef Gates in which COS
expressed his concern to gain an appropriate "DIRCM" system
to protect HoS aircraft. Ambassador clarified that DIRCM is
an umbrella-term for various directed-energy IR
countermeasure systems, one that includes the laser-equipped
LAIRCM AAQ-24 system. However, Ambassador's larger point was
that he and Gen Petraeus would support having the USG
reconsider getting a LAIRCM system to some of Qatar's Head of
State aircraft.

--------------
MCC Dates
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10. (C) Ambassador presented a letter dated 27 Jul 09 from
Ambassador Vershbow. The letter thanked COS for his
hospitality during Vershbow's 20-21 Jul 09 visit to Doha, and
proposed 11-13 Jan 2010 as dates for the next Military
Consultative Commission. COS promised to review and consider
the dates.

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Intra-GCC Military Cooperation
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11 (C) MG Al-Attiyeh noted that he recently had spoken with
both the Emir, now back in Qatar, and the Crown Prince. Both
told him that the QAF must operate for now with the money
already allocated. He noted that the Crown Prince had
advised him to be patient, that the military "would be taken
care of," but that for now QAF would need to shift funds
around as necessary to support the projects and exercises
that it deems priorities.


DOHA 00000503 003 OF 003



12. (C) The COS mentioned that the QAF is considering cutting
or combining some military exercises already scheduled. He
believed in the value of exercises, and he wanted to find a
way to keep doing as many as possible. He mentioned trying
to combine local exercises with larger ones. When Ambassador
asked which ones in particular he intended to cut or combine,
Major General al-Attiyah did not say.


13. (C) Major General al-Attiyah segued from his remarks on
funding constraints to mention Qatar relations with Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. He remarked that he
wished to increase Qatar's contribution to regional
cooperation efforts, such as increasing the number of Qatar
personnel at the GCC combined headquarters, but that those
efforts were also on hold due to lack of funds. He commented
that even with the current financial pressures Qatar still
wished to improve GCC synchronization aspirations. He
mentioned, for example, that Qatar preferred to have an
annual combined GCC-sponsored military exercise but that
other GCC members showed less enthusiasm. He lamented that
"Right now, we have one only every other year or every few
years." Also, he spoke vaguely of desiring to increase
regional capability in various ways and specifically
mentioned air missile defense.


14. (C) Major General al-Attiyah spoke at length of his
personal view of the potential for greater GCC cooperation
opportunities, and how some of the wariness that GCC members
have felt toward each other in the past has lessened. He
used recent border dispute resolutions as examples: Qatar
and Saudi Arabia agreeing to demarcate their boundary, and
Qatar and Bahrain agreeing to let the International Court of
Justice settle their dispute over Hawar and Fasht al-Dibal
islands. He joked how Qatar had really wanted Hawar Island
instead of Fasht al-Dibal but then ended up finding oil near
Fasht al-Dibal anyway, while Hawar Island has so far proven
to be of little value to Bahrain.
LeBaron