Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DOHA467
2009-07-22 13:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR U/S KENNEDY

Tags:  AFIN AMGT MG 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDO #0467/01 2031347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221347Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9274
UNCLAS DOHA 000467 

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON FOR U/S KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AFIN AMGT MG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S KENNEDY

UNCLAS DOHA 000467

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON FOR U/S KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AFIN AMGT MG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S KENNEDY


1. (U) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar.


2. (SBU) Your visit is one of great importance to us, as it signals
top management concern for our Embassy at a time where we are
building a strategic partnership with Qatar to implement the
President's vision of a new beginning with Muslim communities. We
understand that the primary purpose of your visit is to provide
consultation and advice on integrating ILiAD with U.S. Embassy
operations. Accordingly, we discuss ILiAD immediately below,
followed by other internal issues. Paragraph 18 identifies the key
areas where we seek your help. We end with a brief (unclassified)
assessment of the U.S.-Qatar relationship.


--------------
INTEGRATED LINGUISTIC ACTIVITY DOHA (ILiAD)
--------------


3. (SBU) The Integrated Linguistic Activity-Doha (ILiAD) is the US
government's premier Middle East regional center for linguistic
expertise. It is a a confederation of three USG agencies:

-- DIA Combined Media Processing Center-Qatar (CMPC-Q)

-- DNI Open Source Center-Doha (OSC-D)

-- FBI National Virtual Translation Center-Qatar (NVTC-Q)



4. (SBU) The ILiAD collects foreign materials and publicly available
information. It also delivers accurate translations services for
national and operational customers. Finally, it provides extensive
news monitoring throughout the Gulf and Yemen.


5. (SBU) As you know, we are in the process of finalizing a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to bring ILiAD's operations fully
under Chief of Mission (COM) authority, at ILiAD's request. We look
forward to reviewing the current draft with you and seek your
support and advice on finalizing an agreement.

--------------
EMBASSY STAFFING ISSUES
--------------


6. (SBU) Embassy Doha has grown markedly since the start of
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Beginnings in 2005 three new
agencies have joined the Mission - Foreign Commercial Service (FCS),
Legal Attache (LEGATT),and Open Source Center - and existing staff
has grown. However, our needs are now even greater, and developing
our Embassy requires sufficient American and LES human resources to
accommodate our Mission's growth.


7. (SBU) The positions of Financial Management Officer and Human
Resource Officer are currently combined. In response to a June 18
NEA inquiry into splitting the positions, Embassy Doha concluded

that the growth of the U.S. presence in Qatar has substantially
increased workloads to the point that splitting these positions is
warranted.


8. (SBU) In Doha's 2011 Mission Strategic Plan (MSP),Post
reiterated the need for the following American and LES positions:

--------------
AMERICAN POSITIONS
--------------

-- An additional State Public Diplomacy Officer in the Public
Affairs Section will permit the Mission to expand Qatari-funded
exchange programs, deepening the human relationships that are the
core of the bilateral relationship in every field.

-- Because the Embassy's sole Economic Officer can no longer manage
the ever growing demands generated by the bilateral energy and
financial relationships, we are requesting an additional Economic
Officer.

-- The need for additional consular staff is also clear and we seek
the addition of an American Vice Consul.

-- Beyond traditional State Department staffing, Embassy Doha's
Legal Attace is at the center of the Mission's law enforcemen
cooperation and, here too, the growing workloadsuggests we need an
Assistant Legal Attache as son as possible.

-- And as the security workload has increased, the Embassy requires
another Assistant Regional Security Officer.

--------------
LES POSITIONS
--------------

-- Currently, Doha lacks an employee who is responsible for meeting
the Department's requirements for property inventories. In
accordance with FAM regulations, Doha must establish a LES NEPA
ClEsk position to fulfill these responsibilities.

-- The increased demands of the CENTCOM forces in Qatar, combined
with a growing security assistance portfolio, require a new driver
and new translator to support the Senior Defense Representative and
the OMC and DAO functions he will supervise.

-- In addition to the one American Consular Officer position, LES
Consular Assistant and Consular Pre-Screener positions are needed.
These two LES positions were requested in the 2011 MSP.

-- Without a doubt, rapid growth in Qatar and its motivation to
become a key regional player have increased the workload on Mission
Doha. Consequently, the Human Resources Office (HRO) requires
additional manpower to support the increased number of US agencies
present in Doha. In particular, HRO requires one additional HRO
Clerk to provide administrative support.

--------------
LES COMPENSATION ISSUES
--------------


9. (SBU) Achieving goals outlined in the most recent 2011 MSP would
be impossible without competent and motivated personnel, both
Americans and FSNs, to staff our Mission. Doha just learned from
HR/OE that we are scheduled for a September 2009 salaries and
compensation review by Birches Group.


10. (SBU) LE Staff Compensation in Doha continues to be an extremely
sensitive matter. Doha's LE Staff feel they are underpaid. Post
Management now believes (after two salary increases this fiscal
year) that LE Staff base pay is currently above the most recent 2008
comparator organization survey results.


11. (SBU) Local staff report that the cost of housing and the
general increase in prices is their number one concern. A
survey by Embassy Doha's Financial Management office revealed that
from 2005-2006, LES paid an average of 167 percent of their housing
allowance for housing, or two-thirds more than they receive from
Post. Likewise, inflation over the same period caused a 15 percent
rise in the costs of other expenses beyond salary increases. A
separate analysis revealed that from 2001-2007, LES salaries
increased between 9-24 percent (depending on grade),with an average
increase across all grades of 17 percent. At the same time, however,
Qatar's inflation was over 50 percent during the same time period,
while rents increased by at least by 116 percent.


12. (SBU) In July 2006, a State/HR Comprehensive Wage Survey
revealed that the Embassy's salary and benefits packages lagged far
behind the local comparators surveyed. This evidence suggests that
other employers in Qatar are responding faster to demands for higher
salaries because of their greater flexibility to respond to market
forces. Embassy Doha employs 95 LES from 21 countries, but not a
single Qatari. Many LES have lived in Qatar for years, whereas
others came more recently, lured by financial opportunities.
However, what seemed a profitable opportunity several years ago has
turned into a financial burden with many employees in debt and
struggling to make ends meet.


13. (SBU) Last year we reached a "tipping point" when working in
Doha stopped being financially profitable for most of LES, and we
lost many valued employees with years of experience as a result. The
only thing which has saved Embassy Doha so far from losing more LES
to other employers is the difficulty of transferring sponsorship
under Qatari law and the fear of deportation if a sponsorship
transfer request is denied by Qatar labor authorities. Ironically,
pressing Qatar for liberalization of its sponsorship rules is one of
Embassy Doha's top human rights priorities.

--------------
CHANCERY LEASE
--------------


14. (SBU) The Embassy currently does not own property in Qatar and
thus must rent. The current leased compound, dating from 1999, is
approaching capacity, and every time a modification is made for
operational or security reasons - such as the addition of the Marine
House in 2005 - future rent increases. Because land prices are the
principal driver of construction costs in Qatar, the long-term
solution for Embassy Doha is to seek property at no cost from
Qatar's Government on which would be built a USG-owned Embassy
compound with money appropriated by Congress. As real estate prices
in Qatar's will only get higher as the country continues its torrid
pace of development, Embassy Doha submitted an estimate for the
construction of a new embassy compound in FY2008 with the goal of
having Doha placed on the priority list for the Office of Overseas
Buildings Operations in FY2009. Even prior to FY-2008, Doha
requested OBO to consider the Embassy for replacement.


15. (SBU) The Chancery was first leased on January 8, 1999 at USD
1,200,000. The annual rent increased from USD 1,200,000 to USD
2,000,000 as per agreement by appraisers appointed by USG and the
Landlord. In 2006, Embassy Doha requested a new embassy compound,
which was rejected due to the lack of funding in OBO at that time.
Although we have (barely) enough space to accommodate the new
requested positions, future expected growth cannot be accommodated
absent substantial construction to our current leased facility or
the construction of a new, larger building.


16. (SBU) Post Management has learned through sources close to the
current Chancery Landlord that there are plans to double the USD 2
million lease payment when the present lease contract expires on
January 7, 2011.

--------------
DOHA NEW EMBASSY COMPOUND (NEC)
--------------


17. (SBU) The Mission has urged the Government of Qatar to identify
a parcel of land to donate to the U.S. Government to construct a new
Embassy and Chief of Mission Residence, replacing the existing
short-term leased properties. When we receive permission, MGT will
work with the Office of Overseas Building Operations to develop and
approve a construction plan on a USG-owned property that would
improve the quality of life in the work place for staff and increase
staff security and customer service for those operations that deal
heavily with the public.

--------------
HOW YOU CAN HELP EMBASSY DOHA
--------------


18. (SBU) Your efforts to finalize rapidly an MOU to bring ILiAD's
operations under COM authority would be appreciated. In addition:

-- We seek your help in persuading OBO to identify funding for a NEC
in Doha and move quickly to build/complete it. The need for this
will only grow as the costs of leasing our current space continue to
soar. Since a new NEC is years away, as an interim solution we seek
your support for a space planning assessment of how best to maximize
space in our current Chancery.

-- We also look to you for funding to bring on board additional
American staff, as referenced above and previously requested in our
MSP.

-- Ultimately, our greatest current need is to improve the
compensation package for our LES. Your assistance is critical in
scheduling a survey team to visit Doha as soon as possible and
finding funding to fill the gaps we expect that survey to identify.


In summary, you are coming to Doha at a time when the Government of
Qatar has a heightened awareness of its energy resources' importance
to other countries. Doha is clearly growing rapidly, and as such, a
new Embassy Compound is now a necessity; not a "wishful thought".
With the influx of USG agencies establishing a presence in Qatar,
the current facility no longer is sufficient. The sections
immediately below explain why.

--------------
A GROWING QATAR HAS LED TO A GROWING EMBASSY
--------------


19. (SBU) U.S. and Qatari approaches to regional issues sometimes
differ, but the U.S. has a strong interest in working with Qatar to
develop a relationship based on shared principles.


20. (SBU) The Embassy will pursue this objective by continuing to
engage Qatari officials on a range of foreign policy issues,
including Iraq, Iran, and Arab-Israeli peace. In support of U.S.
policy in Iraq, we will continue our efforts to persuade Qatar to
formally forgive Iraq's debt, expand diplomatic relations, and take
other public steps to show support for the Iraqi government. More
broadly, we will encourage Qatar to be a generous and responsible
provider of foreign assistance in the Middle East and beyond.


21. (SBU) U.S. businesses play an important role in Qatar, which is
now one of our largest trade and investment partners in the region,
and about 100 U.S. firms now operate in Qatar.


22. (SBU) Though our current strategic military relationship with
Qatar is only about a decade old, our two countries are now bound
together closely and will only become more important to each other
as Qatar's wealth, U.S. energy needs, and bilateral security
interests grow. Our strategic relationship has had a considerable
impact on Embassy Doha's goals and priorities, and the accompanying
fiscal and personnel needs must be addressed in FY 2010 and beyond.

--------------
The U.S.-Qatar Relationship
--------------


23. The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the U.S. is
impressive, especially for a country the size of Connecticut, with
roughly two million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are
actually Qatari citizens.

-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large, Qatar
now has an annual per capital income of over $70,000 (one of the
highest in the world). Qatar's national revenues will continue
growing despite the global economic crisis, although their upward
trajectory will be moderated by a drop in commodity prices.

-- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital. U.S. energy
companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in the oil and
gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas
reserves in the world after Russia and Iran, is expected to become
in 2010 one of the most important suppliers of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) to the U.S. market.

-- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is strong
and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states
to modernizing its educational system, and has turned decisively to
the United States for help. Qatar has imported branch campuses of
six U.S. universities, including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon,
Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth and
Northwestern. At the elementary and secondary levels it is
instituting a U.S. model of charter schools.

-- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking
audience of some 60 million and a potential English-speaking
audience of 100 million, is based in Doha and funded by the State of
Qatar. The network's coverage, particularly by its Arabic service
on issues important to the United States, has long been an irritant
in our bilateral relationship. We nevertheless recognize the value
of USG officials appearing on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that
official U.S. voices are heard in the Arab world and broader region.



LEBARON