QATAR INITIATIVE -- AU-ARAB MINISTERIAL ON DARFUR:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000038

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM QA SU
SUBJECT: QATAR INITIATIVE -- AU-ARAB MINISTERIAL ON DARFUR:
NEXT STEPS

REF: SHORTLEY/LEBARON E-MAIL OF JANUARY 14

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b, d)

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(C) KEY POINTS
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-- The January 14 statement issued by the African and Arab
Ministers meeting in Doha to discuss next steps in resolving
the Darfur crisis includes a call on the UN Security Council
to "postpone the procedures ... (of Sudanese) cases referred
to the International Criminal Court" under article (16) of
the Rome Statute.

-- The statement further mandates a delegation composed of
Qatar, the African Union, and the Arab League to visit New
York and lobby Arab and African UNSC members on this
provision.

-- UN and AU Sudan Mediator Bassole indicated to Ambassador
in a January 14 meeting following the Doha Ministerial
session that Sudanese rebel movements will not react
favorably to these provisions of the statement. Ambassador
agreed, cautioning that the Qatar initiative must not evolve
into a regional effort focused on protecting al-Bashir from
the ICC.

-- Bassole told the Ambassador that during the meetings he
strongly encouraged "all countries" to support Qatar's
Initiative on Darfur, with the specific aim of bringing the
Sudanese parties to Doha. His second main point to the
Ministerial Committee, he said, was a caution to the
Committee not to neglect the interests of Sudan's neighbors,
a thinly veiled reference to Egypt.

-- Bassole believed that neighbors Egypt and Libya were not
helping the Qatar Initiative.

-- Ambassador encouraged Bassole, at the urging of U.S.
Special Envoy Richard Williamson, to stop in Cairo after Doha
and told Bassole that Williamson had made recent calls to
Libyan and Egyptian officials to encourage their support.
Bassole said his immediate travel plans to Tanzania and
Morocco made an immediate Cairo stop impossible, but he
promised to visit Cairo as soon as practical.

-- Bassole said rebel leader Abdul Wahid remains "reluctant"
to participate in Qatar's Initiative, which means a way must
be found for both SLM Unity and JEM to participate.
Ambassador described to Bassole the seven ways in which the
U.S. is prepared to support Bassole's efforts.

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(C) COMMENT
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-- The dueling approaches by Egypt and Qatar to the Gaza
fighting already cast a shadow over Qatar's Darfur
initiative. For example, the Egyptians were represented at
the Doha Ministerial not by a minister but by the head of
their Sudan office at the Egyptian MFA.

-- Egypt is well positioned to undermine Qatar's effort to
mediate in Darfur. As the tension between the two countries
grows over Gaza, Egypt could increasingly have the incentive
to do so.

End Key Points and Comment.


1. (U) The Ministerial Statement issued by the African and
Arab Committee following its January 14 discussions in Doha
on Darfur contain two noteworthy provisions pertaining to
International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings against
President Bashir and other Sudanese officials:

-- "Calling the Security Council anew to enforce article (16)
of the Rome Statute in order to postpone the procedures
pertaining to all cases referred to the International
Criminal Court with a view to allowing more enhancement of
the prospects of peace and justice and availing best
conditions to launch peace talks and achieve a comprehensive
settlement of the Darfur crisis as soon as possible."

-- "Mandating a delegation from Qatar, the African Union, and
the Arab League to visit New York to coordinate with the
Arab and African members of the UN Security Council with a
view to mobilizing international and regional necessary
support to uphold the objectives of the aforementioned

DOHA 00000038 002 OF 002


committee and enhance peace prospects."


2. (C) In a conversation with Ambassador shortly after the
statement was released, UN and AU Sudan Mediator Djibril
Bassole expressed his concern that the reaction from Sudanese
rebel groups to the above provisions of the final statement
"will not be positive." Ambassador agreed, cautioning that
the Qatar initiative must not evolve into a regional effort
focused on protecting al-Bashir from the ICC.


3. (C) Bassole's deputy, former Tunisian Ambassador to the
U.S. Azouz Ennifar (who also attended the meeting along with
P/E Chief Rice and Kemi Yai of AF/SPG),expressed his
surprise that the final written statement endorsed a
postponement of proceedings so forcefully. It was Ennifar's
view that the ministers in their discussions were less
enthusiastic about postponement.


4. (C) Ennifar opined that Qatar clearly must have been
favorable to the inclusion of these points. If not, as host,
Qatar would have kept them out of the final statement. That
said, Ennifar observed earlier in the day, with Bassole not
present, that there is a "close relationship between Bassole
and Qatar and that Qatar appears to be following Bassole's
lead."

BASSOLE'S PRESENTATION
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5. (C) Bassole told Ambassador that he emphasized two main
points in his presentation to the assembled ministers.
First, it is important that "all countries support Qatar's
Initiative on Darfur" and the idea of having talks among the
parties concerned in Doha, regardless of events elsewhere
(read Gaza).


6. (C) Bassole said that the crisis in Gaza should not
distract the members of the joint AU-Arab League committee
from working together on Darfur. (Note: relations between
Egypt and Qatar, two members of the committee, have taken a
deeply negative turn over events in Gaza and how to deal with
them.) Bassole noted that Egypt did not send its Foreign
Minister for the meetings in Doha. The office director for
Sudan policy, instead, represented Cairo.


7. (C) The second key point Bassole made to the ministers was
that it is essential "not to neglect the interests of the
neighbors" of Sudan in moving forward toward an agreement on
Darfur. Libya and Egypt in particular were causing trouble
for Qatar. Ambassador reponded that U.S. Special Envoy for
Sudan RichardWilliamson had spoken with the Libyans and the
Egptian Foreign Minister recently in an effort to hep.

NEXT STEPS
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8. (C) Ambassadorencouraged Bassole, at the urging of
Williamson,to make a stop in Cairo after the meetings in
Doa. Bassole said he would work in a stop in Cairo as soon
as practical, but he could not travel directly to Egypt from
Doha, since he was committed to meetings in Tanzania January
16 and then had to travel to Rabat for CENSAD meetings.


9. (C) Looking ahead to next steps, Bassole told the
Ambassador that Abdul Wahid remains "reluctant" to
participate in Qatar's Initiative, so Bassole recommended
ensuring that the other two main rebel movements (SLM Unity
and JEM) participate. Bassole said in his view it is "best
to start with JEM now. The problem is to bring SLM Unity on
board."


10. (C) Ambassador discussed with Bassole a list (ref) of
areas (as coordinated by Special Envoy Williamson and AF) in
which the U.S. is willing to help bring the major rebel units
on board with Qatar's Initiative. Bassole said he would
review the points as he formulates next steps and looks
forward to working with Washington. Ambassador underscored
Washington's strong support for Bassole and his mediation
efforts.
LeBaron