Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DOHA393
2009-06-15 10:53:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR A A/S JEFF FELTMAN'S JUNE 16-18

Tags:  PREL PGOV QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8705
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0393/01 1661053
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151053Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9147
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000393 

SIPDIS

EMBASSY MANAMA PLEASE PASS TO A A/S FELTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A A/S JEFF FELTMAN'S JUNE 16-18
VISIT TO QATAR

REF: DOHA 362

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4. (b, d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000393

SIPDIS

EMBASSY MANAMA PLEASE PASS TO A A/S FELTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A A/S JEFF FELTMAN'S JUNE 16-18
VISIT TO QATAR

REF: DOHA 362

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4. (b, d).


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. We have
confirmed a meeting for you with the MFA Minister of State,
Ahmed bin Muhammad Al Mahmoud, and he will host a lunch in
your honor. Also, the MFA informed us today that the Prime
Minister is returning from the United States (where he has
been undergoing medical treatment) to meet with you. He will
want to hear all you can tell him about the proposal for a
bilateral strategic dialogue. He will want to know your
thoughts about a meeting between the Amir and POTUS at the
UNGA. It is possible that you will meet the Crown Prince,
but that is still far from certain as we write this.


2. (C) We have also scheduled a coffee with influential
Qataris at the Ambassador's residence, followed by a dinner
that evening, also at the Residence, with thoughtful,
articulate, members of the expatriate community.


3. (C) Our scenesetter below addresses the main subject areas
of what we understand to be he main focus of your visit: the
proposal for a .S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue (including
"jump-strting" the U.S.-Qatari relationship based on your
recent discussion with former Senator Mitchell) a
coordinated approach to development Assistanc; Lebanon and
Syria; the Iranian elections; and l Jazeera.

--------------
(S) STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
--------------


4. (S) We understand the sub-IPC of June 11 looks to you to
accentuate the positive aspects of the bilateral relationship
(notably military, education, and commercial) while
demonstrating a commitment to dialogue to narrow the
differences. Your visit here would then help establish
benchmarks to guide the level at which a dialogue takes
place.


5. (S) Senior GOQ officials will look to you for a USG
response to the Prime Minister's suggestions (reftel).
Should you meet with the PM (who is currently in the U.S. for
medical treatment),he is the ideal interlocutor for this
discussion. Dennis Ross clearly told the PM in May that
Qatar would be judged by its actions. HBJ expected as much,
but he may not be prepared to hear that the commencement of a

high-level dialogue is contingent upon Qatar's changing its
behavior (support for Hamas, Hezbollah, PA budgetary
support),since he believes Qatar's hosting of the U.S.
military presence speaks volumes for how Qatar lines up with
the U.S. versus Iran.


6. (S) Setting preconditions for a strategic dialogue (e.g.,
identifying ways that Doha can "demonstrate its sincerity"),
would echo what Qatar believes to have been a rude and
dismissive treatment by the OVP six years ago in response to
an overture by the Amir to repair the relationship. Six
years later, in the view of the Amir -- and ours -- that
relationship is still strained. If word of the precondition
gets back to the Amir, further deterioration in the
relationship is possible, especially in diminished
counter-terrorism cooperation, stepped-up negative Al Jazeera
coverage and comment, and a resurgence in operational
tensions in the mil-mil relationship.

--------------
(C) DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
--------------


7. (C) The GOQ has indicated its willingness to partner with
the U.S. on specific developmental projects. Qatar does not,
however, respond well to global appeals for assistance
(unless tied to relief for the victims of a natural
disaster). The Qataris look to us to propose specific
projects on a bilateral, partnership basis to which they
could contribute. It is important to note that Qatar rarely
writes checks for assistance. In the case of Hurricane
Katrina, for example, Qatar's Embassy sent personnel to the
devastated area and determined that a partnership with
Habitat for Humanity was the best way to keep down
administrative costs and ensure that as much of Qatar's
assistance as possible reached the victims.


8. (C) This explains, in part, why Qatar resists the idea of
providing budgetary support directly to the Palestinian
Authority. The Amir does not believe the money will reach
its intended beneficiaries, despite the good intentions of

DOHA 00000393 002 OF 003


Mahmoud Abbas and Salim Fayyad. When Speaker Pelosi made a
pitch to the Amir over dinner for such assistance in May, he
said no such assistance was in the offing. There are, no
doubt, political reasons for this approach, since Qatar's
significant, continuing assistance to Hamas has been widely
reported in classified traffic available to you.


9. (C) Special Representative Holbrooke earlier this month
told the Crown Prince he did not come to Doha to say "Where
is the check?" Rather, he came to establish a dialogue of
mutual respect where we have a strategic symmetry. Policies
and coordination will logically proceed, he explained, in
accordance with the views of Qatar and other partner
countries.


10. (C) Holbrooke told Tamim the important thing is that for
the first time the United States is having an extended,
serious strategic dialogue with Gulf countries and not
embarking on a fundraising mission. (Holbrooke essentially
repeated these comments to the press, albeit with respect to
the Gulf countries writ large, in a June 10 briefing.)

--------------
(C) LEBANON AND SYRIA
--------------


11. (C) Qatar considers its June 2008 mediation of the
Lebanese presidential election impasse an unmitigated
success. This success, in the Qatari view, would not have
been possible had the Amir not been able to pick up the phone
and jaw bone "bad actors" such as Syria and Iran. Indeed, it
was Qatar's success on Lebanon that led it to embark on its
current, more ambitious endeavor to mediate the disputes in
Darfur.


12. (C) Because Qatar increasingly views itself as a mediator
(parties from the Philippines to Mauritania have approached
Qatar for its mediation services),it shies away from public
pronouncements on disputes that it potentially might mediate.
With respect to Lebanon, it is unlikely that the Qataris
will pick sides (certainly not publicly) given that Qatar
might be asked to mediate again on Lebanese issues in the
event that such mediation is warranted.


13. (C) Thinking back to Qatar's self-described success in
Lebanon, the Qatari leadership drew the lesson that engaging
with a wide array of actors (Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran) can
pay rich dividends. In general, the Amir holds the view that
Qatar should engage with everyone. He does not subscribe to
the notion that isolating parties changes behavior. On the
contrary, he believes that only through engagement can you
influence friends and enemies alike.


14. (C) When it comes to Syria, the GOQ believes that the
road to peace in the Middle East in part goes through
Damascus. For this reason, it is vital to engage the
Syrians, in Qatar's view. Our lack of engagement with
Damascus, in the Qatari view, contributed to Syria's
increased alignment with Iran. They welcome our increased
engagement with Syria. Bringing Syria back to the Arab fold
is desirable, in the Qatari view, and this goal will not be
realized absent dialogue and engagement.

--------------
(C) IRAN
--------------


15. (C) The Amir and Crown Prince both communicated,
immediately, their congratulations to the Iranian President
on his re-election. Your meetings will be the first
opportunity to engage GOQ officials on the freeness and
fairness of those elections. Regardless of how senior Qatari
officials view the legitimacy of the election outcome, in
this area and so many others, Qatar will almost certainly
publicly criticize Iran. Too much is at stake: literally
trillions of dollars in future revenues for Qatar from its
shared natural gas field under the Gulf.



16. (C) Some in Washington hold the view that Qatar supports
Hezbollah and Hamas at the behest of Iran. Others, concerned
by Qatari contributions to terrorist groups, question whether
Qatar aligns itself with our strategic orientation on
extremism. Senior Qatari officials bristle at the notion
that Qatar has the same aims and objectives as Iran.
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Al-Mahmoud, for
example, told Ambassador in one conversation that Qatari
officials quietly try to persuade the Iranians that
supporting the education and development of the Iranian

DOHA 00000393 003 OF 003


people (in the context of what the Amir has done in Qatar) is
the best way to secure Iran's future. Al-Mahmoud and others
will vehemently deny that Qatar is an agent of Iran, and they
point to the U.S. military presence as evidence of where
their true allegiance lies, while admitting that Qatar must
retain a "practical relationship" with Iran to secure the
natural gas on which Qatar stakes its survival.

--------------
(S) AL JAZEERA
--------------


17. (S) The Prime Minister has told the Ambassador that he is
willing to instruct Shaykh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani (who
oversees Al Jazeera) to engage with U.S. officials in an
"intelligent way" on Al Jazeera's coverage. However, the
Prime Minister made clear that progress in improving the
overall political relationship in a bilateral strategic
dialogue must come first, given the sensitivity of Al Jazeera
and its importance to Qatar. There are ample precedents for
a bilateral dialogue on Al Jazeera as part of improving
bilateral relations. Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and most recently
Jordan have all benefited from such a dialogue in recent
months.
LeBaron